

Transportation and Homeric Epic

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Statement of Originality

Except where due acknowledgement is given, this thesis is the result of my own research carried out under the supervision of Dr Elizabeth Minchin of the Classics Program of the Australian National University with the advice of Dr Judith Slee of the Division of Psychology of the Australian National University.

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Précis

This thesis investigates the impact of transportation — the phenomenon of “being miles away” while receiving a narrative — on audience response. The poetics of narrative reception within the Homeric epics are described and the correspondences with the psychological concept of transportation are used to suggest the appropriateness and utility of this theory to understanding audience responses in and to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The ways in which transportation complements and extends some concepts of narrative reception familiar to Homeric studies (the Epic Illusion, Vividness, and Enchantment) are considered, as are the ways in which the psychological theories might be adjusted to accommodate Homeric epic. A major claim is drawn from these theories that transportation fundamentally affects the audience’s interpretation of and responses to the narrative; this claim is tested both theoretically and empirically in terms of ambiguous characterization of Odysseus and the Kyklōps Polyphēmos in the ninth book of the *Odyssey*. Last, some consideration is given to the ways in which the theory (and its underlying empirical research) might be extended.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Transportation	9
Real-World Absence	9
Personal Significance	22
Story-World Presence	30
Transportation.....	32
Enchantment.....	34
The Epic Illusion	40
Vividness.....	47
Involvement	49
Chapter 3: Two Psychological Models	55
Gerrig’s Metaphors.....	55
Performance	66
Evidence of Transportation	72
The Transportation-Imagery Model.....	82
(Empirical) Prospects.....	100
Chapter 4: Ambiguity and the Κυκλώπεια	103
Refining the Concept of Ambiguity	104
Sources of Ambiguity	108
“The Tradition”	110
“Homeric” Traditions	110
Non-Homeric Traditions I: “Hesiodic” Κυκλώπεις.....	115
Non-Homeric Traditions II: Folk-Tale Villains	117
Literal Moderation	119
Poetic exaggeration	125
Modifying Odysseus	130
Consequences	141
Guilt/Good by Association	152
Polyphēmos and the Κυκλώπεις	155
The Κυκλώπεις and the Φαιακίαι in ζ and η	156
The Κυκλώπεις and their Environment	159
Polyphēmos’ status as a Κυκλώπεις	166
Retrospective	168
Chapter 5: An Empirical Investigation into the Κυκλώπεια	171
Background	171
Method and Materials.....	174
Participants.....	174
Experimental Narrative	174
Transportation Measures.....	174
Off-Line Measure.....	174
On-Line Measure	175
Measuring Appraisal.....	176
Safeguards and Controls	177
Measuring Ambiguity	179

Experimental Procedure	180
Results	180
Preliminary Analyses	180
Exclusions	180
Off-Line Measure	181
On-Line Measure.....	181
Consistency Between On-Line and Off-Line Measures	183
Semantic-Differential Scales.....	184
Preparatory Questions	185
Did Transportation Occur?.....	185
Were the Characters Ambiguous?.....	186
Main Analysis: Effects of Transportation on Appraisal	187
Odysseus.....	188
Polyphēmos	188
Discussion.....	189
Experimental Method and Procedure	189
Character Appraisal and Reception of the Κυκλώπεια	189
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Extensions.....	193
Appendix 1: Epithets for Dēmodokos and Phēmios	201
Appendix 2: Uses of ΤΕΠΠΩ in the <i>Iliad</i> and <i>Odyssey</i>.....	203
Appendix 3: Uses of ἜΠΤΥΘΕΝ in the <i>Iliad</i> and <i>Odyssey</i>.....	205
Appendix 4: Green and Brock’s “Transportation Scale”	207
Appendix 5: Experimental Narrative.....	209
Appendix 6: Psychophysical Method for Calibrating the Volume of the Aural Stimulus.....	219
Calibration Procedure	220
Appendix 7: Experimental Results	221
Transportation Measures.....	221
On-Line Measures	221
Item-Total Correlations for the Off-Line Measure (Transportation Scale).....	222
Character Appraisals	224
Item-Total Correlations for Semantic-Differential Scales	224
Histograms and Approximated Normal Distributions for the Character Appraisals.....	225
Character Appraisals and Ambiguity Scores as a Function of Transportation	226
Influence of Transportation on Character Appraisal.....	228
Other Data	229
Works Cited.....	231
Ancient Sources.....	231
Modern Sources.....	234
Index Locorum	247

Chapter 1: Introduction

Still screaming, he found himself in the schoolhouse attic, which long, long ago he had left for Fantastica. At first he didn't recognize the place ... [b]ut then, catching sight of his school satchel and the rusty seven-armed candelabrum with the spent candles, he knew where he was.

How long could it have been since he started on his long journey through the Neverending Story? Weeks? Months? Years?

— MICHAEL ENDE*

Most of us have had the experience of “being miles away” when receiving a narrative — perhaps not as intensely as Bastian in *The Neverending Story*, a novel which plays with the boundary between the diegetic and the extra-diegetic, the story world and the real world — but most of us have been, as Victor Nell felicitously put it, “lost in a book.”¹ This phrase, however, means different things in different contexts. In some, the emphasis is on “miles away,” and the connotation is one of absence from the real world; in others, it is on “being,” and the connotation is one of presence in the story world. The two are, however, complementary — the latter entails the former — and may be seen as two facets of the one phenomenon in which, even if we do not realize it at the time, we have been “transported” from our temporal and geographical situation during the reception of a narrative. Such “transportation” is the focus of this thesis.

Given that this thesis also focuses on Homeric epic, it is important to consider whether transportation is relevant to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. This is done on two levels in Chapter 2: first with reference to the audience responses described *within* the epics (in which we may identify both the presence and absence components of transportation), and secondly in terms of responses reported by audiences external to the text. The high correlation of these two “levels” of audience responses suggests that transportation is not only useful for understanding the responses of the external audience, but also may contribute to our understanding of the depicted responses of internal audiences.

* Michael Ende, *The Neverending Story*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985 [originally published as *Die unendliche Geschichte*, Stuttgart: K. Thienemanns Verlag, 1979]), at 370.

¹ Victor Nell, *Lost in a Book: The Psychology of Reading for Pleasure* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

The phenomenon of transportation has, of course, been well studied in the past; it has been investigated in many disciplines and goes by scarcely fewer names.² Within Homeric studies, the notion of absence is to be found in George Walsh's work on "Enchantment," the notion of presence in Andrew Ford and Egbert Bakker's work on "Vividness," and both in Samuel Bassett's "Epic Illusion."³ This thesis extends these concepts not only by approaching them from the perspective of the audience (in Chapter 2) but also by linking them (in Chapters 2 and 3) to a concept from cognitive psychology called "Transportation." Transportation was developed by Richard Gerrig to explain illogical reader responses, but it has been broadened and given an empirical demonstration by Melanie Green and Timothy Brock.⁴

The absence from the real world inherent in transportation may be conceived of as the inaccessibility of extra-diegetic information, whether the sensory input by which we experience presence in the real world or the background knowledge (in Homeric terms, "the tradition") with which we might locate the narrative in its real-world context. Transportation, therefore, obscures a wide range of reader responses which depend (to varying degrees) on this background knowledge: criticism, for example, or, at an even more basic level, the determination of the truth status of an utterance.

There are, of course, thorny philosophical problems surrounding the truth status of utterances in fiction⁵ — poets tell lies at a level more basic than Plato meant

² See below, pp. 33–34, for some terms and bibliography.

³ George B. Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of Poetry* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), Chapter 2; Andrew Ford, *Homer: The Poetry of the Past* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), especially at 54–55; Samuel Eliot Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, Sather Classical Lectures 15 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938), at 25–26. Full discussion and bibliography is, again, given below in Chapter 2.

⁴ Richard J. Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading* (Boulder: Westview, 1998 [originally published: Yale University Press, 1993]); Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock, "The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 5 (2000): 701–21; and Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock, "In the Mind's Eye: Transportation-Imagery Model of Narrative Persuasion," in *Narrative Impact: Social and Cognitive Foundations*, ed. Melanie C. Green, Jeffrey J. Strange, and Timothy C. Brock (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 315–41.

⁵ E.g., John R. Searle, "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse" in John R. Searle, *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), at 58–75; but see the more sensible discussion by Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 97–156; a related problem is raised by Colin Radford, "How Can We be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 49 (1975): 67–80.

when he levelled the accusation in the second book of the *Republic*⁶ — and these problems are compounded when we consider that fictional entities can “lie” intentionally (they can intend to make infelicitous assertions). These problems can, however, largely be avoided: as Frederick Ahl and Hanna Roisman observe,

truth, in our narrowly literal and unpoetic discourse, has little meaning in epic. The Homeric Odysseus’s special claim to fame is his mastery of narrative, his ability to invent himself anew for each audience he confronts. To call such fictions truth is to misuse the English word. To call them lies is to undermine the basis ... of Odyssean myth It is, therefore, wiser to avoid the incorrect distinction some scholars make between the “truth” Odysseus tells the Phaeacians and his later Cretan “lies.” Odysseus’s truth ... is ... a poetic rather than a literal “truth.”⁷

To refer to the “poetic truth” is, then, to take the narrative on its own terms rather than contextualize it against the extra-diegetic information we hold to be literally true in the real world. In these terms, transportation obscures the literal truth and leaves the reader with only the poetic.

Despite Ahl and Roisman’s objection, however, we can distinguish between Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι (tales in reply) to the Phaiakians (ι–μ) and his “Cretan ‘lies’” (ν 256–86, ξ 192–359, ρ 419–44, and τ 165–202, 262–307),⁸ as the latter are examples of what Wayne Booth called “unreliable narration”; more specifically he is, to use Greta Olson’s terminology, an “untrustworthy” narrator when he intends to deceive Athēna, Eumaios, and Pēnelope.⁹ This is completely transparent to the

⁶ R. 377d–78e. Sōkratēs censures Hesiod, Homer, and the other poets on the grounds that some of their stories lack verisimilitude; yet he still assumes, fundamentally, that some of their stories are or can be true (*i.e.*, they are non-fiction).

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of primary texts are from the editions listed in the Bibliography of Ancient Sources (pp. 231–33) and all translations are my own.

⁷ Frederick Ahl and Hanna M. Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), at 93.

⁸ On the “Cretan lies,” see Chris Emlyn-Jones, “True and Lying Tales in the *Odyssey*,” *Greece & Rome* 33, no. 1 (1986): 1–10; and Maureen Joan Alden, “Ψεύδεα Πολλὰ Ἐτύμοισιν Ὀμοῖα,” *Liverpool Classical Papers* 2 (1992): 9–14.

Following the ancient commentators (and many since), references to the twenty-four books of the *Iliad* are made by capital letters of the Greek alphabet, and references to the books of the *Odyssey* with lower-case letters.

⁹ The terminology here is from Greta Olson, “Reconsidering Unreliability: Fallible and Untrustworthy Narrators,” *Narrative* 11, no. 1 (2003): 94–109, building on the work of Wayne C. Booth, “Distance and Point-of-View: An Essay in Classification,” in *The Theory of the Novel*, ed. Phillip Stevick (New York: The Free Press, 1967 [originally published in *Essays In Criticism* 9 (1961)]), 87–107.

I have tried, in my transliterations of names, to balance fidelity to the Greek with ease of comprehension; hence, I have rendered υ as y outside diphthongs, changed –η to –a at word ends, and retained the familiar (Latinized) English versions of names which are so well known (*e.g.*, Odysseus, Zeus, Apollo, Troy) that changing them for consistency (*i.e.*, to Odusseus, Zdeus, ... (continued)

external audience because the contextualizing information is part of their poetic truth, but for Odysseus' (internal) audiences this information is part of the literal truth and any discrepancies between Odysseus' internal poetic and literal truths are opaque unless his hearers bring their "real"-world knowledge to bear on his narrative. To the external audience, the untrustworthiness is overt; to the internal, it is covert.

If we draw back to consider the primary narrator (NF₁) of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in terms of this distinction, we find that he is never overtly unreliable to the external audience.¹⁰ He may be covertly fallible (when he "nods") or untrustworthy (see below), but we never find the "implied composer" contradicting the narrator "behind his back."¹¹ The identification of Homeric unreliability, therefore, always depends on information from the real world and is thus impeded by transportation.

In isolation, the literal and poetic truths may each lead to conclusions which are untenable in the other. When Emmanuel Papamichael pursues the argument that the ram which carries Odysseus to safety from Kyklōps' cave is special because (contrary to ι 447–52) rams normally do not lead the flock, his criticism is wrong-headed at the poetic level if only because the literal truth of what rams actually do in real life has no bearing on what they might do in an environment of cannibal giants, self-growing crops, and hyperpotent wine.¹² His insistence on the literal truth ignores the poetic characterization of Polyphēmos as ignorant and the pathetic irony inherent in his inaccurate explanation of his pet's slowness.

(continued)

Apollōn, Troia, etc.) would significantly impair comprehension. I have used macrons liberally where I feel they do not impair recognition of the name/word.

¹⁰ The term "primary narrator" is used here after Irene J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 1987), at 44–45 to describe the μοι in α 1 or B 484. My use of the term "external," however, is different from hers: where she uses "internal" and "external" *in terms of the narrative* (i.e. to describe whether the function [Narrator, Narratee, Focalizer, Focalizee] does or does not coincide with a character; hence, the NF₁ is "external"), I use them *in terms of the text* (i.e., to describe whether the Narrator or Narratee exists inside or outside the text). In these terms, only the singer himself and those who have received the narratives (in whatever mode and age) qualify as "external."

¹¹ The "implied composer" is my oral version of the "implied author." This formulation of unreliability, then, is after Booth, "Distance and Point of View," at 101: "in *Huckleberry Finn*, the narrator claims to be naturally wicked while the author silently praises his virtues, as it were, behind his back."

¹² Emmanuel M. Papamichael, "The Cyclops and his «Dear Ram»,» *Δωδώνη* 10 (1981): 101–08.

By the same token, Jenny Strauss Clay’s identification of “Goat Island” with Hypereia, the former home of the Phaiakians, is felicitous at the poetic level: her linguistic argument is reasonable, as is the poetic effect she identifies (a “highlight[ing] of the contrast between the super-civilised Phaeacians and the barbaric Cyclopes”);¹³ it is, indeed, underscored by the comment that the *Kyklōpes* lack ships and shipbuilders (ι 125–26).¹⁴ Yet, this identification cannot literally be true: given that the *Kyklōpes* lack ships, it is impossible that σφεας [Φαίηκας] σινέσκοντο¹⁵ if they (the Phaiakians) lived on an island.¹⁶

One of the benefits of bringing transportation to bear on these issues is that, in both cases, the poetic *and* the literal perspectives may be legitimated: in each case, the poetic truth is a reasonable conclusion for a transported audience member to draw; the literal truth for her/his non-transported counterpart. This thesis, therefore, does not set out to mandate *the* (correct) reader response to Homeric epic; rather, it seeks to describe the range of responses which actually occur and to explain them (to a small degree, at any rate) in terms of the extent of audience transportation.

¹³ Jenny Strauss Clay, “Goat Island: *Od.* 9. 116–141,” *Classical Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (1980): 261–64 (the quotation is from 263).

¹⁴ Robert Mondí, “The Homeric Cyclopes: Folktale, Tradition, and Theme,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 113 (1983): 17–38, thinks the comparison is “most clumsy and thus most obvious.” Whether or not the former is true, the latter is certainly accurate. While the *Kyklōpes* have no ships or shipwrights at all, the Phaiakians think of nothing else (ζ 270–72 [perhaps reflected in their unusual, double harbour (ζ 262–65) and the proximity of the temple to Poseidōn (266–69) to their *agora*]), their ships move “swift as a bird or a thought” (ὠκεῖται ὡς εἰ πτερόν ἢ ἐ νόημα: η 36), they can row to the furthest place on earth (Euboia) and back within the course of a day and without any effort (ἦλθον, ἄτερ καμάτοιο τέλεσαν | ἦματι τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπῆνυσαν οἴκαδ’ ὀπίσσω: η 325–26), and they do not need (or use) steersmen since the ships themselves know all the routes and travel swiftly and safely (θ 556–63). The Phaiakians’ passion for sailing extends to their names, which are frequently nautical. The names catalogued at θ 111–19 include Ἀκρόνεως = “ship’s lookout,” Ὠκύαλος = “swift sailor,” Ἐλατρεὺς = “oarsman,” Ναυτεὺς = “sailor,” Πρυμνεὺς = “ship’s stern,” Ἀγχίαλος = “near the sea,” Ἐρετμεὺς = “oars,” Ποντεὺς = “the sea,” and Ἀμφίαλος = “sea-girt.” Cf. Elizabeth H. Minchin, “The Performance of Lists and Catalogues in the Homeric Epics,” in *Voice Into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece*, ed. Ian Worthington (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 3–20, at 10–11, who cites the (lovely) Fitzgerald translation.

¹⁵ They [the *Kyklōpes*] habitually plundered them [the Phaiakians], ζ 6.

¹⁶ Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 102–05 see this as creating a logical problem of why the Phaiakians travelled so far from Hypereia when they had a safe and fertile land to colonize just across the bay. They extend this argument *ad absurdum* to infer that Odysseus is mocking his Phaiakian hosts’ “national tradition,” but neither the objection nor the inference can be sustained (it is possible, for example, that the Phaiakians rejected a nearby location because it would remind them constantly of the circumstances in which their migration was forced, or because they feared one day the *Kyklōpes* might develop ships; on Odysseus’ respect for his hosts, cf. θ 204–13).

In many cases, the difference between the literal and poetic perspectives (and hence transportation) will have little or no effect on the overall interpretation: Papamichael's assertion that Polyphēmos' ram is "special" and Clay's that the contrast between the Phaiakians and Kyklōpes is emphasized in the *Κυκλώπεια* ("Kyklōps episode" of ι 105–566) are, in both cases, the conclusions of both the poetic and literal arguments.

Yet, such consistency is not universal: there are instances in which discrepancies between the poetic and literal "truths" (*i.e.*, unreliability) will lead to quite different interpretations. The impact of transportation on narrative experience should be felt most in these cases, not only because the transported audience loses sight of the literal truth and relies exclusively on the poetic, but also because the non-transported audience can retain access to both. The non-transported audience is thus exposed to a more multifarious portrayal of the character/object/event, and, given a sufficient divergence between the poetic and literal portrayals, this may lead to a perception of ambiguity.

This is, in fact, one of two types of ambiguity which are discussed in this thesis; I call it "literal ambiguity" because it depends on a contrast between the impression given at the surface of the text and the literal truth underlying it. Because it is not part of the poetic truth, it is invisible to the transported audience. The complement of literal ambiguity — which I call "poetic ambiguity" — is the indeterminacy (or inconsistency) inherent in the portrayal at the poetic level; unlike literal ambiguity, therefore, poetic ambiguity is available to the transported audience.¹⁷

Ambiguity (of portrayal) is a rather neglected facet of Homeric studies,¹⁸ doubtless partly due to a well-established view — epitomized by that of Erich Auerbach — that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* lack "background" since,

any ... procedure, creating a foreground and background, resulting in the present lying open to the depths of the past, is entirely foreign to the Homeric

¹⁷ See further below, Chapter 4, *passim* but especially pp. 104–107.

¹⁸ Other types of ambiguity have been well studied: *e.g.*, "semantic" or "lexical" ambiguity (what the words actually mean, rather than how the characters are portrayed) is extensively treated by William Bedell Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939).

style; the Homeric style knows only a foreground, only a uniformly illuminated, uniformly objective present.¹⁹

Yet, whether or not one agrees that the epics lack depth and development,²⁰ ambiguity — or, rather, the *perception* of ambiguity — depends on the *audience* not the narrative, and audience members (ancient or modern) certainly possess “background.” Approaching the epics from the perspective of audience response, therefore, is one way to legitimate a discussion of Homeric ambiguity. A consideration of the *Κυκλώπεια* — arguably one of the most ambiguous episodes of both epics — therefore follows in Chapter 4.

Yet, a concession is in order: my discussion of ambiguity and the literal/poetic distinction was framed above in terms of a contrast between the transported and non-transported audience, but it is difficult to defend such a clear-cut division between the two groups. Rather, we must admit that these are abstractions of the extreme cases, and that most audience members will experience the narrative with some intermediate stance. Transportation and real-world presence, in other words, do not form a dichotomy but a continuum.

This does not, however, undermine the distinction made above between the literal and poetic truths or the ambiguity based upon them; rather, it underscores the need to describe (rather than prescribe) actual audience responses. To this end, this thesis is accompanied by its own empirical study which investigates the effect of transportation on the understanding of character.²¹ A report of this experiment is given in Chapter 5.

Conducting a psychological experiment is, to put it mildly, unusual within the field of Classics; yet this approach has a distinct advantage over purely “armchair”

¹⁹ Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968 [originally published as *Mimesis: dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur* (Bern: A. Francke, 1946)]; reprint, 1974), at 7. Cf. the quotations of Coleridge and Fränkel at the start of Jasper Griffin, “Homeric Pathos and Objectivity,” *Classical Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (1976): 161–87.

²⁰ It would be impossible to give a comprehensive bibliography of studies which demonstrate depth and/or development in the Homeric epics; cf. Bruce Heiden, “Hidden Thoughts, Open Speech: Some Reflections on Discourse Analysis in Recent Homeric Studies,” in *Omero Tremila Anni Dopo*, ed. Franco Montanari and Paola Ascheri, *Storia e Letteratura: Raccolta di Studi e Testi*, 210 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002), 431–44; de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers*, at 22–23.

²¹ Approval for this research was sought and gained from the ANU’s Human Research Ethics Committee as protocol 2004/248.

theorizing. Indeed, the methodology employed in the experiment — simplistically: getting people to read a section of the *Odyssey* and gauging their reactions to/opinions of it — is closely aligned, in many respects, with the more familiar exercises of academic- and literary-criticism. Critics, after all, frequently discuss texts' effects either with reference to their own reactions (gauged by introspection) or the reactions of other critics (gauged by reviewing the literature). In many ways, indeed, criticism and empirical research may be censured along similar lines: both may be criticized for expounding an idiosyncratic point of view or doing violence to the text. In some ways, in this context, empirical research is more “objective” than literary criticism simply because seeking the opinions of a larger number of people inherently *downplays* idiosyncrasy.

Perhaps the most salient difference between the participants in the experiment accompanying this thesis and the literary critic lies in their differing levels of literary expertise: the participants were deliberately recruited from a group (of undergraduates) with a basic exposure to Classical literature rather than one (of, say, postgraduate students or of academics) with high expertise. Although expertise fundamentally affects the way readers understand narratives (expert readers tend to set themselves more sophisticated questions),²² non-expert readers were used in order to avoid preconceptions about the characters (which might be resistant to change) resulting from earlier and detailed study of the target narrative.

The experiment reported in Chapter 5 is, for practical reasons, of more limited scope than the theoretical considerations which precede it. The thesis concludes in Chapter 6, therefore, with a sketch of some of the broader applications of this empirical approach to Homeric epic.

²² See Barbara Graves and Carl H. Frederiksen, “A Cognitive Study of Literary Expertise,” in *Empirical Approaches to Literature and Aesthetics*, ed. Roger J. Kreuz and Mary Sue MacNealy, *Advances in Discourse Processes* (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Group, 1996), 379–96; and Els Andringa, “Effects of ‘Narrative Distance’ on Readers’ Emotional Involvement and Response,” *Poetics* 23, no. 6 (1996): 431–52.

Chapter 2: Transportation

ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη καὶ ἐκπλήξῃς μάλιστα τοὺς θεωμένους, ... τότε πότερον
ἔμφρων εἶ ἢ ἔξω σαυτοῦ γίνῃ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἶεταί σου εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴ
οἷς λέγεις ἐνθουσιάζουσα, ἢ ἐν Ἰθάκῃ οὖσιν ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἢ ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὰ ἔπη ἔχη;
— PLATO*

Real-World Absence

In the eighth book of the *Odyssey*, the stranger (whom the Phaiakians do not yet know is Odysseus) invites the Phaiakian bard Dēmodokos to sing the tale of the wooden horse and, by implication, the destruction of Troy.¹ In his request for this tale — the third performed, but the second which relates to the Trojan War — Odysseus makes reference to Dēmodokos' first song (θ 73–82), the νεῖκος (“quarrel”) of Odysseus and Akhilleus:

“Δημόδοκ’, ἔξοχα δὴ σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομι’ ἀπάντων·
ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ’ ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ’ Ἀπόλλων·
λίην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον αἰεΐδεις,
ὅσσ’ ἔρξαν τ’ ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ’ ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί,
ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας.
ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον
δουρατέου, ...

θ 487–93.²

There are many interesting features in this particular piece of praise: for example, the assertion that Dēmodokos was taught by the Muse or by Apollo is clearly an expression of approval, despite the fact that Phēmios, when pleading for his life, later claims being an αὐτοδίδακτος (“self-taught man”) amongst his qualities;³ there is tension in line 489 in Odysseus' description of Dēmodokos' first song as λίην κατὰ κόσμον (“in *all too good order*”);⁴ and, similarly, there is some tension

* Pl. *Ion* 535b 2–c 3 [Socrates to the rhapsode Ion]: And when you speak the words well and most astonish your onlookers ... at that time are you in your mind or do you become outside your [body], and, being enthusiastic, does your soul suppose it is there beside the events you narrate, in Ithaka, Troy, or whatever place the words occupy?

¹ θ 492–95.

² “Dēmodokos, I praise you as being superior to all mortals; | either the Muse, child of Zeus, taught you, or Apollo; | for in all too good order you have sung the fate of the Akhaians, || what the Akhaians did and suffered and how they toiled, | as if you were somehow there yourself or heard it from another [who was]. | But come now, move along and sing the stratagem of the horse | of wood, ...

³ χ 347. Andrew Ford, *Homer: The Poetry of the Past* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), at 20–26, dissolves this paradox with the suggestion that Phēmios is asserting that he has learned only from the gods, and is independent of any earlier bardic tradition.

⁴ On this, see George B. Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of Poetry* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), at 8–11, and, in reply, Simon D. Goldhill, *The Poet's Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge

... (continued)

between the two analogies to his accuracy in line 491, since eye-witness accounts differ dramatically from second-hand reports in terms of their authority to convey the truth.⁵

Dēmodokos, of course, is in no position to appreciate the irony of his situation, as he does not know that the statement αἰδέεις ... ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν (“you have sung ... as if you were somehow there yourself”) is, in fact, delivered by a man who was there himself;⁶ yet, this is more than simply a comment on the Phaiakians’ ignorance of Odysseus’ identity: it is explicitly a compliment, and Odysseus even includes the explicit performative verb, αἰνίζομαι (“I praise”), in his opening line.⁷ Praise for the song is, however, not necessarily what we might expect Odysseus to give Dēmodokos when his reaction to the first song (on which the praise is based) was to weep,⁸ and he will, of course, weep again at the song he requests. In both

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University Press, 1991), at 57–58 (especially n. 101). Though both (rightly) recognize κατὰ κόσμον as a positive attribute to Dēmodokos’ song, neither considers the sense that Odysseus may include λῆην as a comment on his retrospective grief for the part he played in the subject of Dēmodokos’ tale; cf. Odysseus’ evident grief regarding his victory over Aias at λ 548–51.

Ford, *Homer*, at 122–24, objects that Odysseus has, before he reveals his identity, no “credentials in Phaeacia to authenticate the ‘factuality’ of these events,” and that κατὰ κόσμον should thus be read as “circumspectly, with a regard for details.” The fact that Odysseus has not yet explicitly asserted his credentials (which are obvious to the external audience) has no bearing on whether or not he is praising Dēmodokos for his accuracy, nor whether or not the Phaiakians understand he is doing so. In asserting Dēmodokos’ accuracy, Odysseus implicitly claims to have the authority to do so; if the Phaiakians are circumspect, this may possibly contribute (in addition to his observations of Odysseus’ grief at Dēmodokos’ tales) to Alkinoös’ motives for asking about his connections with Troy (θ 577–86). I cannot accept Ford’s assertion that Eumaios’ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον at ξ 363 does not refer to the truth of his guest’s claim of Odysseus’ imminent return: it is immediately followed by two vehement assertions that Eumaios knows the actual state of affairs (ξ 363, 365), interrupted by two assertions that the claim is a lie (ξ 363–65). As an assertion of the audience’s critical assessment of the veracity of a tale, this is a good parallel to Odysseus’ praise of Dēmodokos’ accuracy (so also, very briefly, Colin Macleod, “Homer on Poetry and the Poetry of Homer,” in *Collected Essays*, ed. Oliver Taplin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 1–15, at 4–5).

⁵ This point is made with great clarity by Jenny Strauss Clay, *The Wrath of Athena: Gods and Men in the Odyssey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), at 12–19, who observes the fundamental connection between knowledge and sight bound up in the twin senses of the perfect οἶδα (“I know” and “I have seen”). As she shows, accurate knowledge in the Homeric poems belongs to the gods (and the Muse, cf. B 485–86), to the Seirēns (μ 189–91), and to those who personally saw the events with their own eyes.

⁶ Ford, *Homer*, at 122 observes that “Odysseus has implicitly pointed out that his own forthcoming account will ... be a tale told by one who was there.” We must add that this is only relevant to the external audience, as Odysseus has not yet been asked to tell his story.

⁷ On “performative” verbs, see John Langshaw Austin, *How to Do Things With Words: The William James Lectures 1955*, ed. James O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [originally published: 1962]). On *explicit* (as opposed to *primary* or *implicit*) performatives, see his Chapter 6.

⁸ See θ 83–92. I cannot agree with Yoav Rinon, “Mise en Abyme and Tragic Signification in the *Odyssey*: The Three Songs of Demodocus,” *Mnemosyne* 59, no. 2 (2006): 208–25 at 217–18, that Odysseus miscalculates the likely effect of the song.

cases, Alkinoös curtails Dēmodokos’ performance out of respect for his guest,⁹ presuming, as we do, that Odysseus’ tears and lamentation indicate he does not enjoy the song.

This is all the more intriguing when we note that Odysseus’ grief in Book 8 echoes the Ithakan scene in Book 1 where Pēnelope attempts to stop the song of Phēmios (α 325–64). The song is “beautiful” (καλόν, α 155), and Phēmios’ epithets (which largely overlap with Dēmodokos’) indicate his skill;¹⁰ his performance should, inherently, be pleasing. Yet Pēnelope, weeping, complains of the “baneful song which continuously distresses the dear heart in my breast,” and begs him to stop:

δακρύσασα δ’ ἔπειτα προσηύδα θεῖον αἰοιδόν·
 “Φήμε, πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλλα βροτῶν θελκτήρια οἶδας
 ἔργ’ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, τὰ τε κλείουσιν αἰοιδοί·
 τῶν ἔν γέ σφιν ἄειδε παρήμενος, οἱ δὲ σιωπῇ
 οἶνον πινόντων· ταύτης δ’ ἀποπαύε’ αἰοιδῆς
 λυγρῆς, ἣ τέ μοι αἰεὶ ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον κῆρ
 τείρει, ἐπεὶ με μάλιστα καθίκετο πένθος ἄλαστον.
 τοίην γὰρ κεφαλὴν ποθέω μεμνημένη αἰεὶ
 ἀνδρός, τοῦ κλέος εὐρὺ καθ’ Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος.” α 336–44.¹¹

Pēnelope’s reaction is understandable: she finds this song distressing, so she asks for a different one from Phēmios’ wide repertoire. Odysseus, in contrast, despite his tears, instructs Dēmodokos to *move along* (μετάβηθι) the song path,¹² to a song which is inherently similar to the first.¹³ And, of course, when Dēmodokos sings his third song, Odysseus’ tears are described by a well-known simile:¹⁴

Ταῦτ’ ἄρ’ αἰοιδὸς ἄειδε περικλυτός· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς
 τήκετο, δάκρυ δ’ ἔδευεν ὑπὸ βλεφάροισι παρειάς.
 ὡς δὲ γυνὴ κλαίῃσι φίλον πόσιν ἀμφιπεσοῦσα,
 ὅς τε ἔῃς πρόσθεν πόλιος λαῶν τε πέσησιν,

⁹ In the second case, explicitly (536–45); in both cases he speaks *as soon* (αἶψα, 96, 535) as he noticed (ἐνόησεν, 94, 533).

¹⁰ Epithets for Dēmodokos and Phēmios are listed below in Appendix 1, p. 205. Of the 27 *loci* at which an epithet appears, 23 references are by shared epithets (Dēmodokos 12/15; Phēmios 11/12), and of these 11 references to Phēmios, 9 reflect positively on his skill (θεῖος αἰοιδός, αἰοιδός ... περικλυτός, ἐρίηρον αἰοιδόν, and θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν).

¹¹ Weeping then she addressed the divine singer: | “Phēmios, you know many other delights for mortals | the deeds of men and of gods, which the singers make famous; | of these you sing one sitting among them, and they in silence || drink the wine; but leave off this song | the baneful one, which continuously wears down the dear heart | in my breast, since an unforgettable grief comes over me most of all. | For such a head do I long for remembering always | the man [my husband], of whom there is fame through broad Hellas and middle Argos.

¹² On μεταβαίνω and οἶμη as technical terms describing song, see Ford, *Homer*, at 41–43.

¹³ Clifford Broeniman, “Demodocus, Odysseus, and The Trojan War in *Odyssey* 8,” *Classical World* 90, no. 1 (1996): 3–13, rightly draws out the connections between the two Trojan songs, even if his interpretation of their effect is (to my mind) somewhat overstated.

¹⁴ On this simile, which evokes Andromakhē, see below, p. 23 n. 59.

ἄστει καὶ τεκέεσσιν ἀμύνων νηλεὲς ἦμαρ·
 ἢ μὲν τὸν θνήσκοντα καὶ ἀσπαίροντα ἰδοῦσα
 ἀμφ' αὐτῷ χυμένη λίγα κωκύει· οἱ δέ τ' ὀπισθε
 κόπτοντες δούρεσσι μετάφρενον ἠδὲ καὶ ὤμους
 εἶρερον εἰσανάγουσι, πόνον τ' ἐχέμεν καὶ οἴζύν·
 τῆς δ' ἔλλεινοτάτῳ ἄχεϊ φθινύθουσι παρειαί·

θ 521–30.¹⁵

The suggestion put forward by Frederick Ahl and Hanna Roisman that Odysseus' tears here are insincere¹⁶ would remove this difficulty: Odysseus' request for another song that will make him weep is explicable if the tears are merely affected in order to prompt Alkinoös to inquire after his identity. But this is not convincing: the violence of his lament at hearing the third song is conveyed not only by the verb *τήκετο* ("he melted," 522), which carries overtones of wasting away in grief,¹⁷ but also by the extended simile, which presumably reflects Odysseus' state of mind rather than just the external appearance of his tears (were that the case we should expect a comparison describing the volume or rate of flow); and both are spoken with the unquestionable authority of the narrator.

¹⁵ The very famous singer sang these things; but Odysseus | melted, and tears ran from his eyelids down his cheeks. | Like a woman cries embracing her beloved husband, | who has fallen in front of his city and his army, || warding off the pitiless day from his city and children; | and while she, seeing him dying and gasping, | throwing [her arms] around him laments shrilly, they from behind | strike her with their spears on her back and shoulders | leading her up into slavery, to have toil and hardship; || and her cheeks are destroyed by her most pitiful troubles.

¹⁶ Frederick Ahl and Hanna M. Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), at 85, argue that Odysseus' tears are false on the grounds that Odysseus displays no such emotions on being reunited with his son, on observing the trials of his wife, or on observing the misery of his father. In fact, this is a furphy. Odysseus cannot weep when Tēlemakhos enters at π 41 — that role is left for Eumaios, who weeps as a father welcoming an only son after a ten-year absence (π 17–19) — without destroying his disguise to Eumaios, but the moment the swineherd departs (π 156), Odysseus (on Athēna's cue) reveals his identity to Tēlemakhos, and weeps (π 190–91; the phrase *πάρως δ' ἔχε νωλεμὲς αἰεὶ* ["he had always and unceasingly resisted before"]) especially argues against Ahl and Roisman's interpretation). Weeping in the presence of Pēnelope, who is as perceptive as (if not more so than) Alkinoös, in τ would similarly ruin Odysseus' disguise — hence, though he pities her, he prevents himself from crying (with "eyes like horn or iron") *in order to maintain his trick* at τ 209–12 (see also William Bedell Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963 [originally published: 1954]), at 56) — but he cries after her acceptance of his identity (ψ 231–32). And although the testing of Laertēs does seem heartless, Odysseus *does* weep as he deliberates whether or not to proceed with the test (ω 234), and, indeed, he eventually gives way to his emotions and embraces his father (ω 318–48). Moreover, Ahl and Roisman's claim that "Odysseus does not weep at the memory of lost times and lost loves" is odd in the light of his tears of longing for Ithaka so explicitly described at ε 82–84 as Odysseus' *regular* behaviour on Ōgygia.

¹⁷ *E.g.*, ε 396 (a sick father lies *τηκόμενος*), and Γ 176 (where Helen states *κλαίουσα τέτηκα* ["I am worn out grieving"]); *cf.* the related verb *κατατήκω* (used in a similar sense by Pēnelope at τ 136). The form *τήκετο* is only repeated twice, both times in the description of Pēnelope when she listens to her disguised husband's fabrication of how he entertained Odysseus on Crete (τ 204–08; including five forms of *(κατα)τήκω* in as many lines).

A verb which connotes wasting away in grief is, of course, highly appropriate to introduce a simile which depicts a woman enslaved after the death of her husband.

Among those who believe that the tears are genuine it is commonly assumed that Odysseus' reaction is essentially opposite to that of the Phaiakians. Indeed, Alkinoös implies as much when he opines οὐ ... πως πάντεσσι χαριζόμενος τὰδ' αἰίδει ("in no way is this song pleasing to all," θ 538) and wishes that ὁμῶς τερπώμεθα πάντες, | ξεινοδόκοι καὶ ξεῖνος ("all may take pleasure alike, hosts and guest," θ 542–43). It is assumed, in consequence, that the reactions of Odysseus and Pēnelope are inherently similar. Hence, George Walsh wrote of "two distinct kinds of audience" in the *Odyssey* and added that both "seem a little odd according to modern notions."¹⁸ I wish to challenge this by suggesting that Odysseus' reaction is essentially a more intense manifestation of the reaction exhibited by the Phaiakians (hence, essentially the opposite of Pēnelope's) and that it is largely compatible with at least one modern notion of the reception of narratives.

The argument that Odysseus' reaction contrasts with Pēnelope's rather than the Phaiakians' is reinforced by the fact that the two scenes are almost inverted: Odysseus is the male guest, Pēnelope the female resident; he remains passive, she is active; the authority of Alkinoös (the interfering figure) is long-established, Tēlemakhos' is new; in Skheria, the song is discontinued, in Ithaka, the bard continues. This balance might, indeed, inform our understanding of why the two individuals weep.

Pēnelope tells us explicitly that the reason for her grief is bound up with the situation in which she *currently* finds herself. Her complaint, τοῖην γὰρ κεφαλὴν ποθέω μεμνημένη αἰεὶ | ἀνδρός ("such a head I long for, remembering always my husband," α 343–44)¹⁹ is construed in the present indicative and the perfect

¹⁸ See, e.g., Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment*, at 4: "the *Odyssey* ... contains at least two distinct kinds of audience," and at 17 "like Odysseus, Penelope construes the song she hears in relation to her present condition." So also Zsigmond Ritoók, "The Views of Early Greek Epic on Poetry and Art," *Mnemosyne* 42 (1989): 331–48 at 338–39: "in both cases the song gives pleasure to one part of the audience, but not to the other"; and, most recently, Rinon, "Mise en Abyme and Tragic Signification in the *Odyssey*," at 213–14: the "divergent responses to the song of Demodocus formulate two possible attitudes to the epic poem in general"; he connects Odysseus' and Pēnelope's responses in n. 21.

¹⁹ This is hardly surprising, since the subject of Phēmios' song, an *Odyssey* itself, must indirectly address Odysseus' absence. Lillian Eileen Doherty, *Siren Songs: Gender, Audiences, and Narrators in the Odyssey* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), at 69–70, cites Jesper Svenbro as seeing Phēmios' theme as "calculated ... to please the suitors." We can go further: the implication is presumably that Odysseus will not return successfully. Tēlemakhos' spirited response at α 346–59, which consists less of a defence of the singer's right to freedom of speech than undermining his mother's claim to personal grief, gives a strong impression that the song

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participle (with its present implication), and the habitative is conveyed by the adverb αἰεὶ (“always”) in that line.²⁰ Before turning to her husband’s reaction, we should note that this complaint indicates that Pēnelope considers her own reaction to differ from the norm. Pēnelope describes songs as βροτῶν θελκτήρια (“enchantments for mortals,” α 337), implying that the standard reaction to the songs (exemplified by Tēlemakhos and the suitors; contrasted against her own reaction) is enchantment. In other words, Pēnelope does not wish to remain in the present remembering her husband; rather, she *wishes to be enchanted*.

From Pēnelope’s words, then, we can infer that enchantment is a form of real-world absence; and this is borne out by the fact that the verb θέλω (“to enchant”), one of two verbs used to describe the effects of narratives in the *Odyssey*,²¹ routinely denotes forgetfulness or a loss of real-world consciousness. It describes the effect of Hermēs’ staff (to put people to sleep),²² and it is used three times in quick succession in κ to describe the effects of the φάρμακα λύγρ’[α] (“baneful

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has tacitly suggested Odysseus has died *en route* (οὐ γὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς οἶος ἀπώλεσε νόστιμον ἡμᾶρ || ἐν Τροίῃ, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι φῶτες ὄλοντο, “Not *only* Odysseus lost his homecoming day in Troy, but many other mortals perished also,” α 354–55). This would tally with, for example, the death of Lokrian Aias (δ 499–511). Another possibility is that the song suggests Odysseus, like Agamemnon (512–37), will be killed on his arrival by his wife’s suitor(s). On this possibility, which is more fully developed, see S. Douglas Olson, “The Stories of Agamemnon in Homer’s *Odyssey*,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 120 (1990): 57–71.

²⁰ It is, admittedly, also possible to take αἰεὶ as distributive here (*i.e.*, “whenever I remember”); this still implies that Pēnelope has (had) this reaction on multiple occasions.

²¹ Θέλω occurs 26 times in the two epics, of which six relate to stories or (epic) song: γ 264 (what Aigisthos did to Klytaimnēstra), μ 40, 44 (the Seirēns), ξ 387 (Eumaios’ rebuke to Odysseus not to spell him with lying), ρ 514, 521 (Eumaios describing Odysseus as a singer). Cf. Ritoók, “Views of Early Greek Epic,” at 335, who connects θέλω to magic and the satisfaction of desire.

The most pertinent of these are the last two: the ἔθελε in 521 — the effect of Odysseus’ singing — echoes the θέλω of 514 (with which Eumaios hopes the stranger might enchant even Pēnelope). It contrasts, in addition, with the lines following (522–27), where the swineherd reports the *contents* of Odysseus’ tale. Obviously, it is the singing, not the content of the song, which enchants Eumaios.

²² Ω 343–44 = ε 47–48 = ω 3–4: τῆ τ’ ἀνδρῶν ὄμματα θέλει, | ὦν ἐθέλει, τοὺς δ’ αὖτε καὶ ὑπνῶντας ἐγείρει, “with which he enchants the eyes of men, whomever he wishes, and wakes back up those sleeping.” According to Ovid (*Met.* I 715–17), Hermēs used his staff to deepen Argos’ sleep in order to kill him (with his sword) and rescue Io; the wand, however, is not mentioned in the relevant section of Apollodorus (2.6–7) or the Scholium based on it (*ad B* 103, explaining the term “Ἀργειφόντης,” slayer of Argos) which state that “when he could not escape Argos’ notice he killed him by throwing a rock.” See further, James George Frazer, *Apollodorus: The Library*, 2 vols. (London: William Heinemann, 1921), *ad loc.*

Cf. the four instances in the *Iliad* (plus an *Odyssean* parallel) in which a god *bewitches* the Akhaians to give the Trojans an advantage: O 320–22 (Apollo rattled the aegis, bewitched them, and they forgot their furious strength), M 255, N 435 (Poseidōn bewitched Alkathōös’ eyes and immobilized his limbs so Idomeneus could kill him), O 594, π 298 (Zeus and Athēna will bewitch the suitors for the slaughter). In addition, at σ 212–13, Pēnelope’s beauty enchants the suitors, making them literally weak at the knees.

drugs”) which Kirkē throws into the potion ἵνα πάγχυ λαθοῖατο πατρίδος αἴης (“so that they [the companions] might altogether forget the land of their fathers,” κ 236).²³

This sense of forgetfulness is also dominant when Kirkē applies θέλω to the Seirēns,²⁴

Σειρήνας μὲν πρῶτον ἀφίξειαι, αἶ ῥά τε πάντας
 ἀνθρώπους θέλγουσιν, ὅτις σφέας εἰσαφίκηται.
 ὅς τις ἀΐδρειή πελάση καὶ φθόγγον ἀκούση
 Σειρήνων, τῶ δ' οὐ τι γυνή καὶ νήπια τέκνα
 οἴκαδε νοστήσαντι παρίσταται οὐδὲ γάνυνται,
 ἀλλὰ τε Σειρήνες λιγυρή θέλγουσιν ἀοιδῆ,
 ἤμεναι ἐν λειμῶνι· πολὺς δ' ἄμφ' ὄστεόφιν θῆς
 ἀνδρῶν πυθομένων, περὶ δὲ ῥινοὶ μινύθουσι. μ 39–46.²⁵

Although the subject of θέλωσιν is, in each case, the Seirēns, the instrumental datives in μ 44 reinforce the notion that they enchant men by means of their song. The fact that Odysseus (who has, after all, been forewarned of the danger) wishes to stay and listen (μ 192–94) is a testament to the strength of the unconsciousness it brings.²⁶

²³ κ 236, 318, 326. *Contra* Samuel Eliot Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, Sather Classical Lectures 15 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938), at 11 (and, indeed, *contra* popular belief), it is not the physical “transformation of the Comrades into swine,” but rather this absence of real-world knowledge, motives, etc., which is the enchantment of the *drugs*; the physical transformation is caused by the striking of the wand at κ 293 (cf. Athēna’s physical transformations of Odysseus with a wand at ν 429, π 172, and 456). Hermēs’ warning to Odysseus, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὡς θέλξαι σε δυνήσεται (“but she won’t be able to charm you in this way,” κ 291), refers to the κικεῶ (“potion”) and the ἐν φάρμακα σίτω (“drugs in the food,” κ 290), not to the subsequent striking with the wand; Odysseus, having drunk the potion, confirms οὐδέ μ’ ἔθελεξε (“and nor did she charm me,” κ 318) before she strikes him with the wand and utters her spell (κ 319–20); Kirkē then reinforces this when she comments θαυμά μ’ ἔχει, ὡς οὐ τι πίων τάδε φάρμακ’ ἐθέλχθης (“wonder takes me that *having drunk these drugs* you are not at all enchanted,” κ 326) and adds his is an ἀκήλητος νόος (“an uncharmable *mind*,” κ 329). When Kirkē changes the companions back into men, her use of drugs is emphasised (κ 391–96), but, in the light of the evidence above, it is significant that she carries her wand with her as she does so (κ 389).

²⁴ Doherty, *Siren Songs*, at 61–62, argues that the Seirēns, through their similarity to the Muses, “disrupt the prevailing pattern of male narrative control” but that the episode should be seen as conforming “to the pattern of female betrayal of males that figures so prominently in the epic plot.” My argument here on θέλω reinforces both points: the application to Kirkē’s drugs is clearly to be seen in terms of a female betraying males, and the description of the Seirēns’ song is to be read, in a sense, as reflecting the narrative performance of the epic itself.

²⁵ You will come first to the Seirēns, who enchant || all men, whoever comes to them. | For whoever approaches in ignorance and hears the voice | of the Seirēns, for him there is no return homeward to his wife | and innocent children nor [for them] a rejoicing as they stand around, | but the Seirēns enchant [him] with their clear song, || sitting in a field; and around them lie many bones | of rotting men, the skin wasting upon them.

²⁶ Cf. Goldhill, *The Poet’s Voice*, at 65: “[t]he power of the Sirens’ song of knowledge enchants even the man who knows of its enchanting danger.”

Eumaios also uses the verb metonymically for storytelling in his famous praise for the disguised Odysseus' rhetorical abilities,

“εἰ γάρ τοι, βασιλεία, σιωπήσειαν Ἀχαιοί·
οἱ δ' ὅ γε μυθεῖται, θέλγοιτό κέ τοι φίλον ἦτορ.
τρεις γὰρ δὴ μιν νύκτας ἔχον, τρία δ' ἡματ' ἔρυξα
ἐν κλισίῃ· πρῶτον γὰρ ἔμ' ἵκετο νηὸς ἀποδράς·
ἀλλ' οὐ πω κακότητα διήνυσεν ἦν ἀγορεύων.
ὡς δ' ὅτ' αἰδὸν ἀνὴρ ποτιδέρκεται, ὅς τε θεῶν ἔξ
ἀείδη δεδαῶς ἔπε' ἱμερόεντα βροτοῖσι,
τοῦ δ' ἄμοτον μεμάασιν ἀκούεμεν, ὅππότε' ἀείδη·
ὡς ἐμὲ κείνος ἔθελε παρήμενος ἐν μεγάροισι.”

ρ 513–21.²⁷

The singer to whom Odysseus is compared is excellent — he has learned his ἔπεα (“words,” or, here, “songs”) from the gods — and his audience desires to listen. The ἔθελε in ρ 521, clearly synonymous with singing a song, informs the θέλγοιτο of 514: the effect of good singing is the same as that of good storytelling.²⁸

As noted above, θέλω is one of two verbs that are used to describe the effects of songs and stories; the other is τέρω, “I enjoy,” or “I delight.”²⁹ Kirkē's use of the

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Either Odysseus has forgotten Kirkē's advice (lack of real-world knowledge) or wishes to stay against his better judgement (lack of real-world cares), both of which are suggestive of absence from the real world; perhaps he does not notice the bones which surround them (lack of perception). Pietro Pucci, “The Song of the Sirens,” *Arethusa* 12, no. 2 (1979): 121–32, was wrong to suggest that Kirkē may have been lying here on the grounds that Odysseus does not mention the bones in his account; Pucci wrongly implies that Odysseus mentions the meadow at all (he only describes it to his companions *before* they see it, and the detail that the meadow is ἀνθεμόεντα (“flowery,” μ 159) rather than full of bones here may be deliberate and aimed at not panicking his men [*cf.* μ 223–25]). The rationalization that the omission indicates Odysseus does not notice is attractive (as it indicates the enchanting power of the song), but is by no means the only explanation.

I cannot accept the sexual innuendo seen in θέλγουσιν by Seth L. Schein, “Female Representations and Interpreting the *Odyssey*,” in *The Distaff Side: Representing the Female in Homer's Odyssey*, ed. Beth Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 17–27, at 21, as only two out of 26 instances of the word in the Homeric poems relate to sex: γ 264, σ 282; only one of the three instances of the related θελκτῆρια does so (Ξ 215), and is counterbalanced by θ 509 (which echoes the more familiar usage of θέλω of the gods “bewitching” one side of a fight to allow the other an easy victory and/or slaughter: see above, n. 22).

²⁷ “If only, queen, the Akhaians would be silent for you; | how he tells stories, he might even enchant your dear heart. || For I had him for three nights, three days I kept him | in my hut; for he came first to me having escaped the ship; | but he has not yet made an end to expounding his suffering. | As a man looks to a singer, who has learned from the gods | the songs he sings to the delight of mortals, || and they, insatiable, are eager to hear him, whenever he sings; | so that one enchanted me sitting beside me in my hall.

²⁸ Indeed, it is possible to read the assertion of 514 as indicating that the stranger's abilities are so good, he might even enchant the least susceptible heart. If so, then an implication of absence is especially apparent.

²⁹ This, indeed, is the verb used to describe the Phaiakians' reaction to all three of Dēmodokos' songs: The poet delivers the first two (Φαίηκων οἱ ἄριστοι, ἐπεὶ τέρποντ' ἐπέεσσιν, “the best of the Phaiakians, since they took pleasure in his words,” θ 91; αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς | τέρπετ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἀκούων ἠδὲ καὶ ἄλλοι | Φαίηκες, “But Odysseus took pleasure in his heart listening as did the Phaiakians also,” 367–69), Alkinoös the third (ἀλλ' ἄγ' ὁ μὲν σχεθέτω, ἴν' ὁμῶς τερωόμεθα

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two terms, indeed, links them as the action of and reaction to storytelling: the Seirēns enchant (θέλγουσιν, μ 40, 44) with their song, but she foresees Odysseus taking pleasure (τερπόμενος, μ 52) as he sails past listening.³⁰

Like θέλω, τέρπω is frequently used in circumstances where we might see a suppression of real-world concerns: At I 186–89, the embassy finds Akhilleus φρένα τερπόμενον (“delighting his heart,” I 186; cf. θυμὸν ἔτερπεν, “he delighted his heart,” 189) with the lyre as he sang the κλέα ἀνδρῶν (the “fames of men,” 189),³¹ despite the rawness of his anger;³² at ψ 300–43 when Odysseus and Pēnelope had been reunited, τερπέσθην μύθοισι, πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐνέποντε (“they were delighted by [their] stories, telling them to each other,” θ 301) and, despite the lateness of the hour and the length of his tale, οὐδέ οἱ ὕπνος | πίπτει ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι πάρος καταλέξει ἅπαντα (“sleep did not fall upon her eyelids before he had related it all,” ψ 308–09).³³

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πάντες, | ξεινοδόκοι καὶ ξεῖνος, “But come let him hold, so all may take like pleasure, hosts and guest,” 542–43 [already quoted]).

³⁰ Cf. Ritoók, “Views of Early Greek Epic,” at 336–37, who links τέρπω with the adjective ἕμερον (desired), used once of song (ψ 144–45).

³¹ I simply cannot agree with J. Bryan Hainsworth, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), at n. ad I 189, that “Akhilleus’ emotional turmoil has ... given way to tedium,” and that he sings “the heroic deeds that he is no longer allowing himself to perform.” This would keep him firmly in the present, but Akhilleus sings a song of the *past*, akin to Homer’s. Cf. the way Phoinix links the κλέα ἀνδρῶν || ἠρώων (I 524–25) to the *ancient* rather than the recent past (527–28) in his introduction to the story of the Kalydōnian boar hunt. That the phrase κλέα ἀνδρῶν refers to epic was the assumption of Eustathius (*il.*, ad I 186–88 and 189), and has been demonstrated also, e.g., by Gregory Nagy, *Comparative Studies in Greek and Indic Meter*, Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature, 33 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), at 245–52, partly reprised in Gregory Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry*, Revised ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999 [originally published: 1979]), at 95–103; Ford, *Homer*, at 57–61 argues that κλέα ἀνδρῶν refers to the past, but is not limited to epic; at 60 he explicitly denies Akhilleus’ and Phoinix’ narratives are epics on the grounds that neither is a poet. Yet, at a more thematic level, Akhilleus is the only hero in the *Iliad* to sing to a lyre explicitly (though we might imply Paris does so also from Γ 53–55), and Phoinix’ extended narrative, performed at a meal and (deliberately) resonating a major theme of the *Iliad*, is, to all intents and purposes, an epic performance.

³² The freshness of Akhilleus’ anger is indicated by his outburst to Odysseus at I 308–429 and when he says to Aias (at 646–48), ἀλλά μοι οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλω ὅππότε κείνων | μνήσομαι ὡς μ’ ἄσφρηλον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν | Ἄτρεΐδης ὡς εἶ τιν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην “But my heart swells in anger whenever I remember that one, how he dealt insolently with me among the Argives, the son of Atreus, like some honourless vagrant.”

³³ This scene appears at the end of the night (Athēna holds back the dawn at ψ 241–46), and Odysseus’ story appears after Pēnelope’s own (ψ 302–05, itself an *Odyssey*, though abbreviated to the external audience). He tells a version of his ἀπόλογοι (again, abbreviated to the external audience; ψ 310–41) which, as Irene J. F. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), has noted at 563, n. ad loc., he tailors slightly to his audience; but we should not *ipso facto* assume that he significantly abbreviates his tale. Cf. Odysseus’ own response at the end of his tale at ψ 342–43: as soon as he stops talking, he sleeps.

Perhaps the most striking example, however, is in Tēlemakhos' response to Menelaos' tale of his capture of Prōteus, the Old Man of the Sea:

Ἀτρεΐδη, μὴ δὴ με πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἔρυκε.
καὶ γὰρ κ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἐγὼ παρὰ σοί γ' ἀνεχοίμην
ἤμενος, οὐδέ κέ μ' οἴκου ἔλοι πόθος οὐδὲ τοκῆων·
αἰνῶς γὰρ μύθοισιν ἔπεσσί τε σοῖσιν ἀκούων
τέρπομαι· ἀλλ' ἤδη μοι ἀνιάζουσιν ἐταῖροι
ἐν Πύλῳ ἠγαθέη· σὺ δέ με χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἐρύκεις. δ 594–99.³⁴

Tēlemakhos implies that, were it not for his companions, he would remain in Sparta a whole year *with no thought of home or parents* since he takes a strange delight listening to his stories. The potential Tēlemakhos describes is reminiscent of his father's behaviour on Aiaia,³⁵ despite the latter's views (and the implications of the epic itself) on the importance of homeland and parents.³⁶ In this context, Tēlemakhos' assertion that he would stay away from home καὶ ... εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ("even for a whole year," δ 595) is not just high praise of Menelaos' ability as a storyteller: it is also evidence of the superlative story's power to make its audience forget about the things they hold most dear: to effect a temporary *absence* from their real-world cares.

If a well-told story can produce in its audience a sense of absence from the real world — can *transport* its audience away from the real world — then we might expect this effect to persist when a story is drawn to a close. The audience members need time to return from the story world to the real world and reorient themselves. This persistence should be strongest when the storytelling is best and when the distance between the story world and the real world is largest (for example, when a story is ended or abandoned abruptly).

³⁴ Son of Atreus, do not detain me here for a long time. || I could keep on sitting beside you even for a whole year, | and nor would any longing for home or parents take me; | for listening to your stories and words I take a strange | pleasure; but already my companions grieve for me | in holy Pylos; while you detain me here.

³⁵ See κ 467–75.

³⁶ Odysseus' opinion is expressed, *e.g.*, at ι 34–36. It is no difficulty that Tēlemakhos refers to his home (οἶκος) while Odysseus refers to his *homeland* (πατρίδος): the latter includes the former, and Tēlemakhos' statement is clearly either equal to or included within his father's. Odysseus' statement is, obviously, a fundamental theme of the poem — it would be an understatement to say that home and parents are important in the *Odyssey*, and Odysseus' absence from them is generally appraised in a negative fashion — which underscores the weight of Tēlemakhos' assertion.

Two such examples appear in Odysseus' ἀπόλογοι (tales in reply) among the Phaiakians (ι-μ).³⁷ Alkinoös' comment that Odysseus has told his story ὡς ... ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως ("like a singer, skilfully," λ 368) is a tribute to his abilities in storytelling,³⁸ and Odysseus does, as many scholars have observed, play the part of the singer throughout his narrative.³⁹ In this sense, Odysseus' story is like the songs of Phēmios and Dēmodokos — a longer, less abbreviated, and less elliptical framed narrative — and its effects upon his audience may be treated in the same framework.⁴⁰

Odysseus breaks off his story twice, and in both instances he does so rather abruptly. In the first (λ 330–32), Odysseus interrupts his Catalogue of Heroines with the protestation that although he could go on all night, it is really ὥρη εὔδειν ("time to sleep," 330–31). The transition is abrupt not only because the audience is brought back to the real world from the underworld (with a temporal jump of some eight years) in the space of (at a maximum) five lines,⁴¹ but also because the preceding claim that there are too many (heroines) to relate them all leads the audience to expect a specific example.⁴²

³⁷ The ἀπόλογοι, the ancient name for ι-μ, are, literally, replies (to Alkinoös' questions of θ 572–86).

³⁸ Not all scholars have taken this as the compliment it surely is: for a sensible review see Hugh Parry, "The Apologos of Odysseus: Lies, All Lies?" *Phoenix* 48, no. 1 (1994): 1–20. For Odysseus' rhetorical abilities, cf. Γ 216–24 (on which see Herbert W. Greene, "The Eloquence of Odysseus," *Classical Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1915): 55–56).

³⁹ See William F. Wyatt, Jr., "The Intermezzo of *Odyssey* 11 and the Poets Homer and Odysseus," *Studi Micenei de Egeo-Anatolici* 27 (1989): 235–54, especially at 241–42; Lillian Eileen Doherty, "The Internal and Implied Audiences of *Odyssey* 11," *Arethusa* 24, no. 2 (1991): 145–76, at, e.g., 147; and Doherty, *Siren Songs*, at 88–90. Ford, *Homer*, at 110–25 discusses how the beginning of ι is fundamentally similar to a *proem* and, although he is unwilling to class him as a poet ("he is of course finally not a poet," 120), investigates how the similarity between Odysseus and Dēmodokos makes their interaction similar to a rhapsodic competition.

⁴⁰ Macleod, "Homer on Poetry and the Poetry of Homer," at 3, goes further: "When Odysseus relates his adventures truly to the Phaeacians or falsely to Eumaeus, when Helen, Menelaus, and Nestor recall their experiences at Troy or afterwards, they are to all intents and purposes poets. ... the reactions they evoke are the same as those which poets evoke."

⁴¹ At the end of λ 332 we are back in Skheria. I am inclined to place the break in Odysseus' narrative at λ 330 (which would form a three-line transition), but I accept there is potentially an argument for placing it at λ 328.

⁴² In its other two occurrences in the *Odyssey*, the formula $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{πάντα μὲν} \\ \text{πάντας δ' } \end{array} \right\} \text{ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι}$

οὐδ' ὀνομήνω $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ὅσσοι ... δ 240} \\ \text{ὅσσον ... λ 517} \end{array} \right.$ ("but I would not be able to tell them all nor name them, so

many...") is followed by a concrete example. The one example in the *Iliad* (of which Eustathius thought λ 328 was a parody), πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω ("I would not be able to tell the multitude nor name them," B 488) appears in an invocation to the Muses, and is

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The second interruption ends the ἀπόλογοι (μ 450–53), and here, again, Odysseus breaks his story abruptly — mid-line, in fact — and returns his audience to the real world from Ὀγυγία to Σκῆρεια (again, with an eight-year ellipsis) in three and a half lines.⁴³ In both instances, the reaction of his audience is the same:

Ὦς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῆ,
κηληθμῶ δ' ἔσχοντο κατὰ μέγαρα σκιδόντα. λ 333–34 = ν 1–2.⁴⁴

The Phaiakians κηληθμῶ ... ἔσχοντο (“remained in the spell of,” or “were spellbound by”) Odysseus’ narrative. The enchantment here, a κηληθμός, is equivalent to those (discussed above) described by forms of the verb θέλω,⁴⁵ and in both instances it outlasts the telling of the story. The Phaiakians’ silences are, in both cases, probably long-lasting: although no indication of time is given in these particular instances, the formula οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῆ (“but they all were totally silent”) is followed, in over half of its fourteen other instances in Homer, by the expression ὁψὲ δὲ δὴ (...) μετέειπε (“at last among them spoke...”).⁴⁶

Raymond Person argues that this “became silent to silence” formula represents a “dispreferred second”: a response in a conversation which conflicts with that expected or preferred by the first speaker.⁴⁷ But, although Person’s argument is indeed illuminating for many instances of the formula,⁴⁸ the argument that the Phaiakians, in becoming silent in these instances, are implicitly contradicting or

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followed by a large number of concrete examples: the 29 contingents of the Catalogue of Ships (complete with 1186 ships, etc.).

⁴³ That the journey had taken him seventeen days and nights of uninterrupted sailing (ε 278–81) is indicative of the large geographical distance involved.

⁴⁴ So he spoke, but they all were totally silent, spellbound throughout the shadowy megaron.

⁴⁵ The word κηληθμός only occurs in this formula at these two loci, but its α-privative adjective, ἀκήλητος (“uncharmable”) is used by Kirkē at κ 329 metonymically for negated forms of the verb θέλω: οὐ ... ἐθέλωθης (“you have not been charmed,” κ 326), οὐδὲ μ' ἔθελεξε (“but it did not charm me,” κ 318), οὐδ' ... θέλωσαι σε δυνήσεται (“but she will not be able to charm you,” κ 291), on which see above, n. 23. Cf. Ritoók, “Views of Early Greek Epic,” at 335–36.

⁴⁶ The formula οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῆ (“but they all were totally silent”) is followed in seven instances (four times with an intervening line) by ὁψὲ δὲ δὴ μετέειπε [name-epithet formula] (“at last among them spoke...[name],” H 398–99, Θ 28–30, I 29–31, 430–32, 693–96, η 154–55, υ 320–21) and once (with an intervening line) by ὁψὲ δὲ δὴ [name] ἀνίστατο καὶ μετέειπε (“at last [name] stood up and spoke among them,” H 92–94). I owe this observation to Raymond F. Person, Jr., “The ‘Became Silent to Silence’ Formula in Homer,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 36, no. 4 (1995): 327–39.

⁴⁷ Person, *ibid.*, especially at 329–32.

⁴⁸ Person is surely right in his interpretations of π 393–94 and I 29–31; yet, his explanation can and should be augmented by the observation that silence is associated also with surprise, shock, and fear. Any explanation of η 153–55, for example, should include surprise at the epiphany of Odysseus, just as any explanation of I 430–32 (and, likewise, I 693–95) should include shock at the force of Akhilleus’ rejection and his suggestion to leave Troy. The notion of a dispreferred (rather than an unexpected) response is difficult for Γ 95 in the light of Γ 111–12.

refusing the assertions or requests of Odysseus is difficult to maintain for anything more than the trivial sense that the Phaiakians wish (at least in the first instance) that he would continue.⁴⁹ Although Alkinoös does, in the earlier instance, eventually contradict Odysseus' assertion that ὥρη εὔδειν ("It's time to sleep," λ 330–31, an assertion that we cannot be sure is not affected⁵⁰), the initial responses (of Arētē, λ 336–41, and Alkinoös, ν 4–15) are both positive in tone — both exhort the Phaiakians to give Odysseus costly gifts — and on the later occasion there is no implicit or explicit contradiction of Odysseus' assertion.

In both cases, on the other hand, the explanation that the audience is so engrossed in the story that they take some moments to reorient themselves to the real world is unproblematic: it accords with the explanation the poet gives of their behaviour (κηληθμῶ δ' ἔσχοντο, "they were spellbound," λ 334 = ν 2) and with the high praise heaped upon Odysseus (here and elsewhere) for his ability to tell his story like a singer (λ 368) and enchant his audience (ρ 513–21). The Phaiakians' languor attests not only to their enjoyment (as Eustathius put it, ἐπίτασις ... ἡδονῆς ὁ κηληθμός⁵¹) and Odysseus' skill, but also to the fact that they have been transported by his narrative.

The assertion that enchantment is effectively a form of absence is not new: Walsh defined "enchantment" as "a kind of unconsciousness."⁵² Yet, he limited this absence in that he discounted the possibility the enchanted audience could "feel any palpable sort of reality"; he saw the effects of song as serene or impassive pleasure, and the "suspension of self-consciousness and personal feeling."⁵³ There is no reason, however, that enchantment should be thus limited, and every reason it should not: the depictions of audience response to the songs in the epics provide evidence that good storytelling can *transport* the listener, not just away from the

⁴⁹ Thus, indeed, Alkinoös urges Odysseus to stay at λ 350–51.

⁵⁰ Doherty, "Internal and Implied Audiences," at 147 sees the interruption as calculated to please Arētē and extract more gifts from the Phaiakians. Cf. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 74, who suggests that the pause "at the one point where the narrative threatens to become wearisome" is motivated by tact.

⁵¹ "The 'spell' is an exaggeration of 'pleasure,'" Eust. *Od. ad* λ 328. Cf. Σ B.V. *ad* λ 333: τῆ μετὰ ἡδονῆς καὶ τέρψεως ἡσυχία ("[κηληθμῶ]: in peace accompanied by pleasure and delight"); and Σ B.V.H *ad* ν 2. The term κηληθμός was glossed as τέρψις ("delight") by the ancient lexicographers: e.g., Apollonius (Soph.), *Lex. s.v.* κηληθμῶ; Herodianus, *Schematismi Homerici s.v.* κατεκλήθησε; Hesychius (Lexicogr.) *s.v.* κηληθμῶ; etc.

⁵² Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment*, at 17.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, at 4, 16, and 14, respectively.

here and now, but so that s/he feels in some way present on the scene of the story.⁵⁴

Personal Significance

Because he saw enchantment as the suspension of personal feeling, Walsh explicitly discounted the reactions of Odysseus (to the songs of Dēmodokos) and Pēnelope (to the song of Phēmios) from his examples of enchantment. Rather than with enchantment, Walsh suggested, Pēnelope and Odysseus respond with *synthesis*, the effortful attempt to identify the speaker's meaning(s) (whether explicit or implicit) and evaluate it/them.⁵⁵ Hence Walsh asserted that Odysseus, like Pēnelope, “construes what he hears in relation to some present trouble, that his present unquiet condition, more than the topic of the song, determines his response as an audience.”⁵⁶

This facet of Walsh's (otherwise excellent) account of enchantment presents a problem for the underlying suggestion of this chapter that Odysseus responds to Dēmodokos' songs in a manner which is essentially the opposite of the reaction exhibited by Pēnelope. Walsh was certainly right to note that Pēnelope's reaction both differs from transportation and is determined by her present situation — as noted above, she frames her complaint in the present and implies that she wishes she were enchanted⁵⁷ — but the evidence for his conclusion about Odysseus is less secure.

Walsh suggests that Odysseus reacts to something other than Dēmodokos' song on the grounds that the response to the third song (tears) does not suit the subject of that song (a moment of Odysseus' triumph).⁵⁸ Indeed, this could be strengthened by the observation that the simile implies Odysseus weeps like a victim of that same

⁵⁴ Admittedly, Walsh allows that the experience of reality (*e.g.*, the evocation of “a vision intrinsically superior to mundane, human experience,” *ibid.*, at 129) is compatible with *post-Homeric* concepts of enchantment (the comparison is most fully drawn in his postscript, 127–32), though he generally ties this up with self-consciousness. I hope to show that reality (whether superior or simply more vivid) is compatible with the Homeric concept of enchantment, and, further, that enchantment (in all its conceptions) is substantially diminished (if not annulled) by audience self-consciousness.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, at 17–18.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, at 17.

⁵⁷ See above, p. 13.

⁵⁸ Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment*, at 17.

triumph.⁵⁹ Yet, this difficulty is not insoluble as transportation does not necessarily imply that narratees re-experience the events narrated from their own perspective. Narratives encourage us to adopt another identity — that of a member of the “implied audience” — which may differ from our own, for example, in terms of gender, age, physique, temporal and geographical location, values, and cultural norms.⁶⁰ This adoption does not depend on the conscious application of real-world knowledge, but on the implications inherent in the text itself.⁶¹

The suggestion, then, that Dēmodokos’ third song should be a cue for pleasure, depends on the assumption that the implied audience’s perspective in the song is pro-Akhaian (or that Odysseus adopts his own perspective when re-experiencing

⁵⁹ The allusion is more concrete than the suggestion of Macleod, “Homer on Poetry and the Poetry of Homer,” at 11: “like Andromache, in effect.” Hence, Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*, at 101, characterizes “the resemblance with Hektor” as “unmistakeable,” and adds “he now feels the grief of his own victims in war.” Cf. Helene P. Foley, “Reverse Similes’ and Sex Roles in the *Odyssey*,” *Arethusa* 11, no. 1–2 (1978): 7–26 at 7: “The conqueror of Troy is identified with the most helpless of his former victims.”

Nagy’s argument is based on the similarity of the third song with the *Iliou Persis* (though this might imply Dēiphobos rather than Hektōr), and we might add that the vision of the wife being led into slavery recalls, to a degree, Hektōr’s vision of Andromakhē’s future at Z 454–65; the echo is strongest at line 463, where Hektōr’s description of himself as ἀνδρὸς ἀμύνειν δούλιον ἥμαρ (“the man who would ward off the day of slavery”) is at least reminiscent of the husband who fights ἀμύνων νηλεῆς ἥμαρ (“warding off the pitiless day”) here at θ 525.

Admittedly, Hektōr is not the only warrior who dies in front of Troy in the *Iliad*, Andromakhē does not actually see him die, and he only has one child (as opposed to the plural τεκέεσσιν [“children,” θ 525] in the simile), yet, he is the only *Iliadic* fighter whose wife and child are depicted, and he is presented as the sole defender of Troy (whose death will lead to the enslavement of the women and children). Ω 729–32: ἦ γὰρ ὄλωλας ἐπίσκοπος, ὅς τέ μιν αὐτὴν ἢ ῥύσκει, ἔχες δ’ ἀλόχους κεδνὰς καὶ νήπια τέκνα, | αἶ δὴ τοι τάχα νηυσὶν ὀχίσονται γλαφυρῆσι, | καὶ μὲν ἐγὼ μετὰ τῆσι: (“Indeed you, the guardian [of Troy], are destroyed, who saved it [the city], having the devoted wives and innocent children, and they [the wives] will be carried swiftly to the hollow ships, and I among them.”). Cf. the way Hektōr’s death foreshadows the fall of Troy (especially) at X 410–11, on which see George Eckel Duckworth, *Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius, and Vergil* (Brooklyn: Haskell House, 1966). For Hektōr as the sole defender of Troy, cf. Z 403: οἶος ... ἐρύετο Ἴλιον Ἐκτωρ (“Hektōr alone saved Ilium”).

Rinon, “*Mise en Abyme* and Tragic Signification in the *Odyssey*,” at 219–21, builds on the identification of Odysseus with Andromakhē and notes the resulting contrast with the allusion to Helen in θ 517–19.

⁶⁰ The term “implied audience” is my oral version of the “implied reader,” on which see Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Wolfgang Iser, *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

For the discrepancy between the identities of the actual and implied readers, see especially Walker Gibson, “Authors, Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers,” *College English* 11 (1950): 265–69 (a small part of which is quoted in Richard J. Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading* (Boulder: Westview, 1998 [originally published: Yale University Press, 1993]), at 12).

⁶¹ Gibson’s example at 266 (which Gerrig quotes) is apt: we can understand a toupée advertisement without being bald — indeed, without consciously recognizing the discrepancy — though the question “Does your toupee collect moths?” implies the “mock reader” (“implied reader”) owns one.

the song) — an assumption which is neither provable, nor necessary for transportation — and that the narrative itself would have been pleasurable for an Akhaian audience. The second assumption is, indeed, more doubtful than the first. As Andrew Ford has noted, the word used by the internal audience to describe general subjects of the Trojan songs of Dēmodokos — οἶτος (in the first case, of the Akhaians; in the second, of the Argives, Danaäns, and of Ilion) — is clearly negative,⁶² and Odysseus and Alkinoös' use of the term implies that the perspective of Dēmodokos' songs cannot be seen simply as pro-Akhaian (and hence a cue for Odysseus' pleasure).

Walsh's argument that Odysseus reacts to his current situation is mainly based on an inference from a maxim, spoken by Eumaios to his disguised guest, which is clearly reminiscent of the description of Odysseus in the opening lines of the epic:⁶³

νῶϊ δ' ἐνὶ κλισίῃ πίνοντέ τε δαιτυμένῳ τε
κῆδεσιν ἀλλήλων τερπόμεθα λευγαλέοισι,
μνωμένῳ μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ,
ὅς τις δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πόλλ' ἐπαληθῆ. ο 398–401.⁶⁴

If a man τέρπεται (“takes pleasure”) in his troubles μετὰ (“afterward”), then clearly if Odysseus does not “take pleasure,” his troubles aren't over. Not only is this a *non sequitur* (denying the antecedent, since other factors might cause him not to “take pleasure” in the story), but also τέρπεται is often misinterpreted (or over-interpreted) here. Although τέρπω refers to pleasurable activities in 82 of its 98 other occurrences in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, in 16 it refers to *comforting* someone or “having one's fill” of something (*e.g.*, weeping, as Akhilleus and Priam do at Ω 513

⁶² Thus Ford, *Homer*, at 40. Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον ... ὅσσ' ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ' ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί (“the fate of the Akhaians ... what the Akhaians did and suffered and how they toiled,” θ 489–90) and Ἀργείων Δαναῶν ἠδ' Ἰλίου οἶτον (“the fate of the Argive Danaäns and Ilion,” θ 578). I must thank Dr Peter Gainsford for drawing this line of argument to my attention. Ford translates “fate” as destruction, which is possibly overstating the case; yet, it should be noted that οἶτος occurs 11× in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, 7 of which are paired with κακόν (also with a form of ὄλλυμι: Γ 417, Θ 34, 354, 465; without ὄλλυμι: α 350, γ 134, ν 384), and one with πολυπενθέος ... ἔχουσα (I 563). At Ω 388 it is equated with death. The argument of Rinon, “*Mise en Abyme* and Tragic Signification in the *Odyssey*,” at 219, that Odysseus' inclusion of the phrase Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον (θ 489) in his request for Dēmodokos' third song “has an unconscious ironic level” is misdirected; the phrase describes the first song.

⁶³ Cf. ο 401 to Odysseus as the man ὅς μάλα πολλὰ | πλάγχθη (“who wandered rather a lot,” α 1–2) and who πολλὰ ... πάθεν ἄλγεα (“suffered many pains,” α 4).

⁶⁴ Let the two of us, drinking and dining in the hut | delight each other with our sorry cares || remembering; for afterwards a man may take pleasure even in his hardships, | one who has suffered rather a lot and wandered far.

and Pēnelope does at τ 213, 251, and 513).⁶⁵ In these latter uses, among which Eumaios' maxim clearly fits, there is a sense of closure and the satisfaction it brings, but not usually a sense of *enjoyment*.⁶⁶

Walsh's "impersonal" view is, in fact, at odds with the ample evidence in Homer (and the later tradition) that enchantment can accommodate more emotion than "impassive pleasure,"⁶⁷ and that singers can transport their audiences when singing about themes of present *and* personal significance.

When Eumaios, speaking to Pēnelope about the stranger, ventures that θέλγοιτό κέ τοι φίλον ἦτορ ("he might enchant your dear heart also," ρ 514) and compares Odysseus to a singer to illustrate how he himself had been enchanted (518–21), he almost immediately summarizes the tales that Odysseus will, in fact, spin for Pēnelope in his interview with her.⁶⁸ Almost the first piece of information Eumaios gives about the stranger to Pēnelope (that he claims to bear news of her husband) is of present and personal significance to her. It is revealing that Eumaios explicitly states here ἐμὲ κείνος ἔθελγε ("he enchanted me," 521), whereas his immediate reaction to Odysseus' tale was certainly not impassive:

“ἄ δειλὲ ξείνων, ἦ μοι μάλα θυμὸν ὄρινας
ταῦτα ἕκαστα λέγων, ὅσα δὴ πάθεις ἠδ' ὄσ' ἀλήθης. ξ 361–62.”⁶⁹

To Eumaios, at least, enchantment does not depend on dispassion and irrelevance.

⁶⁵ The uses of all forms of *τέρπω* and its compounds in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are broadly categorized below in Appendix 2, p. 205. As above (p. 16, n. 26), I cannot accept the connotation of sexual pleasure espoused by Schein, "Female Representations," at 21: seven instances out of 100 hardly justifies his statement that "*τερπὸ* ... is frequently used of sexual delight."

⁶⁶ Exceptions to this are T 19, possibly Ω 633, δ 47, and κ 181, all of which include a sense of wonder or awe.

⁶⁷ The term is after Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment*, at 16. For the later tradition, *cf.*, *e.g.*, Pl., *Ion*, 535b–e and R. 605c 10–d 5. I discuss the Homeric evidence below.

⁶⁸ ρ 522–27, *cf.* τ 165–202, 262–307. As Maureen Joan Alden, "Ψεύδεια Πολλὰ Ἐτύμοισιν Ὀμοῖα," *Liverpool Classical Papers* 2 (1992): 9–14 observes at 11, Eumaios' "mention here [at ρ 522–23] of the stranger's guest-friendship with Odysseus is interesting, for the stranger says nothing about it to Eumaios in 14." The detail that Odysseus was among the Thesprōtians and about to return (ρ 525–27, *cf.* υ 262–307) was narrated to Eumaios at ξ 316–33. Without wishing to open the can of worms of the chronology of the *Odyssey*, one might resolve Alden's objection by observing it is an *argumentum ex silentio* as we are only privy to two of the three days Odysseus spends with Eumaios (we leave Odysseus asleep at ξ 523 at the end of his first day in Ithaka, which is the first day of Tēlemakhos' journey home [the temporal coincidence is anchored — itself somewhat unstably — by Athēna's journey], and only return to him at ο 301–02 at the end of the second day [night passes for Tēlemakhos at ο 186–88], when Eumaios and Odysseus are eating dinner).

⁶⁹ "Ah wretched among strangers, surely you have rather touched my spirit | saying these things, how you suffered and how you have wandered.

Eumaios does, admittedly, remain sceptical about the one detail which is of present personal relevance to him: the imminent return of Odysseus.⁷⁰ Yet there are instances in which a professional singer enchants his audience despite present and personal significance. The first is the song of Phēmios in α, which, though it upsets Pēnelope, enchants the suitors despite the relevance of the theme (Ἀχαιῶν νόστον ... λυγρόν, “the baneful return of the Akhaians,” α 326–27) to their present endeavour.⁷¹

Another, clearer example is to be found in the second song of Dēmodokos (θ 266–366) of Arēs and Aphroditē. There are many parallels within this tale to the present and personal situations of its audience — both to the confrontation between Euryalos and Odysseus in the preceding games, and to the wider concern of the *Odyssey* itself with female infidelity⁷² — yet they all enjoy it just as “impassively” (to use Walsh’s term) as the Phaiakians respond to Dēmodokos’ other two songs.⁷³

⁷⁰ ξ 363–68. It is, of course, ironic that Eumaios believes all the false information and rejects the only true detail (thus also Chris Emlyn-Jones, “True and Lying Tales in the *Odyssey*,” *Greece & Rome* 33, no. 1 (1986): 1–10 at 2). Cf. Eumaios’ affection and longing for Odysseus at ξ 142–47. Odysseus’ tale does include details which are personally relevant to Eumaios’ past (in which he had been abducted into slavery by his Phoenician nurse and her accomplices [Phoenician traders]: ο 403–84); in two instances Odysseus claims to have been betrayed on a ship with the intention of selling him into slavery (ξ 292–309, 334–59), the first time, indeed, by a Phoenician trader. Yet, this is not of present personal relevance, and Eumaios indicates he can enjoy the remembrance of past sorrow (ο 400–01).

⁷¹ Apart from Pēnelope’s description of Phēmios’ songs as βροτῶν θελκτήρια (“charms of mortals,” α 337; see above), the enchantment of the suitors is conveyed by their silence (α 325) which Tēlemakhos implies is unusual (α 369–71), but which parallels the Phaiakians’ responses to Odysseus’ enchanting tales (λ 333 = ν 1). For the implications of the theme and its relevance to the suitors’ endeavour, see n. 19 above.

⁷² On the relevance to the games, see especially Bruce Karl Braswell, “The Song of Ares and Aphrodite: Theme and Relevance to *Odyssey* 8,” *Hermes* 110 (1982): 129–37; on the wider action of the epic (including the reunion of Pēnelope and Odysseus), see Rick M. Newton, “Odysseus and Hephaistus in the *Odyssey*,” *Classical Journal* 83, no. 1 (1987): 12–20; on both, see S. Douglas Olson, “*Odyssey* 8: Guile, Force and the Subversive Poetics of Desire,” *Arethusa* 22, no. 2 (1989): 135–45; de Jong, *Narratological Commentary*, at 206–08, n. ad θ 266–366 (with bibliography); and Maureen Joan Alden, “The Resonances of the Song of Ares and Aphrodite,” *Mnemosyne* 50 (1997): 513–29. Macleod, “Homer on Poetry and the Poetry of Homer,” at 9–10, draws out the contrasts between the divine and human action of both epics (as epitomized by the contrast between Aphroditē in this song and Pēnelope in the *Odyssey*).

Note that Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι, which so enchant the Phaiakians, are also relevant to the narrating instance through themes such as hospitality and the detained hero: see, e.g., Glenn W. Most, “The Structure and Function of Odysseus’ *Apologoi*,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 119 (1989): 15–30.

⁷³ Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment*, at 16; Odysseus and the Phaiakians enjoy (the verb, applied to Odysseus, is τέρπετ’) the second song at θ 367–69; cf. the Phaiakians τέρποντ’ (“enjoy,” θ 90) the first song, and Alkinoös implies the third song is χαριζόμενος (“pleasing,” θ 538) to them.

Thus, the view of enchantment as incompatible with personal significance is not sustained by the descriptions of the phenomenon within the *Odyssey*,⁷⁴ and Walsh's exclusion of Odysseus' reaction to the songs of Dēmodokos does not appear to be justified.

Yet, it is worthwhile pausing here to consider briefly the nature of personal significance. The description of the songs of Phēmios and Dēmodokos being *personally significant* to Pēnelope and Odysseus respectively is, on one level, true; yet on another (perhaps more fundamental) level, it is problematic as the relationship between the audience member and the subject of the song s/he hears is, in each case, qualitatively different. In Ithaka, the theme of Phēmios' song deals only *indirectly* with Pēnelope by covering an issue which is of current significance to her;⁷⁵ the themes of Dēmodokos' Trojan songs, however, deal with Odysseus *himself* and his actions at least ten years in the past.⁷⁶ Where her reaction centres upon the *significance* (i.e., the implications) of her husband's death, his stems mainly from his *personal experience* of the events and places described.⁷⁷

These two concepts — personal significance and personal experience — are somewhat difficult to disentangle in practice, especially in a context where the subjects of (past) personal experience may still be of (present) significance; yet, they are distinguishable theoretically, and differ in terms of their predicted impact on the respondent. Personal significance may be equated with the psychological concept of *involvement*, and will vary to the extent that the issues invoked are

⁷⁴ Thus, Walsh's claim (*ibid.*, at 17) that Odysseus "construes what he hears in relation to some present trouble," which is based on the assumption that enchantment is impassive, loses its validity.

⁷⁵ Phēmios sings the Ἀχαιῶν νόστον ... λυγρόν, ὃν ἐκ Τροίης ἐπετείλατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη ("baneful return of the Akhaians, which Pallas Athēna wrought for them [coming] from Troy," α 326–27). On the probability that the song suggests Odysseus will not return successfully, see n. 19 above.

⁷⁶ Dēmodokos' third song (of the horse and the destruction of Troy) is set approximately ten years before Odysseus' return to Ithaka; the first (of the quarrel with Akhilleus), whether it is set in the *Kypria*, represents a lost text, or is an invention (for a review of the first two positions, see Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*, Chapters 1–4) is set even earlier.

⁷⁷ I do not mean categorically to rule out any present significance of the song to Odysseus. It is possible (though I think it unlikely) he may see in these songs some reason (whether previously known to him or not) for his νόστον ... πολυκηδέ[α] (grievous homecoming, ι 37). My claim is only that such significance is far overshadowed by the continuous evocation of his past situation. Cf. Rinon, "Mise en Abyme and Tragic Signification in the *Odyssey*," at 214: "It is clear that the difference between the Phaeacians' and Odysseus' response to the first song is a function of their different involvement in the narrated events" (although his argument is otherwise opposed to mine).

salient to the individual's situation or the values activated are central to his/her self-conception.⁷⁸ In persuasion research, higher involvement is associated with more extreme attitudes, increased susceptibility to pro-attitudinal advocacy, and increased resistance to counter-attitudinal argument.⁷⁹ According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model proposed by Richard Petty and John Cacioppo, high involvement (*ceteris paribus*) causes persuasion to depend on the active assessment of the merits of the argument (the “central” route) rather than more passive responses to “peripheral” characteristics such as affective cues, speaker credibility, and so on.⁸⁰ As the central route causes the audience to focus on the real-world context of the message, we might expect personal significance — especially of a counter-attitudinal message — to curb transportation.

Personal experience, on the other hand, may be framed in terms of the number and relevance of the listener's memories triggered by the narrative. It is likely, in fact, that personal experience contributes directly to transportation by increasing the vividness of the listener's experience of the narrative. This increase may operate on the vividness of the descriptions, be they of geography (such as when one reads a book or hears a story which is set in countryside, cities, or buildings with which one is intimately familiar) or of actions/emotions (for example, when one reads or hears a narrative in which a character undergoes ordeals or has experiences which one has undergone or experienced oneself). Obviously, a minimum level of relevant personal experience is required to draw sufficient inferences to make any sense of the narrative — this level varies with the obscurity of the references — but experience also allows the construction of inessential inferences and provides

⁷⁸ For this distinction between *outcome-relevant* and *value-relevant involvement* (which have also variously been called *personal importance* and *ego involvement*), see Blair T. Johnson and Alice H. Eagly, “Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A Meta-Analysis,” *Psychological Bulletin* 106, no. 2 (1989): 290–314.

⁷⁹ Akiva Liberman and Sally Chaiken, “The Direct Effect of Personal Relevance on Attitudes,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 22, no. 3 (1996): 269–79, consistently found that pre-message attitudes to issues of high personal relevance (outcome-relevant involvement) differed from (and were more extreme than) those to issues of low personal relevance. For the effects of involvement on persuasion, see especially Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, “Issue Involvement Can Increase or Decrease Persuasion by Enhancing Message-Relevant Cognitive Responses,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37, no. 10 (1979): 1915–26.

⁸⁰ Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, *Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change*, Springer Series in Social Psychology (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986).

details supplementary to the text, both of which enrich the recipient's experience of the narrative world.⁸¹

In Ithaka, then, the reactions of Pēnelope and the suitors to the song of Phēmios are engendered by the high personal significance of its theme, the return of the Akhaians. Both attend to the song's tacit implication that Odysseus has died *en route* or will be killed on his return,⁸² and both exhibit (relatively) extreme reactions: Pēnelope (whose involvement leads her to reject the song) leaves her room, comes downstairs, and asks Phēmios to change his tune; the suitors (whose involvement leads them to endorse it despite any potential dangers) enjoy it for the rest of the day.⁸³

The song is, admittedly, also personally significant to Tēlemakhos, but to a far smaller extent than his mother. He knows his father only by reputation because he was only a baby when Odysseus departed for Troy; effectively, though he may feel more abstract family loyalty towards his father (a form of value-relevant involvement), his knowledge of Odysseus is the same as that of many others “in broad Hellas and middle Argos” (α 344). His ignorance is ironically reflected in his flat refusal to accept his father's identity at π 192–200 when the latter reveals it to him in Eumaios' hut.⁸⁴ Hence, although Tēlemakhos claims μάλιστα δέ μ' ἄλγος ἰκάνει (“grief comes mostly to me,” β 41) in his speech to the Ithakan assembly and he lists the death of his father first when he explains his κακὰ ... δοιά (“two troubles,” 45–46), this loss is less important to him than the imposition of the suitors: their presence is an evil which, he states, is καὶ πολὺ μείζον (“far greater still,” 48). He, therefore, seems not to attend to the subtext of the song, and his

⁸¹ On the role of inferences in the construction of narrative worlds, see especially Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, Chapter 2, and the discussion starting below, p. 66.

⁸² For the song's implication of Odysseus' death, see n. 19 above.

⁸³ α 421–23 (=σ 304–06). The suitors' reaction is possibly more extreme also in that they are unusually silent (itself a sign of enchantment): see n. 71 above.

⁸⁴ Admittedly, the revelation is effected by different means, but the scepticism of Tēlemakhos contrasts markedly with the immediate recognitions of Eurykleia (τ 467–75) and of Eumaios and Philoitios (φ 221–25); Pēnelope's recognition is, of course, delayed, but even though she is famously sceptical about Eurykleia's claim (ψ 11–24) she does allow the possibility that her husband has returned (ψ 32–38).

opinion of the song itself is based on “peripheral” cues, such as the identity or ability of the singer.⁸⁵

In Skheria, on the other hand, Odysseus differs from the remainder of Dēmodokos’ audience most obviously in his level of personal experience of the action of the songs. We cannot assume that Odysseus values the ideals of the songs — presumably honour, duty, and bravery; perhaps the superiority of intelligence over force⁸⁶ — more highly than do the Phaiakians.⁸⁷ It is not unreasonable to suppose, however, that although he and the Phaiakians listen to the same text his experience of it, supplemented massively by his own memories of the places and people about whom Dēmodokos sings, will be inherently more vivid. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that his reaction is more extreme.

Story-World Presence

I wish to suggest, in fact, that Odysseus is enchanted by Dēmodokos’ songs (and to a far greater extent than the Phaiakians), because there is evidence that he is transported and feels present within the story world as he listens. If we return to his praise for the singer, we can recall that Odysseus says ἀείδεις ... ὡς τέ που ... αὐτὸς παρεὼν (“you have sung ... as if you were somehow there yourself,” θ 489–91). The suggestion of *Dēmodokos’* presence at the scene perhaps indicates that *Odysseus*, during the singing, felt almost as if he were there (again) himself.⁸⁸

This impression is reinforced by the simile describing his tears at the third song. Dēmodokos’ tale is, as Gregory Nagy notes, itself an *Iliou Persis*, and the simile completes the song Alkinoös interrupts;⁸⁹ the description of Odysseus weeping like

⁸⁵ Cf., e.g., α 370–71. It is also possible that Tēlemakhos bases his opinion of Phēmios on the enjoyment of those around him or is motivated by a desire for group conformity. Both of these are also peripheral cues.

⁸⁶ For the interpretation of Dēmodokos’ first song as a quarrel between Odysseus and Akhilleus over whether it would be preferable to use bravery or trickery to defeat Hektōr / capture Troy, see Σ E ad θ 75, BE ad θ 77, and the somewhat self-reinforcing interpretation of Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*, Chapter 1 §§11–12, Chapter 4 §§5–8.

⁸⁷ The only factor which may increase the *present* personal significance of the song to Odysseus compared to the Phaiakians is the magnification of his honour. For evidence of the significance of fame and honour to Odysseus, see ι 20 and λ 356–61. Forms of κλέος occur twice (in consecutive lines) in the description of Dēmodokos’ first song (θ 73, 74).

⁸⁸ Cf., similarly, Robert J. Rabel, “Interruption in the *Odyssey*,” *Colby Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2002): 77–93 at 81.

⁸⁹ Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*, at 101.

a participant in the story — an Andromakhē⁹⁰ — effectively transports us, the external audience, geographically and temporally, to the scene Dēmodokos depicts. Here, in addition to the bard, Odysseus and the external audience also become pseudo-eye-witnesses to the events of the story as we too observe the action of the song “as if we were there ourselves.”

This concept, again, is not entirely new to Homeric studies. Samuel Elliot Bassett, for example, described (in 1938) “the ‘spell’ of reality” cast by Homer’s poetry as the “epic illusion,” and cast it in terms of presence in the story world which causes absence from the real world. Somewhat more recently, Andrew Ford described the “purpose of poetry” as “vividness” (he uses also the Greek term, ἐνάργεια), the “sense that the past is somehow present before us.”⁹¹ Egbert Bakker, who cites Ford, approaches vividness from a linguistic angle and shows that the poet uses stylized conversational techniques to construct the pretence of the audience and narrator’s shared vision;⁹² because the narrator seems to speak as if present in the story world, the audience’s feeling of presence on the scene is presupposed.⁹³

As we shall see clearly when we return to them in a moment, one of the features these treatments have in common is that they all focus on the text rather than on the auditor/reader. They add, therefore, little to our understanding of *Odysseus’* reactions to the first and third songs of Dēmodokos as the epitomized “texts” preserved in the *Odyssey* are far too abbreviated to allow them to generate (m)any meaningful conclusions. The theory I propose to bring to bear on *Odysseus’* (and

⁹⁰ On the allusion to Andromakhē in the simile at θ 523–30, see above, p. 23 n. 59.

⁹¹ Ford, *Homer*, at 49. On ἐνάργεια, especially for its relationships with *vision*, see Graham Zanker, “Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry,” *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 123 (1980): 297–311.

⁹² On vividness, see Egbert J. Bakker, *Poetry in Speech: Orality and Homeric Discourse*, Myth and Poetics. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), at 54–85, especially 74–80; and Egbert J. Bakker, “Storytelling in the Future: Truth, Time, and Tense in Homeric Epic,” in *Written Voices, Spoken Signs: Tradition, Performance, and the Epic Text*, ed. Egbert J. Bakker and Ahuvia Kahane, Center for Hellenic Studies Colloquia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 11–36. On transportation (as presence), see also Egbert J. Bakker, “Discourse and Performance: Involvement, Visualization, and ‘Presence’ in Homeric Poetry,” *Classical Antiquity* 12, no. 1 (1993): 1–29.

⁹³ See further below; actually, Bakker’s scheme involves invoking the story world *into* the narrating instance (in which the auditor is present) rather than transporting the audience from the real world into the story world *per se*. Although Bakker might deny it, this is also a form of transportation, as the audience’s awareness of the real world must be diminished. Bakker, “Storytelling in the Future,” at 15–35 also (rightly) sets up the present of the narrating instance as the epic narrative’s future, which, in itself, involves a type of (temporal) transportation.

Pēnelope's) reactions to epic songs, on the other hand, focuses on the audience almost to the exclusion of the text. Let us proceed, therefore, with an account of this theory and the ways in which it corresponds with and complements the treatments mentioned above.

Transportation

As we have seen above, the reactions displayed by members of audiences internal to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to the framed narratives within the epics may be partly explained in terms of the different extents to which those audience members are transported by the story. Hence, although the suitors and Pēnelope hear the same song from Phēmios in α, they react in such different ways partly because the suitors are transported from the real world by the story while she remains firmly within it; similarly, the degree to which Odysseus and the Phaiakians remain in the real world or feel present in the scene of the song partly explains their reactions to the Trojan songs of Dēmodokos (θ 73–82, 499–520), even though all members of the audience receive the same narrative.

Just as the reactions of internal audiences to internal narratives can be and have been seen as model responses for the external audience to imitate,⁹⁴ so also transportation applies both to internal and external audiences (of, one might add, both oral and written narratives). The relationship in this case is, however, inverted: although transportation (and its constituent parts of real-world absence and story-world presence) is reflected in the epics by the language used to describe the reception of narratives — particularly the verbs *τέρπω* and *θέλω* — it is a phenomenon identified in the external audience which we may use to gain greater insights into the reactions exhibited by the internal audiences.

⁹⁴ See, e.g., William F. Wyatt, Jr., "Homer in Performance: *Iliad* I.348–427," *Classical Journal* 83, no. 4 (1988): 289–97 at 290–91; Macleod, "Homer on Poetry and the Poetry of Homer," at 9; and Rinon, "Mise en Abyme and Tragic Signification in the *Odyssey*," at 214: "the response of the listeners to the bard's song is a *mise en abyme* of that of the *Odyssey*'s addressees." Cf. the example given by Eliza Miruna Ghil, "A Romanian Singer of Tales: Vasile Tetin," *Oral Tradition* 1 (1986): 607–35 at 612–13 (also cited by Richard P. Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad*, Myth and Poetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), at 6) of the Romanian singer who tactfully rebuked his audience for inattention by pretending to mock his backup musician for falling asleep.

In using the term “transportation” here, I am taking my cues from a group of cognitive psychologists interested in reading and the reception of narratives. Specifically, I am following a model proposed by the psychologist Richard Gerrig to elucidate the experience of narratives.⁹⁵ Gerrig drew upon metaphors of being “lost in a book” or “miles away” when reading⁹⁶ and used the term “transportation” to describe the phenomenon that a reader’s *extra-diegetic* environment (physical location, background noise, factual knowledge of the real world, and so on) may become, to some extent, inaccessible *while experiencing the narrative*. In other words the way we may, when reading, be in some way absent from the “real world” and/or feel present within the “story world.”

This is, in fact, a widely recognized phenomenon, though it goes by different names in different disciplines. It is similar, for example, to Coleridge’s famous prerequisite for the experience of poetry, the “willing suspension of disbelief for the moment”;⁹⁷ it is similar also to a phenomenon in Film Studies called the “diegetic effect” (that viewers may lose awareness of the fact that they are in a cinema and feel somehow present in the scene depicted) which has also been adopted in narratology;⁹⁸ in Virtual Reality Studies this is called “presence” (or “tele-presence”);⁹⁹ Marie-Laure

⁹⁵ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*.

⁹⁶ The experiments on which Gerrig based his concept of transportation revolved around the experience of written texts; hence, I use the term “reading” here for accuracy and convenience rather than an implication of some ideological position on the literacy of the composer of the Homeric epics. Like Gerrig, I take the term “narrative” to be independent of mode of presentation; along with reception of oral performance reading written books, we can refer to the reception of drama, cinema, music, and visual arts all as (or as evoking) narratives.

⁹⁷ Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, Revised ed. (London: J.M. Dent, 1956 [originally published: London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1906]), at 168–69 (Chapter 24). Note that there are differences too, such as that Coleridge’s formulation presupposes a conscious choice, where transportation assumes that the passive is also possible; Richard J. Gerrig and William S. Horton, “Of Texts and Toggles: Categorical versus Continuous Views of Communication,” *Discourse Processes* 32, no. 1 (2001): 81–87 argue for a “willing construction of disbelief.”

⁹⁸ For film studies, see *e.g.*, Noël Burch, *To the Distant Observer: Form and Meaning in the Japanese Cinema* (London: Scolar Press, 1979), at 19; Ed S. H. Tan, “Film-Induced Affect as a Witness Emotion,” *Poetics* 23, no. 1–2 (1994): 7–32 at 12; and Ed S. H. Tan, *Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as an Emotion Machine*, trans. Barbara Fastling (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), at 52–56 and especially Chapter 6. The term was introduced to narratology by Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse*, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980 [originally published as “Discours du récit” in *Figures III*, Editions du Seuil, 1972]).

⁹⁹ See, *e.g.*, Jonathan Steuer, “Defining Virtual Reality: Dimensions Determining Telepresence,” *Journal of Communication* 42, no. 4 (1992): 73–93; Matthew Lombard and Theresa Ditton, “At the Heart of it All: The Concept of Presence,” *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 3, no. 2 (1997): [<http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol3/issue2/lombard.html>]; and Frank Biocca, Jin Kim, and Yung Choi, “Visual Touch in Virtual Environments: An Exploratory Study of Presence, Multimodal Interfaces, and Cross-Modal Sensory Illusions.,” *Presence: Teleoperators & Virtual Environments* 10, no. 3 (2001): 247–65.

Ryan, a literary theorist, discussed two concepts very similar to transportation (the evocation of a narrative world into the real one, and the transportation of the audience from the real world into the narrative one) under the rubric of “recentering”;¹⁰⁰ and the psychologist Kenneth Oatley wrote simply of “absorption” or “entering the world [of the text].”¹⁰¹ Each of these (with the possible exception of Coleridge’s formula) implies an absence from the real world by means of felt presence within the story world.

Indeed, as I indicated above, the phenomenon is not without precedent in Homeric studies also although the concepts rarely connect real-world absence with story-world presence explicitly. In addition to *enchantment* as described by George Walsh, I mentioned Samuel Bassett’s *epic illusion* and the notion of *vividness* described by Andrew Ford and elaborated (in terms of *involvement*) by Egbert Bakker. Before we proceed with an account of Gerrig’s transportation (and the subsequent elaborations of his model by the psychologists Melanie Green and Timothy Brock), let us turn briefly to these more familiar theories.

Enchantment

George Walsh argues that the detail and guaranteed truth of epic songs presupposed by the *Odyssey* discourage their (internal) audiences from verifying their contents against any external standard, and encourage an “unconsciousness of [oneself and one’s] present situation.” With explicit reference to Homeric vocabulary of storytelling (specifically θέλγω and θελκτήριοι) he describes this state as enchantment (θέλιξις), and opposes it to *synthesis* (epitomized by Pēnelope at α 328–29¹⁰²), “the listener’s effort to grasp what the speaker means.”¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Marie-Laure Ryan, “The Text as World versus the Text as Game: Possible Worlds Semantics and Postmodern Theory,” *Journal of Literary Semantics* 27, no. 3 (1998): 137–63 discussed “recentering” oneself to the narrative or the narrative to oneself; in either case the centrality of the self *vis-à-vis* the real world is diminished.

¹⁰¹ Keith Oatley, “Meetings of Minds: Dialogue, Sympathy, and Identification, in Reading Fiction,” *Poetics* 26, no. 5–6 (1999): 439–54 at 441, wrote of “absorption” into the “story world”; Keith Oatley, “A Taxonomy of the Emotions of Literary Response and a Theory of Identification in Fictional Narrative,” *Poetics* 23, no. 1–2 (1994): 53–74 at 54, wrote of “entering the world created by the artist, as Alice enters the world through the looking glass.”

¹⁰² τοῦ δ’ ὑπερωϊόθεν φρεσὶ σύνθετο θέσπιν ἀοιδῆν | κούρη Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρων Πηνελόπεια (From an upper room perspicacious Pēnelope, daughter of Ikarios, *joined with her mind/thoughts* his divine song).

Enchantment, then, as Walsh uses the term, is clearly similar to the notion of real-world absence (described above as one half of internal audiences' reactions to epic [and epic-esque] narrations in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*); its opposite, synthesis, in turn, is explicitly grounded in the real world, as it involves the combination of intra- and extra-diegetic information. There is, however, no room for story-world presence in this scheme: a maximally enchanted audience does not feel a corporeal presence on the scene of the narrative, but seems minimally conscious. In the limit, the most enchanting song — that of the Seirēns — brings the most unconsciousness.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, in defining the response as passive and impersonal, Walsh excludes any provocation to action or expression of emotion from his instances of enchantment.¹⁰⁵ His scheme, indeed, accounts very well for the silences of audiences of long narratives within the *Odyssey*,¹⁰⁶ for the ability of conspicuous events occurring in the same room to escape their notice,¹⁰⁷ and for the reaction of Pēnelope to the song of Phēmios.¹⁰⁸ As I have argued above, however, the exclusion of Odysseus (reacting to the Trojan songs of Dēmodokos) on the supposition that he “construes what he hears in relation to some present trouble” is not justified.¹⁰⁹

Walsh also treats enchantment (in Homeric terms) almost exclusively as a narrative device; although his chapter on Homer is titled “truth and the psychology of the audience,” those audiences are predominantly internal to the

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¹⁰³ Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment*, at 13–19, especially 13–14 and 17. Forms of συντίθημι occur 13× in the epics (A 76, Z 334, H 44, T 84, α 328, ο 27, 318, π 259, ρ 153, σ 129, τ 268, υ 92, ω 265), always in the sense of attending to and comprehending words.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, at 15.

¹⁰⁵ This is something of a problematic move in the context of Odysseus' reaction to the Seirēns, as at μ 192–94 Odysseus' desire to listen causes him to attempt to communicate with his companions (he describes it as ordering them) using physical signals (ὄφρῦσι νευστάζων, “nodding [his] eyebrows”); this is quite different from the *wholly passive* response Walsh envisions.

¹⁰⁶ The suitors listen to Phēmios in silence (α 325 [cf. 339]); the Phaiakians listen to Odysseus in silence (λ 333–34 = ν 1–2); and Eumaios mentions silence suggestively (in conjunction with a form of τέρπω) at ο 391.

¹⁰⁷ Even if we cannot infer that the Phaiakians listen to the first and third songs of Dēmodokos in silence (though it would be a reasonable conclusion given the evidence of other performances cited in the previous note), their general failure to notice Odysseus' lamentation (θ 93–95 = 532–34) is still odd given that he is “groaning deeply” (95, 534).

¹⁰⁸ That is, that Pēnelope is not enchanted and *actively enters the room* to attempt to have the song discontinued. See above.

¹⁰⁹ Walsh, *The Varieties of Enchantment*, at 17, and see above.

text.¹¹⁰ It is, however, worth considering explicitly whether or not enchantment (or, more generally, Homeric depiction of audience response) is broadly representative (even if in some highly stylized form) of the reactions of the external audience in an ancient (oral performance) and/or modern (literary reading) context.

In order to do so, we must examine the reactions exhibited by actual audiences during the reception of epic narrative. This, however, immediately begs an important question: although an examination of the reactions of the audience in a modern literary context is feasible, how is it possible to examine audience reactions in an ancient context? We cannot simply adopt the circular argument that enchantment must have been a feature of ancient audience responses solely on the grounds that the text models (in the reactions of its internal audiences) the “proper” response of the external audience;¹¹¹ we must look for evidence external to the text.

Some evidence that enchantment was, in ancient times, more than just a literary device may be seen in Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen*. Gorgias, protesting Helen’s innocence against accusations that she left Menelaos of her own accord, describes the power of language (λόγος) in strong terms. It is a powerful force (δυνάστης μέγας),

ὃς μικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξήσαι.¹¹²

Gorgias describes the effect of language on one’s opinion (δόξα τῆς ψυχῆς) as change, persuasion, and *enchantment*.¹¹³ The fact that Gorgias uses the same verb as

¹¹⁰ Walsh (*ibid.*, at 4–5) makes only two (tangential) comments about external audiences: that the reactions of Odysseus and the Phaiakians to Dēmodokos’ songs “seem a little odd according to modern notions,” but that (in the absence of any middle ground) Odysseus’ tears are more reasonable for an ancient audience than the Phaiakians’ impassive response.

¹¹¹ That is, this argument becomes circular when we argue that enchantment as portrayed in the epics is realistic because it was a feature of the external-audience response. The argument that internal-audience responses act as models for the external audience only stands if we limit our consideration to the implied composer and his desires for audience responses.

¹¹² Gorg. *Enc. Helen* § 8: which can by the smallest and unseen body bring about the most divine effects; for it is able to stop fear and remove pain and imbue delight and increase pity.

¹¹³ Gorg. *Enc. Helen* § 10: αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπαγωγὰ ἐπαγωγῶν ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγῶν λύπης γίνονται· συγγιγνομένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπωδῆς ἔθελε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητεία. For the inspired incantations are, by words, bringers of joy and

... (continued)

Homer (θέλω) establishes continuity between the Homeric view of the power of stories and Gorgias' view of the power of words;¹¹⁴ the fact that he treats this as a plausible defence — equivalent to γοητεία (witchcraft) — suggests, even in the context of rhetorical hyperbole, that the concept was not seen as a literary pretence in antiquity but as a psychological reality.

The most explicit evidence for enchantment as a realistic facet of audience response in an ancient oral-performance context, however, is to be found in Plato's *Ion*.¹¹⁵ In his demonstration that the rhapsode is possessed (κατέχεται, 535 e) during performance, Sōkratēs asks Iōn whether, whenever he speaks well and most “amazes” (ἐκπλήξῃ) his audience, he is “in his right mind” (or “rational” ἔμφρων) or his soul, “in its enthusiasm” (ἐνθουσιάζουσα), thinks him to be (present) “beside the action” (παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν) he narrates. When Iōn replies that his eyes run with tears when he says something pitiful and his hair stands straight in fear and his heart leaps when he says something fearful or dreadful, Sōkratēs reasonably concludes that he is not rational and asks,

οἴσθα οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῶν θεατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ταῦτα ταῦτα ὑμεῖς ἐργάζεσθε;¹¹⁶

Even if we accuse Plato of gross hyperbole, we might use Iōn's (affirmative) answer as evidence that some visible displays of emotion were not just the prerogative of the rhapsode, but also plausible audience responses to good rhapsodic performance.¹¹⁷ Sōkratēs links such emotional displays from the rhapsode with a feeling of presence on the scene of the story, and the fact that audiences react in the same manner implies a link on their part also. Indeed, the presence of such a link is reinforced by the sense of movement inherent in the verb he uses —

(continued)

removers of pain; for coming together with the teaching (opinion) of the soul, the power of the incantation *enchants* and persuades and reorients/changes it by witchcraft.

¹¹⁴ Indeed, the power of words to stop fear and pain would rely on an inaccessibility of the (real-world) knowledge causing that fear or pain. As such, Gorgias' view is inherently similar to that seen in the Homeric use of θέλω described above.

¹¹⁵ *Ion* 535 b–e, part of which is quoted at the head of this chapter.

¹¹⁶ Pl. *Ion* 535 e: “And so do you know that you do these very things to the majority of your spectators also?”

¹¹⁷ It is possible that Plato, so familiar with Homeric epic, alludes here to the reactions discussed above of Pēnelope to Phēmios and Odysseus to Dēmodokos. On balance, however, this is unlikely: while the tears of Iōn's audience make him rich (as do Odysseus' Dēmodokos), their laughter makes him poor (which is unparalleled in the *Odyssey*). Similarly, Iōn may be referring to Ω 359 with his description of his hair standing on end, but hearts never leap in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*.

ἐκπλήγνυμι (literally, to expel or drive one out [of one's senses], hence to amaze) — to describe what Iōn does to his audience.

Iōn's irrationality (which Sōkratēs so vividly identifies) is, in fact, very similar to a long-standing problem Richard Gerrig addresses with his notion of transportation. Sōkratēs argues (535 d) that Iōn is not rational because he cries out or reacts with fear when nobody is attacking him and he is surrounded by a multitude of benevolent people; Iōn is irrational because he reacts emotionally to an unreal (fictional) situation where a strictly rational man would realize he had no cause for alarm; he is, literally, οὐκ ἔμψρων: not in his (right) mind. In a similar way, philosophers such as Colin Radford and John Searle have pondered how it is possible for us to react affectively (or even speak seriously) about fictional characters; a strictly rational reader/speaker, cognizant of the fact that the object of her/his emotion/opinion does not exist, is being inconsistent when s/he feels a genuine emotional response or makes a sincere assertion about a fictional entity.¹¹⁸

Gerrig argues, however, that the knowledge which would lead to inconsistency (*e.g.* the fictionality of the situation or referent) simply does not intrude upon the reader's experience of the narrative *while s/he remains transported*: “[t]o bring ... [such knowledge] to mind is to exit the narrative world.” This “paradox of fiction,” therefore, is simply typical of a common situation in which rational beliefs fail to affect our behavioural responses in a thorough and consistent manner.¹¹⁹ It is, further, dependent on transportation in that a psychological separation between

¹¹⁸ On affective reactions, see especially Colin Radford, “How Can We be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supplementary Volume 49 (1975): 67–80 and Kendall L. Walton, “Fearing Fictions,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 75, no. 1 (1978): 5–27. Radford's view was immediately questioned by Michael Weston, “How Can We be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supplementary Volume 49 (1975): 81–93, who saw our affective reactions as motivated aesthetically by the characters' (or events') contexts within a work of art. For a recent move in the right direction, see Glenn A. Hartz, “How We Can be Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony,” *Philosophy* 74, no. 4 (1999): 557–78. For further bibliography, see Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 180.

On the infelicity of speech about fictional referents, see the stimulating essay “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse” in John R. Searle, *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), at 58–75, especially his example at 70: “There never existed a Mrs. Sherlock Holmes because Holmes never got married, but there did exist a Mrs. Watson because Watson did get married, though Mrs. Watson died not long after their marriage.” Searle adds (p. 72), “I did not *pretend* to refer to a real Sherlock Holmes; I *really referred* to the fictional Sherlock Holmes.”

¹¹⁹ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 137; at 179–91 he adduces, *inter alia*, phobics' irrational fears of spiders and insects, and an empirical study in which participants were reluctant to drink from a cup labelled “cyanide” even though they knew it contained sugar-water.

the audience members and their real-world context (and knowledge) removes the irrationality/inconsistency of the responses.¹²⁰ Perhaps Iōn and his audience *are*, as Sōkratēs asserts, acting irrationally; but their actions are explicable in terms of transportation and support my argument that the concept should not be limited to a modern performance context.¹²¹

It is possible to cast doubts, of course, upon the appropriateness of using these slightly later sources as evidence for the reception of Homeric epic in pre-Classical times. In defence, one might cite the similarity between Gorgias' effect of words and Hesiod's description of the power of epic song (*Th.* 98–103). This, admittedly, does not obviate the problem: we cannot prove conclusively what the reactions of Homer's "original" audiences were, regardless of how one construes that audience; but we may, while acknowledging that some uncertainty exists, see the evidence as suggestive of the existence of a psychological reality behind enchantment in performance contexts temporally much closer to Homer's than the modern day.

It is with the plausibility of this connection in mind, then, that we should observe (as noted above) that it is possible to examine the reactions of audiences receiving the narrative of the epics in a modern context.¹²² It is in this context that it is possible to assess the extent to which the Homeric depiction of audience response is broadly representative of the responses of actual, external audiences receiving the narrative. The concept of transportation (to which we will return), especially in its bases in empirical studies, will, when compared to Walsh's and others'

¹²⁰ Radford, "How Can We be Moved," at 71, objected to this sort of solution on the grounds that if we genuinely believed the action (*e.g.*, Mercutio's death in *Romeo and Juliet*) was real we would take appropriate action or "reproach ourselves for not doing so" (76). He takes the absence of an overt reaction as evidence of our awareness throughout the process that we are aware the action is fictional. Yet, the response we feel (*e.g.*, fear or horror) precedes such action temporally and Radford's evidence does not contradict a vestigial sequence (such as an urge to take action) which is never fully realized.

¹²¹ Plato's Sōkratēs himself, indeed, seems to include himself amongst those who react affectively to fictional narrative in the tenth book of the *Republic*: οἱ γὰρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὀμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὄδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἷσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῆ. "For some of the best of us, listening to Homer or another of the tragedians imitating one of the heroes in pain and extending a great speech in his lamentations or both singing (chanting) and smiting himself in grief, you know that we rejoice and, surrendering ourselves, we follow it being sympathetic and eager, and we assert how the poet is good, whoever most dispose us thus." (Pl. R. 605c 10–d 5).

¹²² Such observation has, indeed, been carried out as part of the preparation for this thesis.

descriptions of Homeric depictions of aesthetic response, provide evidence that this overlap is quite substantial, and that hence the Homeric representation is more than a mere literary device.¹²³

The Epic Illusion

Samuel Elliot Bassett described “the ‘spell’ of reality” cast by Homer’s poetry as “the epic illusion,” and elaborated,

If for the moment we can put reason in abeyance, we are “enthralled.” The spell of poetry can make the hearer forget both himself and the poet and the real world about him. It can banish all awareness that an image of life is being presented, because of its magic power to make the image seem the only reality.¹²⁴

For Bassett, the epic illusion depended on three subsidiary illusions: those of “Historicity,” “Vitality,” and “Personality.” The first brings certainty to the audience that the story is literally true; the second is the way the story suppresses the obviousness of geographical or temporal inversions and ellipses; and the third is the creation of authenticity of character, especially through direct speech.¹²⁵

Clearly the epic illusion is very similar to the phenomenon of transportation developed here,¹²⁶ especially in that it combines the notions of reduced awareness of the real world with some sort of imagined presence within the story world. The acceptance of an illusion as reality, after all, involves some psychological distance

¹²³ One might object, of course, that these alternatives (realistic or literary device) are not the only possibilities; another is that the depictions of narrative receptions in the epics reflect an ancient “folk psychology” — whether accurate or not — of audience response that Homer shared with his original audience but not with us moderns. The poet does, after all, as Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 25–26, and Ford, *Homer*, at 54–55 both note, seem to ascribe some sort of magic power to stories (cf. λ 334 = ν 2, and see further below). Yet, when we are concerned (as we are here) with the depiction of the response rather than its explanation, “folk psychology” is to be grouped with “realism” in that the interpretation is of a realistically described, observed phenomenon.

¹²⁴ Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 25–26.

¹²⁵ On the illusion of historicity, Bassett (*ibid.*, at 28–32) wrote of the “[removal] from the mind of the hearer every doubt that the characters of the tale once actually lived and that the events are historically true,” and invoked the Homeric Muse(s) as the poet’s “authority” for “the facts.” On the illusion of vitality, he (32–56) discussed the poet’s techniques for projecting “the impression of the onward movement of time” when the narrative “retraces its steps” (*e.g.*, by omitting words such as “earlier...”; 32–42) or where “flat spaces” are elided (*e.g.*, by including parallel action or minutiae; 42–47), and for suppressing sudden changes of scene (frequently by effecting such transitions via the movement of his characters; 47–56). On the illusion of personality (57–80) he discusses “the dramatic in Homer” and realism of literary character as effected through direct speech.

¹²⁶ Indeed, Bassett (*ibid.*, at 26–27) wrote of poetry which “transports us to the realms of gold” and of “words which transport us to the world of heroes.”

between our moment-by-moment experience and our extra-diegetic knowledge of our identity, geographic and temporal situation, and so on.

Yet there are significant differences. One might ask, for example, whether Bassett's illusion of historicity is a prerequisite for, or a consequence of, the epic illusion. For Bassett, the chief factor which imparts to the audience an "unshaken conviction" in the truth of the epic is the authority of the narrator; the omniscient Muses impart to the whole epic (as Odysseus did to the ἀπόλογοι) the authority of an eye-witness. This, however, implies that the audience would otherwise be sceptical. If, in other words, Homer did not invoke the Muse (or Goddess) at the beginning of the *Odyssey* and *Iliad*, then the illusion of historicity (and, with it, the epic illusion) would be dissolved.

Such scepticism is, however, unrealistic. Bassett himself notes that the repeated invocations of the Muse(s) in the *Iliad* imply the audience do not remain "conscious of the Muse as the narrator,"¹²⁷ and it seems equally unlikely that they remain conscious of the Muse as guarantor of authority. Indeed, were the invocations to the Muses to be omitted from the epics, the effect on the audience's moment-by-moment experience of the narratives would probably be minimal because rather than scepticism, it is *belief* which is our default assumption.¹²⁸ Scepticism depends not on the speaker's authority or the inherent likelihood of the assertions, but rather on the audience's *ability to evaluate* those factors, and this ability, in turn, depends on the availability of contextualizing real-world knowledge against which they may be assessed.

Such real-world knowledge is, however, suppressed by the epic illusion — as Bassett himself implied in the passage quoted above — in that enchantment, the complement to the phenomenon of transportation, involves *absence* from the real world. Thus, when transported by the story (as Bassett would put it, when under

¹²⁷ Bassett, *ibid.*, at 31.

¹²⁸ There is, indeed, empirical evidence that belief, not scepticism, is our default mode of behaviour. See Daniel T. Gilbert, Romin W. Tafarodi, and Patrick S. Malone, "You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65, no. 2 (1993): 221–33. Correspondingly, there is empirical evidence that transportation suppresses scepticism: Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock, "The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 5 (2000): 701–21 at 711 s.v. "Transportation and Pinocchio circling."

the spell of the epic illusion), an audience is inherently less able to break the illusion of historicity by questioning the narrative content.

Thus it seems that the illusion of historicity is a consequence of, rather than a prerequisite for, the epic illusion. One might object here that the epic illusion may be dissolved by the breaking of the illusion of historicity, and that therefore the latter is the prerequisite for the former. If, for example, the illusion of historicity were to be broken by the inclusion in the narrative of information which is patently impossible, the epic illusion would thereby be destroyed. Yet, this objection is subject to the same criticism as Bassett's dependence on the speaker's authority: both assume that the audience members retain the ability to assess the plausibility of the narrative assertions. Rather, the assessment of the information as impossible (which breaks the illusion of historicity) is itself indicative of the dissolution of the epic illusion.

In the elucidation of his illusion of vitality, Bassett provides insights into the strategies employed by the poet to avoid drawing the audience's attention to the fact that it is receiving an artificially constructed narrative. The poet, for example, suppresses temporal inversions (to give the impression that the poem, like life, flows constantly in a single direction) by narrating simultaneous actions sequentially (as Bassett shows, for example, in his close reading of Z 495–516¹²⁹); similarly, he changes scene "realistically" by following characters' movements;¹³⁰ and he maintains local coherence (to avoid forcing the audience's attention too far from the action) by preferring repetition to a reliance on previously narrated action.¹³¹

The illusion of personality stands part way between the illusions of vitality and historicity: in portraying the characters in a realistic manner (by allowing them to speak), the poet suppresses considerations that the characters are not real and hence distracts the audience's attention from the fact that it is receiving a narrative. This illusion is, however, somewhat less demonstrable than the illusion

¹²⁹ Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 35.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, at e.g., 47–48.

¹³¹ Bassett (*ibid.*, at 40–42) shows the utility of this approach for explaining the (somewhat redundant) second scene council of the Gods (ε 3–42), and we may note that the transition between this scene and the next (on Kalypsō's island) is effected by following the movements of one of the characters (Hermēs).

of vitality, and Bassett provides little objective evidence that direct speech is responsible for our apprehension of a character as “real.” Each of the characters he identifies as personalities is the subject of an extended episode in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, and we may legitimately question whether this realism is simply a function of the amount of text dedicated to the character. In other words, given the “realism” of objects (such as Akhilleus’ shield) or landscapes (such as Alkinoös’ garden) which receive extended descriptions, we should ask whether it is possible that an extended *description* of the (physical or behavioural) oddities of a character would leave one with an impression of reality in just the same way as an extended speech.

This is, however, inherently unlikely, as the mimetic nature of direct speech — its ability to show, rather than describe, the characters’ actions¹³² — allows the peculiarities of character which make the literary creation “real” to be conveyed more efficiently; hence, fewer lines of direct speech than description would be required to produce a given level of realism.¹³³ Indeed, this potential (apparent even in our written texts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) is increased by features of performance — such as the composer’s ability to modulate the tone, volume speed and pitch of his voice (not to mention physical stance or the use of gesture) in order to imitate the peculiarities of a character’s manner — which, though traces might remain in the text, are largely irrecoverable.¹³⁴

¹³² Martin, *Language of Heroes*, at 45–46, notes that “[s]peech is ... the arena for pure mimesis,” and cites Pl. *Ion* as evidence that in “rhapsodic performance ... the heroes’ speeches were acted out in voice and character.” Martin does not identify a particular passage of the *Ion*, but see, e.g., 535e 9–536a 1 (σὺ ὁ ῥαψωδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, [the middle ring is] “you, the rhapsode and actor”). One might add to this all of 535 (discussed above), though Iōn’s displays seem to be genuine affective reactions to the texts he recites rather than pretences.

¹³³ Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 58, sees the endurance of the *Kyklōps* in Classical literature as being due to his personality (in turn dependent on his speech) and contrasts against him the royal family of the *Laistrygones*; we might add that of the other characters of the ἀπόλογοι who do not speak — the *Kikōnes*, the *Lōtophagoi*, the *Skylla*, and *Kharybdis* — only the *Skylla* receives a post-Homeric literary treatment (*Met.* XIII 898–XIV 74; in, indeed, a minor role [the object of Kirkē’s revenge against Glaucus] within a sequence [XII 1–XIV 608] evidently designed to provide a background to the *Odyssey* and *Aeneid*).

On the lack of literary treatments of the *Lōtophagoi*, see especially Denys Lionel Page, *Folktales in Homer’s Odyssey*, The Carl Newell Jackson Lectures, 1972 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), at 6–7.

¹³⁴ For a superb example of how such traces may remain in the text, see the exposition of Thersitēs’ “unmeasured” speech in terms of correption and synizesis by Martin, *Language of Heroes*, at 112–13. There are also several descriptions of voice in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* which suggest an individual’s tone: e.g., the *Kyklōps* has a φθόγγον ... βαρὺν (“deep voice,” ι 257);

... (continued)

Although mimicry of a character’s voice is largely dependent upon the particular performance, it is possible that aspects of pitch and speed might be preserved to some extent in the metre.¹³⁵ Consider, in this context, Odysseus’ report to his companions that they must visit the underworld before going home:

“Φάσθε νύ ποῦ οἰκόνδε φίλῃν ἔς πατρίδα γαῖαν
 ἔρχεσθ· ἄλλῃν δ’ ἡμῖν ὄδον τεκμηῖρατὸ Κίρκῃ
 εἰς Ἄϊδάο δόμους καὶ ἔπαινῆς Περσεφονείης
 ψυχῆ χρησομένους Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο.” κ 562–65.¹³⁶

Stanford describes this as “the hardest news [Odysseus] ever had to break to his companions,” and notes that their reaction (tearing their hair in 567) is unparalleled elsewhere in the *Odyssey*.¹³⁷ Surely it is not fanciful to suggest that the relative paucity of dactyls¹³⁸ reflects Odysseus’ aversion to being the bearer of bad news and unwillingness to undertake the journey.

By way of contrast, compare the animation with which Eurykleia reports to Pēnelope that Odysseus has returned:

“ἔγρεο, Πηνελόπειά, φίλον τέκος, ὄφρα ἴδῃαι
 ὀφθαλμοῖσι τεοῖσι τὰ τ’ ἔλδαι ἡματα πάντα.
 ἦλθ’ Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ οἶκον ἰκάνεται, ὄψε περ ἔλθῶν.”

(continued)

Thersitēs speaks ὀξέα κεκλήγων (“clashing shrilly,” B 222); and Stentōr is χαλκεόφωνος (“brass-voiced” [presumably loud and clear], E 785).

¹³⁵ I cannot agree with the conclusion of Martin L. West, “Homer’s Meter,” in *A New Companion to Homer*, ed. Ian Morris and Barry B. Powell, Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava. Supplementum 163. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 218–37, at 232, that metre was not used to “mirror or enhance the sense” of the line except in “one or two passages” (H 238 and λ 593–600). I believe there are many instances in which the two components of metre — rhythm and tempo — are used for poetic effect. I give some examples of tempo below; see also William Bedell Stanford, *The Sound of Greek: Studies in the Greek Theory and Practice of Euphony*, Sather Classical Lectures 38 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), at e.g., at 105 (on rhythm and rhyme at Ψ 116), and Christos C. Tsagalis, “Style and Construction, Sound and Rhythm: Thetis’ Supplication to Zeus (*Iliad* 1.493–516),” *Arethusa* 34, no. 1 (2001): 1–29 at 12–14, and 23–25 (on rhythm [*inter alia*] in Thetis’ ascent to Olympos [A 496–99] and Zeus’ consideration of her first request [A 511–13]).

¹³⁶ “I suppose you think now that we are going home to our beloved fatherland; but Kirkē has made for us a different road, to the house of Hadēs and dread Persephone to consult the soul of Thēban Teiresias.”

¹³⁷ William Bedell Stanford, ΟΜΗΡΟΥ ΟΔΥΣΣΕΙΑ: *The Odyssey of Homer*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1967), at n. ad κ 562ff.

¹³⁸ The ratio of dactyls to spondees in the *Odyssey* is 2.799 : 1. For κ, it is 3.025 : 1 (figures are calculated from Jacob La Roche, “Zahlenverhältnisse im homerischen Vers,” *Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, Patristik und lateinische Tradition* 20 (1898): 1–69 table 2). In this speech, by contrast, it is 1.222 : 1!

μνηστῆρας δ' ἔκτεινεν ἄγῆνορας, οἳ θ' ἔδν οἰκόν
 κῆδεσκόν καὶ κτήματ' ἔδον βιόωντό τε παῖδά.” ψ 5–9.¹³⁹

Here the ratio of dactyls to spondees — 3.158 : 1 — is significantly higher than that for the rest of the book (2.743 : 1), and the liveliness of the metre reflects Eurykleia’s excitement (conveyed also in the verb ἔρρώσαντο, “[her knees] sped,” ψ 3) at her master’s return and her eagerness to convey this news to her mistress.

One might object that the verses in which metre acts mimetically are vastly outnumbered by those in which no such mimesis is identifiable. If metre invariably mimicked tone, we should expect the extreme cases — the verses composed entirely of dactyls or entirely of spondees — to contain exceptional content, but this is not the case. Some 5266 verses (18.94% of the epics) are composed entirely of dactyls, which is clearly too great a proportion to mark them all as “exceptional”; and of the five verses composed entirely of spondees,¹⁴⁰ only in one does the metre seem to contribute to the sense of the line.¹⁴¹ Yet, deviations of single verses from the metrical norm are less significant than deviations of longer passages; while I do not wish to claim that metre alone will preserve the tone of every line’s content, I might suggest that it could function mimetically perhaps more frequently than is generally acknowledged.

Pitch and speed, as noted above, are not the only aural characteristics which a performer might imitate in an oral performance; others include tone, volume, and melodic key. Although it is somewhat speculative to consider specific instances of these features, we must allow that in combination they give the performer great potential to characterize the speakers in his poems individually and more realistically than a traditional conception of “stylized” epic performance might

¹³⁹ “Wake up, Pēnelope, dear child, so that you might see with your own eyes that which you have wished for all these days. He has come— Odysseus— and has reached the house, though coming late; and he has killed the lordly suitors, who were living in his house, consuming his possessions, and causing trouble for his son.”

¹⁴⁰ La Roche, “Zahlenverhältnisse im homerischen Vers,” at 68–69 lists six (Λ 130, Ψ 221, ο 334, φ 15, χ 175 [La Roche’s 157 is a typographical error] = 192), of which one (Λ 130) has had a diæresis “restored” in Monro and Allen’s OCT; D. W. Pye, “Wholly Spondaic Lines in Homer,” *Greece & Rome* 11, no. 1 (1964): 2–6, argues that another (B 544), which also contains a diæresis in the OCT, should also be scanned as a wholly spondaic line.

¹⁴¹ At Ψ 221 Akhilleus calls upon the soul of Patroklos in a completely spondaic line. None of the remaining four completely spondaic lines strikes me as particularly significant. Pye, “Wholly Spondaic Lines in Homer,” cites Eustathius as an authority for the expressiveness of φ 15, but otherwise reaches the same verdicts.

allow.¹⁴² Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that direct speech is, as Bassett proposed, privileged over description in its power to convey to the audience a sense of “reality” and form an illusion of personality.

Despite the success with which Bassett elucidated his epic illusion, we must note that the evidence underlying it (and its subsidiary illusions) is somewhat subjective; while we can identify objective features of the text — such as geographical ellipses or direct speech — which might inherently enhance or suppress them, two problems arise: first, how does one *measure* such features objectively (is it sufficient simply to count geographical ellipses, or should “abruptness” be taken into account? If so, how does one measure abruptness objectively?); and secondly, regardless, the features of the text themselves are not a sufficient measure of the extent to which the audience is under the story’s spell. They describe the text; they may even describe the inherent potential for transportation latent within the text; but they do not describe (and thus cannot measure) the strength of the illusion experienced by the audience, as the text itself is not the only factor determining audience response.¹⁴³

In addition, Bassett’s account is somewhat lopsided: while he provides valuable insights into the strategies (visible within the written text) employed by the composer to increase transportation (or, at least, to avoid destroying it), the role of the audience/reader remains obscure; Bassett essentially elides audience response with the story-spell’s “magic power.” This is, perhaps, unfortunate, as it begs a large question about the ontology of the epic illusion and it virtually precludes discussion of its consequences.

¹⁴² Ruth Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities: Conventions and Strategies of Verisimilitude in Homer and Greek Tragedy*, *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 122* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1999), at 7, describes the fact that characters (her example is Akhilleus) speak in dactylic hexameter as a “synthetic property of Homeric epic” to be “filtered out” to make the narrative credible; I do not wish to disagree with this, but rather to suggest some ways in which oral performance has the potential to compensate for the “synthetic” nature of the epic itself.

¹⁴³ That is, reception (and transportation) will also be influenced by features of the environment (listening to an oral narrative in a high-noise environment is inherently different from hearing it in a silent auditorium) and the individual audience member (whose experience may be influenced by factors such as background knowledge [and preconceptions], mood, personality, and reception-goals).

First, we can and must ask *how* the audience is able to “forget [themselves] and the poet and the real world about [them].”¹⁴⁴ Is it a matter simply of “putting reason in abeyance” (or willingly suspending disbelief for the moment)? If so, how can we explain those moments when we, as critics, suddenly realize that we have been drawn (unintentionally) into a narrative we set out to criticize? Or is it rather a matter of our inherent cognitive limitations? Do we forget reality simply because listening to (or reading) the story demands (or can demand) too much of our attention to leave any for a continued awareness of our environment? This, in fact, does largely accord with our experiences: it explains how a story may engage us gradually by demanding our attention incrementally and it is compatible with the notion of putting reason in abeyance (*i.e.*, deliberately directing our attention towards the text [on its own terms] rather than towards reality). Yet, to an extent, this is less of an explanation than a description (similar to the “magic power” Bassett cited), as it still sidesteps the question of what the audience is doing which so occupies its attention.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we should ask what effects (if any) the construction of (and belief in) an illusory reality has on the audience’s experience of the text. Does it make the text more memorable, more vivid, or more enjoyable? Does it affect our interpretation of the action or our appraisal of the characters? (And if so, how?) Bassett’s exposition of the epic illusion is, however, ill equipped to deal with such questions: its evidence comes from the text, so its conclusions about the responses of actual audiences cannot be externally verified and must remain speculative.

Vividness

In his book on Homeric poetics, Andrew Ford describes the “purpose of poetry” as “vividness,” the “sense that the past is somehow present before us.”¹⁴⁵ This vividness — he uses also the Greek term *ἐνάργεια* — is the “magical and epiphanic” creation of a (visible) scene purely from language and it is, he proposes, “a real psychological effect of epic performance” from which “when the great speeches

¹⁴⁴ See above, p. 40 (and n. 124).

¹⁴⁵ Ford, *Homer*, at 49.

are given we seem to be on the edge of the assembly, and when the heroic actions are performed we seem to be present as onlookers.”¹⁴⁶

Ford stresses the role of the Muses in creating vividness. He draws upon the distinction emphasized within the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* between κλέος (fame, which is heard by report) and the (greater) knowledge of eye-witnesses (amongst which the Muses must be counted, B 484–87) to argue that Homer uses his “fiction of the Muses” to claim his own “report” is privileged over any other.¹⁴⁷ Homer invokes the Muses in the first line of each epic, argues Ford, and it is they who make the vision of the past appear vividly before the audience.¹⁴⁸

While it is true that Homer uses the Muses to claim authority to speak, Ford’s explication of their role in the creation of vividness seems slightly overstated. The Muses are, after all (and as Ford constantly notes) fictional; they are a literary pretence on the poet’s part to encourage the audience to treat the narrative as credible. As such, the ontology of the vividness (as a product of the Muses) is also a literary pretence on the poet’s part, whereas in reality the vividness experienced *by the audience* is a psychological effect of the words uttered by the poet.

Indeed, Ford’s argument is inherently similar to that advanced by Bassett for the illusion of historicity,¹⁴⁹ and it is open to an analogous counter-argument: it is possible to imagine an *Iliad* or *Odyssey* stripped of its invocation(s) of the Muses; it seems inherently unlikely that the audience’s experience of such an epic would be largely different from that of our canonical text as auditors/readers are able (and likely) to lose awareness of the fact that the Muses are (poetically) guaranteeing the authority of the poet’s words.

Moreover, Ford’s (otherwise excellent) book seems very slightly limited because his treatment of vividness deals mainly with the actual narrating instance of the epic and the way the poet evokes the past for the external audience. Hence, his treatment of Dēmodokos in θ and Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι of ι–μ is focused on how the

¹⁴⁶ Ford, *ibid.*, at 54–55. On ἐνάργεια, especially for the relationships with *vision*, see Zanker, “Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry.”

¹⁴⁷ Ford, *Homer*, at 60–63.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, at 55; this is also implied throughout ch.2 (57–89).

¹⁴⁹ See above, pp. 41–42.

song presents itself to the *external* audience as detailed, authoritative, and the newest in a long tradition.¹⁵⁰ Yet, in several instances Ford’s approach implies (or at least accommodates the view) that vividness is equally applicable to the way in which the narratives framed by the epic are received by their *internal* audiences; hence it is legitimate to bring his arguments to bear on our understanding of enchantment as presented within the *Odyssey* (and *vice versa*).

Because he investigates Homeric poetics, Ford’s considerations, like Bassett’s, focus almost exclusively on the activities of the poet rather than the audience. Yet, if it is the intention of the poet to “transport us to an *au delà*”¹⁵¹ (or to construct the past before us), then we should consider also how that intention might be realized by the audience and what effect(s) it might have on their experience of the narrative. Again, because it focuses on the audience rather than the composer, the theory of transportation will provide some interesting suggestions in answer to these questions.

Involvement

Both Ford and Bassett referred to the phenomena they described in terms of the story’s “magic power” over the audience.¹⁵² While this is felicitous for the Homeric conception of poetry,¹⁵³ it is patently inadequate in a modern rationalist context.¹⁵⁴ Egbert Bakker, who cites Ford, approaches vividness from a linguistic angle and attempts, with considerable success, to cast light on some of the mechanisms by which it operates.

¹⁵⁰ Ford, *Homer*, at 120–30.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, at 55.

¹⁵² See the passage quoted above (p. 39) from Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 25–26, which mentions “the spell of poetry” and its “magic power”; see also Ford, *Homer*, at 54–55, who writes of vividness as “magical and epiphanic.”

¹⁵³ Evidence for this comes from the Phaiakians’ reaction to Odysseus ἀπόλογοι (λ 334 = ν 2) where κληθημῶ ἔσχοντο (literally, “they were held by the spell”). Cf. Ford, *Homer*, at 6, and at 34 where he situates Homer’s conception of his art as no longer magic but not yet art.

¹⁵⁴ Victor Nell, *Lost in a Book: The Psychology of Reading for Pleasure* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), one of the earlier psychologists to carry out empirical investigations into real readers swept away by reading narratives (which he called “absorption” or “entrancement”), entitled his third chapter “the witchery of a story” (and devoted a section to “story magic”); his titles are, however, partly tongue-in-cheek: Nell manifestly does not believe stories operate *by* magic (in which case empirical investigation would be pointless), but *like* magic (in that their power to absorb the reader is, *prima facie*, inexplicable given the miniscule effort we seem to expend while reading).

Bakker describes ἐνάργεια as “pretended immediacy, ... as if one verbalizes what one sees and pretending that the extroverted consciousness that saw the epic events is actually seeing them in the present.”¹⁵⁵ This vividness arises, according to Bakker, out of the oral poet’s use of stylized conversational storytelling techniques which preserve (indeed, draw upon) the “processlike quality of speech” in the parataxis of metrical cola.¹⁵⁶ Bakker cites an experiment conducted by the linguist Wallace Chafe in which participants recalled the action of a short film, and convincingly expounds parallels not only of parataxis but also of the use of particles (such as δέ and and).¹⁵⁷

The narrator of Homeric epic is, according to Bakker, “extroverted”: he pretends to look to his immediate environment (rather than inwards and to memory) for the material he describes. Bakker acknowledges that in this context the (well-known) fact that the Homeric narrator never uses the historic present is somewhat problematic not only given its frequency in other traditions but also because it is used consistently in the experimental evidence he cites.¹⁵⁸ He suggests, however, that this lack is partly ameliorated by the narrator’s use of “evidential” linguistic features — *deixis* and the particles δὴ and ἄρα — which are used as if the narrator is experiencing (in the present) the events he describes.

The pretence of immediacy in deictic expressions is, of course, straightforward; Bakker argues, in addition, that *characters within the epic* use “δὴ ... in conversation when [s/he] wants to convey that he or she thinks that what he or she says is obvious, not only to himself or herself, but to the addressee as well, or better: *visible* (δηλον) ... in the mental or physical context shared between speaker and

¹⁵⁵ Bakker, “Storytelling in the Future,” at 15–16.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, and Bakker, “Discourse and Performance,” at 8–13.

¹⁵⁷ This is something of a theme in Bakker’s work, see: Egbert J. Bakker, “Homeric Discourse and Enjambement: A Cognitive Approach,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 120 (1990): 1–21; Bakker, “Discourse and Performance,” especially at 7–8; and Bakker, *Poetry in Speech*, especially at 42–44.

Johannes Haubold, “Homer as Speech,” review of Egbert J. Bakker. *Poetry in Speech: Orality and Homeric Discourse* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). *Classical Review* 48, no. 2 (1998): 259–60, criticizes this aspect of Bakker’s work on the grounds that the recall of a film may produce speech patterns which are atypical. In fact, the criticism is unwarranted as Bakker’s suggestion for the poet’s activity (*i.e.*, speaking as if recalling action he himself has seen) is inherently very similar to the behaviour observed in Chafe’s experiment.

¹⁵⁸ Bakker, “Storytelling in the Future,” at 14–17; Bakker, “Discourse and Performance,” at 15–16.

addressee”;¹⁵⁹ similarly, he argues, ἄρα is used by a speaker who “makes an assertion that is *prompted by evidence before him*.”¹⁶⁰ In all three cases, the language is indicative of the speaker’s visualization of the action he narrates. Thus, Bakker argues, when the composer uses the same particles himself (in the narrator-text rather than reporting them in the speeches) he constructs the pretence that his evidence is not only before him but within visible range of his addressees (the external audience).¹⁶¹

Bakker argues in addition that this pretence is constructed not only by the composer in uttering the narration, but also by the auditors in comprehending it. He frames this argument in terms of the linguistic notion of dialogic involvement,¹⁶² which involves the audience’s (inter)active *construction* of meaning rather than simply passive reception or deciphering of message.¹⁶³ In this way, not only does the poet speak as if present (geographically and temporally) on the scene of the action, but also the audience listens (and comprehends the narrative) in the same way.¹⁶⁴

As far as the audience is concerned, this is inherently similar to Gerrig’s notion of transportation. Although Bakker emphasizes the difference between the construction of the past in the present of the narrating instance (with its consequent transformation of the present into a future which informs our

¹⁵⁹ Bakker, “Discourse and Performance,” at 13–15.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, at 15–23.

¹⁶¹ One might extend Bakker’s analysis by observing that this same pretence should also apply to the narratives framed by the epic. It is something of a problem, therefore, that in the ἀπόλογοι, by far the longest (unabbreviated) narrative framed by either epic, ἄρα/ἄρ/ῥα appears much less frequently (70× in 2233 lines, or a frequency of 0.0313) than elsewhere in the epic (677× in the remaining 9877 lines, or a frequency of 0.0685). (In the song of Arēs and Aphroditē [θ 266–366], on the other hand, the frequency is higher: nine times in 100 lines [a frequency of 0.09].) Figures are from my own (electronic) count, and may be subject to minor error.

¹⁶² Deborah Tannen, *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*, Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics, no. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), at 2, defines involvement as collaborative “[participation] in the making of meaning.”

¹⁶³ Bakker, “Discourse and Performance,” at 2–3. Cf. “[S]peakers do not express their convictions in a vacuum: any assertion is, by definition, not merely a commitment to some “truth,” or the expression of “emphasis,” but also, and more so, an attempt to win an addressee’s consent on some point (or, alternatively, a symptom of such an agreement). ... The use of δὴ ... does not so much establish a common basis for conducting discourse (as in the case of μὲν or μήν) as presuppose one” (*ibid.*, 13–14).

¹⁶⁴ For an interesting parallel, cf. Alan Rumsey, “Chanted Tales in the New Guinea Highlands of Today: A Comparative Study,” in *Expressive Genres and Historical Change: Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Taiwan*, ed. Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern (Aldershot: Ashgate Publications, 2005), 41–81, at 60.

understanding of the action) and the simple transportation of the audience into the past, these are arguably simply different perspectives of a single phenomenon: both involve the distancing of the individual's (physical and/or) temporal proximate environment from that in which s/he (mentally) finds her/himself.¹⁶⁵

To a large degree, Bakker's argument is specific to an oral performance context, as the only guarantee that the relationship is truly dialogic (rather than simply an unanswered pretence on the part of the composer) is that speech, because of its transient nature (it "can only be perceived and 'processed' *while under production*") demands the audience's constant attention.¹⁶⁶ On this basis, Bakker infers that when the composer speaks as if he shares visual cues with his auditors, visualization on the part of the audience may be presupposed: audience members who do not reciprocate and maintain the pretence of shared vision do not keep up.

Whether or not one accepts this inference as valid, dialogic involvement is a two-way street — not only must the composer invite participation, but the audience must take him up on his offer — so we might ask both what activities audience members undertake in being involved and what effect(s) such involvement might have upon their experience of the narrative. Bakker's remark that the poetry "activates visual images in the minds of the audience as well [*sc.* as drawing on those of the composer]"¹⁶⁷ is insightful (though it possibly understates the complexity of the audience's activity¹⁶⁸) but its ramifications (like those of involvement itself) lie outside his focus.

One must question, in addition, whether dialogic involvement can or should be constrained to an oral performance context. Homeric epic has, after all, been received primarily as a written text over the great majority of its existence. While speech may (as Bakker suggests) be "produced in a different way" from written discourse,¹⁶⁹ this does not imply that involvement (in some form) plays no part in

¹⁶⁵ These two possibilities are two different types of what Ryan, "The Text as World versus the Text as Game," at 151, called "recentering."

¹⁶⁶ Bakker, "Discourse and Performance," at 7. Cf. "The 'presencing' of the past, therefore, is not limited to the poet's private consciousness, but *due to the dynamics of the epic performance* is no less an experience of the audience" (*ibid.*, 18–19, emphasis added).

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, at 18–19.

¹⁶⁸ It might be more felicitous to assert that the poetry causes the audience members to *generate* visual images, but we should be wary of equating visualization and involvement.

¹⁶⁹ Bakker, "Discourse and Performance," at 7.

the *reception* of a written text. On the contrary, our experiences of the texts suggest that involvement, though certainly not requisite, is common while reading. Readers, like listeners, are able to construct visual images from the narrative and thus participate in the construction of meaning. In the context of a written reception, then, the question becomes not whether but *under what circumstances* readers become involved (and, indeed, under what circumstances they cannot). It is, therefore, legitimate to ask of readers the same questions raised above regarding auditors: what activities do they undertake in order to be involved, and what might be the effect(s) of such involvement on their reception of the narrative.

Chapter 3: Two Psychological Models

The impression of reality ... is always a two-sided phenomenon. One may seek to explain it by examining either the object perceived or the perception of that object.
— CHRISTIAN METZ*

Gerrig's Metaphors

Richard Gerrig invoked two metaphors to describe our experience of narratives: “*being transported* by a narrative by virtue of *performing* that narrative.”¹ He fleshed out the process of being transported as follows:²

1. Someone (“the traveler”) is transported
2. by some means of transportation
3. as a result of performing certain actions.
4. The traveler goes some distance from his or her world of origin
5. which makes some aspects of the world of origin inaccessible.
6. The traveler returns to the world of origin, somewhat changed by the journey.

It should be immediately obvious from this summary that the “author” (or “composer”³) is entirely absent from Gerrig’s model: the “means of transportation” in this metaphor is the “narrative” upon/with which the audience member performs his/her actions. The definition Gerrig gives of “narrative” is, likewise, given in terms of the audience member and her/his actions: rather than depending on some formal property of the “text,”⁴ Gerrig considers a “narrative” anything which can invoke “whatever set of mental process transports the reader” and thus observes that “no *a priori* limits can be put on the types of language structures that

* Christian Metz, *Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema*, trans. Michael Taylor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974 [originally published as *Essais sur la Signification au Cinéma, Tome I* (Paris: Éditions Klincksieck, 1968)]), at 6.

¹ Richard J. Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading* (Boulder: Westview, 1998 [originally published: Yale University Press, 1993]), at 2, original emphasis.

² *Ibid.*, at 10–11.

³ Although, as we will see presently, Gerrig’s conceptual framework is not restricted by performance modality, his model arose from his (and others’) experiments on *readers* receiving *text* (on a computer screen); I shall, therefore, occasionally refer to “author” and “reader” (rather than “composer” and “audience member”) in this section for brevity, clarity, and fidelity to Gerrig’s book, rather than for some ideological position concerning the formation of the Homeric poems.

⁴ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 3, cites the definition of a “minimal narrative” given by William Labov, *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular*, Conduct and Communication No. 3 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), at 360 (“two clauses which are temporally ordered”); cf. the definition of a “minimal story” (three events conjoined) in Gerald Prince, *A Grammar of Stories: An Introduction* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), Chapter 2.

might prompt the construction of narrative worlds.”⁵ In fact, his definition is completely independent of mode of reception — a “narrative” may be evoked, in these terms, not only by a “text” of any length (even a single word⁶) whether read or heard, but also by any perceivable (*e.g.*, audible or visual⁷) stimulus — and implicitly reaffirms the notion that any one stimulus/narrative is able and likely to produce a unique “narrative” for each individual reader.

This broad scope naturally has both benefits and drawbacks. The theory is applicable to the Homeric epics, for example, regardless of whether one treats them in an oral or a written performance context. This simplifies the argument for the appropriateness of applying this modern, psychological theory to ancient epic, but simultaneously there is a danger that if performance modality is not taken into account then the conclusions at which we arrive may be superficial or inappropriate. The argument that transportation is not *limited by* mode, after all, does not imply that it does not inherently *vary with* mode.⁸

A major advantage of Gerrig’s exposition is that transportation applies to texts regardless of *genre* or fictional status. (Indeed, some of Gerrig’s “texts” lack an identifiable *genre*.) These features, Gerrig argues, may affect our interpretation of the text, but we do not employ different psychological processes or adopt a fundamentally different stance when comprehending fictional or factual narrative. Consider Gerrig’s example, a quotation from the *New York Times*:

Tokyo, Thursday, Jan. 9—President Bush fell suddenly ill and collapsed at a state dinner being given for him Wednesday night at the home of the Japanese Prime

⁵ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, at 4–5. Gerrig’s example is the word “Texas” which, he admits, “may not constitute an elegant entry into a narrative world nor sustain a lengthy visit, but it has as much right to invoke the processes that constitute ‘being transported’ as the best passages of the literary canon” (5).

⁷ That a narrative may be evoked by hearing words is uncontroversial; Gerrig’s definition (as I am presenting it) includes non-verbal audible stimuli such as bird calls, music, or the sounds produced by machines. If a bugle causes us to reflect on the events of a major war, or the sound of a train makes us reminisce on our own experiences travelling, both have transported us and have acted as (or evoked) narratives.

Similarly, paintings and sculptures may evoke stories; plays and films may present them; even tastes, smells, textures, and movement might evoke memories (*e.g.*, cause us to “flash back”) and thus be considered (as having evoked) “narratives” under this definition.

⁸ In other words, some performance modalities may be inherently more (or less) transporting to the audience; some might be affected by transportation in different ways (or to different extents); and modality might even affect the balance of the psychological processes underlying transportation. To a limited extent (given appropriate controls), some of these differences might be empirically identifiable.

Minister. This morning, his spokesman said the President was “up and about” and making phone calls.

Though it is non-fictional, Gerrig notes, “[o]n some strict reading of ‘truth’ ... this excerpt stopped being true as of January 10, 1992. ... At a later date, readers must construct a narrative world in which they act *as if* they were reading the article on that date.”⁹ Readers, in other words, must *transport* themselves (temporally) back to 1992 simply in order to resolve correctly the temporally deictic expression “yesterday.”

In the spirit of Gerrig’s argument, there is no difference in the underlying processes we use to resolve “yesterday” in that (non-fictional) example and the χθιζὸς (“yesterday”) to which Odysseus refers when he says to Alkinoös,

Ἔνθεν δ’ ἐννήμαρ φερόμην, δεκάτη δέ με νυκτὶ
 νῆσον ἐς Ὠγυγίην πέλασαν θεοί, ἔνθα Καλυψὼ
 ναίει ἐϋπλόκαμος, δεινὴ θεὸς ἀυδήεσσα,
 ἥ μ’ ἐφίλει τ’ ἐκόμει τε. τί τοι τάδε μυθολογεύω;
 ἤδη γάρ τοι χθιζὸς ἐμυθεόμην ἐνὶ οἴκῳ
 σοὶ καὶ ἰφθίμῃ ἀλόχῳ· ἐχθρὸν δέ μοι ἔστιν
 αὐτίς ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεύειν. μ 447–53.¹⁰

as, in both cases, the auditor/reader must transport her/himself to the context of the intended audience (in the Homeric case, that of *Odysseus’* intended audience, the Phaiakians) in order to comprehend the temporal reference. Even though readers would probably class the first as “factual” and the second as “fictional,” in neither case is the narrative strictly “true” in the present; the unconscious manner in which we can resolve the newspaper excerpt (or, in reverse, the consciousness required to identify its strict infelicity) is strong evidence that a conscious awareness of fictional status is not required for our understanding of the Homeric one.

Gerrig argues, in fact, that, while receiving a narrative, audience members adopt a stance similar to that of a “side-participant” in a conversation: someone who hears but does not participate verbally in the dialogue. Gerrig suggests that during reception we understand the narrative as if overhearing a conversation between

⁹ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 128–29, original emphasis.

¹⁰ From there I was carried for nine days, but on the tenth at night | the gods brought me to the island *Ōgygia*, on which *Kalypsō* | of the fair hair lives, terrible goddess of mortal speech, || who loved me and tended to me. Why do I repeat these things? | For already yesterday in your house I narrated it | to you and your goodly wife; and it is hateful to me | again to repeat clearly things already spoken.

Although we might also rationalize this narratologically — that the words, though uttered by Agamemnōn, are delivered as part of another, separate speech act in which the primary narrator (NF₁) *informs* his addressees (the external audience) that Agamemnōn commanded (ἐπέτελλε, A 25) the priest and goes on to report the content of that speech verbatim — Gerrig’s approach is attractive because it is not limited to reported speech which is explicitly introduced by a narrator. Although a narratological model will still explain abruptive (unmediated) dialogue by proposing a covert narrator and narratee,¹⁶ Gerrig’s approach is applicable also to non-written texts, such as dialogue in a play or film, where a narrator and narratee are difficult to identify.¹⁷ These situations are, of course, foreign to Homeric epic; yet, the adoption of the stance of a side-participant also explains the (rare) instances in the epics in which the narratee is identifiable but non-existent: cases of *apostrophe*.¹⁸ When the narrator says,

ἔνθ’ ἄρα τοι, Πάτροκλε, φάνη βίοτοιο τελευτή· Π 787.¹⁹

it is easier to take the stance of one witnessing an exchange between the poet and Patroklos (who may seem, for example, to be a fellow member of the audience) than it is to adopt the stance of Patroklos himself (the narratee). The same applies,

¹⁶ Abruptive dialogue lacks verbs outside the direct speech (see Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse*, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980 [originally published as “Discours du récit” in *Figures III*, Editions du Seuil, 1972]), at 151) and roughly corresponds to the *mimetic* component of Plato’s analysis of diction (R. III. 392d, on which see further Irene J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 1987), at 2–5). The abruptive sequence, “How are you today?”—“Fine! You?”—“Great!” may convey a very different picture from the mediated one: “How are you today?” I asked. “Fine!” she exploded, “You?” “Great!” I groaned.

A text with an *absent* or *maximally covert* narrator lacks all what Gerald Prince, *Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative* (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1982) called (at 8) “signs of the I”; the narrator is non-intrusive, and the only trace of her/his presence is the narrative itself (because all narratives must have a narrator to narrate them).

¹⁷ Hence Gerrig’s position is roughly compatible with that advanced by Ed S. H. Tan, *Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as an Emotion Machine*, trans. Barbara Fasting (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), especially at 239–46, that film-audiences are subject to the “illusion of the controlled witness,” *i.e.*, that they take on the role of an invisible spectator or witness to the film’s action, which he describes (at 240) as a “subillusion of the diegetic effect.”

¹⁸ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 111, similarly applies his informative analysis to explain addresses to “nonsensical addressees”: how “Keats, Milton, and Shakespeare can pretend to address a star, time, or the sun while genuinely informing the readers of their sentiments.”

¹⁹ Then indeed, O Patroklos, the end of your life appeared.

On *apostrophe*, see Elizabeth Block, “The Narrator Speaks: *Apostrophe* in Homer and Vergil,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 112 (1982): 7–22, who identifies four types: direct addresses to characters, invocations of the Muses, rhetorical questions, and direct addresses to the external audience. I am referring to the first two of these here, and will discuss the last as a special case below; the rhetorical questions are more difficult to classify: the audience seem to be the addressees of P 260 and χ 12, but E 703–04, Θ 273, and Λ 299–300 seem (despite the absence of a formal invocation) to be directed to the Muses.

indeed, to the other 31 instances in which the narrator addresses a character and the ten in which he addresses the Muses.²⁰

There is, however, a special case in which this situation is reversed: in seven cases of apostrophe the addressee is the external audience itself.²¹ When the poet comments,

Ἔνθ' οὐκ ἄν βρίζοντα ἴδοις Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖον,
οὐδὲ καταπτώσσοντ', οὐδ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ μάλα σπεύδοντα μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν. Δ 223–25.²²

or asks,

τίς κ' οἴοιτο μετ' ἀνδράσι δαιτυμόνεσσι
μοῦνον ἐνὶ πλεόνεσσι, καὶ εἰ μάλα καρτερὸς εἶη,
οἷ τεύξειν θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν; χ 12–15.²³

it is far easier to understand oneself as addressed (*i.e.*, as a narratee) than as excluded (as a side-participant).

The difference between these cases lies more in the apparent intentions of the poet (whether he addresses an individual character or a member of the audience) than the stance of the audience. Thus, we might modify Gerrig's position: audience members usually adopt the stance of a member of a group the primary narrator informs; whether this group is construed as a narratee or a side-participant depends on their identification of the intended addressee of each particular utterance, but they will adopt the stance of a side-participant unless there is

²⁰ The following figures are from or after Block, *ibid.*, at 11–12: *characters* are addressed directly 17× in the *Iliad* (Patroklos at Π 20, 584, 692–93, 744, 754, 787, 812, 843; Menelaos at Δ 127, 146, Η 104, Ν 603, Ρ 679, 702, Ψ 600; Melanippos at Ο 582; and Akhilleus at Υ 2) and 15× in the *Odyssey* (all Eumaios: ξ 55, 165, 360, 442, 507, ο 325, π 60, 135, 464, ρ 272, 311, 380, 512, 579, χ 194). *The Muses* are invoked explicitly 7× (at Α 1, Β 484, 761, Λ 218–20, Ξ 508, Π 112, and α 1). I go further than Block in interpreting three of the rhetorical questions (Ε 703–04, Θ 273, and Λ 299–300) as aimed at the Muses.

²¹ That is, the five cases of the *Iliad* in which the narrator addresses the external audience directly (Δ 223, 429, Ε 85, Ο 697, Ρ 366–67) and the two rhetorical questions which seem to be aimed at the audience rather than the Muses (Ρ 260, χ 12). Figures are, again, from/after Block. The instances in which the poet addresses the audience directly are also discussed by de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers*, at 54–58, who (rightly, to my mind) concludes that such apostrophe makes the action more vivid for the audience by “turn[ing the narratee] ... temporarily into an eyewitness” and cites the similar conclusion of Longin., *Sub.* 26. De Jong's further three examples (of the “anonymous focalizer” or “imaginary spectator”) are not to be included here, however, as they are not apostrophe.

²² Then you would not have seen resplendent Agamemnon being sleepy | nor slinking nor not wishing to fight, || but rather hurrying into battle which brings men glory.

²³ Who would think he among the men at the feast | alone among so many, even if he was rather strong, || would complete for him [Antinoös] death and destruction and dark death?

sufficient affinity with that understood addressee for them to adopt the stance of a narratee.²⁴

The adoption of either *persona* is itself, however, a form of transportation in that the construction of a narrating instance and our presence within it entails some subordination of our perception of reality to our imagination of the narration. At a minimum, we must imagine the presence of a narrator and her/his audible narration despite our knowledge that the narrator does not exist in the real world. More transported audience members may, of course, subordinate reality more drastically and take the stance of a member of a long-dead or fictional group, such as Homer's original audience²⁵ or a character within the text (such as the Phaiakians during Odysseus' ἀπόλογοι or the Akhaian army during the exchange between Khrysēs and Agamemnōn).

It is worth pausing at this point to consider that Gerrig's broader claim (that readers process narratives as a series of indirect speech acts) takes on a much more real meaning in the context of a live, oral performance. Audiences can only imagine the narrator of a printed book; in an oral performance context, he has concrete form: they can *see* him.²⁶ Where readers of a printed book may adopt the

²⁴ The group with which the audience identifies is the implied audience, itself an understanding of the audience rather than something encoded unambiguously in the text (so also Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon, *Psychonarratology: Foundations for the Empirical Study of Literary Response* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 77–80, substituting “implied audience” for “implied reader” or “narratee”). Individual audience members, indeed, may identify with their representations of the implied audience to varying extents; hence, in an extreme case, an audience member who (pathologically) identified with Patroklos might feel her/himself addressed at Π 787; at the other extreme, an audience member who consciously excludes her/himself from the implied audience may not feel addressed at all while experiencing a text.

²⁵ This is, emphatically, the audience member's own construction of the (salient) attributes of that group, which will not necessarily overlap with any historical group. We need not believe in an historical person named Homer nor an “original” performance of his *Odyssey* in order to construct a representation of the text's implied audience.

²⁶ Strictly, the narrator of an oral performance is, too, a construct of the audience; he is potentially separable from the audience's understanding of the composer (the understanding of himself projected by the composer; the “implied composer,” if further jargon is tolerable) were we, for example, to identify instances in which the narration is unreliable; both the narrator and implied composer differ from the historical individual who actually composed the text. In practice, however, audiences collapse all three. The classic experiment of Edward E. Jones and Victor A. Harris, “The Attribution of Attitudes,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 3, no. 1 (1967): 1–24, showed that readers attributed pro- or anti-Castro attitudes to the authors of (what they thought were) answers to an examination in line with the position required by the question; they obtained consistent results even when subjects were told that the texts were the opening speeches of a debate with positions assigned at random. Jones and Harris interpreted this as a sign of “correspondence bias” (also known as the Fundamental Attribution Error) —

stance of a member of the implied audience who may be addressed directly by the narrator, auditors of an oral performance *are* members of the audience and *are* addressed by the (real) performer.

Moreover, in an oral performance, the verbatim report of a character speaking is a re-creation of the original speech act — simultaneously a representation and a re-presentation — which puts the audience in the position of the addressee(s). This goes some way to explaining Ford’s example of vividness — “when the great speeches are given we [sc. members of the audience at an oral performance] seem to be on the edge of the assembly” — because the audience, like the attendees of the assembly, receives the speech act firsthand and thus assimilates the person “speaking” in the real world (the performer) with the one speaking in the story world. If, in the minds of the audience members, the singer “becomes Agamemnon,” transportation is greatly facilitated. Given that approximately half of the epics are composed of direct speech,²⁷ we must recognize that such facilitation is an important aspect of transportation in an oral performance context.²⁸

The “moves” involved in transportation are, of course, contained in points (4) through (6) of the metaphor: the audience member leaves, is absent, and then returns. Hence, there is an immediate correlation between this metaphor of transportation and the poetics of Homeric aesthetic reception outlined in the previous chapter: the vocabulary of narrative reception in the Homeric poems (τέρπω and θέλω) involves, as I have argued, “some aspects of the world of origin [being] inaccessible” (as in (5)). We can, in fact, subordinate point (4) to points (5)

(continued)

the individual’s tendency to attribute another’s behaviour to her/his disposition rather than situation — but it also indicates that readers have a tendency to assimilate the characteristics of the narrator (who mounts the argument) with their representation of the author (*i.e.*, the implied author) which must affect their understanding of the historical author.

²⁷ I count 7052 verses of direct speech in the *Iliad* (45.0% of the 15682 verses of the epic), and 6843 (8236 verses if one counts all the ἀπόλογοι as direct speech) in the *Odyssey* (56.51% or 68.01% respectively of the 12110 verses). In other words, 50.0% (or 55.0%) of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is direct speech. These figures are very close to those of Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin cited by Jasper Griffin, “Homeric Words and Speakers,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 106 (1986): 36–57 at 37. So also, very roughly, Richard P. Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad*, Myth and Poetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), at 45; cf. also Samuel Eliot Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, Sather Classical Lectures 15 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938), at 64, table 1.

²⁸ The facilitation is increased, naturally, if the singer “acts the part” while performing the speeches; I have touched on this above, pp. 43–46.

and (6), as the details — both *that* the audience member has been transported and *how far* s/he has gone from the world or origin — are inferable from the inaccessibility of “aspects” of the real world (in (5)) and, we might expect, the adjustment involved in returning (in (6)) respectively.

Gerrig intended the phrase “some distance from [the] world of origin” in (4) to convey both that there is no inherent (absolute) restriction on the type of narrative world which might transport the reader,²⁹ and (as opposed to “to the story world”) that there is an inherent restriction on the proximity the audience member gains to the story world. That is, the stance Gerrig proposes audience members adopt while experiencing a narrative entails they never feel they are *actively/effectually* participating in the action of the narrative world.

In the context of the first point above, it is worth observing that Gerrig admits that, regardless of the “quality” of the text, not all audience members will be transported while experiencing narratives.³⁰ Indeed, we can and must go further: as observed above, such a binary dichotomy is an abstraction and it is more felicitous to conceive of transportation as lying on a continuum.³¹ In other words, not all audience members will be transported to *the same extent* while experiencing narratives: some (like Odysseus) will be transported so close to the story world that they feel almost present; some (like Pēnelope) will be transported so minimally that they continue to attend to their extra-diegetic environment to the point that we may as well say they have not been transported at all; and the majority (like the

²⁹ “Distance,” in this context, represents the degree to which (our perception of) reality in the real world does not match the reality depicted in the story world (and *vice versa*). I can read a story where Billy Pilgrim becomes unstuck in time and (because I believe that time travel is impossible) when I am transported I have travelled a greater distance than when I am transported by, say, *Catch 22* (or its sequel, *Closing Time*). Were I to believe time travel possible then *Slaughterhouse Five* would be closer to my reality than Heller’s novels (where, presumably, it is not). Cf. Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 13–14 (with some additional bibliography). See further the definition of “realism” proposed by Peter J. Rabinowitz, *Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), at 99–100, and the discussion of Possible Worlds theory by Marie-Laure Ryan, “The Text as World versus the Text as Game: Possible Worlds Semantics and Postmodern Theory,” *Journal of Literary Semantics* 27, no. 3 (1998): 137–63 at 149–53 and (especially) Figure 2.

³⁰ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 5.

³¹ For this concession, see above, p. 7.

suitors and Phaiakians) will be transported to intermediate distances, where only some aspects of the real world become inaccessible.³²

Yet, Gerrig's metaphor describes a complete process but does not circumscribe the audience's preceding or subsequent actions. An audience member might "return to [her/his] world of origin" (as in (6)) only to leave again (as in (4)) almost immediately. S/he might, in other words, oscillate between transported and non-transported states. This, indeed, almost renders the distinction between binary and continuous transportation moot: in all practical terms it matters little whether two audience members are transported to different extents or are oscillating in and out of a state of transportation at different frequencies and are thus denied access to extra-diegetic knowledge during different proportions of their reading times. Hence, we need not be concerned here with whether transportation is *truly* variable; rather, we may assume it is *effectively* so.

One of the most important features of Gerrig's metaphor, however, is contained in his sixth point: narratives have real-world effects on their audiences. To support this claim, Gerrig summarizes a body of empirical evidence that information contained in narratives can sometimes fundamentally affect our judgement.³³ Gerrig and his collaborator, Deborah Prentice, showed that while *context details* (particulars which can be fictionally altered, such as the identity of the US president) are held separate (compartmentalized) from our knowledge of the real world, *context-free assertions* (general statements about the world, such as "mental illness is catching") are *incorporated (uncritically)* into our representation of reality.³⁴ Such "facts" may, of course, then be brought to bear on our decisions.

³² The variable nature of transportation is, indeed, a premise underlying the development of Gerrig's concept by Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock, "The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 5 (2000): 701–21, who developed a scale to measure the extent of the audience's transportation. (See further below.) It also underlies my exposition of enchantment in Chapter 2.

³³ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 196–237 (Chapter 6).

³⁴ See Richard J. Gerrig and Deborah A. Prentice, "The Representation of Fictional Information," *Psychological Science* 2, no. 5 (1991): 336–40. See also Deborah A. Prentice, Richard J. Gerrig, and Daniel S. Bailis, "What Readers Bring to the Processing of Fictional Texts," *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 4, no. 3 (1997): 416–20; and S. Christian Wheeler, Melanie C. Green, and Timothy C. Brock, "Fictional Narratives Change Beliefs: Replications of Prentice, Gerrig, and Bailis (1997) With Mixed Corroboration," *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 6, no. 1 (1999): 136–41.

Gerrig does not, however, develop a strong link between this conclusion and his concept of transportation. We have no way of knowing, in other words, whether the integration of fictional context-free assertions into our real-world knowledge is derived from transportation or is simply an effect of comprehending a text in particular circumstances.

The psychologist Daniel Gilbert produced experimental evidence that, at the most basic level, belief is our default assumption and evaluation of an assertion's truth status is an optional, effortful, and *subsequent* activity even when the information is explicitly labelled as false. Gilbert and his colleagues found that when cognitive resources were limited — such as when attending to or interrupted by an unrelated task — participants were highly likely to misremember false statements as true and *act on them*.³⁵ In other words, when evaluation was impeded, participants took the narrative at face value.

There are, arguably, two ways in which evaluation might be impeded while receiving a narrative: the audience members' access to contextualizing (real-world) facts and/or their cognitive resources available for this task might be reduced. The first (diminished access to real-world information) would provide a direct link to transportation; the second (divided attention), however, does not depend on transportation but might be derived from more basic functions of attending to and comprehending the text. This is especially applicable in non-self-paced delivery modes (such as live performances or films) where, to reframe Bakker's position, the audience cannot afford to let their attention slip far without losing track of the narrative; if the second position is correct, then, we might expect those narratives delivered in such modes to be inherently more believable.

³⁵ Daniel T. Gilbert, Romin W. Tatarodi, and Patrick S. Malone, "You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65, no. 2 (1993): 221–33, had subjects read crime reports with false information clearly identified (by text colour), evaluate the perpetrators, determine what sentence they should receive, and complete a recall task. Subjects distracted by an unrelated task (identifying digits on the computer display) misremembered false statements as true, evaluated the perpetrators in the direction of those statements, and shortened or lengthened the sentences accordingly. Daniel T. Gilbert, Douglas S. Krull, and Patrick S. Malone, "Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some Problems in the Rejection of False Information," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59, no. 4 (1990): 601–13, forced their subjects to react (by pressing a computer key) as quickly as possible to an audible tone sounded immediately after the presentation of the false statement. For a theoretical review, Daniel T. Gilbert, "How Mental Systems Believe," *American Psychologist* 46 (1991): 107–19.

At any rate, both propositions are plausible and they are not mutually exclusive. Subsequent work (to which we will return in its place) has, in fact, provided some evidence to support the first (though not to refute the second). Suffice it to note here, however, that if one approaches the argument from the reverse perspective, transportation itself (which reduces opportunities for real-world contextualization) should inherently increase the believability of a narrative, and this effect is enhanced in an oral-performance context *vis-à-vis* a literate reception.³⁶

Performance

In the previous chapter I laboured the point that one of the major advantages to Gerrig's model (in comparison to the expositions of Bassett, Bakker, and Ford) is the way it is framed in terms of the reader; rather than examining what the composer does to sweep his audience away, Gerrig examines the activities undertaken by audience members in being swept away (or, more modestly, in experiencing narratives at all). He proposed, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, two metaphors for the experience of narratives — transportation *by virtue of performance* — and, having dealt with the first (transportation), we might pause here to consider the second.

Gerrig's notion of performance refers not to the activity of the oral poet, composing *ex tempore*, but to the activities the audience undertakes when receiving the text. It rests on the way we infer details not explicitly presented in the text. Inferences, in this context, are the addition to our understanding of the text of *any* information not explicitly stated, and thus constitute "performance" on the audience's part as audiences must work to supply the missing details.³⁷ Because the inferences fill the gaps between pieces of information supplied by the narrative (itself ultimately supplied by the [implied] composer), this work effected by the audience may be seen as (ultimately) collaborative. Hence, Gerrig's approach is quite compatible with — indeed, complementary to — the *collaborative participation*

³⁶ This, indeed, is the empirical support for my argument in the previous chapter that Bassett's illusion of historicity is a consequence of, rather than a prerequisite for, the epic illusion. See above, pp. 95–98.

³⁷ Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 26–64 (Chapter 3).

of the audience inherent in Bakker's notion of dialogic involvement.³⁸ Where Bakker asks "what does the poet do to involve his audience?" Gerrig asks "what does the audience do to be involved with the poet?"

Because inferences are the addition of *any* implicit information, they range widely in banality and complexity. It is useful to distinguish, however, between those necessary for comprehension (*e.g.*, anaphora and pronoun resolution, or the identification of causal antecedents and superordinate goals) and those which are not (*e.g.*, inferences of states, instruments, or themes).³⁹ Although there is some disagreement about exactly which inferences are constructed "on line" (during the reception of a text),⁴⁰ there is evidence that readers construct automatically only the minimum necessary for comprehension. They do not, for example, routinely draw inferences *on line* about the instruments used to perform tasks, nor fully work out *causal consequences*. "The actress fell from the 14th storey" does not automatically immediately produce the inference "she died," but something less explicit, akin to "something bad happened";⁴¹ but if this information becomes necessary for understanding a subsequent clause — say, "the ambulance took her to the morgue" — then it becomes a *causal antecedent* and the inference is constructed.⁴² This is known as the minimalist hypothesis,⁴³ and we might describe

³⁸ See above, p. 51; Deborah Tannen, *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*, Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics, no. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), at 2, defines involvement as collaborative "[participation] in the making of meaning."

³⁹ For good working definitions of eleven types of inference, see Joseph P. Magliano and Arthur C. Graesser, "A Three-Pronged Method for Studying Inference Generation in Literary Text," *Poetics* 20, no. 3 (1991): 193–232 at 195, who are more generous than the minimalist position of Gail McKoon and Roger Ratcliff, "Inference During Reading," *Psychological Review* 99, no. 3 (1992): 440–66.

⁴⁰ *E.g.*, Edward J. O'Brien *et al.*, "Elaborative Inferences During Reading: Do they Occur On-Line?" *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition* 14, no. 3 (1988): 410–20, claimed to have generated forward inferences on-line; but their inferences were so restricted as to be almost meaningless (they basically come under the category of anaphoric reference), and were not sustained in the absence of their high-context conditions (in experiment 3).

⁴¹ See Gail McKoon and Roger Ratcliff, "Inferences About Predictable Events," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition* 12, no. 1 (1986): 82–91.

⁴² For the automatism of antecedent (backward) but not consequent (forward) inferences, see Murray Singer and Fernanda Ferreira, "Inferring Consequences in Story Comprehension," *Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior* 22, no. 4 (1983): 437–48. Singer and Ferreira rightly comment that *some* forward inferences, such as *intention* (for irony, indirect speech acts, *etc.*), are necessary for comprehension and are probably automatically inferred.

⁴³ See McKoon and Ratcliff, "Inference During Reading," at 440 and *passim*. For a more recent review amending this position (with bibliography), see Nicolas Campion, "Predictive Inferences are Represented as Hypothetical Facts," *Journal of Memory and Language* 50 (2004): 149–64, especially at 149–50.

reading which depends *only* on this minimal level of inferencing “minimalist reading.” By contrast, reading which depends on inferences in addition to those necessary for understanding might be called “supplemented reading.”

We must bear in mind that the distinction here is between inferences which are *automatic* and those which are not; other types of inferences may also occur on line under certain circumstances — those which are so routinely constructed as to be called *inevitable*, and those which are consciously sought, or *strategic*⁴⁴ — and others again may occur *off line*, during recall or reflection. Of these, the inevitable and automatic inferences are compatible with transportation, but the off-line and strategic inferences are not. A non-reflective, moment-by-moment phenomenon, transportation is clearly an unconscious process which occurs (and influences our reception of a text) on line.⁴⁵ The difference between transported and non-transported reception of a text, then, might be phrased in terms of the audience’s ability to construct strategic and off-line inferences.

A maximally transported audience member, in other words, performs a minimalist reading of the text: s/he does not receive the text in a strategic manner but seeks only to comprehend the “poetic truth” visible on the surface of the text; nor (because the text is experienced in a moment-by-moment fashion) has s/he time to pause and consider the ramifications of the action in terms of, for example, the characters’ (or author’s) hidden motives. A minimally (*i.e.*, non-)transported audience member, on the other hand, is able to perform a supplemented reading which may substantially impede (or undermines the conclusions of) the moment-by-moment reception of the narrative; s/he may seek the “literal truth,” valid in the real world, which may only be visible beneath the surface of the text (*i.e.*, may only be identified in a strategic or reflective fashion).⁴⁶ These, of course, are

⁴⁴ To continue the above example, the strategic inference “she died” might occur in the context of a reader actively seeking to identify instances of murder or suicide in literature. Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 44, similarly distinguishes between inferences “inside” and “outside” the narrative world by whether or not they result from conscious planning. As such, he includes some “non-automatic” “strategic” inferences which are “not brought about (even so) by conscious planning”; it is this set which I am terming “inevitable” here.

⁴⁵ I use the term “unconscious” rather than “passive” here to avoid the impression that readers do not have to work to understand texts when transported; *cf.* Gerrig, *ibid.*, at 12–13.

⁴⁶ The terms “literal” and “poetic truth” are used after Frederick Ahl and Hanna M. Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), at 93, to replace the terms “truth” and “lies.”

extremes; real audience members will inevitably construct some intermediate reading which, though supplemented, differs from the minimalist reading by different degrees.

This maximally transported audience (constructing a minimalist reading) corresponds, in several important ways, to the notion of the “ideal narrative audience” articulated by Peter Rabinowitz.⁴⁷ This audience — the most fictional of the series of four audiences Rabinowitz describes — is the one the narrator wishes s/he was addressing:

This ... audience believes the narrator, accepts his judgments, sympathizes with his plight, laughs at his jokes even when they are bad ... [and] accepts uncritically what he has to say.⁴⁸

This audience is, in Rabinowitz’ scheme, an idealization (and hence a more fictional subset) of what might be seen as the narrator’s “actual” audience — which he calls the “narrative audience” — an “imitation audience” whose members believe the world underlying the narrative to be real (even though they may question the narrator’s judgment or presentation of events).⁴⁹ The Phaiakians are an ideal narrative audience to Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι; Eumaios belongs to the broader narrative audience when he listens to (and questions a salient detail of) Odysseus’ Cretan lie at ξ 192–359. In order to receive a narrative successfully, according to Rabinowitz, “we must ... pretend to be a member of the imaginary narrative audience for which [the] narrator is writing.”⁵⁰

Members of the narrative audiences operate like covert characters in the fictional world: they may possess information about the narrative-past (whether or not explicitly narrated in the text), but lack information about the narrative-future. Members of the narrative audience of the *Iliad*, for example, may know of the

⁴⁷ Peter J. Rabinowitz, “Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences,” *Critical Inquiry* 4, no. 1 (1977): 121–41 at 134.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, An ideal narrative audience thus cannot identify unreliable narration (for which see Wayne C. Booth, “Distance and Point-of-View: An Essay in Classification,” in *The Theory of the Novel*, ed. Phillip Stevick (New York: The Free Press, 1967 [originally published in *Essays In Criticism* 9 (1961)], 87–107).

⁴⁹ Rabinowitz, “Truth in Fiction,” at 127–29, reprised and expanded in Rabinowitz, *Before Reading*, at 94–96. The narrative audience (and its distinction from the “authorial” audience, to which I shall return below) has been acutely applied to Greek epic and tragedy by Ruth Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities: Conventions and Strategies of Verisimilitude in Homer and Greek Tragedy*, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 122 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1999).

⁵⁰ Rabinowitz, “Truth in Fiction,” at 127, original emphasis removed.

Judgment of Paris or the events leading up to the last year of the war — some of which are now unknown to the actual audience — but they cannot know about the quarrel over Akhilleus' armour or the Trojan Horse.

Insofar as they are recipients of the narrator's narration, it is tempting to identify the narrative audience with the narratee. Rabinowitz, however, argued that the narratee is conceptualized as external to the self, while the narrative audience is a role readers adopt while experiencing a text.⁵¹ Yet, in the context of Gerrig's position (as modified above) that readers usually adopt the stance of an individual the primary narrator informs (with the precise identification of that role dependent on the reader's affinity with the narratee),⁵² the distinction effectively collapses. We must remember that, in the Homeric poems in particular (or more generally in texts with a maximally covert narratee), there are many instances in which readers may consider themselves members directly addressed by the narrator;⁵³ in these cases, Rabinowitz' argument has no bearing.⁵⁴ In the remaining cases (where the reader *does* feel excluded from the group of narratees), the adoption of a stance of side-participant is inherently similar to Rabinowitz' description of entering the narrative audience. It is worth reiterating, then, that the adoption of either stance — Rabinowitz' act of *pretending* — is a form of transportation.⁵⁵

Rabinowitz opposed these narrative audiences to what he called the “authorial audience,” the hypothetical group the *author* intended as his/her audience. The authorial audience is an idealization of the “actual audience” (the “flesh-and-blood people who read the book”) which possesses the knowledge and preconceptions

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, at 127–28, nn. 14–15; cf. Rabinowitz, *Before Reading*, at 95.

⁵² See above, pp. 60–61.

⁵³ In some cases, this might be better seen as the reader understanding her/himself to be a member of a *group* the primary narrator informs (which has real meaning, of course, in the context of a live performance); this is not the case in the Homeric poems, where all apostrophes of the external audience (see above, p. 60, n. 21) are in the singular.

⁵⁴ Rabinowitz' argument deals only with [groups of] narratees from which the reader feels *excluded*.

⁵⁵ Indeed, Rabinowitz, “Truth in Fiction,” at 128 (cf. Rabinowitz, *Before Reading*, at 96) notes explicitly that there are times at which entering the narrative audience depends on our “[pretending] to abandon our real beliefs and accept in their stead “facts” and beliefs which ... fundamentally contradict our perceptions of reality. ... [T]he narrative audience of *Cinderella* accepts the existence of fairy godmothers ... [a] reader who refuses to pretend to share that belief will see *Cinderella* as a psychotic young woman subject to hallucinations.”

assumed by the author; readers must join it to “understand” the text.⁵⁶ This audience, like the narrative audience, may be joined through pretence but, unlike the narrative audience, it may in some cases also be joined through the acquisition of knowledge. (Hence, it is hypothetical rather than fictional.)⁵⁷ Rabinowitz’ arguments implicitly assume that the authorial audience brings its own and this assumed knowledge to bear on its interpretation of the text.⁵⁸

Although the ideal narrative audience corresponds to the maximally transported audience, the authorial audience does not correspond to the minimally transported audience because reading as the authorial audience is more specific than reading in a non-transported manner. Rabinowitz attempts to extricate his notion of the authorial audience from “some of the problems that have traditionally hampered the discussion of [authorial] intention” by formulating it more broadly in terms of “the joining of a particular social/interpretive community.”⁵⁹ Even so, there are far fewer “social/interpretive communities” than there are possible ways of reading in a non-transported manner.⁶⁰

I noted above that maximally- and minimally transported reading anchor the two ends of a continuum, and that most readers will fall somewhere between the two. In terms of Rabinowitz’ progression of audiences, it seems inherently unlikely that all readers would join the ideal narrative audience for the duration of their

⁵⁶ Rabinowitz, “Truth in Fiction,” at 126–27.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, at 130–32.

⁵⁸ *E.g. ibid.*, at 126 and Rabinowitz, *Before Reading*, at 21–22: “Demby’s *The Catacombs*, for instance, takes place during the early sixties, and the novel achieves its sense of impending doom only if the reader knows that John F. Kennedy will be assassinated when the events of the novel reach 22 November 1963.” This presupposes the repeated application of real-world knowledge.

⁵⁹ Rabinowitz, *Before Reading*, at 22 (and *cf.* 22–27). His defence is fundamentally unconvincing, as it implies throughout that there is a severely limited set of correct ways of understanding the text. It is, in fact, possible to defend “authorial reading” in terms of the *implied* author’s intentions if one recognizes that the implied author and her/his intentions are representations constructed by the *reader* rather than formulations inherent in the text which may be decoded unambiguously. (For a strong defence of this reader-construct position, see Bortolussi and Dixon, *Psychonarratology*, at 74–77.) In these terms, authorial reading becomes the reader’s attempt to interpret the text in the way s/he conceives the author intended; this conception of intention may be influenced by external information such as education, footnotes, *etc.*

⁶⁰ That is, one may deliberately attempt to read in a “resistant” manner, whether in terms of gender (see Judith Fetterley, *The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978)), or more broadly in an attempt to draw new meaning from a text. Resistant reading is conscious and thus non-transported, but it is not necessarily authorial, as the particular resistance involved may depend entirely on the predilections of the reader (and thus does not qualify as a “community”).

reception of the text; rather, most readers (at least, most of those who react affectively to the text) will simply join the (broader) narrative audience.

Rabinowitz' distinction between the authorial and narrative audiences has been applied acutely to the reception of Greek epic and tragedy by Ruth Scodel.⁶¹ She investigates the way readers are able to move between the two audiences; indeed, the twin foci of her book are the “mimetic flaws”⁶² which might draw the reader back from the narrative to the authorial audience and the strategies authors and readers use to avoid such a return.⁶³ The bulk of her study is taken up with identifying specific instances of these flaws and discussing the ways in which the audience may accommodate them.

The “*nature* of the duality of the fictional experience” is, then, outside Scodel's scope but, she notes, “an important psychological reality lies behind it.”⁶⁴ That reality is, I wish to suggest, the phenomenon of transportation. In this context, her conclusions — that authors are concerned about (and take steps to minimize interruption to) credibility and verisimilitude and that *if* readers notice a flaw at all, they will be generous in their interpretation — contribute to our understanding of the textual features and reading-patterns which maintain transportation.

Evidence of Transportation

As stated above, Gerrig's conception of transportation is complementary to the analyses of Bassett, Walsh, Ford, and Bakker mentioned in the previous chapter. Those focus, generally, on the strategies employed by the poet to achieve his goals

⁶¹ Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities*, *passim* but especially at 5–6.

⁶² *Ibid.*, at 10–12. These are discordant assertions (errors of fact, internal contradictions), action (inconsistent or implausible behaviour or action), and obvious *clichés*.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, at 12–15 and 15–21. Authors may assume that facts only hold in their particular context (and are not to be taken as contradicting another part of the text; local motivation), apologize that they have privileged “truth” over credibility, or highlight the significance of the “flaw” (in, for example, a character's personality, or the narrative's action; thematization); readers may not notice a flaw at all (inattention); if they do, they may generously ignore (bracket) it, assume it is deliberate (naturalization), or has thematic significance (thematization). For some empirical results for reader strategies which might be seen as analogous to two of Scodel's categories, see José Otero and Walter Kintsch, “Failures to Detect Contradictions in a Text: What Readers Believe versus What They Read.,” *Psychological Science* 3 (1992): 229–35, especially at 230–31: types 1, 2, and 4 are inattention; type 3 is naturalization.

⁶⁴ Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities*, at 6, emphasis added.

of the “participation and involvement of the audience.”⁶⁵ We may, however, extend these notions by using Gerrig’s concept to reframe them in terms of audience response: to consider what “participation” and “involvement” might mean for an audience (and in what ways the meanings of these terms might vary with performance context); and what absence from the real world and presence within the story world might entail and imply.

Given their genesis in linguistic conversational analysis, the terms “participation” and “involvement” might, in the context of an oral performance, suggest reciprocal, verbal interaction between audience and performer: audience members actively participating by interrupting and contributing (verbally) to the narrative.⁶⁶ Although cross-cultural evidence demonstrates that interruption can occur in some performance contexts⁶⁷ — it is lacking from those depicted in the Homeric poems⁶⁸ — participation and involvement do not *entail* verbalization or reciprocity. Rather, participation and involvement are used here primarily to describe silent, individual responses. In other words, the silent, individual (participatory)

⁶⁵ Egbert J. Bakker, “Storytelling in the Future: Truth, Time, and Tense in Homeric Epic,” in *Written Voices, Spoken Signs: Tradition, Performance, and the Epic Text*, ed. Egbert J. Bakker and Ahuvia Kahane, Center for Hellenic Studies Colloquia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 11–36, at 16, asserts that “epic performers ... achieve vividness of the discourse and *thereby* the participation and involvement of the audience” (emphasis added).

⁶⁶ Such reciprocal interaction (communication from audience to performer) comes under the definition of “back channel” listener feedback; this can be verbal or non-verbal, generic or specific; see recently Janet Beavin Bavelas, Linda Coates, and Trudy Johnson, “Listeners as Co-Narrators,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 6 (2000): 941–52, especially at 942–44 (a verbal interruption may be seen in their example 5).

⁶⁷ To the Asian and African cross-cultural evidence enumerated by Martin, *Language of Heroes*, at 5–7, and 232–33, I wish to add two examples: in performances of *pikono* (chanted tales) among the Duna in Papua New Guinea, members of the audience are able — even encouraged — to interrupt the singer during line-end pauses and comment on the story or speak to (or as) a character (Nicole Haley, *Pers. Comm.* 12 May 2004; see also Alan Rumsey, “Chanted Tales in the New Guinea Highlands of Today: A Comparative Study,” in *Expressive Genres and Historical Change: Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Taiwan*, ed. Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern (Aldershot: Ashgate Publications, 2005), 41–81, especially at 67–70); another, less extreme example is to be found during readings of the Book of Esther (מגילת אסתר) during the Jewish festival of Purim: traditionally, the audience members use noise makers (*groggers* or רעשנים) to drown out each mention of the name Haman, the villain of that story.

⁶⁸ In the depictions of oral performances within the *Odyssey*, audiences listen in silence (even the suitors: α 325, 339), and only contribute at appropriate pauses in the singing (the Phaiakians exhort Dēmodokos to continue at θ 90–91; Odysseus requests that he turn [μετάβηθι] to a different part of the story at θ 492–95; and Alkinoös similarly directs Odysseus’ narrative at λ 370–72). Tēlemakhos’ injunction to the suitors — μηδὲ βοητὺς ἢ ἔστω (“let there be no shouting,” α 369–70) — possibly implies that interrupting the singer could occur in rowdy gatherings, but if so, the context implies that such behaviour would be indecorous. On interruption as an epic motif, see Robert J. Rabel, “Interruption in the *Odyssey*,” *Colby Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2002): 77–93.

responses of an audience member listening to a live, oral performance may be seen as very similar to (and essentially treated the same way as) the silent, individual (participatory) responses of a solitary reader absorbed in a printed text of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*.

Initially, the application of the term “participatory” to readers’ silent responses to printed texts might seem a little incongruous, especially in the light of such active responses to oral performance in other cultures cited above; yet, many readers have had the experience of smiling, or even laughing aloud, after reading something comic in a book, and these reactions must be seen as analogous to “listener responses” in conversation.⁶⁹ Indeed, the psychologists David Allbritton and Richard Gerrig, drawing upon the similarity of conversation and literature,⁷⁰ used the term “participatory response” (abbreviated to “p-response”) to describe a range of non-vocalized reader responses to written narrative.⁷¹

Quintessential *p*-responses are formulated (but not vocalized) exhortations — “oh no!” “look!” “don’t do it!” — perhaps accompanied by a rationale: “keep running: it’s Athēna, not Dēīphobos!” Closely aligned, but perhaps more elaborate, are expressions of preference — “I hope Akhilleus kills Hektōr” (or *vice versa*) — or the

⁶⁹ Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson, “Listeners as Co-Narrators,” at 943–44, distinguish between specific (e.g., “gasping, mirroring the speaker’s gesture, or supplying an appropriate phrase”) versus generic responses (“nodding and generic vocalizations ... ‘mhm,’ ‘uh-huh,’ or ‘yeah.’”). These researchers found differentiating between generic and specific instances of smiling and laughing difficult on the grounds that “[s]miling and laughing could be polite or appreciative generic responses; they could also be specific to the narrator’s own amusement, or they could be maintaining the dialogue (metacommunicative)” (946). Clearly, in the case of reading a book, generic and metacommunicative responses are inappropriate — we do not encourage authors to continue — and laughter may be counted as a specific response.

⁷⁰ On the similarity of literature and conversation (and thus the appropriateness of the application of conversational linguistics to literary narrative), see, e.g., Tannen, *Talking Voices*, at 27–28: “[r]ecently ... there has been increasing recognition that literary storytelling is simply an elaboration of conversational storytelling.” This similarity, indeed, forms the basis for the studies of Egbert Bakker and Andrew Ford (cited and discussed above).

Gerrig’s theory on the role readers adopt in literary narrative is an extension of speech act theory (i.e., grounded firmly in vocalized speech); see Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 103–32.

⁷¹ See David W. Allbritton and Richard J. Gerrig, “Participatory Responses in Text Understanding,” *Journal of Memory and Language* 30 (1991): 603–26, who revealingly state (in the second line of their abstract) that *p*-responses “arise as a consequence of *involvement* in the text” (emphasis added). See also Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 65–96 (Chapter 4); Richard J. Gerrig, “Participatory Aspects of Narrative Understanding,” in *Empirical Approaches to Literature and Aesthetics*, ed. Roger J. Kreuz and Mary Sue MacNealy, *Advances in Discourse Processes* (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Group, 1996), 127–42; James W. Polichak and Richard J. Gerrig, “‘Get Up and Win!’: Participatory Responses to Narrative,” in *Narrative Impact: Social and Cognitive Foundations*, ed. Melanie C. Green, Jeffrey J. Strange, and Timothy C. Brock (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 71–95.

entertainment of potential narrative outcomes: “perhaps a god will rescue Hektōr.” Allbritton and Gerrig produced empirical evidence suggesting not only that these responses exist (and can occur in a broadly regular fashion), but that they fundamentally contribute to our experience of a narrative.⁷²

Gerrig and another collaborator, James Polichak, developed a taxonomy of *p*-responses.⁷³ They distinguish between *as-if* responses (the “basic expression[s] of an affective stance towards narrative objects or outcomes” which “resemble the ... responses a person would experience if they were observing the scene as a participant”: “Look out! It’s Athēna, not Dēiphobos”), *replotting* (the devising of alternative narrative action: “If only Hektōr hadn’t stayed outside the walls alone!”), *problem-solving* responses (the devising of alternative potential outcomes: “Keep running, and maybe you will outrun Akhilleus!”), and *evaluatory* responses (which influence a reader’s real-world beliefs about the subject of the narrative).

Although Polichak and Gerrig did not group them together, replotting and problem-solving responses are similar in at least one important respect:⁷⁴ both attempt to construct a sequence of events ultimately leading to the preferred outcome. In this sense, the main difference between the two is the point in the sequence at which the response occurs. This difference collapses somewhat, however, if the sequence in question is known to the reader in advance because, for example, it has been narrated proleptically, one has read the book (or seen the movie or heard the performance) before, or the subject of the story is traditional. In such cases, the events one would change are in the future (hence the response

⁷² Allbritton and Gerrig, “Participatory Responses,” at 604, theorized (and subsequently provided some empirical supporting evidence) that such exhortations would interfere with a reader’s ability to verify whether or not the warning had been explicitly presented in the text; in a later treatment, Richard J. Gerrig and Deborah A. Prentice, “Notes on Audience Response,” in *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies*, ed. David Bordwell and Noël E. Carroll, Wisconsin Studies in Film (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 388–403, at 397–400 showed that *p*-responses may also influence readers’ affective responses to the text in that expressions of preference about the fate or actions of a literary character (a type of *p*-response) cause reactions (such as guilt) to the fictional action which are inherently similar to those we exhibit in real life.

⁷³ Polichak and Gerrig, “Get Up and Win!” at 77–80.

⁷⁴ Polichak and Gerrig (*ibid.*) differentiated between responses in terms of the timing of the response *vis-à-vis* the narrative event; hence, they grouped problem-solving responses with *as-if* responses (both of which refer to events in the future) rather than replotting (which refers to events in the past).

involves problem-solving activity), but the response is engendered by (if not in the face of) the ultimate consequences of the event(s) in question.⁷⁵

This phenomenon — *p*-responding in the face of a fixed, known outcome — seems somewhat paradoxical: the knowledge of the outcome should bring with it knowledge that that outcome is fixed, and knowledge of the inevitability of the outcome renders *participatory* responses somewhat futile. Gerrig, in an early treatment, dubbed the problem-solving *p*-responses of this type “anomalous replotting” on the grounds that the knowledge required for the activity should, itself, prevent it;⁷⁶ we can add that the replotting responses (about past outcomes) are also anomalous, as they occur despite the fact that the outcomes in question have already been narrated.

The very existence of this phenomenon begs important questions regarding the status of extra-diegetic knowledge during the reception of a text. One might legitimately question, for example, whether outcomes are fixed in the context of a live, oral performance, and, if not, whether they are able to be *known*. Although Homeric epic operates in a traditional framework and is constrained (to some extent) by the mythological “facts,” James Morrison has comprehensively shown that the poet (of the *Iliad* at least) consciously plays up to the possibility of violating those traditional outcomes.⁷⁷ In this context, the problem-solving responses (about future outcomes) lose a great deal of their anomaly.

Yet the discussion of anomalous replotting (in my broader sense) is not inapplicable to Homeric epic. The reception of the epics in printed form implies that *p*-responses are anomalous in a different sense: we should realize that the

⁷⁵ Although they did not note it explicitly, the results of Allbritton and Gerrig, “Participatory Responses,” (though not those of Gerrig and Prentice) deal with this temporal arrangement of events, as the outcome of the story was presented in the first sentence of their stories. Thus, their results did not just show that *p*-responses affect our understanding of narratives (rather than form some sort of “running commentary,” [617]), but also that they occur even when the outcome is known in advance.

⁷⁶ Richard J. Gerrig, “Reexperiencing Fiction and Non-Fiction,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 47, no. 3 (1989): 277–80 at 278. Cf. Colin Radford, “How Can We be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supplementary Volume 49 (1975): 67–80 at 76, who noted that we respond to the death of Mercutio in a way which, logically, “seems absurd ... especially when we know the play.”

⁷⁷ James V. Morrison, *Homeric Misdirection: False Predictions in the Iliad*, Michigan Monographs in Classical Antiquity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) *passim*, but articulated explicitly at 7.

outcomes to which we respond are already determined because the text is fixed, and no amount of *p*-responding can change the outcome. Knowledge of the outcome itself is, in this respect, unimportant; knowledge of its fixedness, which is available even to us when reading the epics for the first time, renders the participatory responses anomalous.

In addition, there are circumstances under which the responses *are* anomalous in the reception of an oral performance: even if replotting about the forthcoming narrative outcomes (the problem-solving response) is of questionable status, that which stems from outcomes already narrated (Gerrig's replotting response) is just as anomalous in an oral as in a literate context. Mode of reception does not bear on the anomaly of the response if, while Hektōr runs for his life around the walls of Troy, we wonder what might have happened had he not remained outside alone.

Gerrig proposed anomalous replotting was dependent on real-world knowledge of the outcome in question on the grounds that in the absence of such knowledge we are unlikely to emit the exhortatory *p*-responses which betray its existence. We are unlikely (to use an Homeric example) to exhort Hektōr to go within the walls at the end of Φ or beginning of X without knowledge of his imminent death at the hands of Akhilleus. Yet, one might question the role of real-world knowledge in this process, simply on the grounds that an outcome which is of high probability but not known absolutely might engender the same response. To a first-time audience, after all, there are no guarantees that Hektōr will die in his duel with Akhilleus *in X*: the duel itself could be delayed again (as it has been numerous times since Akhilleus' vow to kill Hektōr immediately — $\nu\upsilon\nu \delta' \epsilon\hat{\iota}\mu'$ ["I shall go now"] — at Σ 114–15), and the audience's supposition of witnessing the final encounter between Akhilleus and Hektōr has been frustrated twice already.⁷⁸ The capacity of a first-time audience to *p*-respond in this way suggests that certainty in the outcome is not a prerequisite for anomalous replotting.

Gerrig, in fact, identified another reaction — suspense — which may, like replotting, be labelled “anomalous” in some circumstances. Briefly put, most

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, at 43–49; the two instances are the abortive encounter between the two men at Y 419–54, and the first two lines of Akhilleus' encounter with Lykaon in Φ (*i.e.*, at Φ 34–35). Morrison concludes (49): “The audience knows very well what is coming, but the narrator has presented his story in such a way that the audience cannot know when these events will take place.”

conceptions of suspense are framed in terms of *uncertainty* in a narrative outcome:⁷⁹ by definition, knowledge of the story's ending should preclude suspense about the outcome. Such knowledge might be derived from the narrative itself — as in the case of prolepsis or when the audience has received the narrative before — or from the audience's (extra-diegetic) knowledge. These are not only applicable to the reception of an historical novel or the rereading of a book, but also to Homeric epic: not only do the stories operate in a traditional framework (which implies the equivalent of extra-diegetic knowledge *and* the possibility that the audience may have heard some version of them before), but also the epics contain a substantial amount of explicit prolepses.⁸⁰

Yet, Gerrig produced empirical evidence to support the widely recognized phenomenon that, despite the theories, *real* readers *do* experience suspense despite knowing the outcome of the story.⁸¹ He implied that the *suspense* which arises when re-experiencing a text is no different from that which arises when experiencing a text for the first time as both depend on uncertainty in the narrative outcome.

Indeed, the very existence of anomalous replotting and suspense suggests that readers (including those familiar with the traditions or even the text in question) behave, during their moment-by-moment reception of the text, almost as if events which have not yet been narrated have not yet occurred and are thus still subject to uncertainty. In other words, it is not the replotting or the suspense which is anomalous, but the uncertainty underlying them. I wish, then, to unify the considerations of these anomalous reactions by treating them both as consequences of a phenomenon I will call “anomalous uncertainty.”

⁷⁹ William F. Brewer and Edward Lichtenstein, “Stories are to Entertain: A Structural-Affect Theory of Stories,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 6 (1982): 473–86. This view prevails in structuralism and narratology too: see Genette, *Narrative Discourse*, at 67 (who explicitly denies suspense in Homer), and Prince, *Grammar of Stories*, at 58.

⁸⁰ A combination of these two occurs, in fact, when receiving sections of the narrative out of sequence; witness, for example, the recent (1999–2005) trilogy of prequels to the *Star Wars* films: in each, suspense is generated regarding the survival of (at least) two main characters, Anakin Skywalker and Obi-Wan Kenobi, despite the fact that both must survive in order to appear (Anakin as Darth Vader, Obi-Wan as “Ben”) in the original (1977) *Star Wars* (episode IV).

⁸¹ Richard J. Gerrig, “Suspense in the Absence of Uncertainty,” *Journal of Memory and Language* 28, no. 6 (1989): 633–48. For vivid demonstrations of the way suspense can defy our real-world knowledge of the outcome, see, *e.g.*, Gerrig, “Reexperiencing Fiction,” *passim*, and Noël E. Carroll, “The Paradox of Suspense,” in *Suspense: Conceptualizations, Theoretical Analyses, and Empirical Explorations*, ed. Peter Vorderer, Hans Jürgen Wulff, and Mike Friedrichsen (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 71–91, at 72.

In order to explain this uncertainty, Gerrig proposed that we draw on something he called the “expectation of uniqueness,” based on the notion that, although we can form (schematic) expectations from patterns we observe, any individual instance might turn out differently; in other words, we approach narratives (as we approach life) with the feeling that our (schematic) past experience makes particular outcomes more likely, but the narrative has the potential to turn out differently *this time*.⁸²

This expectation does not dissolve the paradox of suspense; it merely removes it to another level as the expectation itself is as anomalous as the uncertainty/suspense it explains.⁸³ Gerrig proposed that the expectation of uniqueness arises from the optimization of cognitive resources in that *always* searching our memories for details not normally available would be wasteful if another mechanism (schematic expectation) can provide us with a reasonably accurate prediction of what will happen. Unlike outcomes retrieved from memory, those predicted by schematic expectations *are* subject to uncertainty. In other words, the intrusion of real-world knowledge (and its certainty) upon our moment-by-moment experience of the narrative does not occur *automatically*; we may employ strategies to ensure that it does so, but without such effort it might not.⁸⁴ Gerrig described this lack of intrusion in terms of the reader being *transported* some (psychological) *distance* from the real world.⁸⁵ The experience of anomalous suspense or replotting,

⁸² Gerrig, “Suspense in the Absence of Uncertainty,” at 645; Gerrig, “Reexperiencing Fiction,” at 279; Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*, at 170; this is similar to the “expectation of variation” proposed by Juan A. Prieto-Pablos, “The Paradox of Suspense,” *Poetics* 26, no. 2 (1998): 99–113 at 111.

Robert J. Yanal, “The Paradox of Suspense,” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 36, no. 2 (1996): 146–58 at 151–52, fundamentally misunderstands this concept when he argues that the expectation of uniqueness should apply to ping-pong balls or place us in perpetual suspense about *everything* in the future. Not only is such an expectation compatible with schematic understanding of the future (so Richard J. Gerrig, “Is there a Paradox of Suspense? A Reply to Yanal,” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 37, no. 2 (1997): 168–74) but also we *are* fundamentally uncertain of everything which will happen in the future; we only feel *suspense* regarding those outcomes about which we care.

⁸³ So also Carroll, “The Paradox of Suspense,” at 90: “Gerrig’s approach still does render recidivists [*i.e.*, those who feel suspense on rereading] irrational, even if in the long run they are victims of a higher rationality.”

⁸⁴ The clearest explication of this (which, one must note, does *not* depend on the expectation of uniqueness) is given by Gerrig, “Is there a Paradox of Suspense?” at 172.

⁸⁵ The metaphor of transportation is worked out most fully in Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds* Chapter 2 (1–25). For the connections between Anomalous Suspense, the Expectation of Uniqueness, and transportation, see Chapter 5, especially 170–74. Cf. the related observation by Richard J. Gerrig, “The Resiliency of Suspense,” in *Suspense: Conceptualizations, Theoretical Analyses, and Empirical Explorations*, ed. Peter Vorderer, Hans Jürgen Wulff, and Mike Friedrichsen

therefore, dependent in turn on the experience of anomalous uncertainty, may be used as evidence that the audience, during their experience of the narrative, has become transported.

In the context of an ancient reception of the Homeric poems, however, the multiplicity and mutability of “the tradition” reduces the audience’s certainty in those narrative outcomes which have not yet been narrated. In these terms, Gerrig’s expectation of uniqueness (which was originally framed to account for the re-experience of a particular narrative [rereading a text, re-viewing a film, and so on]) takes on a new and salient meaning: we must admit that it is not objectively illogical for the audience to entertain the thought that the performance might end differently: it is a real possibility. Performers can and do vary even what some consider the most sacrosanct or important outcomes if it suits their artistic purpose.⁸⁶ In doing so (whether intentionally or not), the performer may (like Mercury in Plautus’ *Amphitruo*⁸⁷) fundamentally change the story and/or surprise the audience, but there is nothing anomalous about the audience’s lack of certainty.

The experience of suspense or replotting about *traditional* outcomes, therefore, cannot be considered sure evidence that an audience member has become transported. A similar conclusion will be reached if we consider the equivalence between our schematic knowledge (how stories of a certain type tend to conclude) and our certainty about the outcomes of a particular text. We bring to the *Odyssey* a schematic knowledge of folk-tales in which heroes prevail over villains and good triumphs over evil;⁸⁸ but even though this schematic knowledge adds to our

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(Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 93–105, at 103, that the “narrative, as it unfolds, must be sufficiently compelling to draw the reader into its narrative world.”

⁸⁶ Witness the recent film, Wolfgang Petersen, “Troy,” Film (Burbank, CA: Warner Bros., 2004), in which the established traditions of Menelaos’ survival of the war to be reunited with Helen (*e.g.*, their presentation in δ; *E. Andr.*; his survival of the war is also inherent in the *agon* of *E. Tr.*) and Agamemnōn’s survival to be killed by Aigisthos and Klytaimnēstra (which underpins, in fact, the whole of the *Oresteia*; *cf.*, *e.g.*, α 35–43, 298–300, λ 405–34, ω 19–34, 95–97; *A. A.*) were disregarded.

⁸⁷ At *Amphitruo* 50–63, Mercury (responding to the consternation of the audience) changes the *tragedy* into a *tragicocomoedia* (*deu’ sum, commutauero*).

⁸⁸ On the *Odyssey* itself as a form of a folk-tale, see especially (and recently) Malcolm Davies, “The Folk-Tale Origins of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*,” *Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, Patristik und lateinische Tradition* 115 (2002): 5–43. On the episodes of the ἀπόλογοι as folk-tales, see Denys Lionel Page, *Folktales in Homer’s Odyssey*, The Carl Newell Jackson Lectures, 1972 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); Rhys Carpenter, *Folk Tale, Fiction and Saga in*

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assessed likelihood that Odysseus must prevail, it cannot eliminate uncertainty: heroes *do* die (eventually); evil *can* triumph; and both *might* happen in this performance.

There are certain narrative-outcomes, however, which should not be subject to any uncertainty because the information is logically (and readily) inferable from the preceding narrative. When Nestōr tells Tēlemakhos of his return from Troy (γ 130–83), the fact that the scene is set in Pylos entails that the return was successful, just as the setting of Menelaos’ reminiscences (δ 351–586) in Sparta entails his success in the capture of Prōteus.

In one of the earliest essays which applied modern narratology to Homeric epic, Ann Bergren lamented the lack of attention paid to “temporality” in Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι. “Despite several reminders,” she wrote, “we tend to forget as we read that Odysseus is telling a tale in the present about events in the past.”⁸⁹ Bergren’s rebuke was aimed squarely at critics, but, in a way she did not intend, it is equally applicable to most audiences of the *Odyssey*. Despite the fact that the posterior narration⁹⁰ of the ἀπόλογοι *should*, by virtue of its tense,⁹¹ *continuously* remind the

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the Homeric Epics, Sather Classical Lectures 20 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), especially Chapter 7 (though I find the argument inherently unlikely as it is based — especially for the Κυκλώπεια — on parallel motifs rather than structural equivalence); and Denys Lionel Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), Chapter 2. On the Κυκλώπεια in particular, there is extensive bibliography: see further below, Chapter 4. On the schemata underlying folk-tales, see especially Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, trans. Laurence Scott, ed. Louis A. Wagner, 2nd ed., vol. 9, American Folklore Society Bibliographical and Special Series (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968 [originally published as Морфология «Волшебной» Сказки [Morfologija Skazki] (Leningrad 1928)]).

⁸⁹ Ann L. T. Bergren, “Odyssean Temporality: Many (Re)Turns,” in *Approaches to Homer*, ed. Carl A. Rubino and Cynthia W. Shelmerdine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 38–73, at 39. Bergren demonstrates that a lack of awareness of the anachronies of the *Odyssey* deprives the reader of fundamental insights into the way Odysseus’ character changes over the course of his journey home. “Anachronies” were defined by Genette, *Narrative Discourse*, at 35–36 as “the various types of discordance between the ... orderings of story and narrative.” Cf. his analysis of the anachronies of the *proem* to the *Iliad* (A 1–11) at 37.

⁹⁰ I have used the term “posterior” after Prince, *Narratology*, at 27, to describe narration in the past tense. Genette, *Narrative Discourse*, at 217, called this “subsequent narration,” referring to the relative temporal positions of the narrated action and the narrating instance, and cited Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι as an example.

⁹¹ Odysseus, like the poet himself, never uses the historic present. I owe the observation of the poet’s neglect of this tense to Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 88–90. There is, of course, a fine line between the historic present (used in action) and the descriptive presents of, e.g., ζ 87 or η 103–32, as both encourage the sense that the narrative (set in the past) is occurring in the present. (On the different effects of the pluperfects of ε 63–74 [Kalypsō’s cave] and the presents of η 103–32 [Alkinoös’ household and garden] or ν 96–112 [the cave of the nymphs], see Bassett, *ibid.*). Odysseus, indeed, uses descriptive presents in much the same way at, e.g., ι 21–28, 107–41, κ 8–12, 82–90, and λ 14–19.

audience of the temporality involved, the strict implications of this relationship frequently (if not regularly) fail to impact upon our responses to the narrative.

A first-person posterior narration should not, under normal circumstances, admit any doubt regarding one thing: the survival of the narrator. Unless the narrating instance takes place in the underworld⁹² or we take into account resurrection (which is unknown in Homer), the narrator's survival is a prerequisite for telling his/her own story. As such, at least as far as Odysseus is concerned, the outcome of the ἀπόλογοι is known in advance: he must survive. Any uncertainty about his safety we might feel in response to the component narratives is thus, by definition, anomalous. There are, then, even in a live oral performance, circumstances in which the arousal of suspense and/or the existence of replotting are indicative of the experience of anomalous uncertainty and hence may be used as evidence of transportation.

This argument is a minimalist position: it excludes all outcomes about which there is the slightest uncertainty in order that whatever remains must be indicative of transportation. Transportation itself, of course, should not be so limited in the normal course of the reception of a narrative; we shall simply have to look elsewhere for supporting evidence. Some of this argument is, in addition, only relevant to the reception of a live performance: when reading a book or watching a film we are, logically, aware of the fact that the text is set and hence *all* participatory responses are anomalous; when subsequently rereading/re-viewing such a narrative we may be sure (at least to the extent we are confident nobody has interfered with the text) that it will re-produce the narrative we have already received, and hence we may be confident in our knowledge of the outcomes. In these situations, uncertainty *is* anomalous and the suspense/replotting responses arising from it *may* be taken as evidence of transportation.

The Transportation-Imagery Model

Gerrig's conception of transportation has been substantially developed by another psychologist, Melanie Green, and her collaborator, Timothy Brock. Where Gerrig

⁹² E.g., Agamemnon's speech in the Νεκυία (at λ 405–34), or Amphimedon's in the Second Νεκυία (at ω 121–90). In these cases, indeed, the setting in the underworld removes doubt about the alternative outcome.

invoked transportation to expose the activities underlying the phenomena of Anomalous Suspense and Anomalous Replotting, Green and Brock set out to investigate its causes and its effects.⁹³ Aside from extending (though slightly reorienting) Gerrig’s concept, Green and Brock’s results provide some empirical evidence on the distinction between personal significance and personal experience discussed in Chapter 2. Some of their conclusions, however, seem to lessen the applicability of their theory to Homeric epic. The purposes of this section are, accordingly, to evaluate their model; to review their experiments; and to assess the suitability of applying their results to our understanding of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

Green and Brock cited Gerrig’s metaphor of transportation,⁹⁴ and adapted it into their own theory on persuasion; they formalized their model in a series of five postulates:

- Postulate I. Narrative persuasion is limited to story texts (scripts) (a) which are in fact narratives, (b) in which images are evoked, and (c) in which readers’ (viewers) beliefs are implicated.
- Postulate II. Narrative persuasion (belief change) occurs, *other things equal*, to the extent that the evoked images are activated by psychological *transportation* ...
- Postulate III. Propensity for transportation by exposure to a given narrative account is affected by attributes of the recipient (for example, imagery skill).
- Postulate IV. Propensity for transportation by exposure to a given narrative account is affected by attributes of the text (script). ...
- Postulate V. Propensity for transportation by exposure to a given narrative account is affected by attributes of the context (medium). ...⁹⁵

Unlike Gerrig’s theoretical framework, then, Green and Brock do not concentrate on the reader/audience member *during* the reception of narrative text, but try to identify the causes and effects (and account for moderating factors) of

⁹³ Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock, “In the Mind’s Eye: Transportation-Imagery Model of Narrative Persuasion,” in *Narrative Impact: Social and Cognitive Foundations*, ed. Melanie C. Green, Jeffrey J. Strange, and Timothy C. Brock (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 315–41, at 317–18: “Our research program begins with this phenomenological experience of being transported to a narrative world, and explores the causes and the consequences of this type of narrative-based mental processing. One of the specific questions we ask is how transporting narratives—even fictional ones—can have an impact on individuals’ real-world beliefs.”

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, at 324; Green and Brock, “The Role of Transportation,” at 701.

⁹⁵ Green and Brock, “In the Mind’s Eye,” at 316–17; I have abridged postulate II by removing a definition of transportation (“a state in which a reader becomes absorbed in the narrative world, leaving the real world, at least momentarily, behind”) and postulates IV and V by removing examples.

transportation itself. Indeed, they give very little consideration at all to the activities of readers while transported.⁹⁶ In this sense, their model complements Gerrig's very well.

In their second postulate, Green and Brock proposed that narrative persuasion depends on the evocation of mental images. The consideration of imagery in their model is (as we will soon discover) a major advantage; yet, here (and elsewhere in their work) they collapse narrative persuasion with transportation. This, which unfortunately is not adequately supported either by argument or empirical data, leads them to a reorientation of Gerrig's concept of transportation in ways which might be better applied only to persuasion.

Gerrig's concept deals with audiences *during* reception — their “on-line,” “moment-by-moment experience” of the narrative — and his metaphor suggests (in point 6) that the consequences of transportation are effected *during* real-world absence (rather than “off line” after the traveller's return).⁹⁷ Subsequent consideration of these consequences moderates their impact: we realize the anomaly of our uncertainty and our suspense for Hektōr (at the beginning of X) is changed to pity; we rationalize that, as a fictional character, Hektōr never existed in the real world and our pity (perhaps) is lessened.

Green and Brock, on the other hand, limited their model (and, indeed, transportation itself⁹⁸) to narratives which evoke “images that can be recalled, recognized, and responded to.” “The generation of images,” they add, “can occur during or after exposure to the focal text.”⁹⁹ This timing, then, marks a major departure from Gerrig's construct, and frames transportation in much more reflective terms. Indeed, Green and Brock proposed that one way imagery might effect belief change is through the “re-invocation” of the narrative after its

⁹⁶ Green and Brock's consideration of the activities constituting transportation is limited to comparisons with other concepts: see Green and Brock, *ibid.*, at 325–27.

⁹⁷ See above, p. 55. Gerrig's sixth point is “The traveler returns to the world of origin, somewhat changed by the journey.”

⁹⁸ That is, rather than simply limiting belief change; Green and Brock, “In the Mind's Eye,” at 327: “Propensity for transportation by exposure to a given narrative account is affected by attributes of the recipient. Among these moderating attributes is imagery skill.” and “[T]ransportation, although a measure of state, not ability, may derive its force from most recipients' general ability to create vivid images.”

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, at 321.

delivery which effectively increases the reader's exposure to the narrative's (implicit persuasive) "message."¹⁰⁰ Hence, we would expect the consequence of transportation (the reader's persuasion) to *increase* with reflection rather than decrease.

It is, however, possible to reconcile these positions if we take any subsequent evocation of a narrative image as a new episode of transportation. In Gerrig's terms, indeed, "narratives" may be evoked just as legitimately by a mental image as by a visual stimulus such as a painting or film. If the recall of an image re-invokes (part of) the narrative itself, then it prompts another journey to the narrative world during which the consequences of transportation (such as persuasion) may be effected.

Green and Brock's model implicitly broadens Gerrig's framework in that transportation is formalized as a variable phenomenon: their third through fifth postulates assume that readers may be transported to different extents, whether by some inherent aptitude (transportability) of the audience, some set of characteristics of the text (its transportingness), or context factors such as the mode of performance, the reception environment, and so on.¹⁰¹

In order to determine the effects of transportation on their empirical results, Green and Brock developed a questionnaire (which they called the "Transportation Scale") to measure transportation. The participants in their experiments were asked to rate their agreement (from "not at all" to "very much") with fifteen statements such as "I was mentally involved in the narrative while reading it" or "While I was reading the narrative, activity going on in the room around me was on my mind."¹⁰² Responses to the items on this scale were graded out of seven (with higher numbers indicating greater transportation) and summed to give a Transportation Score.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, at 337: "in narrative persuasion a part (a central image) can restore the whole, much like a bar or two from familiar music."

¹⁰¹ *Cf.* also Green and Brock, "The Role of Transportation," at 703.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, at 704, Table 1. The questions are reproduced in Appendix 4, below, p. 207.

Three statements, including the second example just quoted, were reverse-scored to minimize the impact of response bias (individuals' tendency to respond at the same point in a scale).

Green and Brock's scale attracts several theoretical objections: first, it is specific to the target narrative and thus technically should not be used to compare the "transportingness" of different texts;¹⁰³ a more urgent theoretical objection is that the scale is an "off-line," retrospective, and reflective measure.¹⁰⁴ As such, responses to it might be affected by Hindsight Bias (the tendency to miscalculate one's previous likelihood of responding in a particular way).¹⁰⁵ Participants who give considered answers to the scale questions might, in addition, respond in a way which makes use of their real-world context.¹⁰⁶ This poses a problem in terms of the "anomalous" reactions discussed above, as the real-world contextualization can fundamentally alter our understanding of an anomalous response. Especially in the context of a narrative which operates in a traditional context, our responses to the statement "I wanted to learn how the narrative ended" may be significantly changed depending on whether or not we acknowledge that our awareness of that ending had been suppressed during reception.¹⁰⁷

In defence of the Transportation Scale we may note that its retrospective nature is consistent with Green and Brock's reworking of Gerrig's model as a reflective phenomenon. Yet, as I shall argue below, Green and Brock's off-line model is less appropriate to Homeric Epic than Gerrig's on-line conception; in consequence, the phenomenon of transportation outlined in this thesis is far closer to the latter than

¹⁰³ The scale is narrative specific in that the last four questions of the scale ask the respondent to rate the vividness of her/his imagery of the major characters in the narrative. While this is not problematic when dealing with a single narrative, it raises questions of parity if responses are compared between narratives because the characters rated may not play equivalent parts in the texts. (This problem is most urgent, obviously, in narratives with fewer than four characters.) In its defence, one might argue that the scale is legitimate if one observes its limitation to a within-texts (rather than between-texts) design; while one may use this scale to study the effects of external factors (*etc.*) on transportation with a single text, it cannot be used to study the effects of, *e.g.*, *genre* or structure (with different texts) on transportation. Unfortunately, however, *ibid.*, at 708, table 4, did not observe this limitation.

¹⁰⁴ For the distinction between "on-line" and "off-line," see above, pp. 67–68.

¹⁰⁵ Baruch Fischhoff, "Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 104 (1975): 288–99; and more recently, *e.g.*, Incheol Choi and Richard E. Nisbett, "Cultural Psychology of Surprise: Holistic Theories and Recognition of Contradiction," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 6 (2000): 890–905, especially their "Bad Samaritan" Study 1.

¹⁰⁶ Indeed, it is difficult to see how responses to statements such as "The events in the narrative have changed my life" could possibly give answers *without* real-world contextualization.

¹⁰⁷ That is, although we may feel suspense regarding Patroklos' safety on the battlefield in Π when we are caught up in the narrative, when we reflect upon the action we remember that he dies and our fear might turn to pity. If asked, afterwards, we are inherently likely to *underestimate* how much we feared for him.

to the former. The appropriateness of gauging this on-line phenomenon with an off-line scale is, then, questionable and this thesis will develop a more appropriate, on-line measure.

In many ways Green and Brock's model is broader in scope than Gerrig's theoretical framework: where he considered only the audience during reception they include also aspects of text and context which might affect transportation, plus the periods before and after reception. In other ways, however, they not only reoriented Gerrig's concept, but severely restricted it. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given that Gerrig's conception was, itself, extremely broad. Yet, some of the ways in which Green and Brock limited their model seem to reduce its application to Homeric epic.

In their first postulate, for example, Green and Brock constrain their model to "narratives." Unlike Gerrig, whose definition of "narrative" (as noted above) was extremely broad, Green and Brock use more restrictive criteria; their definition is framed in terms of the inherent properties of the text rather than the audience's experience. For Green and Brock (as for Aristotle), a "narrative" has an identifiable "story line, with a beginning, middle, and end," and they cite Jerome Bruner's suggestion that narratives are judged according to different truth standards compared to "other types of communications."¹⁰⁸

While this formalism is understandable in the context of Green and Brock's attempt to exclude a confound — the use of an overtly rhetorically persuasive text — from their experiment assessing the potential of narratives to effect belief change, the restriction of their model itself is unfortunate and does not tally with their empirical data. In all four of their underlying experiments, Green and Brock manipulated the perceived truth status of their target narrative (by telling participants the narrative was, for example, either from a newspaper or a literary magazine) but found no effect on transportation or belief change.¹⁰⁹ If narratives

¹⁰⁸ Green and Brock, "In the Mind's Eye," at 320; although they do not cite him, *cf.* Arist. *Po.* 1450^b.

¹⁰⁹ Green and Brock, "The Role of Transportation," experiments 1–3, in fact, used a *true* story which they presented as fiction or non-fiction; the narrative in their experiment 4 was fictional, and, since its subject was unsuited to a newspaper, was presented as either fiction or an historical account. In their experiment 3, an extra condition was added in which participants were informed the narrative was derived from a dream (held to be more fictional than fiction!).

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are judged according to different truth standards, this manipulation should have had a significant and reliable effect. Indeed, Green and Brock's failure to find an effect is similar to Richard Gerrig's use of non-fictional (historical) narrative to generate Anomalous Suspense, and is in tune with his argument that we use the same processes to understand fiction as we do to understand non-fiction.

It may be true, of course, that narratives explicitly labelled as fiction *are* subjected to different truth standards from those labelled as fact; yet, given transportation brings with it the inaccessibility of real-world knowledge, our knowledge of the text's fictional status *per se* and its subjection to an extra-diegetic standard of truth seems to be excluded by transportation. If narratives are to be judged by any truth standards external to the text, then this process can only take place after the transportation when the audience member has returned to the real world.

This distinction is not altogether immaterial, since traditional epic claims to present the detailed and infallible "truth" of an eye-witness account rather than an arbitrarily concocted tale: epic singers within the *Odyssey* do not seem to tell falsehoods,¹¹⁰ the composer himself invokes the Muse as an authoritative source (especially at B 484–87), and liars in general are portrayed in a negative fashion over both epics.¹¹¹ Yet, in our rationalist modern context, we can see that the composer's claims to truth are simply not supported: for us, the *Odyssey* is a work of fiction.¹¹² If transportation were significantly affected by this distinction between true and fictional narrative then the concept would be inherently less applicable to an ancient reception of Homeric epic.

As Green and Brock initially sought to clarify the role of transportation in narrative-based belief change, the texts used in their experiments often were analysed in terms of their implicit message(s). The text used in their first experiment, for example, was about the brutal murder of a young girl by a

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In none of these cases did the perceived source affect transportation, belief, or character appraisal.

¹¹⁰ The potential exception to this rule is Phēnios' song in α (which may imply Odysseus has died, see above, p. 13 n. 19. Phēnios, however, sings for the suitors ἀνάγκη ("under duress," α 154, cf. χ 350–53), and so might be excused for lying.

¹¹¹ E.g., I 312–13, λ 363–69, and ξ 156–57. Odysseus, of course, takes some joy in lying, even when it is not necessary (e.g., at ν 254–86).

¹¹² See also Hugh Parry, "The *Apologos* of Odysseus: Lies, All Lies?" *Phoenix* 48, no. 1 (1994): 1–20 at 2–3.

schizophrenic at a shopping centre, and participants' attitudes and opinions about topics such as mental illness (Should psychiatric patients who have passes to leave their institution be free of supervision?) and violence (How frequently is someone stabbed to death in the USA?) were assessed by questionnaire.¹¹³ This focus on belief change led them to restrict their model to narratives in which readers' beliefs are implicated (postulate I); yet, such restriction is, perhaps, artificial. Although beliefs must be implicated in order for *persuasion* to occur, the fact that descriptive pause (which does not automatically implicate belief) may transport the audience suggests that the implication of belief is not a prerequisite for transportation itself. This distinction, again, has an impact on the applicability of the theory for our reading of Homeric epic in that the implication of the audience's beliefs seems less inherently appropriate in a modern context than an ancient one; were the implication of belief requisite for transportation then a modern audience might find it difficult to be transported at all by the Homeric poems.

Green and Brock theorized that transportation depends on the evocation of mental images,¹¹⁴ in the psychological sense of *perception in the absence of a stimulus*.¹¹⁵ To an extent, this is similar to Egbert Bakker's invocation of the audience's activation of mental imagery which leads to *vividness*.¹¹⁶ Bakker follows Ford in basing the definition of vividness on the Greek *ἐνάργεια*, which Graham Zanker has shown to be bound closely with *vision*.¹¹⁷ Using the psychological definition, however, has a major advantage: it is not constrained to *visual* perception. Mental images can be of sounds (aural images), of tastes and smells (olfactory images), of touch (tactile images), and of motion (kinaesthetic images).¹¹⁸ Indeed, these different types of

¹¹³ Green and Brock, "The Role of Transportation," experiment 1. These are, respectively, (slightly rephrased) items from the "psychiatric patient" and "violence" indices. Green and Brock also measured participants' attitudes regarding whether everybody gets what they deserve ("just-world" index).

¹¹⁴ Green and Brock, "In the Mind's Eye," at 321–22, assert that transportation depends on the evocation of "measurable images ... that can be recalled, recognized, and responded to."

¹¹⁵ Stephen Michael Kosslyn, "Aspects of a Cognitive Neuroscience of Mental Imagery," *Science* 240, no. 4859 (1988): 1621–26 at 1621: "Imagery consists of brain states like those that arise during perception but occurs in the absence of the appropriate immediate sensory input; such events are usually accompanied by the conscious experience of 'seeing with the mind's eye,' 'hearing with the mind's ear,' and so on."

¹¹⁶ See above, p. 52.

¹¹⁷ Graham Zanker, "Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 123 (1980): 297–311.

¹¹⁸ As these terms are somewhat unfamiliar, I shall give an example of each: an aural image is perceived when one tries to imagine the first bars of Beethoven's fifth symphony; an olfactory ... (continued)

imagery may be experienced simultaneously (multimodal images), and one might expect a greater sense of presence within the story world to be associated with more detailed and/or multimodal images.¹¹⁹

The incorporation of imagery into the theoretical construct of transportation does not just complement Ford and Bakker's vividness: it is a major advance over the model proposed by Gerrig.¹²⁰ Ultimately, however, Green and Brock's proposal that transportation *depends on* the evocation of mental imagery is not convincing. Individuals vary dramatically in their ability to construct images, yet individuals poor in imagery may still be transported by narratives.¹²¹ Images are certainly a convenient way to conceive how we can feel present in a story world when that world — the sensory input on which the perception would depend — is actually absent, but the component of transportation complementary to story-world presence, the absence from the real world, bears no identifiable relation to imagery. Indeed, imagery is not the only conceivable way of experiencing the real world — we also process information as propositions¹²² — so we should not expect it to be the only way of experiencing a narrative one.

Yet, on the grounds that images *cause* the lasting effects of transportation on attitudes, Green and Brock proposed that imagery was a prerequisite for

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image when one imagines the smell of coffee; a tactile image when one imagines a firm handshake or the feeling of wearing a prickly woollen jumper; a kinaesthetic image when one imagines falling, or riding on a roller-coaster.

¹¹⁹ In Virtual Reality studies, "telepresence" (or "presence") within a virtual environment has been shown to be enhanced with the number modes and fidelity of the sensory input. See Frank Biocca, Jin Kim, and Yung Choi, "Visual Touch in Virtual Environments: An Exploratory Study of Presence, Multimodal Interfaces, and Cross-Modal Sensory Illusions.," *Presence: Teleoperators & Virtual Environments* 10, no. 3 (2001): 247–65. This is in line with the theoretical predictions of Jonathan Steuer, "Defining Virtual Reality: Dimensions Determining Telepresence," *Journal of Communication* 42, no. 4 (1992): 73–93.

¹²⁰ Green and Brock, "In the Mind's Eye," at 321, note that Gerrig did not address the role of imagery; they also note the discrepancy between the theoretical position (that imagery is unimportant) and the empirical results (that it was important) advanced by Victor Nell, *Lost in a Book: The Psychology of Reading for Pleasure* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

¹²¹ Variation in individual ability for imagery has been the subject of some debate in psychology, yet there is broad agreement that either individuals vary in their potential for imagery or they fall short of an unvarying true potential by varying degrees. The observation that individuals low in imagery may still be transported is a personal one, backed up by the informal reports of friends and colleagues. One of these who claims to have no imagery at all reports having been inseparable from books as a child.

¹²² One cannot do justice in a footnote to the important and long-standing argument between Zenon Pylyshyn and Stephen Kosslyn; for a good summary, see Stephen Michael Kosslyn, *Ghosts in the Mind's Machine: Creating and Using Images in the Brain* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1983), at 30–37.

transportation. This is clearly a *non sequitur*. The mechanism by which images may cause the lasting effects of transportation on attitudes is convincing, but it does not imply that images cause the moment-by-moment transportation of the reader *during reading*. By postulating the reverse relationship — that transportation causes imagery — we avoid the problem that individuals low in imagery can still (potentially) be transported, and simultaneously explain part of the mechanism of felt presence.

Although Green and Brock unequivocally asserted that their conception of transportation was not limited by medium,¹²³ they gave priority to written narratives. This, again, not only is a restriction of Gerrig’s model but also, for obvious reasons, lessens the applicability of the theory to the ancient reception of the Homeric poems.

The priority Green and Brock give to written narrative is implicit in their fifth postulate. They argue that (cognitive) “investment in imagery” co-varies with transportation, and that other media (specifically, film) provide fewer opportunities for such investment than print.¹²⁴ They argue, in addition, that a reader’s ability to *pause* to construct vivid and/or elaborate mental images (“self-pacing”) bolsters transportation, and that opportunities to do so in non-print media are impossible or unusual.¹²⁵ It is hardly necessary to add that auditors of a live performance are unable to indulge in such pauses and hence have fewer opportunities for cognitive investment.

This priority, however, based as it is on reflective pauses, seems counter-intuitive — especially in the context of Gerrig’s conception of transportation as a feature of the *moment-by-moment* experience of narrative — and one must question whether the role of cognitive investment is so central. Investment in imagery will, certainly, make the end results more *memorable*; yet, such recall of a narrative

¹²³ Green and Brock, “In the Mind’s Eye,” at 323: “In our usage, transportation is not confined to the reading of written material. The term ‘reader’ may be broadly construed to include listeners or viewers or *any recipient* of narrative information” (original emphasis).

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, at 329–30. Admittedly, Green and Brock note the ameliorating effect of *p*-responses in film; yet, their fifth postulate (329) includes “aspects of the medium that limit opportunity for imaginative investment” as a “*moderating* attribute” of a medium’s “propensity for transportation.” “Investment in imagery” and “imaginative investment” are, in their terms, clearly synonymous.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*,

occurs after narrative delivery and is thus irrelevant to the *moment-by-moment* experience of that narrative. Such investment and temporal opportunities clearly lead also to the formation of more vivid and/or elaborate mental images, but surely in this context it is the end result — the quality of the images — which is central to transportation rather than simply the effort applied in generating them.

Stephen Kosslyn has argued persuasively that *images* and *percepts* (the products of perception) are, in the visual system at least, fundamentally similar.¹²⁶ Although they differ in important ways — notably in evanescence, veridicality, and mutability — both images and percepts are, in Kosslyn’s “protomodel,” representations in the “visual buffer” (visual areas of the occipital lobe in the brain¹²⁷) and subject therein to identical processes.¹²⁸ This operational similarity between images and percepts undermines Green and Brock’s argument: because (vivid and elaborate) percepts might stand in for imagery, a lack of imaginative investment and self-pacing should not decrease the potential for transportation when viewing a film.

In the context of an oral performance of the Homeric poems there are several ways in which perception might supplement or stand in for imagery. The singer, for example, might “act the part” during passages of direct speech;¹²⁹ *hearing* (rather than seeing them) the words might slightly facilitate the construction of *visual* images;¹³⁰ and the sound of the words might mimic the referent they signify (onomatopoeia, or what Stanford called “sound-mimesis”¹³¹).

¹²⁶ Stephen Michael Kosslyn, *Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), Chapter 4, especially at 74, and 98–104.

¹²⁷ See Kosslyn, *ibid.*, at 70.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, at *e.g.*, at 74. This claim is supported by empirical evidence that images and percepts can be confused (the “Perky effect”; see Cheves West Perky, “An Experimental Study of Imagination,” *American Journal of Psychology* 21 (1910): 422–52; Sydney Joelson Segal and Vincent Fusella, “Influence of Imaged Pictures and Sounds on Detection of Visual and Auditory Signals,” *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 83, no. 3 (1970): 458–64) and that the source of a visual memory (an image or a percept) can be difficult to recall (a failure of “reality monitoring”; see Marcia K. Johnson and Carol L. Raye, “Reality Monitoring,” *Psychological Review* 88, no. 1 (1981): 67–85; Ronald A. Finke, Marcia K. Johnson, and Gary C.-W. Shyi, “Memory Confusions for Real and Imagined Completions of Symmetrical Visual-Patterns,” *Memory & Cognition* 16, no. 2 (1988): 133–37; and Helene Intraub and James E. Hoffman, “Reading and Visual Memory: Remembering Scenes That Were Never Seen,” *American Journal of Psychology* 105, no. 1 (1992): 101–14).

¹²⁹ See above, pp. 43–46.

¹³⁰ Segal and Fusella, “Influence of Imaged Pictures and Sounds on Detection of Visual and Auditory Signals,” found that imaging made the detection of a (visual or auditory) stimulus more difficult (subjects could detect about 80% of stimuli under normal conditions, but only 61–
... (continued)

Any discussion of onomatopoeia in the Homeric poems must be limited, to an extent, by concerns about subjectivity and anachronism.¹³² In addition, the amount of mimicry conveyed by a word or phrase can vary between utterances: words may have onomatopoeic potential, but the extent to which this potential is effected in any particular vocalization is under the control of the performer.¹³³ Thus, onomatopoeia should be cited tentatively, and should not form the sole basis for an argument; but the fact remains that the consideration of an oral performance context must take into account the effects of the sounds of the words as well as their meaning.

Consider, in this context, the blinding of the *Kyklōps*:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄνῆρ χαλκεὺς πέλεκυν μέγαν ἠὲ σκέπαρνον
εἶν ὕδατι ψυχρῷ βάπτῃ μεγάλα ἰάχοντα
φαρμάσσων· τὸ γὰρ αὐτε σιδήρου γε κράτος ἐστίν·
ὥς τοῦ σίζ' ὀφθαλμὸς ἐλαϊνέω περὶ μοχλῶ.
σμερδαλέον δὲ μέγ' ὤμωξεν, περὶ δ' ἴαχε πέτρη,
ἡμεῖς δὲ δείσαντες ἀπεσσύμεθ'.

1391–96.¹³⁴

(continued)

67% while imaging); in addition, the deficit was greatest when the image and stimulus were the same modality (the visual imaging task interfered more with the detection of visual than auditory stimuli and *vice versa*), though the differences were slight (2–6%). We might conclude from this that primary attention to the stimulus would reduce performance on the imagery task, and that the effect would also be isomodal. (Cf. Lee R. Brooks, “The Suppression of Visualization by Reading,” *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology* 19 (1967): 289–99.) Hence, auditory perception would have less impact on visual imaging than would visual perception.

¹³¹ William Bedell Stanford, *The Sound of Greek: Studies in the Greek Theory and Practice of Euphony*, Sather Classical Lectures 38 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), at Chapter 5, broadens the term “onomatopoeia” (which he shuns on account of its etymology and limited scope) to include the effects built up over many words (such as rhythm, alliteration, and assonance) which can function onomatopoeically. See especially the exceptionally fine analysis of the labour of Sisyphus (λ 593–98) which extends that of Dionysios of Halicarnassus (*De Comp.* 20). I am not greatly concerned by Stanford’s objections to the term onomatopoeia: on the first, the word’s origins are irrelevant to its (widespread) use in English; on the second, I am not concerning myself *here* with the evocation of tactile, olfactory, and gustatory images by sound, but only with the extent to which the perception of the *sound* of the words supplants aural imagery.

¹³² Amongst concerns about anachronism, one must include the danger that words and phrases which had no particular resonance seem onomatopoeic to us because the passage of time has altered the pronunciation of the words in ways in which we are unaware.

¹³³ The extent to which an utterance is onomatopoeic depends on speed, pitch, pronunciation (including accentuation), and so on. Consider, for example, that the English word “moo” can, when sounded slowly and deeply, resemble the noise made by a cow, but bears little resemblance when sounded quickly in a high-pitched voice. William Bedell Stanford, “Varieties of Sound-Effects in the Homeric Poems,” *College Literature* 3, no. 3 (1976): 219–27 notes at 221 that “in the performance of such [mimetic] passages a skilled Homerid or rhapsodist would probably emphasize the aural implications.” To this, one must add that a performer could equally, if it suited his poetic intent, suppress such implications.

¹³⁴ As a bronze-smith immerses a great axe or adze into water, and it hisses greatly, tempering it; for in this way the iron is strong; thus his eye sizzled around the olive stake. He wailed awfully, and the rocks re-echoed the sound, and we fled in fear.

Stanford notes the onomatopoeia of σιζ' ("sizzled") in 394,¹³⁵ but it is not far-fetched to identify onomatopoeia in the preceding simile, with the ψ and σ (in ψυχρῶ and φαρμάσσων in 392–93) conveying the hissing of red-hot metal being plunged into water. In addition, the ᾤμῶξεν ("he cried out in pain") of 395 surely carries with it the sound and protraction of Polyphēmos' wail.

We may, then, identify onomatopoeia as a feature enhancing the effect of an oral performance over that of silent reading. Onomatopoeia and sound-mimesis allow the hearers to *perceive* the referent rather than forcing them to generate an auditory image. The relative automaticity of perception *vis-à-vis* image generation means that an audience can possess a higher-quality impression — a percept instead of an image — for the same amount of effort; and this should augment the potential for transportation. When goats are described as μηκάδες ("bleating"¹³⁶), we can add, with no extra effort, an auditory percept of the bleating to whatever impressions we have generated of, say, the Kyklōps' cave.

Thus, while Green and Brock's prioritization of written texts seems to make their theory somewhat less applicable to Homeric epic, even a limited consideration of the dynamics of oral performance suggests that the relative "deficiencies" of non-textual modes of delivery may be amply compensated by mimesis. Yet, my rejection of Green and Brock's priority does not imply I wish to go as far as claiming, as Bassett did, that oral performance is inherently more transporting than other modes.¹³⁷ Rather, I consider all performance modalities capable of transportation and suppose that the relative "transportingness" of different modes is better assessed empirically than theoretically.

Most recently, Green has investigated the relationships between transportation, personal experience (which she calls "prior knowledge"), and perceived realism.¹³⁸ The participants in this experiment read a narrative about a homosexual man's

¹³⁵ William Bedell Stanford, *ΟΜΗΡΟΥ ΟΔΥΣΣΕΙΑ: The Odyssey of Homer*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1967), n. *ad loc.*

¹³⁶ Λ 383, Ψ 31, ι 124, 244, and 341. This and other illustrative examples are noted by Stanford, *The Sound of Greek*, at 103, in his discussion of "mimetic euphony."

¹³⁷ Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 26, was concerned that "the [poetic] illusion is never quite complete if print draws a curtain between us and the poetry."

¹³⁸ Melanie C. Green, "Transportation into Narrative Worlds: The Role of Prior Knowledge and Perceived Realism," *Discourse Processes* 38, no. 2 (2004): 247–66.

experience of a college fraternity reunion; she found that people with higher personal experience with the themes of the narrative (not only those who reported having a homosexual friend or relative, but also those with more detailed knowledge of fraternities and sororities) experienced greater levels of transportation than those who lacked such apposite experience.¹³⁹ She noted explicitly that it was not impossible for those without personal experience to be transported; rather, it was simply more difficult.¹⁴⁰

Green's experiment, in other words, provides some tentative evidence in favour of my conclusion in the previous chapter that Odysseus is transported by Dēmodokos' Trojan songs because of (rather than despite) the fact that they concern his own past actions. Odysseus has (and the Phaiakians lack) significant personal experience of the Trojan plain, heroic quarrels, warfare, and so on. Green's result would not predict that the Phaiakians are *unable* to be transported by these songs — they clearly are engaged by them — just that they are less inherently transportable than Odysseus himself.

One of Green and Brock's pertinent results is that they found transportation leads to an increase in story-consistent beliefs, reflective, as it were, of persuasion by the *subtext* of the narrative.¹⁴¹ They proposed that memories of the mental images evoked by the narrative lead to an effective increase in exposure to the "message" of the text.¹⁴² This, like the proposed role of investment in imagery, is a reflective phenomenon, and again departs from Gerrig's conception of transportation as an

¹³⁹ Green (*ibid.*, at 257) inquired after the participants' sexual orientation, but did not obtain a significant result for non-heterosexual participants themselves due to the small number so identifying. Similarly, the small number of participants who were, themselves, members of a fraternity or sorority prevented the result attaining statistical significance.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, at 261.

¹⁴¹ Green and Brock, "The Role of Transportation," found, in their first three experiments, that transportation was associated with more story-consistent beliefs. Readers transported by the story (which drew attention to the violent murder of a girl in a shopping mall by a psychiatric patient, and hence implied that such incidents might be common), in other words, were more likely to give a higher estimate of the frequency of violence in shopping malls and were more likely to opine that psychiatric patients should not be let out in public. To rule out the reverse association (that higher initial story-consistent beliefs lead to higher transportation), Green and Brock manipulated transportation directly (in their experiment 4), and found that the (artificially produced) decrease in transportation led to a decrease in story-consistent belief.

¹⁴² Green and Brock, "In the Mind's Eye," at 337, argue that images, compared to propositions, are less susceptible to counterargument. Also unlike propositions (which, of themselves, only convey part of an argument), images can convey a total narrative situation (complete with implicit message).

aspect of the moment-by-moment experience of narrative. The mechanism may still be responsible for some of the belief change observed in Green and Brock's experiments as the beliefs were tested after (rather than during) reading, and thus opportunities for recall and reflection were afforded between the construction of the image and the assessment of the attitude.¹⁴³

Yet, it is likely there is more to the narrative persuasion than simply the evocation of images. Green and Brock's results on the persuasive nature of narrative texts jell rather nicely, in fact, with the empirical evidence cited above that we are less critical in our acceptance (and subsequent use) of assertions that make a general statement (context-free assertions) rather than state testable facts (context details).¹⁴⁴ The assertions implicit in narratives (such as "psychiatric patients are dangerous") which underlie their subtexts ("they should never be let out in public") are clearly context-free assertions, whether or not one is led to believe the detail that a little girl called Katie Mason was ever stabbed to death in a mall.¹⁴⁵

At first glance, it might seem inappropriate to consider the Homeric poems in terms of their implicit messages and persuasive effects: the narrator of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* has frequently been described as "impartial" and "objective" rather than "subjective" or "persuasive."¹⁴⁶ Yet, the Homeric narrator is not always even-handed, and the external audience, likewise, is not always impartial in its interpretation of the action.¹⁴⁷ As far as the *Odyssey* is concerned, for example, Jenny Strauss Clay has compellingly argued that the poet does his best to portray Odysseus in the best possible light.¹⁴⁸ This bias might be translated into "implicit messages" in a number of ways — "Odysseus couldn't help losing all his men over

¹⁴³ See further on this point below, Chapter 5, p. 182.

¹⁴⁴ That is, that of Gerrig and his collaborators, plus that of Daniel Gilbert and his collaborators; see above, pp. 64–66.

¹⁴⁵ In this case, indeed, the context detail is true (the story was adapted from a non-fiction text). The truth status of the text was manipulated for Green and Brock's experiments, however, and did not lead to any reliable effects.

¹⁴⁶ See, for example, the citations of Coleridge and Fränkel in Jasper Griffin, "Homeric Pathos and Objectivity," *Classical Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (1976): 161–87 at 161; Griffin, of course, opposes "objectivity" to "pathos," but there is arguably more to the Homeric narrator's subjectivity than this.

¹⁴⁷ Consider, for example, the differing effects of the question of Nestōr to his guests at γ 71–74 and the Kyklōps to Odysseus and his men at ι 252–55, even though the words themselves are identical.

¹⁴⁸ Jenny Strauss Clay, *The Wrath of Athena: Gods and Men in the Odyssey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), at 34–38.

the course of his return,” for example, or “Odysseus is prudent; his companions reckless” — which might or might not correspond to the literal state of affairs in the *Odyssey*.¹⁴⁹ We might expect, then, audience members who are more transported to be more subject to such biases and more persuaded in the direction of these implicit messages. Clearly, this has the potential to affect our interpretation of the text quite dramatically.

Some of Green and Brock’s other results indicate that transportation increases readers’ tendencies to take the narrative at face value. After reading the narrative, the participants in Green and Brock’s Experiment 2 were asked to go back through the text and circle anything which did not “ring true.”¹⁵⁰ They found that transported readers made fewer and smaller circles than their non-transported counterparts.¹⁵¹ This result (that transportation is associated with increased belief in the veracity of the narrative) may go a long way towards explaining Green’s more recent finding that transportation makes a narrative seem more realistic.¹⁵²

In this context, it is revealing that the two assertions in the *Odyssey* of the veracity of the singer are made by the audiences most highly transported by their songs. The first is Odysseus’ praise of Dēmodokos cited above, made by the man reduced to tears by the song; but since Odysseus is actually in a position to assess the veracity of the singer, this locus cannot inform our discussion of transportation and belief. In the second instance Alkinoös, who was highly transported by the first half of Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι,¹⁵³ avers the accuracy of the story much more explicitly:

¹⁴⁹ The degree of correspondence will likely vary from reader to reader, and may be socio-culturally specific; it is possible to see Odysseus, for example, as responsible for the deaths of a large proportion of his men if one a) sees the action of κ-μ as the fulfilment of the Kyklōps’ curse; and b) attributes to Odysseus responsibility for the action and outcome of the Κυκλώπεια. I shall return to this argument in the next chapter.

¹⁵⁰ Green and Brock, “The Role of Transportation,” aptly called this task “Pinocchio circling.”

¹⁵¹ Green and Brock (*ibid.*) report the transported readers as drawing a mean of 4.75 circles over a mean of 6.71 lines; the non-transported readers, on the other hand, drew a mean of 10.52 circles over 17.22 lines.

¹⁵² Green, “Transportation into Narrative Worlds,” noted that this experiment did not determine the direction of causality (*i.e.*, whether higher perceived realism led the narrative to be more transporting or higher transportation led to greater perceived realism). The result that transported readers identified fewer “false notes” than their non-transported counterparts, plus the evidence (to be discussed immediately below) that transportation should increase belief in the narrative assertions (which underlie both the “message” of the text and its realism) strongly suggest that Green’s interpretation of causality was right.

¹⁵³ Cf. λ 333–34 which Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, at 27, cited as his *exemplum* of the epic illusion.

“ὦ Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὸ μὲν οὐ τί σ’ εἴσκομεν εἰσορόωντες
 ἠπεροπήτ’ ἔμεν καὶ ἐπικλοπον, οἷά τε πολλοὺς
 βόσκει γαῖα μέλαινα πολυπερέας ἀνθρώπους
 ψεύδεά τ’ ἀρτύνοντας, ὅθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο·
 σοὶ δ’ ἔπι μὲν μορφή ἐπέων, ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί,
 μῦθον δ’ ὡς ὅτ’ ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας,
 πάντων Ἀργείων σέο τ’ αὐτοῦ κήδεα λυγρά.”

λ 363–69.¹⁵⁴

Alkinoös is, as Irene de Jong observes, “strictly speaking ... not in a position to judge” the veracity of Odysseus’ story,¹⁵⁵ and Andrew Ford similarly objects that “[t]his passage ... has been overread as asserting he truth of the tale.”¹⁵⁶ Yet, Alkinoös patently *is* asserting the truth of the tale by saying that Odysseus is not a liar; the empirical evidence provides a reasonable explanation here: Alkinoös, who was highly transported by Odysseus’ narrative, is inherently less likely — indeed, less able — to question or contextualize the narrative content, and thus more likely to find the story realistic.

One of the most intriguing results Green and Brock reported was that transported readers reliably appraised the protagonists of the narrative they read in a more positive manner.¹⁵⁷ In many cases, we might link this back to the persuasion of the narrative itself. If readers are more persuaded when transported, they will, under these circumstances, follow more strongly the text’s implicit appraisals of the characters. When the identification of a character as a protagonist depends (as it frequently does) on a sympathetic or positive appraisal implicit (sometimes explicit) in the text, we should expect more transported readers to rate protagonists more positively.

A complementary phenomenon, indeed, should exist for antagonists. Where the text itself implies a negative appraisal, transported readers should rate the

¹⁵⁴ “O Odysseus, in no way do we, looking at you, think you | to be a deceiver and a cheat, such as the many || men, widely dispersed, the black earth nourishes | inventing lies from which it is not possible to discern [the truth]; | but there is grace upon your words, the mind within you is stout, | and like a singer, skilfully, you have related your story | of all the Argives’ and of your own wretched troubles.”

¹⁵⁵ Irene J. F. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 286, n. ad λ 363–69.

¹⁵⁶ Andrew Ford, *Homer: The Poetry of the Past* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), at 124–25.

¹⁵⁷ Green and Brock, “The Role of Transportation,” table 3 (708). Participants in the high-transportation group appraised Katie in a significantly more positive manner in all three experiments which used the narrative about her. Her sister, Joan, was appraised more positively throughout, but the results only achieved statistical significance in experiments 2 and 3. The participants in the lowered transportation condition in experiment 4 rated the protagonists of that narrative (a boy and his dog) in a less positive manner.

character in a less positive (*i.e.*, more negative) fashion than their non-transported counterparts. It is interesting, in this context, that Green and Brock found no such statistically significant difference between transported and non-transported readers' (very negative) appraisals of the killer in their story.¹⁵⁸ Green put this down to a "floor effect" (that the character was appraised in such a negative manner by the non-transported readers that a more negative appraisal [by transported readers] would not have been possible).

This, in fact, has two interesting (and potentially empirically verifiable) implications. First, theoretically, a "ceiling effect" should apply to characters who are appraised in an extremely positive manner by non-transported readers. Secondly, in order to get around the floor effect and investigate the differences between transported and non-transported readers' appraisals of negative characters, we must examine characters whose non-transported appraisal is not so extreme. To place this in terms of the distinction between the "poetic" and "literal" truth articulated above,¹⁵⁹ we must look for characters whose poetic portrayal (understood by the transported audience) is negative, but whose literal status is significantly better. By definition, the characters who fit this description are ambiguous.

It would be an understatement to note that there are many ambiguous characters in literary works, and the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are not exceptional in this respect. Akhilleus, for example, the *Iliadic* hero *par excellence*, and Agamemnōn, the supreme commander, have flaws in their characters which might impact negatively on our appraisal of them;¹⁶⁰ without these flaws, indeed, there would be no *Iliad*. Similarly, flaws have been identified in the character of Odysseus in his dealings with the Kyklōps in ı, without which there might have been no *Odyssey*.¹⁶¹ On the other

¹⁵⁸ Melanie C. Green, *Pers. Comm.* (e-mail to author, 6 February 2003).

¹⁵⁹ See above, pp. 68–69.

¹⁶⁰ Akhilleus, for example, is censured by Aias at I 624–42, for neglecting his friends in their time of need. Agamemnōn is censured by Nestōr at I 96–111 (*inter alia*).

¹⁶¹ Odysseus himself notes his desire to wait for Polyphēmos at ı 228–30 was a poor choice; Eurymakhos certainly attributes the blame to him for the loss of the companions (κ 431–37). Odysseus' vaunting to the blinded Kyklōps has also been identified as "flawed" by, *e.g.*, Calvin S. Brown, "Odysseus and Polyphemus: The Name and the Curse," *Comparative Literature* 18, no. 3 (1966): 193–202 at 199–200; see also Rick M. Newton, "Poor Polyphemus: Emotional Ambivalence in *Odyssey* 9 and 17," *Classical World* 76, no. 2 (1983): 137–42 at 139. Without wishing to steal my own thunder in Chapter 4, the last ten years of Odysseus' absence may be seen as the fulfilment

... (continued)

hand, negative characters may be given a sympathetic portrayal, as is the case with Polyphēmos in the *Odyssey* and Hektōr in the *Iliad*. The audience's appraisal of these characters is expected to be significantly affected by transportation.

(Empirical) Prospects

It might be useful, at this point, to pause and reflect on what has been done and where this argument might be pursued next. I have attempted to provide a coherent account of audience responses in and to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* — to convert Walsh's identification of "two distinct kinds of audience" in the *Odyssey* from a dichotomy into a continuum — and to unite several paradigms of audience response by relating each to the notion of transportation. We have seen that the Homeric portrait of audience response (which, following Walsh, we may call *enchantment*), Bassett's epic illusion, and Ford and Bakker's vividness all entail, whether explicitly or implicitly, some degree of absence from the real world and/or presence within the story world. Relating these to transportation facilitates novel answers to questions regarding the role of the audience in these collaborative processes and raises the possibility of an empirical assessment of some of those answers.

We have also explored the conceptions of transportation by Gerrig and by Green and Brock in order to assess their appropriateness to and their utility in enhancing our understanding of Homeric epic. Indeed, despite some initial reservations about the relevance of this modern psychological theory of written literature to ancient oral poetry, we have seen that Gerrig's model easily accommodates the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in both an ancient (oral) and a modern (literary) context. I have also argued that Green and Brock's theory should be subject to slight adjustments in order to admit these poems. It is worth noting explicitly here, then, that the adjustments I have proposed to Green and Brock's theory are peripheral and the core of their theory (that the belief change effected by narratives is enhanced by transportation) remains intact.

(continued)

of Polyphēmos' curse, and hence without the decision to wait in the cave, the return home may have been quick and achieved before the arrival of the suitors; the poet's skill is reflected in the way he makes a series of arbitrary choices (to stay or not; to vaunt or not) seem natural and fixed by character consistency, and hence sets up the situation for the whole of the *Odyssey*.

Last, I have identified one of the many interesting areas in which transportation might be extended in a novel way: that is, in terms of its effects on our understanding of characters who are portrayed in an ambiguous manner at the literal level. This, indeed, is a question which is eminently suitable to empirical investigation; it is, in fact, a question I have attempted to answer with an empirical study to be reported in this thesis. We will return, therefore, to the effects of transportation on ambiguity in our consideration of that study in Chapter 5.

There are, naturally, several characters who are portrayed in an ambiguous manner in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Practical constraints, however, limit the amount of text (and hence the number of characters) which might be used in such a study; before we return to the empirical assessment, therefore, it is necessary to choose which characters are to be studied and demonstrate their ambiguity. Ideally, the characters should be as ambiguous as possible. In addition, as the text to be studied is, necessarily, an *extract* from the epics, the choice of narrative should be as central to the interpretation of the whole as possible to ensure the results are applicable to the entire epic.

The episode which best fits these criteria is, to my mind, the “Kyklops episode” (Κυκλώπεια) of ι 105–566; its centrality to the *Odyssey* and the ambiguity of the characters will be discussed in the next chapter. We will return to the experiment in Chapter 5 and, in Chapter 6, broaden our scope to consider other ambiguous characters (not only from the *Odyssey* but also from the *Iliad*). Let us proceed, therefore, to the land of the Kyklōpes.

Chapter 4: Ambiguity and the Κυκλώπεια

Ζητεῖ Ἀριστοτέλης πῶς ὁ Κύκλωψ ὁ Πολύφημος μήτε πατὴρ ὢν Κύκλωπος,
Ποσειδῶνος γὰρ ἦν, μήτε μητρός, Κύκλωψ ἐγένετο.
—Σ Η, Q, AD 1 106*

Of all the adventures Odysseus relates in his ἀπόλογοι (the tales he tells the Phaiakians in ι–μ), the Κυκλώπεια (“Kyklops episode”) of ι 105–566 arguably makes the greatest contribution to the plot of the *Odyssey*. Other potential measures of importance do not do it justice: it is neither the longest episode he relates,¹ nor the one in which he loses the greatest number of men;² but its importance lies in its consequences (the Kyklops’ curse and the wrath of Poseidōn) which *cause* the longest episode to occur and the loss of most of his men.³ Indeed, the Kyklops’ curse motivates the remaining action of the *Odyssey*, as Polyphēmos’ stipulation that Odysseus return ὀψὲ (“late,” ι 534) and to find troubles in his house (535) engenders the situation in which the suitors can impose themselves upon

* “Aristotle inquires: How was the Kyklops Polyphēmos a Kyklops when neither was his father a Kyklops (for he was the son of Poseidōn), nor was his mother?”

¹ Length may be measured in terms of the *number of lines* of the text or the *duration* of the events described (cf. Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse*, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980 [originally published as “Discours du récit” in *Figures III*, Editions du Seuil, 1972]), at 87–88), but the Κυκλώπεια is the longest in neither; although, at 462 lines (ι 105–566), it is the longest episode of Book 9 by an order of magnitude (cf. 38 for the preliminaries, 43 for the Kikones, and 23 for the Lōtophagoi), of the episodes of the ἀπόλογοι it is second to the 640 lines of the Νεκυία in λ and, were we to add the lines, the two encounters with Kirkē (κ 135–574 [440 lines] and μ 1–152 [152 lines] sums to 592 lines).

In terms of duration, the Κύκλωπεια lasts four-and-a-half days. Although there are shorter episodes (e.g., the Seirēns, Skylla/Kharybdis), there are much longer episodes also (the longest is the stay on Ōgygia with Kalypsō, which lasts some eight years; cf. also the time on Aiaia with Kirkē [a little over a year]).

² Odysseus loses six men to the Kyklops (two each at ι 288–93, 311 = 344); he loses the greatest number of men at the hands of the Laistrygones (between 506 and 584 men depending on how one views the distribution of men amongst the ships; we can infer from κ 208 that the crew with which Odysseus escapes numbers 46). He loses 72 (six men per ship [ι 60–61] × 12 ships [ι 159]) at the hands of the Kikones, and 44 (the 46 survivors less Elpēnōr and Odysseus) in the storm after Thrinakia.

³ The longest episodes (the Νεκυία [in length] and the stay on Ōgygia with Kalypsō [in duration]) would not have occurred had Aiolos’ winds brought Odysseus home successfully; we may infer that this is a consequence of the Κυκλώπεια from Aiolos’ exclamation at κ 72–75. The curse, which stipulates Odysseus must return having lost all his companions (ι 534), is the narrative motivation for the deaths of all but the 72 killed by the Kikones and the six killed by the Kyklops (see previous note), i.e., between 551 and 630 companions.

Pēnelope.⁴ Our interpretation of the Κυκλώπεια, then, should profoundly influence our reading of the *Odyssey* itself.

This situation is compounded by the fact that the underlying story of the Κυκλώπεια is inherently ambiguous: it may be read in very divergent (though still legitimate) ways, and this has been reflected in the breadth of interpretation and critical opinion about the episode which has been offered over the last two-and-a-half thousand years. Variations in interpretation of the Kyklōps-story date back at least to the Classical period. Zōilos of Amphipolis, one of the ὀμηρομάστιγες (“Homer-whippers”), for example, wrote a eulogy for Polyphēmos in the Fourth Century;⁵ Euripides, in contrast, portrayed him as more of an ogre (and gave Odysseus a more defensible motive for being at his cave) in the *Cyclops*.⁶ Aristotle, indeed, was aware of this ambiguity: having said, in the second chapter of the *Poetics*, that an artist may represent his subject as βελτίονας ἢ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους (“better than, worse than, or equal to ourselves,” 1448^a 4–5), he gives the Kyklōps as an example of a character represented differently by various artists.⁷

Refining the Concept of Ambiguity

We might, however, distinguish between different types of ambiguity based on the distinction (adumbrated in Chapter 3) between the “poetic” and “literal” “truths”


⁴ According to Pēnelope at σ 267–70, Odysseus instructed her to remarry when Tēlemakhos had grown up; in this sense, Odysseus’ lateness (caused by the Kyklōps’ curse) leads to the arrival of the suitors. Pēnelope, of course, in the same speech, comments that the suitors’ behaviour has deteriorated since their arrival (σ 275–80).

⁵ Thus William Bedell Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963 [originally published: 1954]), at 146. Stanford does not give testimonia to this (now lost) eulogy, but it is mentioned by Σ in Pl. *Hipparch.* ad 229d 7. The term ὀμηρομάστιξ is used of Zōilos by much later commentators such as Eustathius (ad ι 60), and is most fully explained by the *Suda Lexicon*, s.v. Ζωΐλος (Z 130): ὅτι ἐπέσκωπτεν Ὅμηρον (“since he made fun of Homer”).

⁶ In E. *Cyc.* 96–274, Odysseus comes ashore seeking food and drink and is deceived by Silenus; cf. ι 172–76, and 224–29, where Odysseus crosses to (and, initially, remains in) the Kyklōps’ land out of curiosity. So also Rainer Friedrich, “Heroic Man and *Polymetis*: Odysseus in the *Cyclopeia*,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 28, no. 2 (1987): 121–33 at 123 (and cf. the discussion of motivation by Norman Austin, “Odysseus and the Cyclops: Who Is Who,” in *Approaches to Homer*, ed. Carl A. Rubino and Cynthia W. Shelmerdine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 3–37, at 15. For a detailed comparison (and defence of Euripides’ originality in interpreting the Homeric material), see Andreas G. Katsouris, “Euripides’ *Cyclops* and Homer’s *Odyssey*: An Interpretative Comparison,” *Prometheus* 23, no. 1 (1997): 1–24.

⁷ Arist. *Po.* 1448^a, continues, 14–16: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς νόμους [sc. ἔξει ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς], ὥσπερ †γάστ̄ Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος μιμήσαιο ἄν τις. “In the same way, dithyrambic and nomic [melodic] poetry [will accommodate such a distinction], thus Timotheos and Philoxenos portray the Kyklōps so.”

available, respectively, to the transported and non-transported audiences. In terms of character portrayal, in this vein, we might adopt the terms “poetic portrayal” (the reading of a character which is fundamentally wholly directed by the text) and “literal portrayal” (the reading of a character which draws on extra-textual information and inferences). Characters may be appraised as positive or negative (to varying degrees) along each dimension independently, and we might represent such appraisal as a point on the following graph:



Ambiguity, in these simplistic terms, occurs when there is a disjunction between the literal and poetic portrayals; if a positive poetic portrayal is undermined by some character flaw which is only visible at the literal level or if a negative poetic portrayal is substantially ameliorated at the literal level by information the narrator neglects then the character is ambiguous.⁸ These are, of course, cases of

⁸ That is, the information misrepresented or omitted by the narrator can be identified or inferred at the literal level whether by “reading between the lines” of the text or taking information from an external source. Indeed, this relationship can also be expressed the other way around: if a character’s very positive literal status is smeared in the poetic portrayal or if the narrator puts a positive spin on her/his very negative literal status, then the character is equally ambiguous.

unreliability on the narrator's part;⁹ for convenience, we might group them under the term "literal ambiguity": the ambivalence is not part of the "poetic truth."

The flaw in this scheme is, obviously, that it is simplistic; characters — particularly ambiguous characters — are multifaceted. Different aspects of their portrayal may be located at different points along both the poetic and literal axes. That is, ambiguity may also be apparent at the poetic level, and (rather than points) character appraisals should be represented as rectangles on the above graph. We might call this type of indeterminacy (which depends only on the poetic portrayal and which, unlike literal ambiguity, does *not* require unreliability) "poetic ambiguity."¹⁰

In Chapter 3, I asserted that our appraisal of ambiguous characters should be significantly affected by transportation simply because there is greater potential for (positive or negative) variation in interpretation of an ambiguous character than there is for one who is already polarized;¹¹ I wish, here, briefly to revisit this conclusion in terms of the distinction between poetic and literal ambiguity.

I argued in Chapter 3 that transported readers are theoretically less likely (and less able) to construct a "resistant" reading¹² and are more likely to take the text at face value because they lose access to the real-world information with which they

⁹ "Unreliability" was the term used by Wayne C. Booth, "Distance and Point-of-View: An Essay in Classification," in *The Theory of the Novel*, ed. Phillip Stevick (New York: The Free Press, 1967 [originally published in *Essays In Criticism* 9 (1961)]), 87–107, at 100 to describe a narrator whose credibility is undermined by the implied author. His framework has been broadened by Greta Olson, "Reconsidering Unreliability: Fallible and Untrustworthy Narrators," *Narrative* 11, no. 1 (2003): 94–109, who distinguished between narrators who are ignorant and those who intentionally mislead the audience. Both schemes accommodate instances where the unreliability is (like Huck Finn) or is not (like Odysseus in his ἀπόλογοι) visible at the poetic level.

¹⁰ Poetic and literal ambiguity, we must note, are not mutually exclusive: a character who deserves an extreme appraisal at the literal level but whose poetic portrayal is significantly moderated will be both poetically and literally ambiguous.

¹¹ See above, pp. 98–99.

¹² I use the term "resistant" to describe reading against the ideals and implications of the text. Although slightly broader (as it is not constrained to gender issues), this still captures the essence of its use by Judith Fetterley, *The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978) in her advocacy that feminist critics should read against the grain of "male" literature (be "a resisting reader rather than an assenting reader," xxii). Cf. also Lillian Eileen Doherty, *Siren Songs: Gender, Audiences, and Narrators in the Odyssey* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Chapter 2.

might contextualize or contradict the narrative assertions.¹³ Transported audiences follow, in other words, the poetic portrayal at the expense of the literal while non-transported audiences retain access to both. Transportation should affect, therefore, anything which depends (wholly or in part) on the literal truth.

Poetic ambiguity, which depends only on the poetic portrayal, should not, therefore, be affected by transportation: it should be visible to both the transported and non-transported audience members. Literal ambiguity, however, depends on implicit differences between the poetic assertions about a character and her/his literal status; it may, therefore, be obscured by transportation, and we should expect the transported audience to appraise a literally ambiguous character more in line with her/his poetic portrayal than the non-transported audience.

In this context, the Κυκλώπεια is especially important, as (I hope to show) both Odysseus and Polyphēmos are (at least literally) ambiguous. It is, of course, important to ask whether the divergence of opinion mentioned above is actually inherent in the Κυκλώπεια of the *Odyssey* itself or has been superimposed upon it by later interpreters. Some of the divergence, we must admit, must be due to socio-cultural and individual factors; yet, they cannot account for all of it since one person can draw quite different conclusions when experiencing the one text on separate occasions. I wish, in this chapter, to investigate some of the mechanisms and circumstances which produce the poetic and literal ambiguity of Polyphēmos and Odysseus, to show that at least some of it is “Homeric,” and to assess the resulting impact of transportation on the appraisal of these characters.

Several scholars (notably Rick Newton and, most recently, Pura Nieto Hernández) have already argued that Polyphēmos is characterized in an ambiguous manner during the Κυκλώπεια.¹⁴ I wish, then, to offer some justification for what might initially seem to be a rereading of old ground. Two factors demonstrate that this conclusion requires further examination: first, that the grounds on which Polyphēmos has been identified as ambiguous vary dramatically in credibility; and,

¹³ See the discussion of minimal v. supplemented readings (above, p. 68) and the empirical evidence related to the persuasion and realism generated by transportation (above, pp. 95–98).

¹⁴ Rick M. Newton, “Poor Polyphemus: Emotional Ambivalence in *Odyssey* 9 and 17,” *Classical World* 76, no. 2 (1983): 137–42; Pura Nieto Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” *American Journal of Philology* 121, no. 3 (2000): 345–66.

secondly, that some scholars writing on the Κυκλώπεια still reject the notion that the Kyklōpes in general (and Polyphēmos amongst them) are anything more than “a thoroughly and uniformly unpleasant bunch of ogres.”¹⁵

Sources of Ambiguity

It is worth pausing for a moment, however, to consider the circumstances in which ambiguity arises and to form some hypotheses about its contributing factors.

Poetic ambiguity stems, as noted above, from ambivalence visible at the poetic level; it depends only on the poetic portrayal — or, more precisely, on the audience’s understanding at the poetic level — of the character. This will, naturally, be dependent on the poetic portrayal of the character’s role in the narrative itself (where ambiguity is generated by poetically visible internal ambivalence), but my reorientation of the definition in terms of the audience here is designed to acknowledge that our understanding of characters is frequently affected also by our understanding of their relationships with other characters. Ambiguity arises, in this context, when the effects of these relationships counteract the poetic portrayal and/or each other. The ambiguity surrounding Hektōr in the *Iliad*, for example, stems from a series of such relationships — with Paris (which emphasizes his reliability), with Poulydamas (which makes him seem rash), with the fighters on the Trojan side (which emphasizes his martial ability), with Akhilleus (which makes him seem weak), and so on — as much as from his killing of Patroklos and his choice (in X) to win κλέος (fighting Akhilleus) rather than defend his city and family. Poetic ambiguity should be influenced by anything which affects the poetic understanding of the character but should be unaffected by factors which influence the character’s literal status.

Literal ambiguity stems, in contrast, from a disjunction between the poetic and literal “truths” about a character; it will, therefore, be affected by factors which

¹⁵ James N. O’Sullivan, “Nature and Culture in *Odyssey* 9?” *Symbolae Osloenses* 65 (1990): 7–17 at 16; although he does eventually recognize some ambiguity, Malcolm Davies, “The Folk-Tale Origins of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*,” *Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, Patristik und lateinische Tradition* 115 (2002): 5–43, approaches Polyphēmos from a profoundly negative viewpoint, and hence characterizes (at 29) the speech to the ram (ι 447–60) as an “unexpected switch to pathos” and a “sudden change of sympathies”; another negative interpretation has recently been expounded by John Heath, *The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

influence the poetic portrayal (*i.e.*, the factors which affect poetic ambiguity) and by factors which influence the literal “truth.” Again, we should expect the character’s role in the narrative to be given precedence, but the poetic and literal portrayals are influenced by other factors. The interaction with other characters, for example, should operate at the literal level as well as at the poetic. It is important to note, however, that the literal truth is not constrained to the portrayal in the text: unlike the poetic truth (which is almost wholly dependent on the narration), the literal truth may be inferred or constructed by the audience from a variety of sources including both the underlying “truth” of the text itself and what we will loosely term “the tradition” in which that text was (or is) contextualized.

There are, then, three major areas in which we might investigate ambiguity as it applies to the Κυκλώπεια: “the tradition” (which contributes to the literal truth about Polyphēmos and Odysseus); the portrayals of Odysseus and Polyphēmos within the narrative of the *Odyssey* (at both the literal and poetic levels) and those characters’ relationships with other characters and groups in the epic.

In considering “the tradition,” of course, we must bear in mind the temporal relationships between any non-Homeric sources and the *Odyssey* and consider the legitimacy of using them to inform our understanding of audience responses to Homeric epic. Thus, while we may use sources such as the sixth and eleventh Idylls of Theokritos, Book 3 of Virgil’s *Aeneid*, and Book 13 of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* to inform our modern readings of the *Kyklōps*, we must be more restrictive in our use of sources when considering the original audience of the *Odyssey*. Among the Classical sources, we might consider using the information about the *Kyklōpes* preserved in Hesiod’s *Theogony* (139–46) since the traditions on which this work was based may well have influenced an original performance of the *Odyssey*;¹⁶ we might also investigate the pre-Homeric traditions about the *Kyklōpes* preserved in the *Odyssey* itself.

¹⁶ The legitimacy of using the Hesiodic corpus to inform our understanding of the Homeric poems (and the Κυκλώπεια in particular) was the opening assumption of Pierre Vidal-Naquet, “Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*: A Study of Religious and Mythical Meanings,” trans. Andrew Szegedy-Maszak, in *Reading the Odyssey: Selected Interpretive Essays*, ed. Seth L. Schein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 33–53, at 33; even if (unlike me) he did not justify this assertion, I am, at least, following a precedent.

In addition, it is well established that the *Κυκλώπεια* represents the adaptation and incorporation into the *Odyssey* of two very widespread folk-tales: one in which a captive hero blinds an ogre and escapes (often using a sheepskin or sheep), and one in which a villain is deceived by the provision of a false name such as “myself.” This conclusion was first advanced by Wilhelm Grimm in 1857,¹⁷ and, despite occasional dissent,¹⁸ has been substantially reinforced in the subsequent years by the more precise evidence derived from a greatly expanded corpus of folk-tales.¹⁹ Deviations of the *Κυκλώπεια* from the folk-tale tradition, then, provide fundamental insights into the nature of the episode, its integration into the rest of the *Odyssey*, and the character of Polyphēmos himself.

“The Tradition”

“Homeric” Traditions

Before we turn to the non-Homeric sources, however, we might look for evidence of “the tradition” within the text of the *Odyssey* itself. In order to do so we must examine the epithets which apply to the *Kyklōps* (and *Kyklōpes*); these are as follows:²⁰

¹⁷ It was published the following year: Wilhelm Grimm, “Die Sage von Polyphem,” *Philologische und historische Abhandlungen der Königlich Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (1858): 1–30.

¹⁸ E.g., James N. O’Sullivan, “Observations on the KYKLŌPEIA,” *Symbolae Osloenses* 62 (1987): 5–24, who put forward the view that the entire corpus of folk-tales is derived from the *Odyssey*. This order is also implied for at least one of the folk-tales by Geoffrey Lewis in the introduction to his translation of *The Book of Dede Korkut* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), at 16. It is, of course, possible to find a compromise in that *some* versions may have been derived from (or substantially influenced by) the *Odyssey* while others reflect a pre-Homeric tradition. Most recently, Emily Blanchard West, “An Indic Reflex of the Homeric *Cyclopeia*,” *Classical Journal* 101, no. 2 (2005–06): 125–60 sees the “theory of a folktale-based *Cyclopeia* ... [as] in some ways unsatisfying” (yet still argues for a reciprocal interaction between the folk-tales and the *Odyssey*) and proposes that the episode is more central to the epic than generally acknowledged.

¹⁹ Grimm, “Die Sage von Polyphem,” analysed ten versions of the folk-tale, including that of the *Odyssey*. James George Frazer, “Appendix XII: Ulysses and Polyphemus,” in *Apollodorus: The Library* (London: William Heinemann, 1921), 404–55, gives 36. Oskar Hackman, *Die Polyphemsage in der Volksüberlieferung* (Helsingfors: Frenckellska Tryckeri-Aktiebolaget, 1904) provides some 221 versions. For further bibliography, see Justin Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale and Homer’s *Kyklōpeia*,” *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 102 (1971): 133–81 at 134.

²⁰ I have included the metrical position of these epithets using the system devised by Eugene G. O’Neill, Jr., “The Localization of Metrical Word-Types in the Greek Hexameter: Homer, Hesiod, and the Alexandrians,” *Yale Classical Studies* 8 (1942): 103–78 at 113, viz. by the position of the final syllable within the following scheme:

1	1½	2	3	3½	4	5	5½	6	7	7½	8	9	9½	10	11	12
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	∪	∪		∪	∪		∪	∪		∪	∪		∪	∪		∪
		2			4			6			8			10		12

Name	Πολύφημος (4×)	Κύκλωψ (21×)	Κύκλωπες (11×)
Nominative	Without epithet: Nil κράτερ̄ος̄ Πολύφη̄μος̄ ¹² 2× (ι 407, 446)	Without epithet: 6× (ι 296, 316, 415, κ 435, μ 209, ψ 312) ἄγριος̄ ... Κύκλωψ ¹² 1× (β 19) Κύκλωψ ⁴ ... πέλωρ ⁷ 1× (ι 428) μένος̄ ἄσχετος̄ ... Κύκλωψ ¹² 1× (υ 19)	Without epithet: 2× (η 206, ι 275)
Vocative	Without epithet: 1× (ι 403)	Without epithet: 4× (ι 347, 364, 475, 502)	Without epithet: Nil
Accusative	Without epithet: Nil ἀντίθεον̄ Πολύφημον̄ ⁵³ 1× (α 70)	Without epithet: 4× (ι 345, 362, 474, 492)	Without epithet: 1× (ι 399)
Genitive	Without epithet: Nil	Without epithet: 3× (α 69, ι 319, 548) Κύκλωπος̄ ³ ... μεγάλ̄ητορος̄ ἀνδροφάγοι ¹² 1× (κ 200)	Without epithet: 2× (ι 117, 166) Κυκλώπων̄ ἀνδρῶν̄ ὑπερ̄ηνορέοντων̄ ¹² 1× (ζ 5) Κυκλώπων̄ ³ ... ὑπερ̄φιάλων̄ ἀθεμίστων̄ ¹² 1× (ι 106)
Dative	Without epithet: Nil	Without epithet: Nil	Without epithet: 4× (α 71, ι 125, 357, 510)

It will be obvious from this table that I have been somewhat more inclusive in my analysis than Milman Parry and his continuators (who analysed formulae and thus discounted phrases with intervening words).²¹ Even so, the instances in which an epithet is used are few in number — eight in total — and so we must bear in mind the limitations of sample size on the significance of our conclusions.

From these data, it seems that the pre-Homeric traditions regarding the *Kyklōpes en masse* are profoundly negative: the *Kyklōpes* are ὑπερφίαλοι (“overbearing”), ἀθέμιστοι (“lacking in laws” or “lawless”), and ὑπερηνορέοντες (“overbearing”). All are pejorative descriptions: of the 19 other occurrences of ὑπερφίαλοι in the *Odyssey*, 16 describe the suitors,²² and the other three convey moral overtones;²³ of the ten in the *Iliad*, seven are applied to an enemy;²⁴ ἀθέμιστοι occurs once

²¹ Milman Parry, “The Traditional Epithet in Homer,” trans. Adam Parry, in *The Making of Homeric Verse*, ed. Adam Parry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971 [originally published as *L’Épithète Traditionnelle dans Homère: Essai sur un Problème de Style Homérique* (Paris 1928)]), 1–190; see also Norman Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer’s Odyssey* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975).

²² α 134, β 310, γ 315, δ 790, λ 116, ν 373, ξ 27, ο 12, 315, 376, π 271, σ 167, υ 12, 291, φ 289, ψ 356.

²³ δ 503 (the hubristic boast of Aias reported to Menelaos by Prōteus), δ 774 (the suitors’ speech when planning to ambush Tēlemakhos), and ζ 274 (the Phaiakians who might mock Nausikaä).

²⁴ Akhaians about the Trojans: Γ 106, Ν 621, Φ 224; pro-Akhaian gods about the Trojans: Φ 414, 459; Arēs about Diomēdēs after being attacked by him: Ε 881; Hēra about Zeus’ spirit after being threatened: Ο 94; the exceptions are Ν 293, Σ 300, and Ψ 611, where it seems to mean only “passionate.”

elsewhere in the Homeric texts, describing the suitors;²⁵ ὑπερηνορέοντες is reserved for the suitors in its eleven other occurrences in the *Odyssey* and for the Trojans in its two in the *Iliad*.²⁶

In contrast, the traditions regarding Polyphēmos seem relatively positive. When mentioned by name, he is ἀντίθεος (“equal to a god”), a generic epithet applied most commonly to Odysseus²⁷ but also to 26 other heroes.²⁸ Although we cannot discount the negative alternative offered by the (indecisive) Scholiast who glossed ἀντίθεον as τοῖς θεοῖς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιοῦντα, ἢ τὸν θεομάχον (“[either] the same as the gods themselves, or a god-fighter”),²⁹ we may at least suggest it is unlikely, especially when the following phrase implicitly compares Polyphēmos’ strength to that of Zeus.³⁰ Κρατερός (“mighty”), too, is a generic epithet; it is applied most frequently to Diomēdēs³¹ but also to 26 other heroes in the two epics.³²

Parry asserted that within the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* the generic epithet lacks any particular meaning. As his exemplar, he cited δῖος (applied most frequently to Odysseus and Akhilleus) which describes “32 heroes who have in common only the fact that they are heroes,”³³ and included κρατερός among his other examples.³⁴ If we follow Parry’s lead, we must conclude that the application of ἀντίθεος and

²⁵ ρ 363; cf. the singular form in the *gnomē* at I 63–64: ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος | ὅς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος. “Devoid of society, lawless, and heartless is the man desirous of dreadful war amongst his own people.” Cf. O’Sullivan, “Nature and Culture in *Odyssey* 9?” at 8.

²⁶ β 266, 331, 324, δ 766, 769, ρ 482, 581, υ 375, φ 361, 401, ψ 31; of the two in the *Iliad*, one is pejorative (Δ 176, the Trojan Agamemnon fears might dance on Menelaos’ grave) but the other is indeterminate (N 258 of Dēiphobos).

²⁷ 12×: Λ 140, α 21, β 17, δ 741, ζ 331, ν 126, ξ 40, ο 90, τ 456, υ 369, φ 254, χ 291. I have, of course, adopted the term *generic* (v. *distinctive*) epithet from Parry, “The Traditional Epithet in Homer,” at, e.g., 83–96.

²⁸ 19 heroes in the *Iliad* (29×), 8 in the *Odyssey* (21×); one hero in both.

²⁹ Σ H. ad. α 70. The poet may, indeed, be employing satire here, or remembering the ἀντίθεον Πόλυφῆμόν¹² mentioned by Nestōr at A 264 in a list of ancient heroes.

³⁰ α 70–71. I cannot accept the conclusion of Denys Lionel Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), at 6 that Polyphēmos was the Kyklōpes’ “lord and master,” but agree with O’Sullivan, “Nature and Culture in *Odyssey* 9?” at 14–15, in his reading of ὄου κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον | πᾶσιν Κυκλώπεσσι (whose power is greatest among all the Kyklōpes) — which was largely foreshadowed by Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 148 (read 1.70–71 for 9.70–71) with further bibliography — that κράτος reflects physical, not political, power. Zeus, too, is the *strongest* of the Olympian gods (Θ 17–32).

³¹ 22×: Δ 401, 411, E 143, 151, 251, 286, 814, Z 97, 278, H 163, Θ 532, K 369, 446, 536, Λ 316, 361, 384, 660, Π 25, Ψ 290, 472, 812.

³² 20 in the *Iliad*, 6 in the *Odyssey*.

³³ Parry, “The Traditional Epithet in Homer,” at 146, with a list of the 32 names.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, at 85.

κρατερός to Polyphēmos endows upon him some heroic status, and must be seen in a positive light.³⁵

Turning to the singular of Κύκλωψ (which, in the *Odyssey*, always refers to Polyphēmos), we find he is μεγαλήτωρ (“magnanimous”) — another of Parry’s examples of the generic epithet³⁶ — which reinforces the impression of him as a generic hero. This epithet, however, is coupled with ἀνδροφάγος (“man eating”), which is a *hapax legomenon* in the *Odyssey*. Eustathius noted a variant reading ἀνδροφόνοιο (“man slaying”) but, though relatively common in the *Iliad*, the word is hardly attested in the *Odyssey*.³⁷ Although a purely metrical explanation is possible,³⁸ the degree to which the epithet is appropriate to the action of the *Odyssey* suggests it is probably used with particularized meaning (rather than simply being a distinctive epithet).³⁹ In sum, we cannot be sure the phrase is traditional, but if so it implies that an encounter of Odysseus with the Kyklōps predated Homer.

The other epithets applied to Κύκλωψ refer to his strength (μένος ἄσχετος, “irrepressibly mighty”), size (πέλωρ, “huge”), and ferocity (ἄγριος, “fierce”). These descriptions are more ambivalent: the first is used by Nestōr to describe the Akhaians (in a positive sense) at γ 104, but it is also used three times by Antinoös (each time in the opening line of an address to Tēlemakhos) at least twice in a profoundly negative sense;⁴⁰ the second (linguistically related to positive terms,⁴¹

³⁵ In addition to its status as a generic epithet, the term κρατερός should be taken in a positive light because the possession of great strength is, itself, a positive characteristic. Witness Priam’s prayer to Zeus to send him as a sign φίλτατος οἰνῶν, καί εὐ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον (“most beloved [to you] of birds, and whose strength is greatest,” Ω 311 = 293), and Zeus sends in reply an eagle, τελειότατον πετεηνῶν (most perfect / powerful of birds, Ω 315).

³⁶ Parry, “The Traditional Epithet in Homer,” at 86.

³⁷ Eust. *Od. ad κ 200*; this is preserved in five of the manuscripts according to the *apparatus criticus* (*ad loc.*) in the OCT. Ἀνδροφόνοιο (in the genitive) is used 11/13× of Hektōr in the *Iliad*, but the only form of ἀνδροφόνος in the *Odyssey* is in the phrase φάρμακον ἀνδροφόνον (*i.e.*, “poison,” α 261).

³⁸ That is, ἀνδροφάγοιο may be an alternative to ὠμοφάγου (“[raw-]flesh eating”), which is metrically difficult for the line end. The dative, ὠμοφάγω is used in the *Iliad* five times, always as an epithet of wild animals: lions (E 782, H 256, O 592), jackals (Λ 479), and wolves (Π 157).

³⁹ Ἀνδροφάγος may be seen as a parody of σιτοφάγος (“grain eating,” an epithet of men at ι 191; itself a *hapax*, but a reflection of σίτον ἔδοντες as a description of men at θ 222, ι 89, κ 101; cf. E 341. At any rate, the *sense* of the word is important and thus it cannot be generic.

⁴⁰ β 85, ρ 406; the third instance, β 303, seems quite positive, though Tēlemakhos’ reply is still adversarial.

⁴¹ The related πελώριος (which also describes Polyphēmos (ι 187) is used in a positive sense of heroes in the *Iliad*: it refers to the huge size of the gods’ spears (E 594, Θ 424), heroes’ armour

but used only of monsters in the *Odyssey*) is used too sparingly to determine its overtones conclusively;⁴² the third, ἄγριος, is generally neutral in descriptions of wild animals (it is a stock epithet of goats),⁴³ but negative when applied to other creatures or races (men, the Giants, and the Skylla).⁴⁴

In sum, if we can draw any conclusions about pre-Homeric traditions from the epithets applied to the names Πολύφημος, Κύκλωψ, and Κύκλωπες within the *Odyssey*, these must be that the *Kyklōpes* as a race are profoundly negative characters (similar to the suitors), but Polyphēmos himself is relatively “heroic.” This position would be somewhat difficult to defend, however, simply on the grounds that Polyphēmos’ epithets may have been attracted to the *Kyklōps* from an original application to a hero of the same name mentioned in the *Iliad*,⁴⁵

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(Rhēsos’ at K 439, Akhilleus’ at Σ 83), gods (Hadēs at E 395; Arēs at H 208), and the heroes themselves (Agamemnon at Γ 166; Telamōnian Aias at Γ 229, H 211, P 174, 360; Periphas the Aitōlian at E 842, 847; Hektōr at Λ 820; Akhilleus at Φ 527, X 92), all in positive senses. In the *Odyssey*, it seems a more neutral description of size: it describes huge waves (γ 290), Ōriōn (λ 572), and Sisyphos’ immense stone (λ 594).

The related πέλωρος which, though it describes the Gorgōn twice (E 741, λ 634) and the *Kyklōps* once (ι 257), also seems to refer simply to size when describing a Deer on Kirkē’s island (κ 168, the size of which is emphasized at 158 and 180) and a *tame goose* in the bird-sign which appears before Tēlemakhos’ departure from Sparta (ο 161).

⁴² Πελώρ only occurs three times in Homeric epic: one, which describes Hēphaistos (Σ 410), seems to lack any negative sense (though it does appear close to his physical description at 414–15, and his lameness is emphasized at 411 and 416–17); its effect in its application to Polyphēmos at ι 428 is overshadowed by its linkage with the pejorative phrase ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς (“knowing [only] lawlessness”); the third, which describes the Skylla at μ 87, opposes her voice, ὄση σκύαλκος νεογιλῆς (“equal to newborn puppies,” μ 86–87), to her physical form (a πέλωρ κακόν, “huge evil [creature]”), but it is possible (if unlikely) that the word simply refers to her size. Rhys Carpenter, *Folk Tale, Fiction and Saga in the Homeric Epics*, Sather Classical Lectures 20 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), at 109 explains this last in terms of etymology: “a beast with so puppy-like a name as Skylla must bark like a puppy (*scylax*) to the immortal confusion of the resultant picture.”

⁴³ Goats: Γ 24, Δ 106, Ο 271, ι 119, ξ 50. Ἄγριος also describes wild animals such as boars (Θ 338, Ι 539, cf. E 52), or the flies which might attack Patroklos’ body (Τ 30), and in a similar sense describes Delusion (Τ 88), anger (Δ 23, Θ 460, θ 304), fury (X 313), and the struggle over Patroklos’ body (P 398, 737).

⁴⁴ When applied to a specific human, the term ἄγριος is only used to describe an enemy, generally to an ally: Z 97 = 278 (Helenos to Hektōr, and Hektōr to Hekabē, both about Diomēdēs), Θ 96 (Diomēdēs to Odysseus about Hektōr), α 199 (Athēna /Mentēs to Tēlemakhos about the men who restrain Odysseus against his will); cf. I 629 (Aias to Odysseus about Akhilleus’ heart after the rejection of the embassy). The criticism of Akhilleus’ behaviour by Apollo (Ω 41) also conforms to this pattern, and is closely related to the descriptions of wild animals.

When applied to groups of humans, ἄγριος is, in the *Odyssey*, always grouped with ὕβρις and injustice, and opposed to φιλοξενία (love of strangers) and θεοδεία (fear of the gods): ζ 119–21, ι 174–76, ν 200–02, cf. the almost identical phrasing in Alkinoös’ instruction at θ 572–76.

Otherwise, ἄγριος describes the *Kyklōps* (three times: β 19, ι 215, 494), the Giants (η 206, closely linked to the *Kyklōpes*), and the Skylla (μ 119).

⁴⁵ Thus Stephanie West in Alfred Heubeck, Stephanie West, and John Bryan Hainsworth, *A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey: Volume I, Introduction and Books I–VIII*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), ad α 70, describes ἀντίθεος as “a somewhat surprising epithet ...

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especially if one takes the view that giving the name Polyphēmos to a Kyklōps was Homer's invention.⁴⁶

Even so, when we consider the specific portrait of the Kyklōps in the *Odyssey*, having positive epithets probably has a positive impact on our appraisal of Polyphēmos' character. Whether or not the epithets derive from a traditional hero (but especially if they do), the quasi-heroic status they imply for Polyphēmos reflects positively upon him; if the Polyphēmos whom Nestōr mentions at A 264 was well known to the ancient audiences, then it is possible that an association (even if only by name) with the traditional hero would also reflect positively on the Kyklōps.

Non-Homeric Traditions I: “Hesiodic” Kyklōpes

Another source of “background information” the audience might bring to bear on the interpretation of the Κυκλώπεια is that of competing or alternative traditions about the Kyklōpes which have since been preserved in other works. A source for one such tradition, for example, is Hesiod's *Theogony* (139–46), and it is worth comparing the description of the Kyklōpes in that work with their portrait in the *Odyssey*.

Hesiod states the three Kyklōpes were the children of Gaia and Ouranos (139–40) and describes them in generally positive terms: their hearts were ὑπέρβιον (“mighty,” *Th.* 139),⁴⁷ they were θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιοι (“equal to the gods,” 142), and

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probably best explained as imitation of *Iliad* i 264.” It is unnecessary, however, to invoke an “imitation of [the] *Iliad*” (with its assumption of temporal precedence) here; we may assume just as easily that both draw on a common traditional source. If Nestōr's catalogue of the heroes of old at A 263–65 refers to traditional material, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that κρατερός is likewise attracted to the Kyklōps from the same hero.

⁴⁶ Cf. Frederick Ahl and Hanna M. Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), at 109–10: “there is a strong possibility that Polyphemus's name is Odysseus's invention rather than a traditional appellation,” on the grounds that Πολύφημος is not named among the Kyklōpes in the *Theogony*. (A discrepancy between the names was also noted by Eustathius *ad* ι 184.) The possibility persists, indeed, even after the demolition of this weak argument (on the relationship between the Hesiodic and Homeric Kyklōpes, see below) if only on the grounds that the very high degree to which his name (the only one of the Kyklōpes' names given in the *Odyssey*) is appropriate to his specific role in the *Odyssey* suggests it was imported for the purpose. On the appropriateness, see Bruce Loudon, “Categories of Homeric Wordplay,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 125 (1995): 27–46 at 41–42 (though I reject his conclusion about the Οὔτις-trick).

⁴⁷ In its three occurrences in the Hesiodic corpus (*Th.* 139, 898, *Op.* 692), as with its two in the *Iliad* (P 19, Σ 262), the term ὑπέρβιος lacks the pejorative sense so frequent in the *Odyssey* (α 368, δ 321, ξ 92, 95, π 315, and 410 [suitors], and μ 379 [slaughter of Hēlios' cattle]). A non-pejorative

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there ἰσχύς (“strength”), βίη (“might”) and μηχαναί (“stratagems”) were in their work (146). Homer, by contrast, implies there were more than three⁴⁸ and that one (at least) was a descendent of Poseidōn; moreover, their “technological primitiveness” (reflected in their lack of ships and shipbuilders at ι 125–26 and seeming ignorance of the use of fire for anything other than illumination⁴⁹) are not easily reconciled with such skilled craftsmen.⁵⁰ In fact, the *Kyklōpes* in the *Theogony* bear such little resemblance to those in the *Odyssey* that one ancient commentator stated flatly that these were a different γενή (“race”) of *Kyklōpes* from those described by Homer.⁵¹

In this context, it is difficult to use the *Theogony* as a source of information to fill the gaps in the *Kyklōpes*’ literal portrayal in the *Odyssey*:⁵² the overwhelming differences between the two portraits seem to indicate that the “Homeric” depiction is either completely independent of or subverts the “Hesiodic” tradition in this instance. This does not imply, however, that it is inappropriate to use *any* information from the Hesiodic corpus to inform our understanding of the Homeric poems; rather, each case should be considered on its merits (and we will have cause to turn to Hesiod again in this chapter). Even so, we must admit that if the “Hesiodic” tradition was known to the members of the Homeric audience, then (as with “Polyphēmos” above) simple word association — the association between the term “*Kyklōps*” and the positive tradition — might have had a positive effect on their understanding of Polyphēmos.

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sense is evidenced once in the *Odyssey* (ο 212). Σ BM² gloss ὑπέρβιον at *Th.* 898 simply as ἰσχυρόν (strong) and ἰσχυρότατον (very strong).

⁴⁸ A larger number is required, *e.g.*, when the narrator comments θεμιστεύει ... ἕκαστος || παίδων ἡδ’ ἀλόχων (“each makes laws for his children and wives, ι 114–15).

⁴⁹ So Seth L. Schein, “Odysseus and Polyphemus in the *Odyssey*,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 11, no. 2 (1970): 73–83 at 77, who explicitly associates this with technological primitiveness.

⁵⁰ So also Robert Mondi, “The Homeric Cyclopes: Folktale, Tradition, and Theme,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 113 (1983): 17–38 at 18.

⁵¹ Σ in *Th.* 139: οὐ περὶ τῶν παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ Κυκλώπων λέγει· Κυκλώπων γὰρ γένη τρία· Κύκλωπες οἱ τὴν Μυκλήνην τειχίσαντες, οἱ περὶ τὸν Πολύφημον, καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοί. “He does not speak of the *Kyklōpes* [described] by Homer; for there are three races of *Kyklōpes*: those who walled Mycenae, those [living] around Polyphēmos, and these gods.”

⁵² The argument of Ahl and Roisman (see above, n. 46) on the novelty of Polyphēmos’ name does exactly this.

Non-Homeric Traditions II: Folk-Tale Villains

The two sources of “background knowledge” discussed above have in common the facts that they are *pre*-Homeric Greek traditions which, compared to the *Odyssey*, portray the *Kyklōps* in a positive manner. To these, let us add a third which is non-Greek and preserved in texts which postdate the *Odyssey* by more than a millennium, but, more importantly, gives a far more negative depiction of Polyphēmos than the *Odyssey*: this is the *communis opinio* cited above that the *Κυκλώπεια* is the earliest surviving example of a widely known folk-tale. This theory was first advanced by Wilhelm Grimm in 1857, and while Grimm’s identification of a mid-nineteenth-century Norwegian fairytale as *the* source of the Polyphēmos story seems somewhat quaint in retrospect, his main point — that these are all examples of a single story — remains valid.⁵³

Grimm recounted ten versions of the *Polyphemsage* (though only the four most literary of his texts in any detail⁵⁴) and has been followed by such notable scholars as Oskar Hackman⁵⁵ and James Frazer;⁵⁶ but, within Homeric studies, the seminal work on the folk-tale associations of the *Κυκλώπεια* was Denys Page’s *The Homeric Odyssey*.⁵⁷ Page analysed six differences between the *Κυκλώπεια* and the other versions of the folk-tale,⁵⁸ and used the folk-tale background of the episode

⁵³ Grimm, “Die Sage von Polyphem.”

⁵⁴ These four (coincidentally, the four earliest versions when we exclude Euripides’ *Cyclops*) are: the *Κυκλώπεια* of the *Odyssey*, the giant-story (usually entitled “Polyphemus”) in the story of the sixth sage in the *Dolopathos* by Johannes de Alta Silva (on which see further, below p. 138), the third voyage of Sindbad the Seaman (Sinbad the Sailor) in the *Arabian Nights* (see below, pp. 122–23), and the story of Depé Ghöz (Tepegöz or “goggle-eye”) in the Oğuz (Turkish) epic *The Book of Dede Korkut* (on which see Jo Ann Conrad, “Polyphemus and Tepegöz Revisited: A Comparison of the Tales of the Blinding of the One-Eyed Ogre in Western and Turkish Traditions,” *Fabula* 40, no. 3–4 (1999): 278–97). Editions and/or translations of these works are listed in the Bibliography of Ancient Sources (pp. 231–33).

⁵⁵ Hackman, *Die Polyphemsage in der Volksüberlieferung*, gives 221 versions of the tale: the 124 in the “A group” describe the blinding of a giant and the hero’s subsequent escape; the 50 in the “B group” contain a trick with a fake name, usually “myself”; the 47 of the “C group” combine the two, but are not widespread geographically and the means of blinding (always with hot liquid or metal, under the pretence of curing bad eyesight) differs from that of the *Odyssey*.

⁵⁶ Frazer, “Appendix XII: Ulysses and Polyphemus,” recounts 35, including the nine variants of Grimm (*i.e.*, all those except the Homeric version).

⁵⁷ Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, at 5–16 (ch.1).

⁵⁸ That is, the trick with Οὔτις (which is only found twice in Hackman’s “A group”), the role of wine, the ending of the story (the “sequel of the Talking Ring” as opposed to the rock-throwing sequence), the method used to blind the giant (and the fact that his victims are not cooked), the mode of escape, and the *Kyklōps*’ single eye. Page (*ibid.*, at 12) reasoned that the drawing of lots to decide who would help Odysseus blind Polyphēmos (ι 331–35) was an adaptation of a story in which companions drew lots to decide who would be eaten next, but this is an *argumentum ex*

both to augment our understanding of, and to explain what he saw as inconsistencies within, the Homeric text.⁵⁹

Page's analysis was extended greatly by Justin Glenn, who used 125 versions of the story to produce a "folk-tale commentary" on the *Κυκλώπεια*.⁶⁰ Glenn's work, which is meticulously supported by statistics compiled from this folk-tale corpus, is particularly informative regarding which features of the Homeric story are unusual (or unique) and, consequently, how "[t]hese distinctively Homeric contributions to the giant allow us to speak of Homer's Polyphemus as a convincing literary character, as opposed to the monotonous, pasteboard ogre who constantly recurs in the folk-tales."⁶¹

Yet, the approach of Page and Glenn (continued in Page's later book on folk-tales in the *ἀπόλογοι*) was somewhat limited in purview since it treated the *Κυκλώπεια* almost in isolation from the rest of the *Odyssey*.⁶² This deficiency was ably redressed by Seth Schein in a paper roughly contemporaneous with Glenn's;⁶³ Schein attempted, with considerable success, to link each of the differences identified by Page with the major themes of the *Odyssey* as a whole.⁶⁴

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silentio (he adduced no folk-tales as evidence) and I am not prepared to count it as a "difference" here.

⁵⁹ For example, Page (*ibid.*, at 7–8) uses the folk-tale background (at 7–8) to bring new light to the poet's "oversight" in the use of γάλα (milk) after ἄκρητον (unmixed) at ι 297 where we expect μέθυ (wine); there are, naturally, other explanations (such as intentional humour). For the serious, see Frank Eggleston Robbins, "'Unmixed Milk,' *Odyssey* ix. 296–98," *Classical Philology* 10, no. 4 (1915): 442–44; for a convincing argument for the humour, see John O. Lofberg, "'Unmixed Milk' Again," *Classical Philology* 16, no. 4 (1921): 389–91.

⁶⁰ Glenn, "The Polyphemus Folktale," at 144–81.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, at 181.

⁶² Between them, Page and Glenn cite only four passages from Homer outside ι: Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, at 6, cites only α 70–71 (ἀντίθειον Πολύφημον ὅου κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον | πᾶσιν Κυκλώπεσσι, "Godlike Polyphēmos whose power is greatest among all the Kyklōpes") as evidence that Polyphēmos was the Kyklōps' king; this untenable position (refuted most meticulously by O'Sullivan, "Nature and Culture in *Odyssey* 9?" at 14–15) was rebutted by Glenn, "The Polyphemus Folktale," at 148, who cited also λ 485. Glenn (at 177) also briefly cited α 68–69 and ν 341–43 in an explication of the wrath of Poseidōn.

Although it deals explicitly with other sections of the *Odyssey* (to the total exclusion of the *Κυκλώπεια*), the same criticism may also be levelled at Denys Lionel Page, *Folktales in Homer's Odyssey*, The Carl Newell Jackson Lectures, 1972 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973): each is discussed as a discrete tale, rather than as an integrated part of the whole epic.

⁶³ Schein, "Odysseus and Polyphemus in the *Odyssey*."

⁶⁴ Hence, the olive stake (which Page saw only in terms of the fact that Polyphēmos eats his victims raw and hence has no metal spit) is not only indicative of a fundamental association between Odysseus and olive trees (*e.g.*, with which he constructs his raft in ε [234–36], and from which he has constructed his bed [ψ 190–204]; see Schein, *ibid.*, at 75–76, for these and three other examples) but also of the Kyklōps' "technological primitiveness" which is to be

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Glenn’s conclusion, cited above, that Polyphēmos is “a convincing literary character” is, however, both valid and cogent; it is reinforced by the success of Schein’s analysis. We must bear in mind that the *Odyssey* stands independently as a work of literature, and thus the conception of the Kyklōpes within the epic (and the mind of its composer) may differ substantially from the conceptions of them in the folk-tale paradigm and the Hesiodic (and other Classical) traditions.

Nevertheless, the understanding (whether conscious or not) of the Κυκλώπεια as a folk-tale frames the audience’s interpretation of the nature, actions, and motives of the characters. Folk-tales, to adopt terms from the approach of Vladimir Propp, revolve around the victory of the “hero” over the “villain.”⁶⁵ They are black and white: heroes are good, villains are bad; heroes are justified, villains are not; heroes deserve to prevail, it is fitting that villains are defeated.⁶⁶ Were we to understand Polyphēmos simply as a folk-tale villain, then, the effect on our interpretation would be profoundly negative; if we understand Odysseus simply as a folk-tale hero, we may applaud behaviour which is usually incompatible with the ethos of epic.

Literal Moderation

Polyphēmos is not, however, simply a folk-tale villain; rather, especially in comparison to the folk-tale ogres, his portrayal seems somewhat moderated. Justin Glenn, for example, showed that the Kyklōps’ address to his favourite ram (ι 447–60) — a passage which has “a clear element of pathos which is undoubtedly intentional” — very probably represents a deviation by the poet from his traditional material.⁶⁷ This conclusion is echoed, indeed, by Pura Nieto Hernández’

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contrasted against Odysseus’ skills (which, *e.g.*, allow him to construct his raft and bed; *ibid.*, at 76–77).

⁶⁵ Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, trans. Laurence Scott, ed. Louis A. Wagner, 2nd ed., vol. 9, American Folklore Society Bibliographical and Special Series (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968 [originally published as Морфология «Волшебной» Сказки [*Morfologija Skazki*] (Leningrad 1928)]). Page, Schein, and Glenn all used these terms directly or indirectly of Odysseus and Polyphēmos.

⁶⁶ When such conventions are inverted or ignored, the product is satire; for an excellent set of examples, see James Finn Garner, *Politically Correct Bedtime Stories* (New York: Macmillan, 1994).

⁶⁷ Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 169–71 (§21): In other versions of the folk-tale, “[t]he address is almost always ludicrous or sarcastic, and directed to the hero disguised in a sheepskin, *not* to the animal itself” (original emphasis). The *pathos* inherent in this speech is almost universally acknowledged, regardless of whether it is seen as consistent with the preceding material. *Cf.*, *e.g.*, Alfred Heubeck and Arie Hoekstra, *A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey*:
... (continued)

argument that Polyphēmos is ambiguous because although he is a monster he is “humanized by his mastery of language ... which differentiates him from animals.”⁶⁸

In this context, let us consider the description of Polyphēmos when we first meet him in the *Κυκλώπεια*:

ἔνθα δ' ἀνήρ ἐνίαυε πελώριος, ὅς ῥα τὰ μῆλα
οἶος ποιμαίνεσκεν ἀπόπροθεν· οὐδὲ μετ' ἄλλους
πωλεῖτ', ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθεν ἐὼν ἀθεμίστια ἦδη.
καὶ γὰρ θαῦμ' ἐτέτυκτο πελώριον, οὐδὲ ἐφίκει
ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγω, ἀλλὰ ῥίψ ὑλήεντι
ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων, ὅ τε φαίνεται οἶον ἀπ' ἄλλων. ι 187–92.⁶⁹

In this passage, Hernández sees four features which differentiate Polyphēmos from “normal human beings”: his isolation (ι 188–89), the explicit description of him as not resembling grain-eating men (190–91), and the two descriptions of him as *πελώριος* (187, 190) which she renders as “monstrous.”⁷⁰ We might add, indeed, that the description of the mountain peak itself (192) reinforces the isolation of the preceding lines,⁷¹ while the comment *ἀθεμίστια ἦδη* (“he knew [only] lawlessness, 189) highlights the negativity of this depiction.⁷²

(continued)

Volume II, Books IX–XVI, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), at 36–37, n. ad ι 446–61. See also Newton, “Poor Polyphemus,” at 138 (“a perfect example of the ambivalent emotional state Homer has engendered”) and Irene J. F. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 245, n. ad ι 444–61 (who argues this speech “underlines ... the ambivalent nature of the giant”). A prominent exception is, then, Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, at 82, who sees this as anachronistic.

⁶⁸ Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 354. Cf. Davies, “Folk-Tale Origins,” at 29, who writes, “It is a remarkable inspiration, this sudden switch of sympathies to the ogre, but it has been prepared for by the generally humanising treatment of Polyphēmos.” Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2 (see, e.g., 41 and 61) argues that language is the defining characteristic which separates humans from gods and animals (and the dead); he, however, expounds a particularly negative reading of Polyphēmos in the *Κυκλώπεια* (79–84).

⁶⁹ And a huge man used to pass the night there, who tended the | flocks alone and aloof; and not with others | did he come and go, but was far away and knew [only] lawlessness. || And he had been made a huge wonder, and he was not like | men who eat grain, but like a woody peak | of a lofty mountain, which appears alone apart from the others.

⁷⁰ Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 354–55.

⁷¹ Hernández, unfortunately, does not quote the last phrase of the comparison.

⁷² Eust. *Od.* ad ι 189, in fact, connects the isolation and the lawlessness: ὡς μηδὲ παίδων θεμιστεύων κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους Κύκλωπας μηδὲ γυναικός, εἰκότως καὶ ἀθέμιστα καὶ ἄδικα εἰδῶς λεχθήσεται. καὶ εἴη ἄν, ἀθεμίστων ἀθεμιστότερος (“as he has neither children nor a wife to give laws to in the manner of the other *Kyklōpes*, naturally he is called both ‘lawless’ and ‘knowing injustice.’ He might indeed be [called] the most lawless of the lawless.”). So also Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 145–46, and Jenny Strauss Clay, *The Wrath of Athena: Gods and Men in the Odyssey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), at 126 (who cites Eustathius’ conclusion).

While Hernández is right to see Polyphēmos as isolated, her translation of πελώριος is, perhaps, a little pejorative: in the majority of its uses this adjective lacks the negative sense of the related noun πέλωρ (“monster”)⁷³ and refers simply to immense size.⁷⁴ Further, the description of him as a θαῦμα[α] (“wonder”) in 190 is implicitly positive.⁷⁵ In fact, Polyphēmos’ appearance here — a huge, isolated creature who lives in a cave and lacks a law code — is more like a wild animal (an explanation which not only accords with his isolation here,⁷⁶ but also accounts for his epithet ἄγριος at β 19)⁷⁷ than a monster.

Yet, just as the simile comparing the Kyklōps to a mountain peak might seem downplayed if (given the knowledge of his real diet) we expect the statement “he was not like grain-eating men” to foreshadow the constitution of his next meal,⁷⁸ so also Polyphēmos’ “animal” characteristics seem somewhat muted. Although he is compared to a lion when he eats the first two of Odysseus’ companions (ι 292), the simile is immediately qualified as referring to the fact that he leaves no scraps,⁷⁹ and any points of correspondence in prey or temperament between the Kyklōps

⁷³ On the sense of πελώρ, πελώριος, and related terms, see above, p. 113, nn. 41–42. Richard John Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* (London: Blackie and Son, 1924), defines πελώριος as “[o]f uncommon size or strength, great, huge, prodigious, [or] wondrous.”

⁷⁴ This alternative is, in fact, supported by the description of the mountain peak in ι 191–92 as being ὑψηλὴν ὀρέων (“of a high mountain”).

⁷⁵ The noun θαῦμα occurs 9× *Il.* and 9× *Od.* and, except when it conveys surprise (N 99, O 286, Y 344, Φ 54, κ 326, ρ 306, τ 36), is always explicitly positive. Hence, Odysseus describes Pērō as θαῦμα βροτοῖσι (“a wonder among mortals,” presumably for her beauty) at λ 287; the word describes Hēphaistos’ craftsmanship in making the field on the shield of Akhilleus look ploughed though it was made of Gold (Σ 549). It is more commonly used in the phrase θαῦμα ιδέσθαι (“a wonder to look upon”): the edge of Hēra’s chariot wheel (E 725), Rhēsos’ armour (K 439), Akhilleus’ (old) armour (Σ 83), the self-propelling tripods of Hēphaistos (Σ 377), Arētē’s purple cloth (ζ 306), the walls of Skheria (η 45), Aphroditē’s beautiful robe (θ 366), and the Naiads’ purple cloth (ν 108). The related verbs (θάομαι, θαυμαίνω, and (ἀπο)θαυμάζω) occur 9× *Il.* (only θαυμάζω) and 18× *Od.* Again, except where it conveys surprise (α 382, δ 655, η 145, ι 153, π 203, σ 411, υ 269) it is always positive, and, in fact, usually implies a sense of awe (especially at some tangible manifestation of the divine: B 320, γ 373, ν 157; cf. E 601, K 12, N 11, Ω 394, 629, 631, δ 44, η 43) or highly positive appraisal (especially of a desirable person/object: Σ 467, 496, θ 459, σ 191, τ 229, ω 370; cf. ζ 49, θ 108, 265).

⁷⁶ Cf. Arist. *Pol.*, 1253^a, who asserts ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος (“man is a political animal, and the one who is citiless by nature (rather than by [bad] luck) is either worse or better than man,” 2–4), on the grounds (27–29) that an asocial creature is either too self-sufficient to be part of a city (a god), or incapable of taking part in a community (an animal). On this last point, see also Katsouris, “Euripides’ *Cyclops* and Homer’s *Odyssey*,” at 15.

⁷⁷ Ἄγριος is a common epithet of wild animals. See above, p. 114, nn. 43–44.

⁷⁸ Cf. Heubeck’s comment *ad* ι 191–92 that σιτοφάγος anticipates the Kyklōps’ epithet ἀνδροφάγος at κ 200.

⁷⁹ ἦσθιε ὡς λέων ὀρεσίτροφος, οὐδ’ ἀπέλειπεν, | ἔγκατὰ τε σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα μυελόνετα (“he was eating like a mountain-bred lion, leaving nothing [remaining], the entrails, the flesh, and the marrow bones,” ι 292–93).

and the lion are left unstated. Further, Polyphēmos and the Kyklōpes are described with forms of ἀνὴρ (*man*) by Odysseus, his companions, and the poet himself.⁸⁰ Although this is, in three of the four cases, closely paired with an adjective which could relate him to an animal,⁸¹ the effect is more of a bestial human than a humanized animal.

This interpretation of muting is supported if we compare Polyphēmos' portrait in the *Κυκλώπεια* to that of the giant in the “folk-tale” version of the blinding-story which appears in the *Arabian Nights* in the third voyage of Sindbad the Seaman (Sinbad the Sailor).⁸² This, like the ἀπόλογοι, is a first-person episodic travel narrative told by the protagonist himself after the end of his adventures; the giant is introduced as follows:

... a huge creature in the likeness of a man, black of colour, tall and big of bulk, as he were a great date-tree, with eyes like coals of fire and eye-teeth like boar's tusks and a vast big gape like the mouth of a well. Moreover, he had long loose lips like a camel's, hanging down upon his breast, and ears like two Jarms [barges] falling over his shoulder-blades and the nails of his hands were like the claws of a lion.⁸³

The giant in this story is described in explicitly bestial terms: he is a huge man with tusks like a boar, lips like a camel, and claws like a lion; later, when he falls asleep after his meal on human flesh, he snores like a slaughtered animal;⁸⁴ and when he snarls he is compared to a dog about to bite.⁸⁵ The only description of Polyphēmos' physical form, by contrast, is of his size,⁸⁶ the only description of his voice its depth

⁸⁰ Odysseus at 1 187 and 214 (Polyphēmos); the companions at 1 494 (Polyphēmos); and the poet at ζ 5 (the Kyklōpes as a race).

⁸¹ Πελώριος at 1 187, ἄγριον at 1 215 and 1 494.

⁸² *The Book of a Thousand Nights and a Night*, Burton translation, vol. 6, at 24–28. Lane (*The Thousand and One Nights*, Vol. 3, at 24–28) rendered his name as “es-Sindibād of the Sea.” (see Bibliography of Ancient Sources). On the manuscript traditions and dating of the collections of the Sindbad stories (and the qualities of these two translations), see Mia I. Gerhardt, *The Art of Story-Telling: A Literary Study of the Thousand and One Nights* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963), Chapter 5, especially 236–44.

⁸³ *The Book of a Thousand Nights and a Night*, Burton translation at 24.

⁸⁴ Indeed, the giant does this twice: “snarking and snoring like the gurgling of a lamb or cow with its throat cut” (25), “like a beast with its throat cut” (26) till morning. The third evening (27) his snoring is like thunder.

⁸⁵ This occurs (*ibid.*, 27) on the third evening.

⁸⁶ Polyphēmos is explicitly described as an ἀνὴρ ... πελώριος (huge man, 1 187); a θαῦμα' ... πελώριον (huge wonder, 190); Odysseus mentions his size (again, πέλωρον) at 257, and describes his belly as huge (μεγάλην ... νηδὺν, 1 296). His size is also implicit in the size of his cavern and its entrance at 1 182–86; the size of the door-stone at 240–43; the ease with which he lifts it at 313–14; the size of his ρόπαλον (walking-stick) at 319–24; and the size of the stones (the first a κορυφὴν ὄρεος μεγάλοιο [“peak of a great mountain,” 481], the second πολὺ μείζονα [“much bigger,” 537]) he casts at Odysseus' ship.

and volume,⁸⁷ and the only explicit comparison to an animal describes the way he eats rather than his physical form.⁸⁸

Hernández rightly notes that Polyphēmos is “humanized” by his “mastery of language” on the grounds that talking animals are almost unknown in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*⁸⁹ — a point which Polyphēmos himself echoes when he wishes his ram could talk (ι 456–60). Polyphēmos’ speech (which, as Bassett observed, is fundamental to our appreciation of his character⁹⁰) is not, indeed, limited to his tender address to his ram; he uses speech for deception, for threats, and for prayer.⁹¹ His ability is thrown into sharp relief when compared to the Arabian giant: the latter does not talk at all.⁹²

(continued)

Homer notoriously omits any mention of Polyphēmos’ most obvious physical characteristic and either assumes the audience is aware the Kyklōpes only had one eye or leaves them to figure it out for themselves. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, at 14–16 noted the singular form does not occur until ι 333, and rationalized the audience would either infer the detail from the folk-tale or from the name Kyklōps itself. Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 155–56, saw this readily inferable detail as part of a “suppression or deemphasis of magical or supernatural elements.” Mondī, “The Homeric Cyclopes,” at 31–36, prefers Page’s first option on the grounds that the Kyklōpes were not traditionally one-eyed, and that therefore mentioning the single eye would have seemed discordant to the audience; O’Sullivan, “Observations on the KYKLŌPEIA,” n. 8, categorically rejects this view as inherently unlikely; Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 354, also mentions this “problem.”

⁸⁷ ι 257, 395.

⁸⁸ The simile comparing him to a lion (already mentioned) occurs at ι 292–93.

⁸⁹ Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 354 and n. 27, notes as an exception Akhilleus’ horse Xanthos (T 404–18), though she concentrates on the “exceptional circumstances” of the horse’s pedigree, rather than the fact that he had been given the power of speech (temporarily) by Hēra (T 407; see also Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, at 39–41 for an acute discussion of this scene). It is, perhaps, problematic that (*contra* Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, at 41) other monsters in the *Odyssey* (the Laistrygones, the Seirēns) *can* speak; by the same token, these are also humanized: the Laistrygones, indeed, are largely differentiated from the Kyklōpes (to whom they are, inherently, extremely similar; cf. Page, *Folktales*, at 27–28, 31–32) by the humanizing features that they live in a city (πτολίεθρον, κ 81; ἄστν, κ 105, 108, 118), have houses (δῶματα, κ 111–12) and an ἄγορά (κ 114); the Seirēns have super-human knowledge. In contrast, the Skylla is almost mute: despite her epithet δεινὸν λελακυῖα (“terrifyingly barking,” μ 85), Kirkē describes her voice as like newborn puppies in the following lines, and, when Odysseus reaches her straits, there is every indication he cannot hear her at all, given that he is unaware six of his companions are being taken until they are already high above him (μ 232–50).

⁹⁰ Samuel Eliot Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, Sather Classical Lectures 15 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938), at 57–58: “It is the words of Polyphemus to Odysseus, to the other Cyclopes, and to his pet ram, that make him a *personality*, destined to live throughout classical literature” (emphasis added).

⁹¹ Cf. Louden, “Categories of Homeric Wordplay,” at 41: “[h]e asks questions ... offers insults ... is capable of irony ... [and] can forcefully say nothing.”

⁹² Whether the giant *can* talk or not, he certainly *does* not in this story: there is no questioning or attempted trickery; the giant does not talk as he chooses, spits, and roasts the sailors, nor when he leaves in the morning; although he does make a great deal of noise when he is blinded, this is roaring in pain, not crying for aid; and when he returns with help there is no vaunting or cursing.

Admittedly, many of the folk-tale giants can and do talk, and, in this sense, the *Arabian Nights*' version is perhaps atypical; but the comparison, though extreme, is, nevertheless, justified: the speech of the giants in the folk-tales — of the order of “today I will fill my empty belly with you!”⁹³ — is incomparable in quality to that of the rather eloquent Polyphēmos. Indeed, the etymology of the name Πολύφημος as “having many utterances”⁹⁴ would be, as Louden observes, appropriate for an articulate giant.⁹⁵

But the scene in which Polyphēmos really demonstrates his eloquence (and attracts our sympathy) is in the address to his ram. Here, he shows that he is capable of one of the most “human” traits of all: empathy. He tries (albeit unsuccessfully) to understand *why* his pet ram is not leaving the cave first as usual. Alfred Heubeck's comment, that Polyphēmos “is capable of feelings and friendship, but they are directed only towards an animal,”⁹⁶ rather misses the point that, compared to the folk-tale giants, even love for a pet is a “human” quality.

⁹³ So the giant in the *Dolopathos*, p.74 ll. 30–31 in Hilka's edition: *De te ... ego hodie uentrem saginabo ieiunum* (rendered by Grimm, “Die Sage von Polyphem,” at 7 even more crassly as “du bist feist, du sollst heute meinen Bauch füllen” “you are fat! Today you will fill my belly!”).

⁹⁴ Several etymologies have been proposed for Πολύφημος: Carolyn Higbie, *Heroes' Names, Homeric Identities*, ed. John Miles Foley, Albert Bates Lord Studies in Oral Tradition vol. 10 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), at 12, sees it as “having many utterances” (perhaps “ironic, commenting on the isolation of the Kyklōps and thus his lack of opportunities to be πολύφημος”). Ann L. T. Bergren, “Odyssean Temporality: Many (Re)Turns,” in *Approaches to Homer*, ed. Carl A. Rubino and Cynthia W. Shelmerdine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 38–73, at 49 with n. 27, proposes “much speaking”/“much spoken of,” “much prophesying (or cursing)”/“much prophesied (or cursed).” Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 109–10, propose “the one who speaks much”/“the one spoken much of.” Egbert J. Bakker, “Polyphemos,” *Colby Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (2002): 135–50, surveys the uses of φήμη and φήμις in the *Odyssey*, concluding the sense is “many disclosures” (prophecies or things better left unsaid).

⁹⁵ So Louden, “Categories of Homeric Wordplay,” at 41–42. This is reinforced when we note (with Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 109–10, to whom I owe this observation) that the names given for the Kyklōpes at Hes. *Th.* 140–41 (Βρόντης [Thunderer], Στερόπης [Lightning], and Ἄργης [Shining]) “are appropriate to [their] ... roles [as] ... the creatures who bestow on Zeus the thunder and the thunderbolt.” (This is a much more sensible argument than the inference of Mondì, “The Homeric Cyclopes,” at 31 that “the original idea was that they made nothing, but gave *themselves* to Zeus” [original emphasis].) We might add that whichever etymology of Πολύφημος we choose, his name is, similarly, appropriate to his role in the *Odyssey* as the loquacious giant who curses Odysseus.

⁹⁶ In Heubeck and Hoekstra, *Commentary*, n. ad 1 446–461; so also Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 120: “more humane when conversing with his animal than in human society.” Cf. Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 148: “Polyphēmos' life is diligent and methodical but hardly more humanized than that of the flocks he tends.” Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, at 82 is sarcastic (“How cute — he talks to critters!”) but argues ὁμοφροσύνη between men (by which he means Polyphēmos) and animals would seem “grotesque” to the Greeks; hence, Polyphēmos is missing the distinction between humans and animals. His (contradictory) interpretation at 41 (“even this brute does not expect a response”) is more compelling.

Poetic exaggeration

The effect of this moderation on our appraisal of Polyphēmos is, of course, positive; its impact, however, is limited to the literal level: the comparison with the folk-tale ogre depends on extra-diegetic information, and such information is unavailable to the transported audience. This in itself is sufficient to generate literal ambiguity, but its effect is increased by the fact that, in opposing Polyphēmos and Odysseus, the poet implicitly creates a dichotomy where, instead of Odysseus being smarter than a passably intelligent Kyklōps, he is smart and his adversary stupid.

Polyphēmos' inquiry about the location of Odysseus' ship is a case in point: as the narrator, Odysseus comments to his audience,

ᾠς φάτο πειράζων, ἐμέ δ' οὐ λάθην εἰδότα πολλά,
ἀλλὰ μιν ἄψορρον προσέφην δολίοις ἐπέεσσι· ι 281–82.⁹⁷

Odysseus' phrase εἰδότα πολλά (knowing much) in ι 281 implies that, in contrast, his opponent "knew little"; moreover, we may sense the complicity of the poet himself in this as Polyphēmos' unsuccessful attempt at trickery is trumped by Odysseus' δολίοις ἐπέεσσι (crafty words): Odysseus beats Polyphēmos, as it were, at his own game and his success reinforces the audience's understanding of a dichotomous relationship at the poetic level between the hyperintelligent Odysseus and the dim-witted Kyklōps.⁹⁸

Odysseus, in fact, trumps Polyphēmos' tricks several times in the Κυκλώπεια: this exchange is preceded, for example, by Polyphēmos' accusation that Odysseus must be νήπιος (foolish/naïve⁹⁹) or have come from afar (ι 273) if he expects him to take any notice of the gods. (Odysseus *has*, indeed, come from far away, and it *is* possible

⁹⁷ So he spoke testing, but it did not escape me knowing much, | but I spoke back to him with crafty words.

⁹⁸ Louden, "Categories of Homeric Wordplay," at 42, n. 38, observes acutely that Odysseus' answer creates "[a] rare instance of irony beyond Odysseus' control as Poseidon will shortly be as hostile to them as in Odysseus' lie." This irony, which is only apparent to an audience aware of the lie's context in the story (*i.e.*, only at the literal level), alerts us to the great magnitude of Odysseus' folly and its consequences. At the literal level, then, the effect of this exchange is rather the opposite to the effect at the poetic level.

⁹⁹ Susan T. Edmunds, *Homeric Nēpios* (New York: Garland, 1990), at 64–65 notes that "[t]he contest between Odysseus and Polyphemos is a struggle over who will turn out to be *nēpios*." Although she notes νήπιος "seems here to refer to a mental deficiency" (which she otherwise calls "mental disconnection"), she attempts to explain the word in the Κυκλώπεια principally in terms of "social disconnection." This is clearly pushing an otherwise excellent argument past its limits.

to see his decision to stay in the cave at 228–29 as foolish and *naïve*.¹⁰⁰) Later in the episode, however, Odysseus twice relates the term *νήπιος* to Polyphēmos. The first use (at 419) is implicit: Odysseus infers that the *Kyklōps* is judging him by his own standards in trying to tempt him to escape the cave undisguised but that he would have to be incredibly *naïve* to do so;¹⁰¹ and that *naïveté* is reinforced at 442 when he explains why the *Kyklōps* only checked the backs of the sheep.¹⁰² By binding the sheep in threes Odysseus had, in fact, taken steps to reduce the risk of discovery if Polyphēmos *did* feel underneath them — a possibility which might have been suggested to him by the ewes’ need of milking¹⁰³ — and this, again, directs attention towards the failure of the *Kyklōps* to anticipate *this* means of escape (and hence Odysseus’ cleverness in devising it) and away from the fact that he did recognize that hiding among the sheep was a potential escape route.

These poetic manipulations depend, ultimately, on the phenomenon that explicit assertions are more powerful than implicit contrasts or omissions, and this effect, in turn, is augmented by transportation. For implicit contrasts or omissions to be as powerful as explicit assertions, we must presuppose additional activities (such as the consideration of real-world knowledge or the application of logical inference) which are inhibited by transportation.

¹⁰⁰ So also Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 358, who sees Odysseus’ attribution of the supernatural plenty in which the *Kyklōpes* live to “trusting in the gods” (ι 107) as a form of *naïveté*. Odysseus certainly acknowledges his foolishness in hindsight at ι 228–30. Christopher G. Brown, “In the Cyclops’ Cave: Revenge and Justice in *Odyssey* 9,” *Mnemosyne* 49, no. 1 (1996): 1–29 at 22 defends Odysseus against the charge of *naïveté* but acknowledges that Odysseus comes from far away “from a region of the world where respect for the gods is strictly enforced.” Anthony J. Podlecki, “Guest-Gifts and Nobodies in *Odyssey* 9,” *Phoenix* 15 (1961): 125–33 at 128 argues that “Odysseus lays himself (or the poet) open to the charge of naivety” but attempts (unconvincingly) to defend him on the grounds that Odysseus “does not yet have any solid reason to suppose that his unknown host will depart from the normal procedure of entertaining his guests hospitably.” He does: see below.

¹⁰¹ ι 417–19: αὐτὸς δ’ εἰνὶ θύρῃσι καθέζετο χεῖρε πετάσσας, | εἴ τινά που μετ’ ὄεσσι λάβοι στείχοντα θύραζε· | οὕτω γάρ πού μ’ ἤλπετ’ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ νήπιον εἶναι. And he himself sat down in the entrance with his hands outstretched, in case he might catch anyone going through the doorway with the sheep; so *naïve* I suppose did he hope me to be in my wits.

¹⁰² ι 440–43: ἄναξ δ’ ... | τειρόμενος πάντων οἴων ἐπειμαίετο νῶτα | ὀρθῶν ἐσταότων· τὸ δὲ νήπιος οὐκ ἐνόησεν, | ὥς οἱ ὑπ’ εἰροπόκων οἴων στέρνοισι δέδεντο. But their [*i.e.*, the sheep’s] master ... was feeling the backs of all the sheep as they stood up; for the *naïve* one did not think/notice how they were tied to the chests under the woolly fleeced sheep.

¹⁰³ The ewes stand bleating for want of milking at ι 439–40; this does not, admittedly, present an immediate danger to Odysseus, as he and his men are hidden under the rams (425). One wonders, however, whether this quickly noted fact has been obscured by the grouping of the genders in the intervening lines (since *οἷς* is not gender specific) and subsequent redivision into male and female (ι 438–40).

The trumping of a stratagem (and with it the comparison between the clever Odysseus and dim-witted *Kyklōps*) is, of course, most marked in the *pièce de résistance* of the episode: Odysseus' famous trick with the name Οὔτις (no-one). Here again, however, there is something of a disjunction between the literal state of affairs and the impression gained at the poetic level.

The trick which Odysseus “trumps” in this instance is, obviously, Polyphēmos' insincere offer of a ξεινήϊον (guest-gift) at 355–70;¹⁰⁴ the degree to which he outsmarts the *Kyklōps*, however, probably obscures the fact that this offer is a far more sophisticated ploy than either of his two previous ruses mentioned above and, unlike most other deceptions in the *Odyssey*, the audience is not told explicitly that this is a trick.¹⁰⁵ Polyphēmos' trickery might, therefore, be difficult to identify *in advance*, especially for a transported and/or first-time audience. In this sense, Odysseus outwits not only the *Kyklōps* but also the external audience in having the foresight to see through Polyphēmos' deception.¹⁰⁶

Odysseus' artifice in giving his name as Οὔτις is, in contrast, completely transparent to the external audience at the poetic level and Polyphēmos' failure to

¹⁰⁴ Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 147 sees this, “Polyphemos' pathetic attempt at a pun on *xeinion*” not as a trick, but “his gross admission that he has no knowledge of the social relationships that *xeinia* symbolize.” I cannot agree — simply because the text itself (the νηλεῖ θυμῷ, “hard heart,” of ι 368) implies (Odysseus thinks) Polyphēmos knows exactly what he is doing — and prefer the view of Grimm, “Die Sage von Polyphem,” at 19, that “die Bitte um das Gastgeschenk trefflich benutzt ist, um den rohen Humor des Riesen zu schildern” (“the petition for the guest-gift is admirably used to illustrate the giant's crude sense of humour”). Cf. Podlecki, “Guest-Gifts and Nobodies in *Odyssey* 9,” at 129 (“this grim jest”) who cites (n. 9) also a similar conclusion of Demetrius (*Eloc.* 130); Schein, “Odysseus and Polyphemus in the *Odyssey*,” at 82 interprets the offer as ironic mockery of Odysseus, as does Agathe Thornton, *People and Themes in Homer's Odyssey* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1970), at 39.

¹⁰⁵ We are told this of Polyphēmos' attempted trick at ι 281. Cf. Odysseus' tests of Eumaios (ξ 459, ο 304), the proposals to test the other servants (π 305–07, 313, 319), Pēnelope's tests of Odysseus (τ 215, ψ 181; the latter explicitly introduced at ψ 114), and the tests of Laertēs (ω 216, 238, 240). Polyphēmos' attempt to lure Odysseus out the doorway at ι 417–19 is not marked as a trick, but it is obvious enough not to need such a label. The prominent exception is the *Kyklōps*' second offer of a guest-gift (ι 517–19), and the omission leads, indeed, to some uncertainty in whether or not Polyphēmos is actually being insincere. See further below, pp. 145–46.

¹⁰⁶ I take the description of Odysseus' speech as ἔπεα μειλίχια (“soothing/appeasing words,” ι 363) as an indication that he sees through this trick; yet, his provision of the fake name is, as Ruth Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities: Conventions and Strategies of Verisimilitude in Homer and Greek Tragedy*, *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 122 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1999) notes at 139, “more important than we could have guessed” because Polyphēmos, armed with the prophecy of Tēlemos, would presumably have killed Odysseus had he learned his real name before the blinding. Odysseus, she notes, “turns out to have been in less control than we thought.” On the audience considering whether or not Polyphēmos' offer is genuine, see Podlecki, “Guest-Gifts and Nobodies in *Odyssey* 9,” at 129.

realize that he has been deceived therefore situates him at a greater level of stupidity than the reader/auditor. Further, this hierarchy (Odysseus–audience–Polyphēmos) is substantially reinforced when the (first-time) audience *but not the* *Kyklōps* realizes that Odysseus had employed more foresight than had previously been apparent in choosing *this* false name rather than any other.¹⁰⁷

Many scholars have noted that the confusion between Οὔτις and οὐ τις is paralleled by the complementary confusion between μή τις and μῆτις (intelligence);¹⁰⁸ hence, when the other *Kyklōpes* say to Polyphēmos “surely no-one is killing you by trickery or violence” (ι 405–06), we are entitled to hear “surely *intelligence* is killing you by trickery or violence.”¹⁰⁹ This second pun, which echoes Odysseus’ epithet πολύμητις,¹¹⁰ reinforces the dichotomous relationship in intelligence between Odysseus and *Kyklōpes*.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ That is, the external audience realizes the utility of the fake name in the *dénouement* of the trick at ι 410–12; Polyphēmos does not realize that he has been deceived until Odysseus reveals his name at ι 502–05; he still thinks Odysseus’ name is Οὔτις at ι 455 and 460.

¹⁰⁸ William Bedell Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939), at 104–06; Podlecki, “Guest-Gifts and Nobodies in *Odyssey* 9,” at 129–31; William Bedell Stanford, *The Sound of Greek: Studies in the Greek Theory and Practice of Euphony*, Sather Classical Lectures 38 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), at 90–91; Schein, “Odysseus and Polyphemus in the *Odyssey*,” at 79–81; Norman Austin, “Name Magic in the *Odyssey*,” *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 5 (1972): 1–19 at 13; Bergren, “Odyssean Temporality,” at 47–48; Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 119–20; Simon D. Goldhill, *The Poet’s Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), at 32; Yoël L. Arbeitman, “Odysseus «by any Other/by No Name» Chez Polyphemos,” *Emerita* 63, no. 2 (1995): 225–44, *passim*; Charles P. Segal, “Kleos and its Ironies in the *Odyssey*,” in *Reading the Odyssey: Selected Interpretive Essays*, ed. Seth L. Schein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 201–21, at 211; Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Odysseus in Person,” trans. James Ker, *Representations*, no. 67 (1999): 1–26 at 7–11; de Jong, *Narratological Commentary*, at 243–44, n. ad ι 396–414; Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, at 81–82.

¹⁰⁹ Thus Schein, “Odysseus and Polyphemus in the *Odyssey*,” at 80.

¹¹⁰ Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 362–63, notes that Odysseus’ epithet πολύμητις is used to introduce the ἀπόλογοι at ι 1, and “the use of this (and not another) epithet ... seems relevant since, ... Odysseus’ *mētis* ... is especially conspicuous in the encounter with the Cyclops.” Cf. Goldhill, *The Poet’s Voice*, at 34.

Louden, “Categories of Homeric Wordplay,” at 42, suggests that the name Πολύφημος (“Having many utterances”) “itself helps trigger Odysseus’ ... famous wordplay, Οὔτις,” but this is not convincing. Odysseus does not ascertain (or use) the *Kyklōps*’ name until the other *Kyklōpes* address him at ι 403 (see Σ H.Q. ad ι 403; cf. de Jong, *Narratological Commentary*, at 232, n. ad ι 106–566) — well after Odysseus’ “wordplay” at 366 — and the only mention of the name earlier in the *Odyssey* (α 70) is separated by too great a distance to make this trigger likely. The fact that this trick itself forms a folk-tale (see n. 109 above) makes the reverse more likely: Homer’s inclusion of the Οὔτις-trick in the “giant” folk-tale may have suggested to him the name Πολύφημος for the antagonist.

¹¹¹ Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, at 82 sees the *Kyklōpes*’ reply to Polyphēmos at ι 410–12 as a neglected instance of group stupidity; I confess I cannot see the stupidity: their reply is perfectly reasonable given they think Polyphēmos has said, at 408, “nobody is killing me by trickery or violence” (instead of “Nobody is killing me by trickery, not violence”).

Odysseus' foresight in this scheme is beyond question; the disjunction between the poetic impression adumbrated above and the literal truth of the episode concerns how transparent Odysseus' deception of Polyphēmos actually is. The external audience has several advantages over the Kyklōps here: for a start, we know full well who Odysseus is and what his name is. When he calls himself Οὔτις, we know immediately that he is lying; Polyphēmos, of course, lacks this contextualizing knowledge and it is thus perhaps unreasonable to put his oversight of the pun down to a lack of intelligence.

Austin, however, argued that the pun is “flagrant” and Polyphēmos' failure to notice it is “consistent with his mental acumen elsewhere” and “the culmination of the portrait the poet had been carefully painting.”¹¹² This is, perhaps, unwarranted, and not just because Polyphēmos is drunk when he falls for Odysseus' Οὔτις-trick (a point which Homer has his Kyklōps reinforce twice¹¹³). Within the world of the epic Odysseus is, as Athēna intimates in ν, the smartest of all men,¹¹⁴ so it would be unfair to expect Polyphēmos (or anyone else) to equal him in this respect.

At the other extreme, Stanford rationalized that the change in accent — Οὔτις rather than the regular οὔτις — would affect the pronunciation of the word; in Stanford's English (stress-accent) equivalent, this changes “‘no man’ (with equal stress and divided as ‘no-man’)” into “‘Noman’ (stressed on the first syllable and divided more like ‘nom-an’).”¹¹⁵ In this context, we might excuse Polyphēmos' mistake, especially given that he was drunk at the time. Ultimately, it would be perverse to argue that Polyphēmos is not more gullible than the external audience;

¹¹² Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 147.

¹¹³ ι 454 (in the address to his ram), and 516 (in the lament of the fulfilment of the prophecy). Arbeitman, “Odysseus «by Any Other/by No Name»,” at 234, n. 10, observes a verbal echo between Odysseus' giving Polyphēmos the wine (πόρον, ι 360) and Polyphēmos' description that Οὔτις gave him evils (*i.e.*, blindness and pain; κακῶν τά ... πόρεν Οὔτις, ι 460).

I cannot agree with Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 162, who cites ι 455 as evidence that the wine's effect “consisted not in temporarily convincing Polyphemus that his enemy's real name was *Outis*, but rather in causing the giant to phrase his cry for help so foolishly that it was sure to fail”; it does both, and Polyphēmos' continued incapacity the next morning may be due to pain (*cf.* ι 440–41) rather than wine.

¹¹⁴ ν 297–99: σὺ μὲν ἔσσι βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἀπάντων | βουλήν καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσι | μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν (“for you are far the best of all men for counsel and words, while I among the gods am called [best] for intelligence and profit”).

¹¹⁵ Stanford, *The Sound of Greek*, at 91. *Cf.* Carpenter, *Folk Tale, Fiction and Saga*, at 140–41, who hears “*ōtis*” and translates “Big-ears.” Even without Carpenter's more general (and more posterous) claim of Odysseus' resemblance to a bear, this verbal confusion is still possible.

but we might at least admit that the degree of his gullibility is not literally as great as it perhaps seems at the poetic level.¹¹⁶

These circumstances, indeed, give rise to literal ambiguity: the *Kyklōps*' literal portrayal (which is potentially ameliorated by extra-diegetic sources, and which paints Polyphēmos in a positive light compared to his folk-tale cousins) does not match his poetic portrayal (in which he is unfairly compared to Odysseus and to the external audience). In these terms, we must expect the members of a transported audience (who see only the poetic portrayal) to form a more negative opinion of Polyphēmos than a non-transported audience (who retain access to the ameliorating aspects of Polyphēmos' [literal] portrayal). The discussion of his poetic portrayal so far has, however, been limited to his intelligence; other facets of his poetic portrayal (to which we will return later in this chapter) are not so negative and thus create poetic ambiguity in addition to the literal ambiguity demonstrated here.

Modifying Odysseus

Before we investigate these compensating factors of the *Kyklōps*' poetic characterization, it is worth noting that Odysseus' poetic portrayal in the episode has likewise been exaggerated to create literal ambiguity (and, indeed, likewise contains compensating factors which generate poetic ambiguity): where Polyphēmos is made to seem more obtuse at the poetic level, Odysseus is made to seem more intelligent. This exaggeration and compensation is not, indeed, limited to his intelligence but applies also, as we shall see, to his piety.

Consider, for example, the explanation Odysseus gives for carrying the wineskin with him to the cave: that he had had a premonition that he would meet ἄνδρ' ἐπελεύσεσθαι μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκὴν, | ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εἶ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (“a man endowed with great strength, fierce, knowing well neither justice nor laws,” ι 214–15). This foresight is remarkable, but the audience (which has

¹¹⁶ The pun (and its ambiguity) is repeated, of course, when Polyphēmos calls for the aid of his fellow *Kyklōpes*. Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 148 sees “[t]he other *Kyklōpes*' failure to make sense of Polyphēmos' nonsensical cry” as “as absurd as his original mistake” (cf. Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, at 81–82). Stanford, *The Sound of Greek*, at 91 dryly comments: “the intonations of furious ogres are likely to be hard to hear, especially from outside a resonant cave blocked by a huge boulder. So we can hardly blame his fellow Cyclopes when they mistake, or neglect, the nature of the pitch accent and think he is saying οὔτις, not Οὔτις.”

heard the *Kyklōps* is ἄγριος [fierce, β 19], ἀθεμίστος [lawless, ι 106], and that ἀθεμίστια ἤδη [he knew (only) lawlessness, 189]) already knows it to be true. At the poetic level, this accuracy reinforces our faith in the infallibility of Odysseus' intelligence.¹¹⁷

At the literal level, however, we are entitled to question the reliability of Odysseus' narrative at this point. The prediction is, perhaps, too neat: it lacks verisimilitude. Were we to be uncharitable, we might suggest that Odysseus is artificially inflating his own intelligence for the benefit of his audience and presenting hindsight/happenstance as foresight to disguise some other, baser reason for taking wine to the cave. In support of this interpretation, we might note that Odysseus does use hindsight liberally throughout his introduction to the *Κυκλώπεια*,¹¹⁸ that he notes it was not dear to any man to refrain from drinking *Marōn's* wine (ι 211), and that he had, after all, spent most of the previous day eating and drinking on the beach on Goat Island (161–65).

Yet, the two occasions seem quite different. Despite the speed with which some critics have jumped to the conclusion that the *Kikonian* wine consumed on that occasion was the same as the wine of *Marōn* mentioned here, the narrative's marking of the potency and provenance of the wine taken to the cave (ι 196–211) seem to imply they were different vintages;¹¹⁹ further, on Goat Island Odysseus drinks in an environment he knows is safe¹²⁰ whereas the *Kyklōps'* cave is an unknown. In fact, a closer parallel to drinking in an unknown environment is the companions' feast on the beach at line 45 after sacking *Ismaros* — a feast from

¹¹⁷ Cf. Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 108. Irene J. F. de Jong, "The Subjective Style in Odysseus' Wanderings," *Classical Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1992): 1–11 at 3, notes that "we are given an example of Odysseus' intelligence: he thinks ahead."

¹¹⁸ Odysseus uses hindsight, for example, when he describes the land of the *Kyklōpes* and Goat Island (ι 106–41) when he sails in on a night so dark nobody knew the island was there until their ships ran aground upon it (ι 142–49). Similarly, the description of *Polyphēmos*; before meeting him (ι 187–92) must be in hindsight. See Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 105–06.

¹¹⁹ So also Austin, "Odysseus and the Cyclops," at 20, who fits this difference (between the (unmarked) "*vin ordinaire*" and the "marked wine") into a broader scheme of "mitoses" (e.g., *Polyphēmos* is the "marked" *Kyklōps*, differentiated from them by his savagery; Goat Island is the product of a mitotic split from the *Kyklōpes'* mainland) in the *Κυκλώπεια* and in myth/folk-tale more generally. Those who have taken the wines to be the same include de Jong, *Narratological Commentary*, at 235, n. ad ι 163–65, and Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 106–08.

¹²⁰ Odysseus and his companions knew the geography of this island: they had "roamed about it" at ι 153.

which Odysseus is at pains to exclude himself¹²¹ — so we might assume that taking wine to the cave to drink it himself would be uncharacteristic of Odysseus.¹²²

Yet, at ι 228, Odysseus' behaviour recalls that of the companions at Ismaros: while waiting in Polyphēmos' cave, he rejects their petition to flee.¹²³ Odysseus clearly makes the wrong decision here. Stanford notes that he admits his own culpability “in the strongest words of self-denunciation that he ever uses,”¹²⁴ but it is worthwhile noting explicitly that these “strongest words,”

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην, ἦ τ' ἄν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν ι 228.¹²⁵

are markedly weaker than his denunciation of the companions on the beach at Ismaros:

τοὶ δὲ μέγα νήπιοι οὐκ ἐπίθοντο. ι 44.¹²⁶

Stanford famously paraphrased Odysseus' grounds for waiting for the *Kyklōps*' return (ι 229) as “inquisitiveness and acquisitiveness.”¹²⁷ The former is clearly (as Stanford asserted) a characteristic to be associated positively with Odysseus' intelligence;¹²⁸ and although there has been, historically, some doubt of the

¹²¹ Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 89, rightly observe this, though their division between the “I” of ι 40 and the “they” of 41–42 is inaccurate: the verb in ι 42 is *δασσάμεθ'*, and the “we” must be seen as inclusive. The division actually occurs at ι 43 (*μὲν ἐγὼ*) – 44 (*τοὶ δὲ*). Cf. the contrasts with Odysseus' tales to Eumaios (ξ 257–84) and Antinoös (ρ 419–44) excellently identified and explained by Chris Emlyn-Jones, “True and Lying Tales in the *Odyssey*,” *Greece & Rome* 33, no. 1 (1986): 1–10 at 5–8: Odysseus casts his companions' actions as *hubris*.

¹²² We might, indeed, wonder whether Odysseus' exclusion of himself from the feasting at ι 44 is, likewise, a rhetorical ploy to excuse himself from the loss of 72 men; although this explanation may have merit, we are faced with a lack of objective evidence to support it.

¹²³ The thematic connection is strengthened by the fact that although disregard for exhortations occurs frequently in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, its explicit marking by οὐ + *πειθομαι* is relatively rare: ι 44, the formulaic ι 228 = E 201 = X 103 (always expressing regret), and ω 456 (in a rebuke).

¹²⁴ Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, at 76. Cf. Bergren, “Odyssean Temporality,” at 47: the “demonstration of foresight is complimentary to the hero, but it also sharpens the critical edge of the narrator's next prolepsis.”

¹²⁵ But I was not persuaded, though it would have been more profitable.

¹²⁶ But they in great *naïveté* were not persuaded.

Note, in addition, that Odysseus' self-denunciation at ι 228 is immediately followed by an implication that the consequences of his decision are limited to the loss of the six companions (implicit in the *ἐτάροισι* [for my companions] of ι 230). I shall argue below that Odysseus' foolish decision here extends his responsibility (at the literal level) far beyond this.

¹²⁷ ὄφρ' αὐτόν τε ἴδοιμι, καὶ εἴ μοι ξείνια δοίη. (Both so I might see him and if he would give me a guest-gift.) The quip is explained by Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, at 76 (and William Bedell Stanford, “Astute Hero and Ingenious Poet: Odysseus and Homer,” *Yearbook of English Studies* 12 (1982): 1–12 at 7); it occurs “out of context” in his n. *ad loc.*

¹²⁸ Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, at 75–77; Stanford, “Astute Hero,” at 7. Cf. Friedrich, “Heroic Man and *Polymetis*,” at 123, and Brown, “In the Cyclops' Cave,” at 22. It is revealing that we excuse Odysseus' inquisitiveness here but censure that of the companions at κ 44–45: there, the motive is greed; here it is not... at least at the poetic level (see below, p. 152).

morality inherent in the latter,¹²⁹ most commentators now agree acquisitiveness was a fundamental part of Homeric heroism — whether through the τιμή (honour) associated with possessions or through the ritual of guest friendship — and would not, itself, have attracted objection from the original audience.¹³⁰

In arguing that Odysseus' expectation of a guest-gift was heroic, Christopher Brown alleges that the companions' suggestion to flee "is the response of baser men." Odysseus' decision to wait for Polyphēmos, he asserts, is not indicative of any "recklessness," but his "aristocratic assumptions."¹³¹ Similarly, Anthony Podlecki criticizes the companions' suggestion to flee as immoral while situating Odysseus' acquisitiveness in terms of the traditions of hospitality. "Odysseus," he admits, "lays himself (or the poet) open to the charge of naïvety," but "he does not yet have any solid reason to suppose that his unknown host will depart from the normal procedure of entertaining his guests hospitably."¹³²

This argument is, however, severely jeopardized by Odysseus' premonition cited above of meeting a man ignorant of θέμιστες (amongst which the customs of hospitality are manifestly included¹³³). He has — or at least he says he has — the knowledge which would justify his retreat, but his actions are inconsistent with his claim: he behaves, in other words, as if he had not had the premonition at all. This too, in other words, might provide evidence that he was misrepresenting his "foresight" at ι 213–15.

¹²⁹ For bibliography of those who have censured Odysseus for acquisitiveness (which Stanford emphatically does not), see Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, at 255 n. 18 and Brown, "In the Cyclops' Cave," at 22 n. 61 (who wrongly implies censure on Stanford's part). Cf. Rainer Friedrich, "The Hybris of Odysseus," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 111 (1991): 16–28 at 21: "inquisitiveness is uncharacteristic, and acquisitiveness even unbecoming of Heroic Man." Russo's comment *ad* τ 271–84 that "Odysseus' acquisitiveness ... is a cardinal trait of a folk-tale hero" comes close, to my mind, to censure.

¹³⁰ Thus Stanford, "Astute Hero," at 7 describes it as "the rule rather than the exception" among Homeric heroes and compares Akhilleus and Agamemnōn; Friedrich, "Heroic Man and *Polymetis*," at 123–25, Friedrich, "Hybris of Odysseus," at 21, Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 116, and Brown, "In the Cyclops' Cave," at 25 all link acquisitiveness with the forging of guest-friendships.

¹³¹ Brown, "In the Cyclops' Cave," at 25, continues: "That Odysseus would have been better off had he not acted as he did is ... a reflection of the ... point that the hero assumes a set of values that does not hold true among the Cyclopes."

¹³² Podlecki, "Guest-Gifts and Nobodies in *Odyssey* 9," at 128: "[g]iven the tradition of divinely sanctioned hospitality ..., Odysseus is right to reject his companions' proposal to steal and run." So also Friedrich, "Heroic Man and *Polymetis*," at 124–27.

¹³³ See ι 268 (so also O'Sullivan, "Nature and Culture in *Odyssey* 9?" at 8), ξ 56–58, and Λ 777–79.

Odysseus' behaviour, indeed, reflects badly on his literal status regardless of whether or not we conclude his premonition was genuine: either he has told the audience a boldfaced lie or his decision to stay in the cave is made — with uncharacteristic short-sightedness — in the face of knowledge that remaining there would probably be very dangerous. If he has lied, of course, we shouldn't attribute to him the extraordinary foresight for which the premonition is evidence; this would lower his "intelligence" (at the literal level). If he has stayed despite his premonition, the rashness of this move also lowers his literal intelligence.¹³⁴

In this context we might grant the companions' urgent pleas to leave the cave more legitimacy than Brown and Podlecki will allow. The audience, which has been privy to Odysseus' "premonition," knows that at least part of their advice is sensible and right: their suggestion to leave is legitimate; Odysseus, after all, does not have to consent to the theft. His unilateral decision to remain (which is all the more noteworthy considering he had been forced to acquiesce on the beach at Ismaros by the companions' [greater] numbers) against good advice seems to reverse the "normal" roles of the sensible Odysseus and his foolish companions.¹³⁵ Earlier, he had described them as μέγα νήπιοι (great fools) for their disregard of such advice, and the application of this label to him — at least on the literal level — seems warranted here.

Thus we are justified in seeing some literal ambiguity surrounding Odysseus' intelligence in the *Κυκλώπεια*: not only does Odysseus emphasize his own intelligence by contrasting it with that of Polyphēmos, but also he seems to exaggerate it *vis-à-vis* its literal status. The unreliability of the narration is defensible here — we should not forget that Odysseus, telling his own story, is trying to make a good impression on his hosts — but it creates a disjunction between the poetic and literal truths of the episode and, thereby, different impressions for the transported and non-transported audiences.

¹³⁴ I do not mean to imply this is the only effect: it is not. Staying despite foreknowledge of the danger might also lead us to censure Odysseus on other lines such as deliberately sacrificing six of his companions in order to see/test the *Kyklōps*.

¹³⁵ For the "normal" roles of sensible Odysseus/foolish companions, witness the contrast drawn between them among the *Kikōnes* at ι 43–44, the *Lōtophagoi* at ι 98–99, during the bag of winds episode at κ 19–55, and, of course, at *Thrinakia* at μ 260–402. The reversal occurs again at ι 491–500, where the companions are unsuccessful in their petition to silence Odysseus.

Through its connection with Ismaros Marōn’s marked wine contributes, indeed, to another disjunction between the literal and poetic truths; this time, however, the facet of Odysseus’ character which is exaggerated is not his intelligence but his piety. Odysseus describes the wine’s provenance as follows:

ἄτὰρ αἶγεον ἄσκον ἔχον μέλανος οἴνοιο,
 ἠδέος, ὃν μοι δῶκε Μάρων, Εὐάνθεος υἱός,
 ἱρεὺς Ἀπόλλωνος, ὃς Ἴσμαρον ἀμφιβεβήκει,
 οὐνεκά μιν σὺν παιδί περισχόμεθ’ ἠδὲ γυναικί
 ἄζόμενοι· ὥκει γὰρ ἐν ἄλσει δενδρήεντι
 Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος. ὁ δέ μοι πόρεν ἀγλαὰ δῶρα·

ι 196–201.¹³⁶

From the phrase μιν ... περισχόμεθ’ ... ἄζόμενοι (“we protected him being reverent,” ι 199–200), one gains the impression that the piety of Odysseus and his men prompted them to intervene in an attack against the priest and his family by a third party;¹³⁷ the ἀγλαὰ δῶρα (splendid gifts, which include the wine), though given only to Odysseus, are thus a natural and fitting reward for their aid.¹³⁸ This, however, is not literally the case: Ismaros, the city of the Kikones (ι 39–40) was not sacked by a third party but by Odysseus himself. In these circumstances, if Odysseus were speaking plainly we might expect him to use a different verb (such as the metrically equivalent πεφιδόμεθ’[α], “we spared”). At any rate, Odysseus’ motives for accepting the wine (and Marōn’s for giving it¹³⁹) are open to question.

Given that the Kikones were allies of the Trojans,¹⁴⁰ an Akhaian sacking their city is not without precedent — Akhilleus claims in the Λιταί (“petition” scene in I) to have sacked 23 such cities¹⁴¹ — yet, here in *Odyssey* 9, where Odysseus proclaims

¹³⁶ I had a goat-leather wineskin of dark wine, | sweet, which Marōn the son of Euanthēs gave to me, | the priest of Apollo who protected Ismaros, | since previously we protected him and his wife and child || being reverent; for he lived in a wooded grove sacred | to Phoibos Apollo. And he gave to me splendid gifts.

¹³⁷ Περιέχω gains its sense of protection and assistance from its base meaning “to embrace.” It occurs only twice in the Homeric corpus: here and at A 393 where it is noteworthy that Akhilleus’ use of the verb requests Thetis to provide him with aid against an assault by a third party (Agamemnon).

¹³⁸ So Charles P. Segal, “Divine Justice in the *Odyssey*: Poseidon, Cyclops, and Helios,” *American Journal of Philology* 113, no. 4 (1992): 489–518 at 501.

¹³⁹ So Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 106–08, who argue that the wine was given by Marōn in an attempt to destroy Odysseus and his men by causing them to sit feasting on the beach by Ismaros at ι 45.

¹⁴⁰ The Kikones appear in the Catalogue of Trojans at B 846–47.

¹⁴¹ I 328–29: δώδεκα δὴ σὺν νηυσὶ πόλεις ἀλάπαξ’ ἀνθρώπων, | πεζὸς δ’ ἔνδεκά φημι κατὰ Τροίην ἐρίβωλον· I say I sacked twelve cities of men with my ships, and eleven on foot, through the fertile Troad.

himself “the city sacker,”¹⁴² there is surely also an allusion to the sack of Troy itself; the two cities are, after all, mentioned in consecutive lines (ι 39–40). In this sense, even if Odysseus spares Marōn and his family only as suppliants, his behaviour is thrown into sharper relief by the contrast with the portrait (preserved in the epic cycle) of the Akhaians’ lack of mercy, disregard for temples and sanctuary, and ill-treatment of other individuals associated with Apollo during the (campaign against and) destruction of Ilium.¹⁴³ When set against this background, Odysseus’ claim that he protected the priest not only asserts he is pious but that he is more so than the other major Akhaian heroes.

Odysseus, indeed, explicitly connects piety with the proper observance of the customs of hospitality (ξενία): before he sets off from Goat Island he announces his intention to discover of the inhabitants (τῶνδ’ ἀνδρῶν),

οἳ τινές εἰσιν,
ἢ ῥ’ οἳ γ’ ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι,
ἦε φιλόξενοι, καὶ σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής.

ι 174–76.¹⁴⁴

Thus Odysseus creates a dichotomy between pious hospitality and wild unjust hubris.¹⁴⁵ About forty lines later, his premonition of meeting a man who is ἄγριον (wild) and [οὐ] ... δίκας εὔ εἰδότα (did not know justice well, ι 215) forces the Kyklōps to the latter side of this dichotomy and casts him as hubristic, inhospitable, and impious before we have even met him. Even at this early stage, the implied contrast probably has a positive effect on our understanding of

¹⁴² ι 504: φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πολυπόρθιον... etc. (Say that Odysseus the city-sacker...). For this title as a consequence of Odysseus’ stratagems making possible the sacking of the city see Adele J. Haft, “The City-Sacker Odysseus’ in *Iliad* 2 and 10,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 120 (1990): 37–56; the allusion itself therefore implicitly asserts Odysseus’ intelligence.

¹⁴³ At Z 57–60, Agamemnon states his intention to destroy the all the males of Troy including the boys *in utero*; in this context, any sparing of males by Odysseus might seem lenient. The Akhaians’ disregard for sanctuary is to be seen in Neoptolemos’ slaughter of Priam at the altar of Zeus and Lokrian Aias’ dragging of Cassandra from the altar of Athēna; although neither is mentioned in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, both are old traditions which were (according to Proclus, *Chrestomathia*, 107.30–108.3 Allen) narrated in the *Iliou Persis*.

Cassandra (herself associated with Apollo) was, of course, subsequently enslaved by Agamemnon (λ 422, cf. A. A.). Treatment of individuals associated with Apollo (not only Cassandra, but also Khrysēs and Khrysēis in A) thus provide another point of comparison between Agamemnon and Odysseus here.

¹⁴⁴ Who they are, || and whether they are arrogant (*hubristic*) and wild and not just, | or stranger-loving and their minds are god-fearing.

¹⁴⁵ Of course, this is the poet’s doing, and he puts similar words into the mouth of Alkinoös at θ 572–76 (Odysseus is, indeed, answering this question), but it is significant that Odysseus changes the first half of η 575 (where Alkinoös uses χαλεποί, harsh) in order to create the dichotomy with ὑβρισταί (arrogant) in ι 175.

Odysseus' character at the poetic level: it highlights his piety and casts him as one opposed to hubris. Polyphēmos, of course, is hubristic,¹⁴⁶ especially in his claim to superiority over Zeus (ι 275–76), and his treatment of Odysseus could hardly be described as φιλοξενία; but the effect on the poetic portrayal of Odysseus is not necessarily warranted at the literal level.

In this context it is noteworthy that Odysseus exaggerates his piety to conceal several breaches of those same hospitality conventions during the Κυκλώπεια. The mechanics of the “Homeric hospitality scene” have been set out well by Steve Reece, who includes among the elements of the type-scene (in order): waiting at the threshold on arrival at the dwelling (V), consumption of the shared feast (IX b), the host's request for his guest's identity (XI a), and the provision of guest-gifts (XX).¹⁴⁷ Odysseus, however, breaches three of these: first, he enters the Kyklōps' dwelling uninvited (ι 216–18);¹⁴⁸ secondly, while waiting for a guest-gift, he eats in the absence of his host, stealing his cheeses and sacrificing one of his animals (231–33).¹⁴⁹ (In this context, as Rick Newton notes, the charge levelled frequently at Polyphēmos of breaching the ξενία ritual by asking the identity of his guests before feeding them is, ironically, annulled by the fact that his guests had already eaten a meal at his expense.¹⁵⁰) Last, Odysseus helps himself to a guest-gift

¹⁴⁶ Brown, “In the Cyclops' Cave,” at 7 objects to the use of the term ὕβρις in this sense (“general arrogance that prompts some kind of punishment (regularly divinely sent), and in particular the pride that goes before a fall”), and prefers the term ἀτασθαλία. While I agree that the latter term better suits some contexts in which hubris has been identified (such as Odysseus' hubris in taunting Polyphēmos; see below, pp. 143–45), this dichotomy between hubris and having a godlike mind suggests that this sense of hubris predates Greek tragedy.

¹⁴⁷ For the 38 elements from which these four have been extracted, see Steve Reece, *The Stranger's Welcome: Oral Theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), at 6–7 and 12–39. Reece's book includes a chapter on the Κυκλώπεια (Chapter 6, 123–43), which he calls a “cynical parody” of the ritual (10–11). He concentrates primarily on Polyphēmos' breaches of the etiquette, but does include a very short section on the ways in which Odysseus inverts the ritual (142–43).

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, at 15–16. On crossing the threshold, see also Donald Lateiner, “Heroic Proxemics: Social Space and Distance in the *Odyssey*,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 122 (1992): 133–63 at 146–49.

¹⁴⁹ See Gabriel Germain, *Genèse de l'Odysée: Le Fantastique et le Sacré* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), at 68–69; Newton, “Poor Polyphemus,” at 139–40. The assertion that the sacrifice was of cheeses, made by Merry n. ad ι 231 (reiterated by Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 117 and Vidal-Naquet, “Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*,” at 40), is not only disingenuous, but also does not diminish Odysseus' responsibility for stealing cheeses. Friedrich, “Heroic Man and *Polymetis*,” at 128, rejects Newton's suggestion that an animal was sacrificed, but abstains from explaining the ἐθύσαμεν (he notes only that it “remains puzzling”). Again, this does not defend Odysseus against the charges of entering the cave uninvited and stealing the cheeses.

¹⁵⁰ Newton, “Poor Polyphemus,” at 140 n. 12, cf. Austin, “Odysseus and the Cyclops,” at 12–13; and Odysseus Tsagarakis, *Form and Content in Homer*, Hermes Einzelschriften, Heft 46 (Wiesbaden:

(he steals the *Kyklōps*' flocks, ι 469–70) and curtly rejects Polyphēmos' suggestion he return for one.¹⁵¹

It was on the first two of these grounds that Gabriel Germain described Odysseus and his men as “*cambrisseurs surpris*” and stated they had acted “*d’une façon ... qui n’a jamais été dans les traditions de l’hospitalité.*”¹⁵² Although Alfred Heubeck and Christopher Brown objected to this view, neither adduced any evidence to the contrary.¹⁵³ Indeed, it is worth noting here that in the blinding-tale in the *Dolopathos*, one of the earliest surviving “folk-tale” versions of the blinding-story, the “hero” is a robber who goes to steal the giant’s gold.¹⁵⁴ Odysseus’ behaviour has either been adapted from, or interpreted as, folk-tale burglary.¹⁵⁵

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Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982), at 67–68 (who notes the difference but argues against comparing individual scenes with the “type” on the grounds that the individual instances are constrained by the narrative context; Reece’s study provides good evidence that this is not an insurmountable problem). For the charges laid against Polyphēmos of a premature request for his guests’ identities, see Thornton, *People and Themes*, at 40; Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 117; Heubeck and Hoekstra, *Commentary*, n. ad ι 252–25: “Polyphemus demands immediately to know who the strangers are, which does not bode well: he is obviously ignorant of the laws of hospitality”; Reece, *Stranger’s Welcome*, at 132; William H. Race, “First Appearances in the *Odyssey*,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 123 (1993): 79–107 at 106.

¹⁵¹ On this point, see further below, p 144.

¹⁵² Germain, *Genèse de l’Odyssée*, at 68: “burglars caught in the act” who acted “in a fashion which has never been in the traditions of hospitality.”

Germain argues, in addition, that Odysseus probably had an ulterior motive in coming to the cave: “Ulysses and his companions go in during the day (in the morning, it seems); ... In a pastoral society, the shepherd remains with the flocks outside during the day ... If one wants to plunder his cave, this is the moment one will choose” (70). See further immediately below. Cf. Odysseus’ companions’ intentions to steal the flocks and cheeses at ι 225–27.

¹⁵³ Brown, “In the Cyclops’ Cave,” at 23 simply referred to the categorical statement in A. Heubeck in Heubeck and Hoekstra, *Commentary*, n. ad ι 231, that “this view is without foundation.”

¹⁵⁴ The *Dolopathos* by Johannes de Alta Silva dates from the period 1184–1212 AD. The blinding-tale appears in the parable of the sixth sage (pp. 73–75 in Hilka’s edition of the Latin, or pp. 64–66 in the Gilleland translation (see Bibliography of Ancient Sources).

¹⁵⁵ The precise extent to which the *Dolopathos* depends on the *Odyssey* rather than preserves an independent folk-tale is open to some question. Hackman, *Die Polyphemsage in der Volksüberlieferung*, at 26 notes (*contra* the later assertion of Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 140) that the story does name the giant as Polyphēmos when the narrator of the story (the sixth sage) sums up to his audience (the king, Dolopathos): *vide ergo, o rex, quomodo ... ipsorum pater Poliphemum illum gigantem fefellerit* (“see therefore, O king, how ... their own father duped that giant *Poliphemus*,” Hilka p. 78 13–15). Against this, Hackman cites (as does Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 140) the author’s claim in his introduction that the story had never been written down before, and this is apparently sufficient for him given that he spends the rest of his discussion asserting the story preserves a French rather than a German tale. Yet, as the *Dolopathos* is quite clearly a literary work, I can see its author’s claim of originality as no more than a literary device; it is certainly not compelling evidence.

The issue is confused still further by the fact that the *locus* which names the giant has two other textual variants (both preserving different names) and *Poliphemum* is not the *lectio difficilior* (it is easy to see how a scribe might have corrected a variant name to that of the well-known giant); yet *Poliphemum* is preserved in the earliest MS and two of the three branches of the MS tradition (MSS L and M, on which see Hilka’s introduction, p. X). Moreover, this is not the only reference

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Newton reads into these transgressions a justification for Odysseus' punishment, on the grounds that "according to the archaic concept of justice it is the first offender that must be punished, regardless of the extent of the crime."¹⁵⁶ In support, he cites υ 394, where the poet tells us the suitors were all to be punished πρότεροι γὰρ ἀεικέα μηχανώωντο ("for they were first to plot unseemly [deeds]").

At the poetic level, however, Odysseus employs two strategies to minimize his responsibility for these breaches. First, although he is not averse elsewhere to phrasing his narrative in the singular in order to take credit (as leader) for the actions in which he led his men,¹⁵⁷ here (with the prominent exception of ι 224–30) he generously shares responsibility for his actions by consistently using the first person plural.¹⁵⁸ The verb ἐθύσαμεν (ι 231) is a case in point: of the three other sacrifices in the ἀπόλογοι, two (ι 551–53, λ 24–37) emphasize the fact that it was Odysseus alone who performed the ritual; the only other plural sacrifice is one from which Odysseus explicitly excludes himself: that of the cattle of the sun on Thrinakia (μ 343–65).¹⁵⁹

Secondly, Odysseus plays up his (and his companions') piety to gloss over their violations: the "sacrifice" of ι 231 is, after all, theft; yet, Odysseus' assumption that he will be treated as a guest in accordance with the hospitality ritual (an assumption which underlies his decision to remain in the cave) reflects positively on him: he is judging the Kyklōps by his own standards;¹⁶⁰ the demand for a guest-

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to the *Odyssey* in the text: Johannes mentions the Kirkē episode in the final paragraph of his work.

Thus, while Glenn's argument that the differences in the two stories (the same differences between the other folk-tales and the *Odyssey*; see Glenn's n. 31) make it inherently more likely that the *Dolopathos* tale was *not* "based on Homer," we should at least consider plausible that its author had the *Odyssey* in mind while writing the story.

¹⁵⁶ Newton, "Poor Polyphemos," at 140.

¹⁵⁷ Cf., e.g., ι 40 (ἔπαρθον, ὤλεσα) to 165 (ἐλόντες). Odysseus is, obviously, emphasizing his role as leader in the former; my point is that he does not do so in the Kyklōps' cave.

¹⁵⁸ That is, ἀφικόμειθ' ... εὔρομεν (ι 216–17; cf. ἐκίχανον [singular] κ 60–61 despite the fact he is not alone), ἐλθόντες ... ἐθηύμεσθα (ι 218), κήαντες ἐθύσαμεν (ι 231; cf. the way Odysseus labours the singulars at ι 553 and from λ 24 onwards), αἰνύμενοι φάγομεν μένομεν ... ἦμενοι (ι 232–33).

¹⁵⁹ Eurylokhos proposes that the companions should sacrifice the cattle at μ 344 (ῥέζομεν). Vidal-Naquet, "Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*," at 44 observes that the sacrifice is infelicitous as the companions are forced to substitute "natural" ingredients for the "essential requisites for proper sacrifice."

¹⁶⁰ It is, certainly, more than possible to see Odysseus as employing a *double* standard here — so Newton, "Poor Polyphemos," at 139–40 — but, *contra* Newton, I am not sure the inconsistency is necessarily obvious to the transported audience.

gift¹⁶¹ (itself unique) is accompanied by an acknowledgment of Zeus' superiority (262) and is followed by a pious "request" to respect the gods. Indeed, Odysseus' first vaunt to the *Kyklōps* (475–79) may be seen in much the same light: it is Odysseus who blinds Polyphēmos, but he claims to be acting (piously) in the name of the gods.

Thus, as with Polyphēmos, we can identify aspects of Odysseus' poetic portrayal — specifically, his intelligence and his piety — which have been exaggerated (compared to the literal truth) and thus create literal ambiguity. Again, as with Polyphēmos, this should lead to a difference in the perception of Odysseus between members of the transported and non-transported audiences: the transported audience, having lost sight of (some of) the moderating attributes of Odysseus' character, will probably perceive him as more intelligent and more pious than will the non-transported audience. Yet, again like Polyphēmos, Odysseus is a multifaceted character: other aspects of his poetic portrayal compensate for these overstatements and create poetic ambiguity.

Before we turn to poetic ambiguity, however, it is worth noting that the literal ambiguity is not constrained to the *Κυκλώπεια* as these exaggerations are continued throughout the epic. Two of the four subsequent references to the episode reinforce the interpretation of the *Κυκλώπεια* simply as an escape by intelligence¹⁶² — an interpretation which, through its omission of the circumstances in which Odysseus was trapped in the cave, is biased in favour of Odysseus' intelligence — and this series culminates in the morally loaded description of the episode in the summary of the *ἀπόλογοι* Odysseus narrates to Pēnelope in ψ.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Note that Odysseus requests a *ξεινήϊον* (guest-gift) or *καὶ ἄλλως | δοίης δωτίνην*; the Greek here is slightly ambiguous: either "and you might give some other gift" or "you might give a gift in another way." Both, indeed, accurately describe Polyphēmos' sarcastic offer at ι 369–70.

¹⁶² At μ 209–12 Odysseus reassures his companions by reminding them of their ordeal and how his *ἀρετῆ βουλή τε νόω τε* (excellent plan and mind) allowed them to escape; at υ 18–21 his self-encouragement centres around his previous endurance of the *Kyklōps ὄφρα ... μήτις ἐξάγαγ' ἐξ ἄντροιο* (until intelligence led [him] forth from the cave).

Odysseus' intelligence is, of course, emphasized throughout the epic, and well before the *Κυκλώπεια*; Thornton, *People and Themes*, at 80–82, notes in addition that these summaries also emphasize his ability to restrain his impulses, and connects this with his second thought at ι 299–305.

¹⁶³ The summary is ψ 310–43; the lines for the *Κυκλώπεια* are ψ 312–13: [*ἄρξατο*] ἦδ' ὅσα Κύκλωψ ἔρξε, καὶ ὡς ἀπετείσατο ποινήν | ἰφθίμων ἐτάρων, οὐς ἦσθιεν οὐδ' ἐλέαιρεν. "(he told her) what ... (continued)

The exception — the very first mention of the *Kyklōps* after ι — is, however, highly critical: Eurylokhos warns that Kirkē will constrain them in her house,

ὥς περ Κύκλωψ ἔρξ', ὅτε οἱ μέσσαυλον ἴκοντο
 ἡμέτεροι ἔταροι, σὺν δ' ὁ θρασὺς εἶπετ' Ὀδυσσεύς·
 τούτου γὰρ καὶ κείνοι ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο. κ 435–37.¹⁶⁴

His criticism is largely negated by the fact that it appears within a speech in which his bravery and intelligence are contrasted unfavourably with those same qualities in Odysseus,¹⁶⁵ but Eurylokhos interprets the *Κυκλώπεια* in a way which is much closer to the *Odyssey's* literal truth than Odysseus' poetic one. The importance of Eurylokhos' outburst lies, for us, in its implication that the literal truth adumbrated here (and, by extension, the ambiguity for which I have been arguing) is not inherently anachronistic: the poet puts this interpretation into the mouth of one of his own characters.¹⁶⁶

Consequences

At the beginning of this chapter, I asserted that the importance of the *Κυκλώπεια* is felt through its consequences (in narratological terms: the events it *motivates*) and that our interpretation of the episode should thus direct our interpretation of the epic itself. To put it simply, the blinding of the *Kyklōps* leads to the wrath of Poseidōn which, in turn, leads (*via* the curse at ι 528–35) to the long delay in Odysseus' homecoming;¹⁶⁷ this delay not only is responsible for the arrival of the suitors (σ 267–70), but also is a source of grief for his family to the point that it prompts his father into isolation and kills his mother (λ 187–203). In this context, the question of responsibility looms rather large, for if Odysseus can be held

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things the *Kyklōps* did, and how he had exacted a blood-price for the stout companions he had eaten without pity.”

¹⁶⁴ Just as the *Kyklōps* did when our companions came to his enclosure, and with them went bold Odysseus; for by the recklessness of this one they perished.

¹⁶⁵ κ 431–37; Eurylokhos seems to be something of a character double for Odysseus: he is the leader of the other half Odysseus' companions (κ 205) who has the foresight to remain outside when Kirkē invites them in at κ 230–32. His explicit identification of the trick at κ 232 links him with Odysseus' knowing much at ι 281. In this sense, Eurylokhos has already been shown to be worse than Odysseus, who entered Kirkē's dwelling and overcame her magic. Eurylokhos implicitly acknowledges Odysseus' superiority at κ 447–48.

¹⁶⁶ This is in answer to the question posed above (p. 107) of whether the divergent interpretations of the *Κυκλώπεια* are inherent in the text or have been superimposed upon it by later interpreters.

¹⁶⁷ α 68–75, cf. α 20–21, ζ 330–31, λ 100–17, ν 341–43. This is underscored, indeed, by the echo of ι 534 in Eurykleia's statement to Pēnelope at ψ 7 that Odysseus has returned ὁψέ περ ἔλθῶν (though coming late).

culpable for the curse and the blinding then it is possible to see him as responsible for these more drastic consequences.

Polyphēmos' curse, of course, does not just stipulate that Odysseus should return ὀψέ (late, ι 534), but also,

κακῶς ἔλθοι, ὀλέσας ἄπο πάντας ἐταίρους,
νηὸς ἐπ' ἄλλοτρῆς, εὐροὶ δ' ἐν πῆματα οἴκῳ. ι 534–35.¹⁶⁸

By the time we hear this, we already know it will be fulfilled — we do not even need to wait for the formulaic τοῦ δ' ἔκλυε (x heard him) in the next line¹⁶⁹ — as we have witnessed the πῆματα in his house “firsthand” in the first four books of the epic.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, we already know that Odysseus lacks his own ship¹⁷¹ and have been told the identity of the “others” in whose ship he will sail.¹⁷² Polyphēmos' curse, therefore, provides narrative motivation at the poetic level for the events which (at the literal level) are the inevitable consequences of Odysseus' late return.

This knowledge makes the curse act like a prophecy (in which form it is, indeed, subsequently reworked);¹⁷³ the stipulation that Odysseus return having lost all his companions, then, not only provides the missing link between his current situation

¹⁶⁸ Let him come “badly,” having lost all his companions, in a ship of others, to find troubles in his house.

¹⁶⁹ For the prayer type-scene and the effect of such responses, see James V. Morrison, “The Function and Context of Homeric Prayers: A Narrative Perspective,” *Hermes* 119, no. 2 (1991): 145–57, especially at 147–49, who includes this among the “paradigmatic” prayers in n. 16.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. the aligned but more limited (in that it only refers to the prophecies of Halithersēs in β and Zeus in ε) observation of Heubeck, n. ad ι 532–35.

¹⁷¹ δ 559 = ε 16 (cf. ε 141 which emphasizes Kalypsō's isolation), and the destruction is narrated at η 249–51.

¹⁷² η 188–96, 317–28, θ 30–36, 50–56. This, in fact, is an apt demonstration of John Peradotto's observation that prophecies in literature never determine their outcomes, but are always constructed from them. See, e.g., John Peradotto, “Prophecy Degree Zero: Tiresias and the End of the *Odyssey*,” in *Oralità: Cultura, Letteratura, Discorso*, ed. Bruno Gentili and Giuseppe Paioni (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1985), 429–55.

¹⁷³ Porph. ad *Od.* similarly describes it (ad θ 564) as τὴν μαντείαν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Κύκλωπος (the prophecy of the Kyklōps). It is reworked as a prophecy by Teiresias at λ 112–17 (cf. μ 137–41), on which see Karl Reinhardt, *Tradition und Geist: Gesammelte Essays zur Dichtung*, ed. Carl Becker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), at 101–02: “Der Fluch des Polyphem bedient sich ... seherischen Form. ... Fluch des Polyphem und Rede des Teiresias greifen ineinander” (The curse of Polyphēmos operates in ... prophetic form. ... The curse of Polyphēmos and the speech of Teiresias interrelate with each other). In this context, we are justified in seeing a foreshadowing of Odysseus' return to Ithaka in the guise of a beggar in the κακῶς of ι 534.

Cf. Bakker, “Polyphemos,” at 137–38, who describes Aigyptios' words at β 33–34 an “utterance ... [which] acquires with hindsight the force of a prophecy of which he himself is unaware.” This is Bakker's gloss of φήμη, and he subsequently (148–49) describes Polyphēmos' curse with this term. So also Bergren, “Odyssean Temporality,” at 49 with n. 27.

and the solitude which has been emphasized in the preceding books of the epic,¹⁷⁴ it also allows the audience to interpret the remainder of the ἀπόλογοι *while receiving them* (i.e., at the poetic level) as the enactment of Polyphēmos' curse. In other words, the curse provides the narratological motivation for the deaths of all but those killed by the Kikones (all but 6 from each ship¹⁷⁵). We are never told *explicitly* at the poetic level how many companions were on each ship, but we can work out (at the literal level) that there were 59;¹⁷⁶ the six per ship killed by the Kikones, therefore, account for a little over 10% of the fleet, and the remaining men (almost 90% of the group) can be held to have been destroyed by the Kyklōps' curse.¹⁷⁷

All this, of course, only reinforces my assertion that the attribution of responsibility here should fundamentally direct our interpretation of the *Odyssey*. The question becomes, then, where does this responsibility lie? Polyphēmos is, obviously, directly responsible for the curse at the most basic level, but he utters it in revenge for the wrongs he feels he has suffered at Odysseus' hands: not only the theft of his vision but also his verbal humiliation. We might consider, therefore, whether Odysseus may be held responsible for the curse he receives or whether he is merely defending himself against the aggression of the Kyklōps.

Because Odysseus provokes Polyphēmos' curse with his vaunting, many have seen his behaviour as inappropriate; but it is possible to defend Odysseus against each charge levelled at him. Some (such as Charles Segal) see the addition of insult to

¹⁷⁴ α 13, δ 559 = ε 16 ≈ 141, η 248–53.

¹⁷⁵ ι 60–61; as noted above, p. 103 n. 2, this is 72 in all. See Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 89–90 who identify this strategy as one way in which Odysseus rhetorically abrogates his responsibility for the deaths of his companions on the way home.

¹⁷⁶ For a calculation, see Stanford, n. ad κ 208: 22 in each half-crew (κ 208) plus two leaders makes 46 survivors of the Laistrygonēs; adding one man killed by Antiphatēs at κ 116, six by Polyphēmos, and six by the Kikones at ι 60–61 gives a total of 59. Assuming an equal number of men on each ship, Odysseus and his men numbered 708. The assumption that the man Antiphatēs killed was from Odysseus' ship is gratuitous, and the assumption that none of the companions died in the sacking of Ismaros itself at ι 40 is only slightly more defensible.

The whole business of calculating such numbers is, admittedly, far too literal to be “Homeric.” Since I am seeking the literal truth here I do not find this a great concern.

¹⁷⁷ Rick M. Newton, “Odysseus and Melanthius,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 38, no. 1 (1997): 5–18 at 12 n. 22, calculates that 11/12 (91²/₃%) of Odysseus' men perished at the hands of the Laistrygonēs; this arithmetic is, in fact, inaccurate: 11/12 of the *remaining* men perish here, which works out at 83¹/₃%. This does not really undermine his argument, however, as Newton illustrates only that the greatest number men die here (which is true, despite the poetic truth asserted at α 7) rather than on Thrinakia.

injury as inappropriate and thus censure him for boastfulness;¹⁷⁸ Christopher Brown, however, convincingly relates Odysseus' speeches to "the εὐχος of the hero in battle,"¹⁷⁹ and Malcolm Davies has noted the psychological appropriateness of the outbursts.¹⁸⁰ Against those (such as, famously, Calvin Brown) who censure Odysseus for revealing his real name at ι 504–05,¹⁸¹ Jenny Strauss Clay argues that suppressing it would be "inconceivable" (despite the "disastrous consequences") because it is a prerequisite for him to receive the κλέος (fame and honour) for his "masterful accomplishment."¹⁸²

Others have censured Odysseus' first address to the Kyklōps.¹⁸³ Karl Reinhardt saw this as hubris on the grounds that he had no divine mandate to claim to have meted out punishment from the gods;¹⁸⁴ but the lines are better explained as a manifestation of Jörgensen's Law and an indication that Odysseus finds his achievement inconceivable without a god's help.¹⁸⁵ Others again have censured

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, at 76–77, and Segal, "Divine Justice in the *Odyssey*," at 494. Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, *Homer and the Epic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), at 121 calls him a "dangerously conceited victor."

¹⁷⁹ Brown, "In the Cyclops' Cave," at 26. Cf. Odysseus' own use of the word εὐχος at ι 317. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that Brown chooses (as his two illustrative examples) Hektōr's εὐχος to Patroklos in Π (830–42; a speech in a sequence also associated with hubris) and Akhilleus' to Hektōr in X (345–54; which may be associated with excess). This is a problem with his examples, however, not his argument, as vaunting is not uncommon in the *Iliad*, and not generally associated with arrogance.

¹⁸⁰ Davies, "Folk-Tale Origins," at 30, argues that Odysseus' proclamation of his name is "appropriate at a profounder psychological level (expressing the need to burst out emotionally after the long hours of tension and imprisonment within the cave)." See also the bibliography cited by Glenn, "The Polyphemus Folktale," at 175–76.

¹⁸¹ Calvin S. Brown, "Odysseus and Polyphemus: The Name and the Curse," *Comparative Literature* 18, no. 3 (1966): 193–202; cf. Charles Rowan Beye, *The Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Epic Tradition* (New York: 1966), at 180–81, cited also by Glenn, "The Polyphemus Folktale," at 174–76.

¹⁸² Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 121–22. So also Brown, "In the Cyclops' Cave," at 26: "the hero's victory must receive some kind of public ratification; he must speak it out aloud."

¹⁸³ ι 475–79: Κύκλωψ, οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλες ἀνάκλιδος ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρους | ἔδμεναι ἐν σπηϊ γλαφυρῶ κρατερῆφι βίηφι. | καὶ λίην σέ γ' ἔμελλε κιχῆσθαι κακὰ ἔργα, | σκέτλι, ἐπεὶ ξείνους οὐχ ἄζεο σῶ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ | ἐσθήμεναι τῶ σε Ζεὺς τίσατο καὶ θεοὶ ἄλλοι. "Kyklōps, you were not fated to eat the companions of a cowardly man in your hollow cave with your mighty strength. And surely it was fated that your evil deeds would catch up with you, wretch, since you did not shrink from devouring the guests in your house; and for this Zeus and the other gods have punished you."

¹⁸⁴ Reinhardt, *Tradition und Geist*, at 68–69 (= Karl Reinhardt, *Von Werken und Formen: Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Godesberg: Verlag Helmut Küpper, 1948), at 85, cited also by Friedrich, "Hybris of Odysseus," at 17, n. 5): "Im Irrtum ist Odysseus freilich nicht ... indem er einen Auftrag zu erfüllen wähnt, ohne von einem Gott beauftragt zu sein" (Odysseus himself is not blameless... in that fancies he has is implementing a mandate without being authorized to do so by a god; 68).

¹⁸⁵ The law formulated by Ove J. Jörgensen, "Das Auftreten der Goetter in den Buechern ι-μ der *Odyssee*," *Hermes* 39 (1904): 357–82, is, of course, that characters mistakenly attribute divine actions to Zeus, a god, or the wrong god. Odysseus describes his vengeance as a gift of Athēna at ι 317. Phyllis Grau, "The Curse of the Cyclops," *Classical Bulletin* 50 (1973–1974): 31–32 made the unlikely argument that Odysseus' punishment was due to his taking credit for Athēna's plan.

Odysseus' third (and final) address to Polyphēmos:¹⁸⁶ Calvin Brown called this “an act of blasphemy ... the belittling of Poseidon”;¹⁸⁷ Charles Segal described it as “presuming what Poseidon will do” (which, were it true, would certainly be [as he described it] a “dangerous step”);¹⁸⁸ yet, these criticisms misinterpret the lines — they are not a presumption but an idiomatic expression of Odysseus' opinion¹⁸⁹ — and, at any rate, there is no need to explain Poseidōn's wrath in these terms.¹⁹⁰ Poseidōn's anger is due, as Zeus states explicitly at α 68–75, to the blinding of Polyphēmos.

Yet, even if this third address did explain Poseidōn's wrath, we could hardly argue that it prompts the curse *qua* insult. Rather, it functions as a curt rejection of the ξείνια and πομπήν (guest-gifts and escort, ι 517–18) which the Κυκλώπς had just offered him.¹⁹¹ Here, again, it is possible to censure Odysseus: it is quite possible that Polyphēmos has a change of heart and recognizes the superiority of the gods when he realizes the truth of Tēlemos' prophecy at 506–16;¹⁹² in this context, it is not impossible that the offer is, in fact, genuine; certainly this can be supported at the literal level,¹⁹³ and may even create some uncertainty at the poetic. If the offer

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For a discussion of whether or not Odysseus is piously attributing his achievements to the gods, see Friedrich, “Hybris of Odysseus,” at 24.

¹⁸⁶ ι 523–25: αἶ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην | εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω, || ὥς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ' ἴησεται οὐδ' ἐνοσίχθων. “Would that I were able to make you bereft of your soul and vital spirit and send you down to the house of Hadēs, as surely as the earth beater will not heal your eye.”

¹⁸⁷ Brown, “Odysseus and Polyphemus,” at 200. For further bibliography, see Friedrich, “Hybris of Odysseus,” at 20–21.

¹⁸⁸ Segal, “Divine Justice in the *Odyssey*,” at 505.

¹⁸⁹ On the interpretation of these lines in a wider context, see Frederick M. Combellack, “The Wish Without Desire,” *American Journal of Philology* 102, no. 2 (1981): 115–19. Note that the ὥς-clauses of the closest parallels to this passage (Θ 538–41, Ν 825–29, ρ 251–53) are *all* eventually shown to be false; we might draw from this that Homer expected (contrary to the subsequent tradition) that Poseidōn *would* cure his son's eye.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Brown, “In the Cyclops' Cave,” at 7.

¹⁹¹ That is, in ι 517–19.

¹⁹² Hence, he finally asserts himself as a son of Poseidōn and belatedly takes up his neighbours' advice to pray to his father. The prayer is an acknowledgement of the god's power and hence suggests a change of heart compared to ι 275–76. Note that Polyphēmos' stance while praying (holding up the hands, ι 527) recalls Odysseus' supplication of Zeus at 294. Raising the hands is a standard stance for prayer: cf. the metonymic use at E 174, and see also A 450, Γ 275, 318 = H 177, Z 257, 301, Σ 75, Τ 254, Ω 301, υ 355, ρ 239 (especially appropriate in that the curse is explicitly described as praying), and υ 97. Holding up the hands, in its connection with supplication, may be taken as an acknowledgement of one's own inferiority.

¹⁹³ Davies, “Folk-Tale Origins,” at 30, and n. 107, notes another motif in the folk-tale where “the death-demon ... ensure[s] the hero's speedy return to the real world.” More generally, if we follow the approach of Propp, *Morphology*, our instinct is to cast Polyphēmos as the villain.

The sequence is thus: α (initial situation): Odysseus and companions are in the Κυκλώπς' cave; A¹⁵ (the villain imprisons someone) the Κυκλώπς imprisons Odysseus and his companions + A¹⁷ (the

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is genuine, Odysseus' curtness is unwarranted; yet, at the poetic level Odysseus is probably sensible to reject the offer: Polyphēmos offers Odysseus the gifts and the aid of his father immediately after insulting him,¹⁹⁴ and Odysseus does have grounds to distrust Polyphēmos after the earlier, sarcastic offer of a gift at ι 355–70.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, this prudence can be defended at the literal level too, as a folk-tale parallel suggests the gift the Kyklōps would give him would be destructive.¹⁹⁶

I cited, above, the argument of Rick Newton that Odysseus' breaches of hospitality — especially his (uninvited) entry into the cave and his theft of the Kyklōps' possessions — place him “at fault” and render him liable for punishment. It is tempting, in this context, to consider whether the breach of hospitality is itself responsible for the curse. Glenn, reacting to a similar argument by David Belmont, argued that the idea that Odysseus' homecoming is delayed by anything other than Poseidōn's wrath over his son's blinding is “highly dubious” as it argues against Athēna's explanation at ν 341–43 and Zeus' at α 68–75.¹⁹⁷ This is a sensible

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villain threatens cannibalism) the Kyklōps eats Odysseus' companions, and will eventually get to Odysseus; H¹ (struggle) Odysseus attempts to blind the Kyklōps; I¹ (victory) Odysseus does so successfully; K¹ (the object of the search [here, freedom] is seized by force or cleverness); Pr⁶ (the pursuer tries to kill the hero) the Kyklōps throws rocks at Odysseus' ship; Rs⁹ (the hero is saved from attempt on his life) but his companions row him to safety.

Yet, it is just as possible to cast him as an initially hostile donor, in which case the (expected) sequence becomes α (initial situation): Odysseus is almost home; ↑ (departure): a storm blows them via the Lōtophagoi to the Kyklōpes; D⁸ (a hostile donor attempts to destroy the hero); E⁸ (the hero saves his own life [by employing his adversary's tactics]) here: trickery; F (provision or receipt of a [helpful] magical agent/helper) the guest-gift is offered; G (spatial transference, guidance) Polyphēmos offers the πομπή.

¹⁹⁴ ι 515: ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανός καὶ ἄκις, “small and worthless and feeble.”

¹⁹⁵ To the discussion of whether the earlier offer was sarcastic (see above, p. 127, n. 104) we can add the interpretation of this *locus* by Segal, “Divine Justice in the *Odyssey*,” at 504: “Polyphemus would also repeat his earlier outrage in his ironical offering of ‘guest-gifts’.”

¹⁹⁶ Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, at 8–9, and especially n. 15, famously saw in this offer the possible remnant (removed because it is too “supernatural” for “this realistic narrative”) of an episode found in the folk-tale where the giant almost overcomes the hero by giving him a magical gift (such as a ring) which latches on to him and alerts the giant to his position. Brown, “Odysseus and Polyphemus,” at 201–02, offered a more felicitous parallel for the *function* of the ring sequence in Polyphēmos' curse. See also Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 177–79 (though I cannot agree with his preference for Page's explanation over Brown's).

¹⁹⁷ David Eugene Belmont, “Early Greek Guest-Friendship and its Role in Homer's *Odyssey*” (Diss., Princeton University, 1962), 172 cited by Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 176–77. The objections to Athēna's reliability at ν 299–351 made by Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 201–04 are a furphy, and are certainly insufficient to deny that Poseidōn's wrath is a cause of Odysseus' long absence, especially in the context of Zeus' authoritative speech at α 68–75.

observation, and Odysseus' punishment for his breach of the ξενία conventions must be limited to his imprisonment and the loss of six of his men.¹⁹⁸

Odysseus should not, therefore, be blamed for the Kyklōps' curse on these grounds. Even though the narrative itself highlights the consequences of Odysseus' revelation of his name,¹⁹⁹ his behaviour is both consistent and reasonable. Polyphēmos, however, does have reason to curse Odysseus: while his hostility might initially have seemed unmotivated (at least at the poetic level), the blinding supplies it with a reason. Thus, if we are to consider whether Odysseus is responsible for the curse we should examine his responsibility for the blinding rather than scouring his addresses to the Kyklōps after his escape for some contributing fault.

Obviously, just as Polyphēmos is responsible for the curse in the sense that he utters it, Odysseus is likewise responsible for the blinding at the most basic level. The question which should be addressed, however, is whether Odysseus may be absolved of this responsibility on the grounds that (as he realizes just in time at ι 302–05) blinding rather than killing the Kyklōps is the only way in which Odysseus and his companions can escape from the cave and/or take revenge for the impious murder of their companions.

Here, it is worth mentioning that Rick Newton sees the manner in which Odysseus blinds Polyphēmos as disproportionate and cruel. Newton avers that “in order to extinguish Polyphēmos' sight, he has only to destroy the pupil,” but the description of the blinding (ι 382–94) shows him using “excessive thoroughness and brutality ... [to destroy] the giant's entire forehead.”²⁰⁰ While it is true that the blinding leads us to pity Polyphēmos, the evidence for savage excess in this passage

¹⁹⁸ Thus, we do not have to choose whether Odysseus or Polyphēmos will be punished (as Newton implies) based on who is the first to contravene the hospitality ritual. Both are punished: Odysseus by the loss of his men, Polyphēmos by being blinded.

¹⁹⁹ The emphasis is increased, obviously, by the juxtaposition of Odysseus' revelation with his companions' pleas to keep silence; this recalls his decision to stay in the cave at ι 228–29. Newton, “Poor Polyphemus,” at 139, n. 9, notes that “Odysseus' behavior in this part of the episode ... evokes an ambivalent response from the audience,” with further bibliography.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, at 138.

is tenuous and to describe it as the destruction of the *Kyklōps*' "entire forehead" is clearly hyperbole.²⁰¹

I implied above that Odysseus may be pardoned for his blinding of Polyphēmos on the grounds that it was his only option for taking revenge and escaping with his and most of his companions' lives. Here, however, we find one last disjunction between the literal and poetic truths of the episode: at the poetic level, Odysseus manages to make Polyphēmos' actions appear internally (*i.e.*, self-)motivated and his own externally motivated; with few exceptions, that is, Polyphēmos seems to be directed only by his own will — as he puts it at 1278, he takes orders from his θυμός — while Odysseus reacts to the unfolding situation in which he finds himself. At the literal level, however, we may see that at times these positions are reversed.

This is exemplified by Odysseus' impulse to kill the *Kyklōps* as he sleeps at 1299–305. His motive here is revenge for the deaths of the two companions murdered in the immediately preceding narrative²⁰² — his own inclination — but he is prevented from doing so by his situation: he rationalizes explicitly that the rock which bars the entrance would leave them trapped in the cave. Thus, it is his situation which forces him to seek an alternative course of action, and the delay in effecting this new plan costs him the lives of four more of his companions.

Polyphēmos, on the other hand, is not given an explicit rationale either for killing Odysseus' companions or for placing the stone in the doorway, and in the absence of a situational motive, we are likely to attribute his actions to his personality.²⁰³

²⁰¹ The text states that the ἀϋτιμή ("breath") of the fire εὔσεν (*singed*) the eyelids and eyebrow as the γλήνης (eyeball, though this can also mean merely "pupil") shrivelled/burned up (1389–90). Not only does this fall a long way short of "destroying" his "entire forehead," I can see nothing in this other than the consequences of the intense heat which makes the stake (famously) "glow through terribly" in 379.

²⁰² That is, at 1288–98; the juxtaposition of the two sections makes this look like an immediate reaction (Glenn, "The Polyphemus Folktale," at 159 calls this "instant revenge"); in fact, we cannot know how much story time passes during the *Kyklōps*' meal or how long it takes him to go to sleep.

²⁰³ This is an example of what is known in psychology as the "fundamental attribution error." See above, n. 26, p. 61.

His murder of Odysseus' companions seems particularly impetuous because he, unlike the external audience, has not seen his "guests" stealing his possessions.²⁰⁴

We must note, however, that the placement of the stone seems odd. When the *Kyklōps* deviates from his standard procedures, we might expect some sort of explanation²⁰⁵ — as we get when he brings all his herd into the cave at 1337–39²⁰⁶ — so when he places the stone over the entry at 240–43 *before* he catches sight of Odysseus and his men at 251 it is reasonable for us to assume this is his usual practice.²⁰⁷ We might wonder why he does so: it cannot be to keep his sheep from escaping (his enclosure outside is sufficient for the males [238–39], and he has pens inside the cave [219–22]); and if it is to keep out intruders (or animals) then it is problematic that he blocks the cave in his presence but had left it unblocked in his absence.

He does block the cave in his absence *the next day* (1313–14) — an unmarked departure from his standard practice — but his motives for doing so are obvious: he wishes to keep Odysseus and his men penned inside the cave. With this in mind, we might wonder if the whole business with the stone is not likewise motivated: in other words, it is likely that Polyphēmos' lack of a reason for blocking the doorway at 240–43 is illusory and he does so in response to some evidence that there are intruders in his cave. Perhaps, since he is so methodical a dairy farmer, he has noticed the missing cheeses, the missing animal, or the remains of the Greeks' meal. At any rate, having cause to block the doorway reduces his capriciousness at the literal level; if my supposition is correct about the nature of his evidence, then his murder of Odysseus' companions is, likewise, less unmotivated.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴ Cf. Austin, "Odysseus and the Cyclops," at 12, who sees the murders as insufficiently motivated by the intruders' theft and notes we attribute Polyphēmos' "spontaneous cannibalism" to the fact that he is "a compulsive."

²⁰⁵ To use the terms of Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities*, at 13, and 18–21, an "apology" which the audience can "naturalize" or "thematize."

²⁰⁶ When Polyphēmos brings all his herd into the cave at 1338 (as opposed to just the females at 1238–39), Odysseus comments he did so ἢ τι οἰσάμενος, ἢ καὶ θεὸς ὧς ἐκέλευσεν (either suspecting something or as a god ordered him, 1339); the audience can then generously assume this will be significant in the upcoming narrative (which it is) and/or take this as a reflection of Polyphēmos' character (e.g., that he is capricious).

²⁰⁷ Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 147 does so when he connects this to a lack of intelligence/imagination.

²⁰⁸ It does seem extreme for Polyphēmos to murder Odysseus' companions for stealing his food, but this is similar, in some ways, to Odysseus' murder of the suitors. For fuller correspondences
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Odysseus, on the other hand, as has often been noted, lacks a sufficient *situational* motive for going to the cave in the first place; as Karl Reinhardt and Norman Austin have noted, he is in no need of food, water, or wine;²⁰⁹ it might be argued that he goes in search of information of his whereabouts or some recognition of his status as a hero (in order to receive a guest-gift, as he later asserts) but in doing so he ignores the indications (such as the size and construction of Polyphēmos' forecourt, the desertion of the nearby island which indicates the Kyklōpes' lack of ships, and so on) that his "host" is not human, civilized, or liable to participate in gift exchange.²¹⁰ Rather than a situational motive, Odysseus' reasons for visiting the Kyklōpes' land — a desire to ascertain the identity of the inhabitants (ι 174) after seeing signs of life (166–67) — have everything to do with his personality: this is the same inquisitiveness which prompts him to stay in the cave "in order to see him" at 229.²¹¹

Odysseus' (internally motivated) desire to learn about and see the Kyklōps certainly does not justify Polyphēmos' later breaches or inversions of hospitality: recklessly scorning "Zeus of Strangers" and feeding *on* (rather than feeding) his guests;²¹² yet, his decision to remain in the cave marks a major turning point in the *fabula* underlying the (literal truth of the) *Odyssey*. The transitions from prisoner to vanquisher to escapee to boaster to the addressee of the curse (and hence to the object of Poseidōn's wrath and to solitary absentee) all follow inevitably from this choice. His decision to stay, therefore, transfers to him at least some culpability for the action and consequences of the *Κυκλώπεια*. Although (as noted at the beginning of this section) those consequences are serious in the extreme at the literal level, if we notice any responsibility at the poetic level it is limited to the

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between the situations Odysseus and Polyphēmos find in their respective dwellings, see Newton, "Poor Polyphemus," and Newton, "Odysseus and Melanthius."

²⁰⁹ Reinhardt, *Tradition und Geist*, at 64–65: "Die Höhle des Polyphem ist unter den Märchenabenteuern das einzige, in das Odysseus nicht als Dulder, sondern willentlich und wissentlich gerät" (The Cave of Polyphēmos is, among the fairy-tale adventures, the only one in which Odysseus comes not as a sufferer but willingly and purposefully). Austin, "Odysseus and the Cyclops," at 14–15, in fact, goes further, claiming (rightly) that the whole logic of the episode, including Odysseus' decision to taunt the Kyklōps, is internally motivated.

²¹⁰ Reinhardt, *Tradition und Geist*, at 65, uses Odysseus' premonition as evidence that he knows in advance that he will get nothing from the Kyklōps that he did not have already on Goat Island (die Ziegeninsel). De Jong, "The Subjective Style," asserts that the premonition itself arises from his observation "of the gigantic dimensions of the cave ... in 183–6."

²¹¹ Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme*, at 76 mentions both *loci* in his discussion of Odysseus' "desire to know."

²¹² Friedrich, "Heroic Man and *Polymetis*," at 128; Reece, *Stranger's Welcome*, at 134.

“unavoidable” loss of six of his companions, perhaps offset by his success in “saving” his companions’ lives. Odysseus’ concentration on his μήτις and its role in his escape, indeed, comes at the expense of the fact that he caused them to be trapped in the first place.²¹³

As with the exaggerations of Odysseus’ piety and Polyphēmos’ stupidity, this disjunction between the poetic and literal motivations of the action of the Κυκλώπεια leads to a more positive characterization of Odysseus and a more negative perception of the Kyklōps. At the poetic level, the removal of all explicit motivations for Polyphēmos’ actions makes them (and him) seem arbitrary; he is made to seem capricious and aggressive, and both have negative impacts on our understanding of his character. Odysseus, on the other hand, is rescued from a situation literally of his own making by portraying his actions as reactions to circumstances beyond his control; his hand seems constantly forced because our attention is diverted away from the section of the narrative where he made his choice. The speed and success with which he adapts his situation to his own advantage emphasize his versatility (which is, of course, a facet of intelligence), and the effect on his character is positive. The differences between the poetic and literal portrayals of Odysseus and Polyphēmos, then, lead to literal ambiguity in both characterizations.

In addition, this disjunction leads to two different attributions of fault for the episode. At the poetic level, Polyphēmos is at fault and Odysseus’ behaviour is to be excused; at the literal level, the fault lies with both,²¹⁴ but it is Polyphēmos whose actions may be put down to his circumstances. In other words, not only is there ambiguity in the characterization of the main *dramatis personae* of the Κυκλώπεια, there is also ambiguity in the action of the episode itself.

If, as I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the literal truth of a narrative is obscured by transportation and only the poetic truth is left visible, then such disjunctions (dependent on the unreliability of the narrator) should mean that the degree to which we are transported while receiving the text will make significant

²¹³ Hence, not only the narrative of the Κυκλώπεια, but also two of the four references to it after 1 emphasize precisely this aspect. See above, p. 140 with n. 162.

²¹⁴ Cf. Segal, “Divine Justice in the *Odyssey*,” at 506: “[o]n Polyphemus’ island the hero is drawn towards resemblance with his antagonist.”

differences in the way we interpret not only the characters but also the action itself. The transported audience will, having lost access to the literal truths (and hence the literal ambiguity) adumbrated above, probably see Odysseus and Polyphēmos as more polarized; it is unlikely, however, that the transported audience will fail to see *any* ambiguity as some is inherent in the text at the poetic level. It is, then, to this poetic ambiguity that we must now turn.

Guilt/Good by Association

Disjunctions (such as those sketched above) between the literal and poetic truths create, as noted previously, literal ambiguity. Poetic ambiguity, on the other hand, depends on the conflicting facets of a character being visible at the poetic level; this occurs when the poetic depiction of a character is internally ambivalent, but it also may occur when the audience's conception of a character is affected by his/her relationship(s) with the poetic depictions of other characters in the text.²¹⁵

The effect of such associations on character appraisal is determined by whether the relationship is one of similarity or contrast: if the similarity between two characters (or one character and a group) is emphasized, then any negative sentiment expressed about the other character(s) will (unless we are given reason to think that it is inapplicable) have a negative impact on the appraisal of the character under consideration (guilt by association); similarly, a positive sentiment should have a positive impact (which we might call “good by association”). When the relationship is, however, one of contrast, then the effects are reversed: something that has a negative impact on one character will have a positive impact on the other and *vice versa* (i.e., guilt/good “by comparison”).

As an example, let us consider the first time we hear of Polyphēmos in the *Odyssey* — at α 68–75 — when Zeus explains to Athēna the reason for Odysseus' protracted absence:

ἀλλὰ Ποσειδάων γαιήοχος ἀσκελὲς αἰὲν
 Κύκλωπος κεχόλωται, ὃν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάωσεν,
 ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον, ὅου κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον

²¹⁵ The role of the audience's background knowledge may be seen in similar terms: the audience's conception of the character is affected by their perception of relationships with the same character in different texts. This, of course, can only operate at the literal level, as the existence of texts not mentioned in the narrative is not apparent at the poetic level.

πᾶσιν Κυκλώπεσσι· Θόωσα δέ μιν τέκε νύμφη,
 Φόρκυνοσ θυγάτηρ, ἀλὸσ ἀτρυγέτοιο μέδοντοσ,
 ἐν σπέεσι γλαφυροῖσι Ποσειδάωνι μιγεῖσα.
 ἐκ τοῦ δὴ Ὀδυσῆα Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων
 οὔ τι κατακτείνει, πλάζει δ' ἀπὸ πατρίδοσ αἴησ. α 68–75.²¹⁶

This is the most positive description of the *Kyklōps* in the *Odyssey*, and it is significant that it is delivered by Zeus (who is an authoritative speaker and an objective narrator in the epic). Polyphēmos is not only ἀντίθεοσ (“equal to a god,” α 70), but the phrase ὄου κράτοσ ἐστὶ μέγιστον (“whose power is the greatest”) compares him implicitly to Zeus,²¹⁷ and the fact that he is of divine parentage is explicit and emphasized. Obviously, this association with the gods (an emphasis of similarity) reflects positively on him.

In contrast, consider the reference to Polyphēmos in β 19 where he is described as ἄγριοσ (“wild”). We have already noted that this generic epithet is negative for men in the *Odyssey* and that its application to Polyphēmos insinuates his “animal” nature; here we can add that the negativity is reinforced by the context in which it occurs. When Tēlemakhos summons the assembly in β, the first to speak is the ἥρωσ (“hero,” β 15) Aigyptioσ,

ὄσ δὴ γήραϊ κυφὸσ ἔην καὶ μυρία ἤδη.
 καὶ γὰρ τοῦ φίλοσ υἱὸσ ἄμ' ἀντιθέω Ὀδυσῆϊ
 ἴλιον εἰσ εὔπωλον ἔβη κοίλῃσ' ἐνὶ νηυσίν,
 Ἄντιφοσ αἰχμητήσ· τὸν δ' ἄγριοσ ἔκτανε Κύκλωψ
 ἐν σπήϊ γλαφυρῶ, πύματον δ' ὀπλίσατο δόρπον.
 τρεῖσ δέ οἱ ἄλλοι ἔσαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν μνηστῆρσιν ὀμίλει,

²¹⁶ But it is earth-encircling Poseidōn who is continuously and always enraged at him for the sake of the *Kyklōps*, whose eye he blinded, Polyphēmos, equal to the gods, whose power is the greatest among all the *Kyklōpes*; the nymph Thoōsa bore him, daughter of Phorkys (ruler of the barren sea), who lay with Poseidōn in a hollow cave. And because of this earth-shaking Poseidōn does not kill Odysseus, but always drives him from his homeland.

²¹⁷ Zeus is described with the formula κράτοσ ἐστὶ μέγιστον 3×: B 118, I 25, and ε 4. This, in fact, is the source of an infamous inference that Polyphēmos was the *Kyklōpes*' “lord and master” (so Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, at 6; followed by, e.g., Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), at 167; Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 350; West, “An Indic Reflex of the Homeric *Cyclopeia*,” at 129–31), which would exponentially either increase or decrease his status depending on how one views the *Kyklōpes* as a group. This position is, however, untenable, and has been refuted by Glenn, “The Polyphemus Folktale,” at 148, and (more comprehensively) O'Sullivan, “Nature and Culture in *Odyssey* 9?” at 14–15. Κράτοσ must refer to physical rather than political power.

Even so, it is worthwhile to observe that the possession of great physical power is itself a positive characteristic — κρατερός is a positive, generic epithet for *Iliadic* heroes; cf. also the description of the eagle sent by Zeus (φίλτατοσ οἰνῶν, καὶ εὐ κράτοσ ἐστὶ μέγιστον, “most beloved of birds, and whose strength is greatest,” Ω 311) as τελειότατοσ πετεηνῶν (most perfect / powerful of birds, Ω 315) — so the application of the formula at α 70 (as with ἀντίθεοσ in the same line) should be seen in a positive light.

Εὐρύνομος, δύο δ' αἰὲν ἔχον πατρώϊα ἔργα·
 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὧς τοῦ λήθετ' ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων.
 τοῦ ὅ γε δάκρυ χέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπε·

β 16–24²¹⁸

There is, obviously, a dichotomy constructed here between the φίλος υἱός (“beloved son”) of the ancient hero — a spearman and war veteran who is still mourned almost a decade after his death — and the wild killer who has caused his father such grief. The favourable terms in which Aigyptios is described (age and experience are positive characteristics in the Homeric poems, as indicated by their chief exemplar, Nestōr)²¹⁹ and the positive term with which he describes Odysseus,²²⁰ reinforce our understanding of him as a morally “good” character and, in a complementary fashion, cast the Kyklōps in a more unsavoury light.

In a more general context, ambiguity can arise from such associations in two different circumstances: if an association counteracts the portrayal at the poetic level (especially if the poetic portrayal is polarized), or, as is the case with the two instances mentioned above, if different associations work in different directions. If the character’s poetic portrayal is, in fact, polarized, the latter can include the former; certainly elements of both affect our understanding of Odysseus and Polyphēmos in the Κυκλώπεια. There are many associations which may be framed in this way: the antithetic functions of the Kyklōpes and Phaiakians,²²¹ for example, cast Polyphēmos in a worse (and the Phaiakians in a better) light; the complementary portraits of Odysseus and Polyphēmos effect, as we have seen for intelligence and piety, more extreme portrayals at the poetic level. There remains, however, one association which is difficult to pin down (indeed, there is not

²¹⁸ Who was stooped by age and knew a myriad [things]. Indeed his dear son went to fine-colt-breeding Iliion with godlike Odysseus in his hollow ships, the spearman Antiphos; but the wild Kyklōps killed him in his hollow cave, in the last meal he prepared. He had three other [sons]: one, Eurynomos, thronged with the suitors, and the other two constantly kept and worked the land of their father; but even so he did not forget mourning and grieving for him. Shedding a tear for him now he counselled and addressed them.

²¹⁹ The positive terms are ἥρωας, “hero,” β 15; μυρία ἤδη “knew a myriad [things],” 16; and γέρων, “elder,” 40. The knowledge and experience implicit in 16 is similar to the description of Nestōr as ruling over the third generation (γ 245); Nestōr is a γέρων 11×, and the only figure more frequently described as a γέρων in the *Odyssey* is Odysseus (when disguised: 13×).

²²⁰ As Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon* noted at 51 (from the data in his tables at 46–47), Odysseus’ enemies “do not even use the simple *dios Odysseus* except [in one instance] when repeating Penelope verbatim.”

²²¹ See, e.g., Mondì, “The Homeric Cyclopes,” at 25–25: the Phaiakians and Kyklōpes are opposites in hospitality, temper, social structure, and nautical abilities; and they are the beginning and end of Odysseus’ journey home and the wrath of Poseidōn.

uniform consensus on whether this is a case of similarity or difference) and which thus deserves further consideration; it is to this relationship we must now turn.

Polyphēmos and the Kyklōpes

Aristotle, according to the scholium cited at the beginning of this chapter, asked the *naïve* question: how was Polyphēmos a Kyklōps when his father was a god and his mother a nymph? The query is presumably prompted by the digression on his pedigree at α 71–73,²²² but the answer provided (essentially, that gods are able to bear such children: if Poseidōn could father the horse Pēgasos, he could father a Kyklōps) is as absurd as the question. What matters, as far as we are concerned here, is not *how* Polyphēmos happened to be a Kyklōps (he is because the narrative states that he is), but how the Kyklōpes are portrayed in the *Odyssey* and what impact membership of this group has on our understanding of Polyphēmos.

Group membership is an obvious case of a relationship of similarity: in the absence of indications to the contrary it is reasonable for us to assume that everything which applies to the Kyklōpes in general will also apply to Polyphēmos in particular. (In fact, the reverse also tends to apply as we often assume that Polyphēmos is a typical Kyklōps and that therefore, unless it is indicated to the contrary, whatever is true of him is true of all the Kyklōpes.²²³) Hence we should expect that a negative sentiment expressed about the Kyklōpes will have a negative effect on the audience’s appraisal of Polyphēmos, and that anything positive we learn about them will have a positive effect on our understanding of him.

The appearance of the Kyklōpes (*en masse*) in the *Odyssey* is limited to a facilitating role in the *dénouement* of Odysseus’ famous Οὔτις-trick in the Κυκλώπεια; yet, we are provided with a substantial amount of information about them before we ever meet them. This information is provided in three instalments: two (before ι) which inform us indirectly of the Kyklōpes by comparing them to (or contrasting them

²²² α 71–73, cited and translated above, p. 153.

²²³ Some, indeed, explicitly argue against this assumption: the Scholiasts (especially Antisthenēs) reconciled the divine plenty of the land of the Kyklōpes against their impiety by proposing that only Polyphēmos was impious; *e.g.*, Σ H in ι 106: πάντες μὲν οἱ Κύκλωπες ἀγαθοὶ εἶσι καὶ θεοὺς τιμῶντες, χωρὶς τοῦ Πολυφήμου (“All the Kyklōpes are good and honour the gods, with the exception of Polyphēmos”); Cf. Σ T, and V in ι 106, T in ι 107. This solution has also been applied to a slightly broader range of “problems” by Mondī, “The Homeric Cyclopes.”

with) the Phaiakians, and one in the introduction to the *Κυκλώπεια* which gives us direct information about them.²²⁴

The *Kyklōpes* and the Phaiakians in ζ and η

The first time we hear of the *Kyklōpes* as a group is in the digression on how the Phaiakians came to Skheria at ζ 2–10; here they are described as *ὑπερηνορέοντες* (“overbearing,” ζ 5). This adjective, as we have seen, is, of itself, pejorative, but the moral overtones are amplified by the context. As with *Aigyptios* and *Polyphēmos*, a dichotomy is established between the *Kyklōpes* and the Phaiakians: the *Kyklōpes* “used to plunder” (*σινέσκοντο*, ζ 6) their weaker neighbours to the point that they forced them to emigrate. If we appraise the Phaiakians as morally “good” characters on the grounds that they help Odysseus,²²⁵ then this opposition reflects badly on the *Kyklōpes* (and *Polyphēmos*).

It is all the more interesting, therefore, that the only other time we hear of the *Kyklōpes* before the beginning of the *Κυκλώπεια* emphasizes their *similarity* to the Phaiakians. I am referring, of course, to *Alkinoös*’ assertion of the Phaiakians relationship to the gods:

σφισιν [*i.e.*, θεοῖσιν] ἐγγύθεν εἰμέν,
ὥς περ Κύκλωπές τε καὶ ἄγρια φῶλα Γιγάντων. η 205–06.²²⁶

Alkinoös offers this as the reason why the gods show themselves clearly (*φαίνονται ἐναργεῖς* ... οὐ τι κατακρύπτουσιν, η 201, 205) to the Phaiakians, and, given *Athēna*’s actions in the preceding scenes, we might have cause to question his reliability (or fallibility, at least) here;²²⁷ the more salient question is, however, what does

²²⁴ Race, “First Appearances in the *Odyssey*,” rightly asserts that the introductions of individual characters in the *Odyssey* are important for our understanding of their ethos. It is unfortunate, then, that his consideration of the *Kyklōpes* and *Polyphēmos* (105–06) is entirely limited to the *ἀπόλογοι*, for he misses the implications of *Polyphēmos*’ characterization at α 68–75 and β 16–24, as well as any implications that can be drawn from the depictions of the *Kyklōpes* in ζ and η (see below). Race rightly identifies suspense and surprise in the episode, but misses the ambiguity of *Polyphēmos*’ character.

²²⁵ The audience is, by the beginning of ζ, already aware of the Phaiakians’ role as *Odysseus*’ helpers in his return: we are told four times in the preceding book, all by speakers of great authority. We are told once (most explicitly) by *Zeus* (ε 34–42), once by *Poseidōn* (ε 288–89), once by *Leukothea* (ε 345), and once by the poet (focalizing the thoughts of *Athēna*, ε 386–87).

²²⁶ We are close (*ἐγγύθεν*) to them, as are the *Kyklōpes* and the wild races of the Giants.

²²⁷ Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 49, see *Alkinoös* as “mistaken” on the grounds that *Athēna* is disguised in Skheria in η and θ (I am not convinced of the necessity of *Poseidōn*’s invisibility at ν 160–64). *Athēna* is, on the other hand, the trickster goddess (ν 298–99), and may thus be seen as the exception.

Alkinoös mean when he states that the Phaiakians, Kyklōpes, and Giants are all ἐγγύθεν (“close”) to the gods, and what impact does that have on our understanding of the Kyklōpes (and Polyphēmos)?²²⁸

In the context of the rest of his speech,²²⁹ it is easy for us to assume that he is referring to the divine favours they receive on account of their piety²³⁰ and this would have an extremely positive impact on our understanding of the Kyklōpes. It is possible that some audience members may think no more of this, but there is an incongruity between piety and the description of the Giants as ἄγρια (wild) in the same line, and having the Phaiakian king describe the Kyklōpes as pious is difficult in the context of their behaviour at ζ 5–6.

The Scholiasts suggested, on the other hand, that Alkinoös’ use of ἐγγύθεν at η 205 points to a similarity in *genealogy* between the three groups.²³¹ Indeed, there is some merit in this argument, as the three groups are closely related not only to the gods but also to each other.²³² This also may have a positive impact on our understanding of the Kyklōpes. This usage of ἐγγύθεν, however, is unparalleled in

²²⁸ This question is raised by Jenny Strauss Clay, “Goat Island: *Od.* 9. 116–141,” *Classical Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (1980): 261–64, who makes no progress in answering it. Note that Odysseus (in disguise) characterizes the Phaiakians as ἀγχίθεοι (“near the gods”) at τ 279; the following discussion thus has some relevance to the interpretation of that *locus* also.

²²⁹ η 199–206: εἰ δέ τις ἀθανάτων γε κατ’ οὐρανοῦ εἰλήλουθεν, ἢ ἄλλο τι δὴ τόδ’ ἔπειτα θεοὶ περιμηχανόωνται. | αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ πάρος γε θεοὶ φαίνονται ἐναργεῖς | ἡμῖν, εὐτ’ ἔρδωμεν ἀγκλειτὰς ἐκατόμβας, | δαίνυνται τε παρ’ ἅμμι καθήμενοι ἔνθα περ ἡμεῖς. | εἰ δ’ ἄρα τις καὶ μόνος ἰὼν ζύμβληται ὀδίτης, ἢ οὐ τι κατακρύπτουσιν, ἐπεὶ σφισιν ἐγγύθεν εἰμέν, | ὥς περ Κύκλωπες τε καὶ ἄγρια φύλα Γιγάντων. But if he is one of the gods come down from heaven, then the gods are indeed scheming differently [from before]. In the past the gods have always appeared to us vividly, whenever we perform our glorious sacrifices, they feast beside us sitting amongst us, inside with us. Even should a lone traveller come across [some], they do not conceal themselves at all, since we are close to them, as are the Kyklōpes and the wild races of the Giants.

²³⁰ J. B. Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth, *Commentary*, at, n. ad η 205, dismisses geographical and kinship factors in favour of “the special relationship of the Phaeacians with the gods.” In fact, these are not mutually exclusive: one may have a special relationship with the gods by virtue of piety and/or kinship and/or geographical proximity.

²³¹ E.g., Σ ΒΤ in η 205: συγγενεῖς γὰρ ἔσμεν θεῶν, ὡς οἱ Κύκλωπες τῶν Γιγάντων. “For we are descended from the gods, as are the Kyklōpes and Giants.” So also O’Sullivan, “Nature and Culture in *Odyssey* 9?” at 11.

²³² Polyphēmos is Poseidōn’s son (ι 412, 519, 528–35); Athēna tells Odysseus that Alkinoös, Arētē’s uncle, is Poseidōn’s grandson and his great-grandfather, Eurymedōn, was king of the giants (η 53–68). See Gilbert P. Rose, “The Unfriendly Phaeacians,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 100 (1969): 387–406 at 392–93, who argues persuasively that “these associations tend to maintain a tense atmosphere throughout Book 7 and an uncertainty which helps to account for Odysseus’ long delay in revealing himself.” Cf. Ahl and Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed*, at 103, who suggest that these relationships prompt Odysseus to antagonize his Phaiakian hosts.

the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, so although modern audiences may assume a genealogical meaning through the semantic range of the English term “close,” this option is less likely for the “original” audience.²³³ Ἐγγύθεν usually conveys geographical proximity, so we might assume that Alkinoös intends a geographical sense for Ἐγγύθεν at η 205 (an option which has no effect on our appraisal of the Kyklōpes or Polyphēmos), but, given that the Phaiakians now live far from the Kyklōpes, it would be difficult for both to be geographically near to the gods.²³⁴

Rather, we may use genealogy to open up another, more fundamental similarity between the three groups. It is, indeed, interesting to observe that the *personae* in the *Odyssey* who are divine, of divine descent, or otherwise supernatural are, on the whole (and with a few prominent exceptions²³⁵), geographically distant from the “human” societies with which the external audience identifies; they are, as the poet puts it, the ἔσχατοι (most remote, α 23, ζ 204–05).²³⁶ To use the ethnographic terms advanced by Carol Dougherty, they may vary in the extent to which they are “other” or “same” but they are all “there” rather than “here.”²³⁷ In this sense, cartographic distances between, say, Hypereia, Skheria, and Mount Olympos are subsumed, like the two groups of Aithiopians,²³⁸ by their proximity in the

²³³ For the uses of Ἐγγύθεν, see below, Appendix 3, p. 205. I am excluding the Alexandrians from this “original audience”: cf. the explanation of Ἐγγύθεν by Σ T ad ι 107: ὡς ἀπογόνων ... ἢ ὡς δικαίων (on account of [their] descent ... or righteousness).

²³⁴ In a trivial sense, the speed with which the gods move (cf. Athēna at Δ 74–79) means that all locations are “near” to them; yet, Alkinoös’ must be implying that the Phaiakians, Kyklōpes, and Giants are somehow “closer” than everyone else for his statement to have meaning.

²³⁵ Apart from Athēna’s visits, the most prominent exception is, of course, Helen, daughter of Zeus (δ 569); Homer knew of Menelaos’ descent from Pelops (B 104–05), but there is no evidence of Pelops’ descent from Tantalos (Pi. O. 1.36) or the latter’s descent from Zeus (Paus. 2.22.4). Helen is the exception who proves the rule, as she lives (*vis-à-vis* Tēlemakhos) “over there”; see below.

²³⁶ Away from the cities of men we find not only the Kyklōpes and Phaiakians (ζ 8, 204–05, *contra* those who would have them as liminal), but also monsters (Laistrygones, Seirēns, the Skylla, Kharybdis), divinities (Aiolos, Kirkē, Kalypsō), the underworld and its inhabitants, Elysium (δ 563–68), the herds of the sun god’s cattle, and tribes of mortals who either enjoy divine privilege (the Aithiopians, among whom Poseidōn feasts [α 22–26; cf. Ψ 205–07]), are sustained by magical, enchanting food (Lōtophagoi), or are immune to agricultural disaster (Syrians [ο 403–11], Libyans [δ 85–89]). See also Anthony T. Edwards, “Homer’s Ethical Geography: Country and City in the *Odyssey*,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 123 (1993): 27–78 at 47–48; cf. the aligned argument of Brown, “In the Cyclops’ Cave,” at 18–20.

It is revealing that the one episode of Odysseus’ ἀπόλογοι not listed above — the Kikones (ι 39–66) — has as its subject a group of humans who are geographically close to Troy (and, indeed, were allies of the Trojans, B 846–47, cf. P 71–74). Cf. Vidal-Naquet, “Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*,” at 37–40.

²³⁷ Carol Dougherty, *The Raft of Odysseus: The Ethnographic Imagination of Homer’s Odyssey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 81–101.

²³⁸ At α 23–24, the poet describes the Αἰθίοπας, τοὶ διχθὰ δεδαΐαται, ἔσχατοι ἀνδρῶν, | οἱ μὲν δυσομένου Ὑπερίονος, οἱ δ’ ἀνιόντος (“Aithiopians, who are divided in two, the furthest of men,
... (continued)

ethnographic imagination of the poet and the external audience, and the way he has Alkinoös use ἐγγύθεν reflects this.²³⁹

In terms of its impact on our appraisal of the Κυκλώπες, Alkinoös' association is thus at worst neutral (if the audience simply accepts that the ἔσχατοι receive divine favour); at best, we might expect it to have a positive effect, either by implying the Κυκλώπες are pious or by associating them with the Phaiakians.

The Κυκλώπες and their Environment

Another positive connection may be drawn between the Κυκλώπες and the Phaiakians at the beginning of the Κυκλώπεια; aside from the fact that they share an epithet (ὑπερφιάλων, “overbearing,” ζ 274, ι 106), there is a fundamental similarity in their geography. Odysseus describes the Κυκλώπean land as follows:

Κυκλώπων δ' ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεμίστων
 ἰκόμεθ', οἳ ῥά θεοῖσι πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν
 οὔτε φυτεύουσιν χερσὶν φυτὸν οὔτ' ἀρώσιν,
 ἀλλὰ τὰ γ' ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνήροτα πάντα φύονται,
 πυροὶ καὶ κριθαὶ ἠδ' ἄμπελοι, αἳ τε φέρουσιν
 οἶνον ἐριστάφυλον, καὶ σφιν Διὸς ὄμβρος ἀέξει.
 τοῖσιν δ' οὔτ' ἀγοραὶ βουλευφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες,
 ἀλλ' οἳ γ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα
 ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
 παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι.

ι 106–15.²⁴⁰

Although some scholars have censured the Κυκλώπες for their lack of agriculture,²⁴¹ many have seen this description (at least, lines 107 onward) as reminiscent of the

(continued)

some [live] at the sinking of Hyperīōn [Hēlios], the others at his rising”). Yet, the Aithiopians are, in practice, treated as a single group, amongst whom, for example, Poseidōn can feast (α 26).

²³⁹ Dimitri Nakassis, “Gemination at the Horizons: East and West in the Mythical Geography of Archaic Greek Epic,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 134, no. 2 (2004): 215–33, comes to a similar conclusion in that he explains poetic problems of Homeric geography in terms of the conflation of the “uni-polar and bi-polar models of solar change,” in which “the gates of the sun, while located at opposite ends of the world, are simultaneously at its geographical center” (230–31). Nakassis does not mention the Κυκλώπες, but proposing that Hypereia and Skheria can be simultaneously distant and collocated is certainly in accord with his conclusions.

²⁴⁰ Then we arrived at the land of the overbearing law-lacking Κυκλώπες, who, relying on the immortal gods, neither plant plants with their hands nor plough, but everything grows unsown and untilled: wheats, barleys, and vines (which bring forth full-bodied wine), and the rain of Zeus grows [these] for them. They have neither *agoras* for councils nor laws, but they live on the peaks of high hills in hollow caves, and each makes laws for his children and wives, and they do not care about one another.

²⁴¹ Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 145.

Age of Gold portrayed in Hesiod's *Works and Days*.²⁴² Specifically, the fact that the *Kyklōpes* “neither plant with their hands nor plough” (ι 108) is similar to the Men of Gold being ἄτερ ... πόνων καὶ οἰζύος (“free of toils and hardship,” *Op.* 113); and the fact that “everything grows unsown and untilled” (ι 109) is similar to the land in the Age of Gold bringing forth fruit αὐτομάτη (“of its own accord,” *Op.* 118).

In this context, it is noteworthy that the land of the *Phaiakians* has also been seen as similar to the Age of Gold: the fruit of *Alkinoös*' orchard οὐ ποτε ... ἀπόλλυται οὐδ' ἀπολείπει | χεῖματος οὐδὲ θέρεως, ἐπετήσιος (“never perishes nor is wanting, neither in summer nor winter, but is perennial,” η 117–18) and grows in plenty (η 120–21); that all stages of winemaking can proceed simultaneously (η 123–26) indicates that his vineyard, similarly, produces continuously; and his herbs ἐπηετανὸν γανώωσαι (“look fresh year-round,” η 128). Carol Dougherty sees in this a similarity to the Age of Gold on the grounds that Hesiod describes the land as bringing forth fruit πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον (“in plenty and ungrudgingly” [*i.e.*, willingly], *Op.* 118).²⁴³ Anthony Edwards notes the absence of verbs of working (and their subjects) in the description of *Alkinoös*' grounds, and rightly identifies the effect of this on the audience as a suppression of the necessity of labouring in the garden; he connects this to the lack of toils or hardships and the automatic bearing of food (cited above) described by Hesiod.²⁴⁴

Here, then, is another fundamental similarity between the *Phaiakians* and the *Kyklōpes*: both live (or seem to live) lives of relative ease, surrounded by supernatural plenty. The similarity to the Hesiodic Age of Gold is not simply an archaizing motif,²⁴⁵ as the description of that era in the *Works and Days* is one of an

²⁴² Kirk, *Myth*, at 164; Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, at 126; Ingrid E. Holmberg, “The Sign of ΜΗΤΙΣ,” *Arethusa* 30, no. 1 (1997): 1–33 at 16; Vidal-Naquet, “Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*,” at 41; Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 349–50; Mondì, “The Homeric Cyclopes,” at 19, and 22, writes of their “‘golden-age’ existence” without mentioning the *Works and Days*, as does de Jong, *Narratological Commentary*, at 232, n. ad ι 106–566; Ruth Scodel, “The Achaean Wall and the Myth of Destruction,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 86 (1982): 33–50 at 49, notes the similarity is possibly greater to the Age of Silver. Austin, “*Odysseus and the Cyclops*,” at 23–30 argues the “abundance of negatives” in the description of the land are “a conventional rhetorical formula for paradise landscapes.”

²⁴³ Dougherty, *The Raft of Odysseus*, at 87–88.

²⁴⁴ See Edwards, “Homer's Ethical Geography,” at 47–48; cited also by Dougherty, *The Raft of Odysseus*, at 88. Cf. Vidal-Naquet, “Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*,” at 39, who stresses the fact that the *Lōtophagoi*, *Laistrygonēs*, and *Kyklōps* are not “bread eaters” and connects this with a suppression of agricultural work.

²⁴⁵ E.g., Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 355.

utopia²⁴⁶ and if the lands of the Phaiakians and Kyklōpes are similar to the environment of the Age of Gold, this, again, is liable to have a positive impact on our appraisal of the Kyklōpes.

Pura Nieto Hernández, however, sees “the Golden Age, as Hesiod describes it, [as] itself fundamentally ambiguous,” on the grounds that the reigning god, Kronos, “whose rule symbolizes the Golden age,” was a cannibal who devoured his own children at birth (*Th.* 453–506).²⁴⁷ Her logic is similar to that of Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who argues that “the counterpart of the age of gold is cannibalism” on these and other grounds.²⁴⁸ This argument assimilates, however, Kronos’ cannibalism in the *Theogony* with his status as creating god in the *Works and Days*. Yet, to borrow an argument from Christopher Brown, we must be cautious in treating the two poems as a single, internally consistent, theology, as the themes of two poems describe succession myths which are diametrically opposed: the *Theogony* describes a moral progression, the *Works and Days* a decline.²⁴⁹ Ultimately, we must yield to Hesiod’s explicit assessments of the Age of Gold: κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν ἀπάντων (“they were free of all evil,” *Op.* 115) and ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα τοῖσιν ἔην (“they had all/only good

²⁴⁶ The Men of Gold live “like the gods” with carefree hearts (ὥστε θεοὶ ... ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες, *Op.* 112), free from toils, hardship, and troubles (113, 115), with all/only good things (116–17), delighting at the feasts (114) in eternal youth (113–14) until claimed by a sleep-like (*i.e.*, peaceful, painless) death (116).

²⁴⁷ Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 349–50; many of Hernández’ observations have merit, but I do not find her broader claim that the Κυκλώπεια re-enacts the establishment of the reign of Zeus (and hence a better world order) convincing: the parallels are too few and too exaggerated and, at any rate, the blinding does not usher in a new or better era for Odysseus or his companions.

Cf. Justin Glenn, “The Polyphemus Myth: Its Origin and Interpretation,” *Greece & Rome* 25, no. 2 (1978): 141–55 at 149–53, who also discusses the similarities between “the Polyphemus myth” and “the myth of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus,” from a Freudian psychoanalytical perspective, and concludes that “[w]hat we have here ... are two versions of the same story, the same struggle” (150). Although he admits that “[i]n the Polyphemus myth, these ... [‘Oedipal’ elements] are latent and disguised,” he proposes that blinding is to be seen as a “symbolic castration,” and Polyphēmos as “a symbolic father-figure” (151). This analysis, which conflates the Ouranos/Kronos and Kronos/Zeus stories, is confused (Glenn’s identification of the imprisoned Odysseus with Kronos is directed at a myth which does not involve cannibalism, and his identification of the Kyklōps with Kronos is directed at a [different] myth which does not involve castration), and has been superseded by his “The Polyphemus Folk-tale” article (already cited).

²⁴⁸ Vidal-Naquet, “Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*,” at 36, (the quotation is from 41). In addition to Kronos’ cannibalism, Vidal-Naquet uses several late sources (Euhemerus, Sextus Empiricus, and “Fourth Century Cynics” [even the Fourth Century is “late” when compared to Homer]) as evidence, but does not consider the possibility that the customs they describe were speculation from the early literary sources. He then uses Polyphēmos to infer that this is the case in Homer. This argument is untenable in the context of the Golden-Age Lōtophagoi who *do not* practice cannibalism and the city-dwelling Laistrygonēs who *do*.

²⁴⁹ Brown, “In the Cyclops’ Cave,” at 19 (n. 50), advances this argument in a different context.

things,” 116–17). Ultimately, then, we must conclude that any allusion to the Age of Gold in the descriptions of the Phaiakians’ and the Kyklōpes’ lands has a positive effect.

Yet, we are still justified in questioning whether any allusion is being made to an alternative tradition at these *loci*. The correspondences cited could simply be symptomatic of a generic portrait (in both works) of a setting which is idyllic compared to the pressing daily concerns of the (external) audience such as having to work, produce food, and resolve disputes. In other words, both descriptions differentiate their subjects from the external audience in terms of alterity. In support of this, we may note that the lands of the ἔσχατοι — those “over there” rather than “over here” are blessed with supernatural fertility: in Libya the sheep lamb three times a year and produce milk continuously (δ 85–89); in the country of the Laistrygonians the short nights permit twice the amount of shepherding (κ 81–86); and Eumaios describes his former home, Syria, as one of plenty, free from famine (ο 405–08).²⁵⁰ Syria is also similar to the Hesiodic Age of Gold in that the inhabitants of both worlds enjoy painless deaths (ο 409–11, *Op.* 113–16). The lands “over there” in the *Odyssey* are, in fact, inherently similar to the Hesiodic Age of Gold in their *distance* from the external audience. In the *Odyssey*, the distance is geographic; in the *Works and Days*, it is temporal.²⁵¹ It is, therefore, not necessary to propose an allusion between one tradition and the other to “explain” the fertility of the land.²⁵²

Thus, the utopian description of the Kyklōpean landscape is at worst neutral (if the ἔσχατοι are seen purely as different rather than better or worse), and at best positive (if an assumption is made that those who receive divine favour must deserve it). This, however, is undermined by the fact that the description of the utopia is immediately preceded by a description of the Kyklōpes as ὑπερφίαλοι and ἀθέμιστοι (“overbearing” and “without laws,” ι 106). These, as we have seen, are

²⁵⁰ Edwards, “Homer’s Ethical Geography,” at 47–48, notes Libya and Syria (but not the Laistrygonians); he gives also Elysium (δ 563–68) and Olympos (ζ 41–46) as further examples of mild weather and easy livelihood, but I omit them as I am concentrating on agricultural plenty.

²⁵¹ Of course, the distance is temporal also in Homer as far as the external audience (whether ancient or modern) is concerned; it is not temporal, however, for Odysseus’ audience (the Phaiakians).

²⁵² West, “An Indic Reflex of the Homeric *Cyclopeia*,” at 133 also, for a different reason, concludes that the description does not imply piety.

pejorative descriptions. Although the former term (perhaps) originally meant “exceedingly mighty,”²⁵³ its moral overtones in the *Odyssey* are unquestionable;²⁵⁴ and although the latter occurs only twice elsewhere in the Homeric poems,²⁵⁵ its nuances are quite clear. The *least* pejorative occurrence, in fact, is in a famous *gnomē* from Nestōr:

ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος
ὄς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος. I 63–64.²⁵⁶

Eustathius glossed the phrase ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος as ἄπολις ... καὶ μήτε θέμιν εἰδῶς μήτε οἶκον ἔχων (“cityless ... and neither knows laws nor has a home”²⁵⁷), but there is arguably more to Nestōr’s description than this. All three words imply the exclusion of the man from civilized society: he is without brotherhood, and thus lacks any social peers; he is without (or pays no heed to) society’s laws and privileges, or what is collectively considered right; and he is hearthless — not just lacking his own hearth, but excluded from all others’ — and hence shunned by his fellow men.

Thus, when a member of the external audience of the *Odyssey* hears the Kyklōpes described as ἀθέμιστοι at ι 106, the effect is a profoundly negative one. As a group, the Kyklōpes stand outside civilized society. The asocial aspects of the Kyklōpes are inherent also in their lack of ἀγοραὶ βουλευφόροι and θέμιστες (“*agoras* for making decisions” and “laws” [or “law-codes”], ι 112), that their law codes do not extend beyond the family unit (114–15), and they do not converse with each other (115). It is significant that the *agora*’s function as the site of the assembly (rather than simply as a marketplace) is highlighted here. Not only do the Kyklōpes lack law codes — the product of social agreement — but also the means of forming them.

²⁵³ Thus the LSJ, though I cannot accept Antinoös’ self-reference at φ 289 as evidence that the term can lack moral overtones in the *Odyssey*. At worst, this is a slip on the poet’s part; I see it, however, as part of a deliberate strategy in which the suitors’ arrogance is made so obvious that even they are (eventually) forced to accept it.

²⁵⁴ See above, p. 111.

²⁵⁵ ρ 363 (applied to the suitors) and I 63 (see below). The related ἀθεμιστιος occurs four times: twice applied to the Kyklōps (ι 189, 428), once indefinitely (σ 141), and once to the suitor Ktēsippos immediately before he (impiously) throws the ox-hoof at Odysseus (υ 287).

²⁵⁶ Devoid of society [lit: brotherhood-less], without laws, and hearthless is that man | who loves dreadful war among his people.

²⁵⁷ Eust. *Il. ad loc.*

Yet, not all have taken verse 106 in a negative light. The Scholiasts, for example, saw the description of the *Kyklōpes* as “overbearing and lawless” on the one hand and their trust in the gods and divine privileges of the following passage on the other as inconsistent. Some sought to rationalize this inconsistency by glossing *ὑπερφιάλοι* as “superiority of the body,” and *ἀθέμιστοι* as “not using law codes [νόμοι], rather than ‘unjust’ [ἀδικοί].”²⁵⁸ Yet, this reading is difficult to sustain: as shown above, the terms convey strong moral overtones which cannot be explained away. Indeed, the juxtaposition of the pejorative descriptions of 106 and the idyllic landscape of 107–11 does not seem such a great difficulty when one sees the latter as the product of the *Kyklōpes* geographic (or ethnographic) location rather than their moral standing.²⁵⁹

Other scholars have argued that the negativity inherent in ι 106 is short-lived. Geoffrey Kirk, like the ancient commentators, connects the *ἀθέμιστων* of 106 with their lack of *θέμιστες* in 112; unlike the Scholiasts, however, he argues that this lack — and their lack of an *ἀγορά* — “resumes, and somewhat moderates, the description of them as ‘lawless’ a few lines before,” and this limited “lawlessness” is potentially “a very idyllic, if primitive, state of affairs.”²⁶⁰ Robert Mondi takes this in a similarly positive sense, and associates it with the “Golden Age” imagery of the introduction to the *Κυκλώπεια*.²⁶¹ The focus of this argument is, however, on the *retrospective* effect of verse 112 — an effect which does not come into force until that line is reached — and it is also worth considering the *prospective* effects of 106, and the effects of the intervening lines, on the passage as a whole.²⁶²

An audience hearing this introduction to the *Κυκλώπεια* does not begin with a *tabula rasa*. Although what knowledge of the *Kyklōpes* individual audience

²⁵⁸ Σ T *ad* ι 106; so also Σ V, B, *ad loc.*, and Eust. *Od. ad* ι 106. The problem (though not this solution) is also raised by Segal, “Divine Justice in the *Odyssey*,” at 494. Other Scholiasts (e.g., Σ H *ad* ι 106) accepted the negativity of the phrase, and explained the inconsistency by proposing that the labels applied to Polyphēmos alone, but the rest of the *Kyklōpes* were good and pious (and hence enjoyed divine privileges). The solution of Mondi, “The Homeric Cyclopes,” is more or less a restatement of this latter view.

²⁵⁹ *Pace* the implications of Segal, “Divine Justice in the *Odyssey*,” at 494.

²⁶⁰ Kirk, *Myth*, at 164.

²⁶¹ Mondi, “The Homeric Cyclopes,” at 24: “A golden age needs no laws.”

²⁶² *Cf.* de Jong, “The Subjective Style,” at 7: “The qualification *ἀθέμιστων* might at first sight be taken as descriptive (*cf.* 112 ...). However, lines 189, 215, and 428 make clear that Odysseus is in fact voicing a negative evaluation here.” I only take issue with the first sentence: I think the negativity is immediately apparent, and it is the lack of laws in 112 which is (implicitly) descriptive.

members bring to the text or what they can remember from the preceding section of the epic (such as α 68–75 and β 19–20) is uncertain, we are on much surer ground observing that there is generic danger involved in landing in a strange place.²⁶³ The negative implications of ι 106, then, resume this theme and undermine the positive description of the paradise at which Odysseus has arrived. Kirk was right, therefore, to see the *Kyklōpes*' lack of an ἀγορά and θέμιστες (ι 112) as *resuming* their description as ἀθέμιστοι of 106, but the extent to which this *moderates* the description is open to question. It is, indeed, more likely that a moderating effect operates in the reverse direction: the initial piece of information we learned about the *Kyklōpes* when arriving at this section was negative, and this negativity almost inevitably moderates the positive description of their surroundings, including any potentially positive aspects of the *Kyklōpes*' lack of social institutions.

In other words, the “Golden Age” description of the *Kyklōpes*' land is, as Hernández claimed, ambiguous, but we do not need recourse to any extra-diegetic information to demonstrate this ambiguity: as with the *Seirēn*-song, beauty can be deceptive and its investigation can be perilous. This is not, however, simply a re-statement of her conclusion: the dependence of Hernández' argument on this extra-diegetic information would imply that the ambiguity she identifies is not visible at the poetic level; it is literal rather than poetic ambiguity, and would have no effect on the transported audience. By reframing the evidence, my argument suggests that ambivalence is inherent in the poetic depiction of the *Kyklōpean* geography and society, and that thus it will be available to the transported audience.

²⁶³ When the audience reaches ι 106, two of Odysseus' adventures have been presented, both of which assert this danger. Although the danger among the *Kikones* could be variously explained in terms of their alliance with the Trojans (B 846–47) or as retribution for Odysseus' sacking of the city, the fact that the *Lōtophagoi* did not devise death for Odysseus' companions (ι 92) is presented as unusual, and implies that the inhabitants of strange lands are generally dangerous. (On negations “with retrospective scope” as contradicting the audience's expectations [in the *Iliad*], see Irene J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 1987), at 61–65.) The majority of Odysseus' other adventures (with the exceptions of *Aiolos* and *Kalypsō*) will also bear out this danger, as does Odysseus' rhetorical question about the nature of the inhabitants (the second of three in temporal sequence, but the first presented in the narrative itself) upon landing in *Skheria* (ζ 119–21; cf. ι 174–76, ν 200–02). The ancient audience presumably had experience of other epics about such adventures, and we may assume they were well acquainted with this danger.

Polyphēmos' status as a Kyklōps

At the beginning of this section, I posed the question: what impact does Polyphēmos' membership of the group known as "Kyklōpes" have on our understanding of his character? The evidence sketched out above suggests the answer is that it lends him a degree of poetic ambiguity. The Kyklōpes are related to the gods in a positive manner in η; they are contrasted with the helpful Phaiakians in ζ; and they live in a poetically ambivalent utopia at the beginning of the Κυκλώπεια.

As Polyphēmos is the only Kyklōps whose character is developed — indeed, the only one named — it is natural for us to assume that he is a typical Kyklōps. The effects noted above depend, to some extent, on the strength of this assumption. In this context it is noteworthy that some critics have questioned the extent to which Polyphēmos can be held to represent the Kyklōpes and *vice versa*. In an attempt to reconcile the piety supposedly inherent in the Kyklōpes' fertile environment (seen in the phrase θεοῖσι πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν, "trusting in the immortal gods," at ι 107) with their description as ὑπερφιάλοι ("arrogant," ι 106) and Polyphēmos' categorical rejection of Zeus and the other gods at ι 275–76, the Scholiasts rationalized that only Polyphēmos was arrogant and unjust, but the rest of the Kyklōpes were pious, just, and trusted the gods.²⁶⁴ Similarly, Geoffrey Kirk distinguishes between the "relatively civilised" (and at times "super-civilised") depiction of the Kyklōpes and the "super-uncivilised" depiction of Polyphēmos.²⁶⁵ Robert Mondi also proposed that the long-standing "problems" of the Κυκλώπεια could be "explained" by seeing Polyphēmos as different from the other Kyklōpes.²⁶⁶ A parallel question is, indeed, whether we can infer Poseidōn was the father of all the Homeric Kyklōpes from the fact that he was the father of Polyphēmos.

²⁶⁴ Σ H ad ι 106; cf. Σ T (quoting Antisthenēs), V, B, *ad loc*, and T ad ι 107, which connects the piety of the fertile environment with the piety seen in Alkinoös' ἐγγύθεν at η 205.

²⁶⁵ Kirk, *Myth*, at 167–70, especially his table at 169.

²⁶⁶ Mondi, "The Homeric Cyclopes," *passim*. Mondi's argument differs from the Scholiasts' in that he does not attempt to reconcile the depictions *within* the *Odyssey*, but to explain them diachronically (*i.e.*, how they came to exist within the *Odyssey*).

Although the ascriptions of piety on these grounds are (as argued above) unwarranted,²⁶⁷ when we come to compare Polyphēmos and the rest of the *Kyklōpes* at the poetic level we can see some evidence that Polyphēmos may have differed from the other *Kyklōpes*, particularly in his (im)piety. Our first and most explicit evidence for the impiety of Polyphēmos is, of course, his rejection of Odysseus' petition to respect his guests, when he famously asserts,

οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχου ἀλέγουσιν
οὐδὲ θεῶν μακάρων, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτεροί εἰμεν· l 275–76.²⁶⁸

Polyphēmos provides, in context, two synonyms which mirror his use of the verb ἀλεγίζω (to show due regard) in 275: the first is δειδοῖκα (to fear / to shrink from); the second is ἀλέομαι (to avoid [sc. the anger] of). Ἀλέομαι, indeed, appears twice: coupled with θεοὺς (the gods) in the preceding sentence,²⁶⁹ and coupled with ἔχθος Διὸς (the enmity of Zeus) in the subsequent one.²⁷⁰

That the *Kyklōpes* have a similar attitude is implicit in the logic of Odysseus' narration of the episode: it is a fundamental assumption of his Οὔτις-trick that the other *Kyklōpes* would assist Polyphēmos in destroying Odysseus should they learn about his presence, and Polyphēmos seems to assume the same thing when he addresses them as φίλοι (“friends,” l 408) and explains his predicament. Yet, it is also apparent at the poetic level that the other *Kyklōpes* show at least some respect to Zeus and the other gods. When they misunderstand his “Οὔτις με κτείνει δόλω οὐδὲ βίηφιν”²⁷¹ their reply,

²⁶⁷ That is, because the fertility and “closeness” are not indicative of piety but of the *Kyklōpes*' ethnographic status as “there” rather than “here.” There is a potential problem with this in that l 107 attributes their plenty to their trust in the gods, but we can see this (with Hernández, “Back in the Cave of the Cyclops,” at 358, although she frames it in different terms) as the focalization of Odysseus rather than the narrator.

²⁶⁸ For the *Kyklōpes* do not care about aegis-bearing Zeus nor the blessed gods, since we are better by far.

²⁶⁹ l 273–74: νήπιός εἰς, ὧ ξεῖν', ἢ τηλόθεν εἰλήλουθας, | ὅς με θεοὺς κέλει ἢ δειδίμεν ἢ ἀλέασθαι. “You are naïve, stranger, or have come from far away, who orders me either to fear or keep out of the way of the gods.”

²⁷⁰ l 277–78: οὐδ' ἂν ἐγὼ Διὸς ἔχθος ἀλευάμενος πεφιδόμην | οὔτε σεῦ οὔθ' ἐτάρων, εἰ μὴ θυμός με κελεύοι. “And nor would I spare you or your companions to avoid the wrath of Zeus unless my spirit ordered me to do so.”

²⁷¹ l 408: He intends “Outis is killing me by trickery, but not by violence,” but they hear “No-one is killing me by trickery or violence.”

“εἰ μὲν δὴ μή τις σε βιάζεται οἶον ἔόντα,
νοῦσόν γ’ οὐ πως ἔστι Διὸς μεγάλου ἀλέασθαι,
ἀλλὰ σύ γ’ εὔχεο πατρὶ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι.”

ι 410–12.²⁷²

is framed in “pious” terms: not only do they ascribe illnesses to mighty Zeus, but also they suggest that the cure for disease is prayer (to Poseidōn, another Olympian god). This is reinforced by the verbal resonance of ἀλέομαι in 411: where Polyphēmos assumed it was possible to avoid the will of the gods in 274 and 277 on the grounds that the Kyklōpes were their equals, his friends assert that the gods’ will cannot be evaded, only mitigated.

This contrast emphasizes Polyphēmos’ impiety and has a negative effect on our appraisal of him. Although, as I noted above, he does seem to have a change of heart and he does subsequently take up his friends’ advice to “pray” to his father,²⁷³ their advice does not persuade him immediately: his first move after their departure is yet another attempt to trap Odysseus (*i.e.*, he continues his impious treatment of his suppliant guests) with the intention, as he says forlornly to his pet ram at 458–60, of killing him to find relief from his troubles. Again, this emphasizes the difference between Polyphēmos and the Kyklōpes: where they suggest prayer as a means of alleviation, all he can think of is further violence.

Retrospective

Polyphēmos and Odysseus are, in sum, both poetically and literally ambiguous. The literal ambiguity stems from the unreliability of Odysseus’ narration: at the poetic level, he paints the Kyklōps as more stupid and capricious than he literally is; he emphasizes (and possibly exaggerates) his own intelligence and piety; and he obscures the true consequences of his actions. In all of these, indeed, we can sense the complicity of the poet himself in that he carries Odysseus’ interpretation on through the rest of the *Odyssey*.

The poetic ambiguity, on the other hand, arises from contradictions in the audience members’ understanding of the characters at the poetic level. Although the poetic characterizations of Odysseus and Polyphēmos are generally very positive and very negative (respectively), there are facets of the characterization of

²⁷² If indeed nobody is doing you violence and you are alone, there is no way of avoiding an illness of mighty Zeus, but do you pray to your father the lord Poseidōn.

²⁷³ See above, p. 145, n. 192.

both which act in the opposite direction. Polyphēmos gains some positive characteristics (whether deservedly or not) through his status as a Kyklōps and through his associations with the gods in α. He is also given positive characteristics — such as his skills as a dairy farmer — which shine through at different moments in the episode,²⁷⁴ and his *pathos* after the blinding elicits our pity. Odysseus' character, on the other hand, is tarnished only slightly; his dichotomized opposition to the Kyklōps reflects badly on him whenever it reflects well on Polyphēmos and thus the pity we feel for the Kyklōps in the last section of the story may be accompanied by some censure of Odysseus' behaviour.

I noted early in this chapter that the literal status of a character may become obscured by transportation (especially when it diverges from the poetic truth) and argued that it is the poetic, rather than the literal, portrayal which directs the transported audience's appraisal of the characters and the action. In this sense the Κυκλώπεια, which accommodates interpretations of the characters, the action, and its consequences which differ significantly between the literal and poetic levels, is a very suitable text on which we might test our theories.

²⁷⁴ Polyphēmos' skills as a dairy farmer are mentioned at ι 218–23, 244–49, 307–09, and 340–42, all in positive terms: for the positive implications of ἐθηεύμεσθα (“we wondered,” ι 218), see n. 75, p. 121 above; at ι 245 = 309 = 342, the Kyklōps is described as performing his tasks πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν (“all in order”), which is implicitly complementary. Cf. de Jong, *Narratological Commentary*, at 232, n. ad ι 106–566, who rightly refers to “Odysseus' approving focalization.” Even Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, at 144–45, gives a positive assessment of Polyphēmos' skills as a dairy farmer, albeit while censuring the Kyklōps (in a wonderful *non sequitur*) for disregarding the “agricultural paradise” in which he lives.

Chapter 5: An Empirical Investigation into the Κυκλώπεια

[I]t stands to reason that a sustained dialogue among the disciplines of literary theory, narratology, cognitive psychology, discourse processing, and linguistics is a prerequisite for a more rigorous inquiry into how narrative functions.

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Background

In Chapter 2, I compared several conceptualizations (including that implicit in the texts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) of audience response in (and to) Homeric epic to the psychological theory of transportation. In Chapter 3, I outlined two (mostly complementary) conceptions of transportation more fully. One (perhaps *the*) major advantage transportation offers over the theoretical work of Bassett, Walsh, Ford and Bakker is the potential it brings to the study of Homeric epic for empirical verification of theoretical conclusions. The success with which Melanie Green obtained results in her large-scale studies shows that transportation is not just a hypothetical construct to be invoked to describe a literary device (as is Walsh's *enchantment*) or to explain the composer's stance in performance (as is Bakker's *vividness*); rather, transportation is an experimentally demonstrable phenomenon with empirically verifiable causes and consequences.

I referred, at the end of Chapter 3, to the fact that this thesis is accompanied by its own empirical study examining the influence of transportation on the appraisal of literary characters who are literally ambiguous. Having shown that the Κυκλώπεια fits the criteria of ambiguity and centrality adumbrated at the end of Chapter 3, it is to the details of that study we now turn.

As noted in Chapter 3, Green and Brock found that transportation reliably increased their subjects' appraisal of Katie and Joan (the protagonists of their target narrative)¹ — a phenomenon I refer to as the “protagonist effect” — but, in unpublished data, they did not find a complementary “antagonist effect” on the

* Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon, *Psychonarratology: Foundations for the Empirical Study of Literary Response* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 3.

¹ See Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock, “The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 5 (2000): 701–21 at 708, table 3, for a summary.

appraisal of the killer.² Although Green hypothesized that the lack of influence on the appraisal of the antagonist was due to a “floor effect” — appraisals in the low-transportation group were so bad that there was no scope for a worse appraisal in the high-transportation group — Green and Brock made no attempt to account for the protagonist effect.

It is possible to interpret this protagonist effect as simply another facet of increased narrative-persuasion among transported readers. The protagonists in Green and Brock’s target narrative, “Murder at the Mall,” are clearly portrayed in positive terms: Katie Mason is an innocent “buoyant, beautiful child of nine,”³ Joan (her mother), the only witness who does not initially flee from (in fact, who advances toward) the child’s scream at the beginning of the incident.⁴ Further, our understanding of Katie’s character is influenced not only by the contrast with her killer (who is explicitly characterized as “demonic”⁵) but also by the sympathetic reactions of others towards her (such as the hospital staff who were “appalled” and “did every possible thing to bring her back, even with the certain foreknowledge that their attempts would be futile”⁶). In this sense, the fact that readers in the high-transportation group rated the protagonists in a more positive manner might be seen as persuasion by an implicit message along the lines of “Katie is good.”

In Chapter 3, I proposed that one might circumvent the “floor effect” and investigate the antagonist effect by choosing an antagonist who, to the non-transported audience at least, is not inherently so negative; in a word, a character who is ambiguous. Ambiguity, however, is not limited to antagonists; it can form part of the characterization of protagonists also. Indeed, I hope to have shown in Chapter 4 that both the protagonist and antagonist of the target narrative in this experiment (the *Κυκλώπεια*) are ambiguous.

² Melanie C. Green, *Pers. Comm.* (e-mail to author, 6 February 2003).

³ Green and Brock’s narrative was extracted from Shewin B. Nuland, *How We Die* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), at 123–28; Nuland describes Katie in this way at p. 124; he later describes her as a pretty girl (p. 128).

⁴ *Ibid.*, at 125–26.

⁵ Nuland, *ibid.*, at 128, notes that “[a]s early as age six, he [sc. the killer] had told a psychiatrist that the devil had come up out of the ground and entered his body.” “Perhaps,” he comments, “he was right.” Shortly thereafter he describes the stabbing as a “demonic work.”

⁶ *Ibid.*, at 127–28.

In Chapter 4, I differentiated between two different (but not mutually exclusive) types of ambiguity. One was “poetic ambiguity”: the internal inconsistency of characterization at the surface (poetic level) of the narrative. The other, which I call “literal ambiguity,” arises when the narrative is unreliable and there is a discrepancy between the status of a character visible at the surface of the text (the “poetic truth”) and its underlying basis (the “literal truth”). I then argued that both Odysseus and Polyphēmos are literally ambiguous in the *Κυκλώπεια* — the literal extent of their (im)piety and (un)intelligence is misrepresented at the poetic level — but that their characters are complicated by the addition of a modicum of poetic ambiguity.

Because transportation restricts access to the extra-diegetic information on which the literal truth depends, the implicit “message” of the text by which the transported audience is persuaded should depend solely on the poetic portrayal of the character; this leads to competing predictions for the effect of transportation on the literal and poetic ambiguity of characters: for literal ambiguity, the suppression of unreliability by the concealment of the literal truth should reduce perceived ambiguity and augment the appraisal straightforwardly in the direction of the poetic truth; for poetic ambiguity, in contrast, the exaggeration of the different facets of the poetic portrayal should *increase* perceived ambiguity but (because exaggeration operates in both directions but the individual facets make unequal contributions to the overall construction of the character) have a less predictable effect on appraisal.⁷ In general, we should expect a reduced change in appraisal for a poetically ambiguous character than for a literally ambiguous one.

If Odysseus and Polyphēmos are, as argued in Chapter 4, mostly literally ambiguous but slightly poetically ambiguous, then we may expect that the impact of transportation on the audience’s understanding of their characters will resemble that of literal ambiguity but will be slightly moderated. In other words, the appraisal of Odysseus should be more positive, the appraisal of Polyphēmos more negative, and the ambiguity of both substantially reduced for highly transported audience members compared to those who are minimally transported.

⁷ We might describe the appraisal as a weighted average of the contributing facets; the weightings will, however, vary between individuals.

It is, obviously, necessary to have an empirical index of transportation itself if we are to assess its impact on the understanding of character portrayal. Two such indices were employed in this experiment: an “off-line” measure (that is, one administered after [rather than during] the reception of the narrative) developed previously by Green and Brock,⁸ and a novel “on-line” measure (one administered contemporaneously with the reading of the text) introduced here.⁹ These measures are described in detail in the Method section of this chapter.¹⁰

Method and Materials

Participants

Participants’ background knowledge was standardized as far as possible by recruiting them from first-year Classics courses (Ancient Greek, Latin, and a Classical Mythology survey-course). A total of 41 undergraduate Classics students participated in the experiment for a token payment. Sessions were run individually for each participant.

Experimental Narrative

The target narrative used in the experiment was extracted from my own translation of the *Κυκλώπεια*; the narrative covered ι 193–542 with the exclusion of the digression about Marōn’s wine (204–11).¹¹ Although an auditory reception would obviously match an ancient (oral) reception context more closely, a written-text delivery was chosen to parallel the modality of the vast majority of modern reception contexts.

Transportation Measures

Off-Line Measure

The off-line measure used in this experiment was the “Transportation Scale” developed by Melanie Green and Timothy Brock mentioned above in Chapter 3: a fifteen-item questionnaire which requires participants to rate their agreement or

⁸ This is the “Transportation Scale” of Green and Brock, “The Role of Transportation,” at 703–04 and *passim*. See above, pp. 85–86; the scale itself is reproduced in Appendix 4, below, p. 207.

⁹ For the distinction between on- and off-line, see above, p. 84.

¹⁰ See below, this page, under “Transportation Measures.”

¹¹ The breakdown of the narrative into screens as delivered in the experiment may be found below in Appendix 5, starting p. 209.

disagreement with a series of fifteen statements conceptually aligned with or directly opposed to transportation.¹² (Homeric characters were substituted for the narrative-specific items.¹³) Participants responded to the statements by moving a slider along computerized Likert scales¹⁴ anchored at the ends with the labels “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”; the direction (left-right) of the questions was counterbalanced.¹⁵ Responses were scored between 1 and 7 and summed to give a Transportation Score with a theoretical range of 15 to 105.¹⁶ The items of the scale itself are reproduced in Appendix 4.¹⁷

The Transportation Scale is, we must note, easy to implement, whether as a pen-and-paper questionnaire as employed by Green and Brock or as a computerized task as in this experiment. It also attempts to gauge transportation directly. The inevitable consequences of this directness are, however, that the measure is both subjective (in that it asks respondents to report on their experiences) and retrospective (in that respondents report these experiences well after the fact).

On-Line Measure

This experiment, therefore, employed also a novel, alternative measure of transportation which was created by importing a technique used in psychological studies of attention. This measure was designed to be objective (rather than subjective) and to gauge transportation “on line” (that is, contemporaneous with the narrative reception). A signal-detection paradigm was employed to measure real-world *presence*; participants were asked to respond to a faintly audible tone

¹² Green and Brock, “The Role of Transportation,” at 703–04. See above, pp. 85–86.

¹³ The names substituted in these last four items (all “while reading the narrative I had a vivid image of...” were “Odysseus,” “the Cyclops,” “the Cyclops’ cave,” and “Odysseus’ companions.”

¹⁴ A Likert scale is a numbered scale anchored at both ends and sometimes (though not in this instance) also in the middle. An example from the Transportation Scale is:

6. *I wanted to learn how the narrative ended.*

Agree |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

¹⁵ The initial direction (left-right) of the scale was chosen at random; the direction of each subsequent item was the reverse of the preceding item. This counterbalanced the questions for each individual respondent, and should (on average) have counterbalanced them across all participants.

¹⁶ In a slight departure from Green and Brock’s precedent, the computer was programmed to allow responses between the numbered points of the scale, and recorded responses to an accuracy of 0.1.

¹⁷ See below, p. 207.

presented at irregular intervals during the delivery of the narrative.¹⁸ In these terms (and given appropriate safeguards: see below), a decrease in sensitivity to the signals (real-world stimuli) was taken as a reflection of real-world *absence*, itself indicative of transportation. Sensitivity was calculated by comparing the proportion of signals detected (the “hit rate”) and the speed of signal detection (the response latency) during narrative reception to a baseline (no text) condition.

Signals were presented for half a second each at a computerized approximation of “middle C.”¹⁹ In order to limit intrusion upon reception (which would, inherently, moderate transportation), the tone started and finished softly²⁰ and the volume of the signal was set just above the minimum perceivable level (the absolute threshold of hearing). Participants responded to the tone by tapping the spacebar on the computer keyboard.

Response latencies were measured by computer with an accuracy of 1 ms (0.001 seconds).²¹ Latencies shorter than 150ms were discounted (and recorded as false alarms) because they must reflect actions already under way at the onset of the tone. Participants had five seconds to respond to each tone, and thus latencies over 5000ms were also recorded as false alarms. Latency was then averaged over all the hits.

Measuring Appraisal

Discussing the effects of transportation on appraisal, of course, presupposes that participants’ views about a character are somehow able to be quantified. Following the precedent set by Green and Brock, this was done using a set of four semantic-differential scales. A semantic-differential scale seeks to ascertain a respondent’s view by asking her/him to situate the object (here, the character being appraised) between two antonyms such as “good” and “bad.” An example is shown in Figure 1. The response (the point indicated along this dimension) is then coded on some

¹⁸ The signal was presented aurally to minimize interference with the reception of the (written) text.

¹⁹ The sound played was, in fact, MIDI note 60, which has a frequency of 261.6256 Hz.

²⁰ The voice chosen was MIDI patch 79, a “whistle,” as this has gentle attack and release attributes at the chosen frequency, but no decay.

²¹ Times were measured using the multimedia clock in the Windows sub-system; this clock can take and answer requests at the speed of the processor (in this case, 400 MHz = four million requests every second, or 4,000 every millisecond) but only gives a response to the nearest millisecond.

arbitrary scale, such as between 0 and 7, -3 and +3, -50 and +50, or similar. The process is repeated over several dimensions and responses to each scale are added to give an overall appraisal.




Figure 1: A semantic-differential scale

Green and Brock used four such scales to gauge character appraisal in their empirical studies on “Murder at the Mall.” The dimensions they measured were good-bad, pleasant-unpleasant, attractive-unattractive, and responsible-irresponsible. Of these, the latter two seemed to have less relevance to the characters in the *Κυκλώπεια*; in this experiment, therefore, they were reoriented to more basic dimensions (like-dislike and right-wrong) which measure some of the fundamental ambiguities of the episode itself.

Participants appraised both Odysseus and the *Kyklōps* on these scales; a position was marked on the scale by moving a slider left/right with the keyboard or mouse. The order of presentation of these scales was determined at random for each participant, but was the same for both characters. Order of appraisal (of Odysseus and the *Kyklōps*) was, likewise, determined at random (and should have been counterbalanced on average). The order in which characters were appraised and subscales were presented was not recorded. Each scale was anchored at each end with the semantic term, and at the centre with the differential terms joined by neither ... nor (*e.g.*, “Neither Right nor Wrong”); the marker was initially positioned in the centre. Scales were scored from -30 to +30, with tick marks every 10 units. Subscale scores were added to give an overall appraisal. The theoretical range for Appraisal Scores was -120 to +120.

Safeguards and Controls

The assumption underlying the on-line measure was that a decrease in sensitivity to the audible signal was reflective of transportation (and an increase in sensitivity indicative of diminished transportation); this assumption may be invalidated, however, by several confounding factors: it does not hold if, for example, the

participant could predict when the signals would be given or if s/he could not hear them at all. The relationship between transportation and character appraisal is also subject to interference if the participant did not pay attention to the text but based his/her appraisal on prior or schematic knowledge of the character in question. Safeguards against these confounds were therefore put in place as follows:

Individual Differences in Hearing

In order to ensure that the signal would always be audible but, simultaneously, non-intrusive, the volume of the tone was set just above the minimum perceivable level (the absolute threshold of hearing). This, in fact, raised a problem of individual differences, as this threshold not only varies from person to person, but also is extremely sensitive to the amount of background noise. Further, because the perceived volume of a sound decreases exponentially with the distance (in centimetres) between the source of the sound and the ear, the threshold of hearing is also sensitive to variations in this distance.

To standardize the last two of these variables, the experiment was conducted in an anechoic environment (to minimize background noise) and signals were presented binaurally through stereo headphones (to maintain a constant displacement of the sound source from the eardrum).²² Within this environment, the first variable was addressed by calibrating the volume of the sound individually to a level where the participant could detect, on average, 80% of signals.²³

Predictability

Obviously, the on-line measure may only be related to transportation when we can be confident that the response latency and hit rate are related to the extent to which the participant is concentrating on the task rather than the text; there are circumstances, however, where this assumption does not hold. When a participant can predict the timing of the next signal, for example, s/he might regularly switch attention between the two activities; this would allow greater apparent sensitivity for a given level of transportation. When a participant constantly responds

²² The sound-proof environment was, in fact, the phonology recording-studio maintained by the Linguistics Program, School of Language Studies, ANU; my thanks are due to Dr Phil Rose (and to the School and the Arts Faculty) for making this environment available.

²³ The exact procedure used to calibrate the volume in this experiment is described below in Appendix 6, p. 219.

regardless of the presence or absence of a signal, her/his sensitivity will also be artificially increased. The first problem was addressed by delivering the signals at random intervals (between 15 and 30 seconds) so their timing could not be predicted; the second circumstance did occur, but the resulting data sets are easily identifiable because they result in a high number of “false alarms.”

Recall Test (Attention Check)

Naturally, we must acknowledge the possibility that some readers’ appraisals will be more extreme for reasons other than having been transported. Some readers, for example, simply might not attend to the text or the experimental tasks but base their appraisals on a superficial understanding of the characters (gained from inadequate engagement with the text on *any* level).

Box 1: Questions used in the recall test

- What was the name of the Cyclops?
(Polyphemus/Maron/Euanthes)
- How many of Odysseus’ companions did the Cyclops kill?
(Seven/Six/Four)
- What fake name did Odysseus give to the Cyclops?
(Somebody/Nobody/Anybody)
- How many sheep carried each companion?
(One/Two/Three)
- How many rocks did the Cyclops throw at Odysseus’ ship?
(One/Two/Three)

Participants completed a short (five-item) multiple-choice recall test of prominent facts from the story; the exclusion criterion was set at 50% (*i.e.*, effectively a score of two or less). Participants answered questions by placing a dot in a circle with the mouse (or using the keyboard). No item was selected initially. Questions were delivered in the order listed in Box 1, but the order of the answers was, in each case, chosen at random.

Measuring Ambiguity

Discussing the effects of transportation on ambiguity likewise requires the quantification of the perceived ambiguity of a character. Measures of ambiguity were derived from the semantic-differential appraisal scales, and are reported under Results below.²⁴

²⁴ See below, p. 186.

Experimental Procedure

After being welcomed, participants completed a calibration phase where the volume for the absence measure was set, a baseline recorded, and the audibility of the aural signal was confirmed.

Participants then completed a familiarization exercise (which mirrored the actual experimental delivery), reading a short extract from Herodotus' *Histories* on the nature of crocodiles.²⁵ Responses to the transportation measures from this exercise were not recorded.²⁶ Participants confirmed (orally) they understood the tasks to be performed before embarking on the test phase.

During the test phase, participants read the target narrative on the computer screen at their own pace, using the left- and right-arrow keys to move back and forth through the text at will. While reading, they responded to the aural stimuli of the on-line measure.

After the test phase, participants appraised the characters, completed the off-line measure, and answered multiple-choice content questions. They were then debriefed, remunerated, and thanked.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Exclusions

Eight participants were excluded from the analyses: two because they scored less than 50% on the recall test and it was assumed these subjects had not attended sufficiently to the text to base their appraisals upon it; two due to anomalies with the calibration of the stimulus volume for the on-line measure; two due to a high false-alarm rate for the on-line measure; and a further two due to a computer problem which resulted in a loss of data.

²⁵ Hdt. *Hist.* II.68 1–17.

²⁶ It might be objected that these measurements should have been recorded so that the experimental results were compared against a non-transporting (rather than no-) text condition (to rule out an explanation of the results simply in terms of divided attention). This was not done for two reasons: first, because the unfamiliarity of the measure in the practice phase seriously undermines its usefulness as a baseline; and secondly because the distinction between divided attention (which allocates fewer cognitive resources to the text) and transportation (which focuses those resources on the text) may be drawn from the recall test.

Off-Line Measure

In order to treat the fifteen items of the Transportation Scale as a unified measure of transportation, item-total correlations were performed on all questions of the scale;²⁷ correlation coefficients and probabilities are given in Table 1.²⁸ Three items did not correlate significantly with the Transportation Score: “After finishing the narrative I found it easy to put it out of my mind” (question 5), “I wanted to learn how the narrative ended” (question 6), and “The events in the narrative are relevant to my everyday life” (question 10).

Item	1: Easily picture the events	2: Activity of room (R)	3: Picture myself in scene	4: Mentally involved	5: Easy to put out of mind (R)	6: Wanted to learn how ended	7: Affected me emotionally	8: Thinking of alternative ends	9: Mind wandering (R)	10: Events relevant	11: Events changed my life	12: Vivid image Odysseus	13: Vivid image Cyclops	14: Vivid image Cave	15: Vivid image companions
<i>r</i>	0.450	0.514	0.485	0.551	0.234	0.268	0.534	0.568	0.519	0.314	0.571	0.532	0.413	0.505	0.386
<i>p</i>	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	>0.15	>0.10	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	>0.05	<0.01	<0.01	<0.05	<0.01	<0.05

Table 1: Item-total correlations for the Transportation Scale

Note: all *p*-values are from 2-tailed *t*-tests, *df*=31.

The removal of items 5, 6 and 10 left a twelve-question scale with a theoretical range of 12 – 84 and a midpoint of 48. The observed range, 36 – 67, was substantially reduced from these theoretical limits. The mean of the responses was 55, with a standard deviation of 7.7.

On-Line Measure

Response Latency

As individuals’ reflexes vary, the response latency was expressed as a proportional (percentage) decrease in performance *vis-à-vis* the baseline measure.²⁹ It was possible to perform better at this task during reading than at the baseline

²⁷ Performing item-total correlations also ensures that only those questions which are relevant to the target narrative remain in the scale. It was possible, for example, that at least two of the fifteen questions of the Transportation Scale were far less relevant to the *Κυκλώπεια* than to Green and Brock’s target narrative. The statements “The events in the narrative are relevant to my everyday life” and “The events in the narrative have changed my life” (questions 10 and 11) are, after all, less appropriate to a folk-tale set in a wonderland than they are to a factual narrative set in a shopping mall.

²⁸ The data may be found below, Appendix 7, pp. 222–23.

²⁹ That is, $\text{Sensitivity}_{(\text{response latency})} = \frac{\text{Mean latency}_{(\text{reading})} - \text{Mean latency}_{(\text{baseline})}}{\text{Mean latency}_{(\text{baseline})}} \times 100\%$.

(indicative of a lack of transportation), and such performance produced a negative figure.

Statistics for the response latency measure are given in Table 2.³⁰ The mean difference between the baseline and narrative-delivery conditions was a decrease in sensitivity of 32.6%. There were, in fact, four participants who were faster at responding to the stimuli during the test phase; this might indicate some subjects were distracted from the narrative by the task, but the fact that all four participants had high scores on the recall test rather undermines this conclusion. At any rate, distraction from the text by the task was by no means universal, and in the vast majority of cases (29 compared to 4) the effect was the other way around.³¹

	Response Latency	Hit Rate
N	33	33
Range	-14.1 – 83.9%	-20.0 – 90.0%
Mean	32.6%	6.6%
Standard Deviation	24.8%	18.64%
Median	32.2%	5.7%

Table 2: Summary of Results for the On-Line Measure of Transportation

Hit Rate

The “hit rate” was expressed as a proportion because the number of signals presented during reception was not constant between subjects.³² The change in sensitivity was then calculated as the decrease in this proportion during the narrative reception *vis-à-vis* a ten-signal baseline taken before reading.³³ As the baseline measurement was designed to be less than 100%, improvement during the reading phase (indicative of reduced transportation) was possible and produced a negative figure.³⁴

Statistics for the hit-rate measure are given in Table 2.³⁵ The mean difference between the baseline and text-delivery conditions was a decrease in sensitivity of

³⁰ The data may be found below, Appendix 7, p. 221.

³¹ That is, participants were distracted from the task by the text. One participant, in fact, got so caught up in the story that s/he failed to respond to any of the signals and, when they were mentioned in the debrief, expressed genuine surprise that they had been delivered at all. Audibility of the signal was then checked as a precaution, but the subject indicated the tone was clearly audible.

³² That is, Hit rate = $\frac{\text{Number of signals detected}}{\text{Number of signals presented}} \times 100\%$. The number of signals varied between participants because the signals were delivered at random intervals.

³³ That is, Sensitivity_(hit rate) = Hit Rate_(baseline) – Hit Rate_(reading).

³⁴ That is, the volume was calibrated to a level at which the hit rate for the baseline was approximately 80%.

³⁵ The data may be found below, Appendix 7, p. 221.

5.9%. Seven subjects performed *better* during the narrative delivery (test phase) than when setting the baseline, but this statistic was inherently limited by the fact that 22 subjects scored 100% when setting the baseline. The hit rate was thus considered, despite the decrease in accuracy in the test phase, to be at a ceiling level and was dropped from further analyses.

Consistency Between On-Line and Off-Line Measures

The extent to which the two measures actually gauged the same phenomenon was assessed by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient (r value). The measures, surprisingly, showed no correlation ($r = 0.015448$, p (2-tailed) = 0.9320). The only tenable interpretation of this result is that the measures were gauging different phenomena. We are faced, therefore, with a choice: we must decide which one of these measures actually gauges transportation.

As noted in the Method and Materials section above, Green and Brock's Transportation Scale attracts theoretical objections because it is both retrospective and subjective; even with the best intentions, participants' responses to the questionnaire might not accurately reflect their narrative experiences as Hindsight Bias may suppress the identification of "anomalous" responses.³⁶ It must, in addition, be modified individually to each target narrative and thus results for different texts are not directly comparable. Unlike Green and Brock's "Transportation Scale," my on-line measure is not subject to Hindsight Bias and is unproblematic to apply to multiple texts; it may, indeed, legitimately be used to make direct comparisons of the transportation generated by different narratives.³⁷

Further, the off-line measure (which is answered at the end of the narrative reception) might, because of its timing, be disproportionately influenced by the later sections of the narrative; the on-line measure, in contrast, gauges transportation continuously throughout the narrative reception. It may, therefore, be a somewhat more robust measure of absence.

³⁶ See above, p. 86.

³⁷ In order to make such comparisons, the characteristics of the tone (the volume of the sound in terms of the absolute threshold of hearing, the attack and release attributes, and the time for which the note is sustained), obviously must be held constant.

One possible drawback of the on-line measure is that it potentially limits transportation by distracting the participant from the text. The task and stimulus were, however, designed to be as undemanding of attention as possible, and participants were instructed to concentrate on reading rather than responding to the sounds. It is possible that some participants concentrated on the task rather than the text, but the recall test was incorporated to exclude the results of those participants who based their appraisals on an insufficient reading of the narrative.

The on-line measure is, in sum, not only a viable measure of transportation but also in some ways more theoretically robust than Green and Brock's Transportation Scale. The theoretical objections which might be levelled at the measure may be easily circumvented in its future applications by making slight procedural changes, but they had little if any impact on the results of this experiment. It was decided, in consequence, that the on-line measure was a more reliable gauge of transportation than the off-line measure, and the off-line measure was dropped from all further analyses.

Semantic-Differential Scales

In order to treat the (potentially independent) dimensions of the semantic-differential scales as items of a single unified appraisal, item-total correlations were performed for each dimension for both Odysseus and Polyphēmos. All dimensions were found to correlate in a highly significant manner (all r values > 0.67 ; all p values < 0.00001).³⁸ The dimensions were therefore added together to form a single scale with a theoretical range of ± 120 . A summary of the appraisals of Odysseus and Polyphēmos is given in Table 3.

As is immediately apparent from this table, participants clearly identified Odysseus in far more positive terms than Polyphēmos: his mean appraisal is almost 60 points (one quarter of the scale) higher than that of the Kyklōps, and the overall range of responses

	Odysseus	Polyphēmos
Observed Range	-86 – +101	-120 – +20
Mean	+13.88	-39.70
Standard Deviation	39.53	37.68

Table 3: Character Appraisals

was also higher. A t-test confirmed the appraisals are significantly different ($t =$

³⁸ The data may be found below, Appendix 7, p. 224.

6.62, $p < 2.5 \times 10^{-7}$). We may be confident, therefore, that participants distinguished Odysseus as a protagonist and Polyphēmos as an antagonist.

Preparatory Questions

The question underlying this experiment is how the appraisal of ambiguous characters is affected by transportation. In order to answer this satisfactorily, however, two other questions must first be addressed.

Some researchers have seen transportation as a robust phenomenon which may arise even in the most adverse conditions; others have found “the literary experience” elusive and sensitive to artificial conditions.³⁹ Although Green and Brock demonstrated the phenomenon in a laboratory setting, the current experiment was conducted under more artificial conditions as it took place in an enclosed environment, participants wore headphones, and they read the text on a computer screen (rather than on paper or in a book). The first question we must ask explicitly is, therefore, “were the participants in the experiment transported?”

Further, my argument in Chapter 4 that Odysseus and Polyphēmos are ambiguous is, we must admit, only theoretical; the divergence of scholarly opinion on the *Kyklōpes* seems to support this conclusion, but it does not demonstrate that the participants in this experiment actually perceived either character to be ambiguous. The second question we must ask before proceeding is, then, “did participants appraise Odysseus and/or Polyphēmos as ambiguous?”

Did Transportation Occur?

As noted above, although five participants were faster at responding to the tone in the test phase (indicating a lack of transportation), 29 participants were slower (indicating they had been transported). Over all subjects, the average response latency for the tone increased by 0.142 seconds (from 656 to 798 ms) while reading; although this figure might seem small, it is significant because it is based on a large

³⁹ An example of the former would be Richard J. Gerrig, *Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading* (Boulder: Westview, 1998 [originally published: Yale University Press, 1993]); a strongly worded example of the latter is Russell A. Hunt, “Literacy as Dialogic Involvement: Methodological Implications for the Empirical Study of Literary Reading,” in *Empirical Approaches to Literature and Aesthetics*, ed. Roger J. Kreuz and Mary Sue MacNealy, *Advances in Discourse Processes* (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Group, 1996), 479–94.

number of trials. When expressed as a within-subjects calculation, the decrease in performance was, on average, 31.4%. The on-line measure, in other words, indicates that most participants were transported.

Were the Characters Ambiguous?

Measuring Ambiguity

I predicted above that transportation should affect not only the overall appraisal of ambiguous characters, but also the level of ambiguity perceived by the audience. This raises the question, of course, of how one might measure ambiguity. There are, in fact, at least two ways one might gauge ambiguity simply from the character appraisals on the semantic-differential scales.

Between-Subjects Analysis

The first is to look to the data set as a whole (to take a between-subjects measure). It is legitimate to assume that, given a large sample, overall character appraisals will approximate a “bell-shaped curve” (*i.e.*, they will be normally distributed).⁴⁰ The statistic which measures ambiguity is, in this context, that which describes the average variation of each member of the data set from the mean: the standard deviation.⁴¹ A higher standard deviation should, therefore, indicate a more ambiguous character.

The standard deviations listed in Table 3 (p. 184) are both large; the confidence-interval (which, on average, will cover 95% of the data; two standard deviations either side of the mean) would cover almost two thirds of the whole scale. Similarly, the ranges of responses indicated in the table are also large: that of Odysseus in particular covers over three quarters of the whole scale; that of Polyphēmos covers just under 60%. Qualitatively, therefore, the group of participants in this experiment clearly saw both Odysseus and the *Kyklōps* as ambiguous.

⁴⁰ The actual distributions of the character appraisals are given below, Appendix 7, p. 225.

⁴¹ It is, of course, also possible to use the *variance* (the average squared deviation from the mean) as this measure; the standard deviation is the square root of the variance.

Within-Subjects Analysis: The Ambivalence Score

Taking the overall appraisal of a character, however, is not necessarily the best measure of ambiguity. One of the features of ambiguous characters is, in fact, that we would expect the appraisals in the different dimensions of the semantic-differential scales to be contradictory; they should, to some extent, cancel each other out when they are added together to give each participant's Appraisal Score. To measure ambiguity, therefore, we might assess the extent to which this cancelling out occurs *within* each subject's responses.

An Ambivalence Score was calculated by subtracting the absolute value of the Appraisal Score from the sum of the absolute values of each subscale score. This gave a measure of how much the different subscale scores cancelled each other out because they were of opposite sign. The theoretical range for Ambivalence Scores was 0 to 120.⁴² Means, standard deviations and ranges are given in Table 4.

	Odysseus	Polyphēmos
Observed Range	0 – 60	0 – 42
Mean	10.73	7.82
Standard Deviation	16.56	11.96

Table 4: Ambiguity of Character Appraisals

The figures indicate that participants viewed both characters as mildly (less than 10%) ambiguous, but there was reasonable variation in the amount of ambiguity identified. Some participants saw no ambiguity at all; two participants saw Odysseus as 50% ambiguous. By these figures also there was almost no difference between the ambivalence of the two appraisals. This was confirmed with a t-test ($t = 1.285, p = 0.208$).

Main Analysis: Effects of Transportation on Appraisal

Following the precedent of Green and Brock, the participants were divided into high- and low-transportation groups by splitting the sample at the median of the independent variable (the measure of transportation). Participants who scored at

⁴² In an extreme case, for example, one subject rated the Odysseus along the four scales as -10, +30, -10 and -20. The Appraisal Score was therefore -10, but the Ambivalence Score was $(|-10| + |30| + |-10| + |-20|) - |-10| = (70) - 10 = 60$.

The same subject rated the Kyklōps as -30, -30, -30, -30, giving an Appraisal Score of -120, and (quite reasonably) an Ambivalence Score of 0.

the median were excluded. The resulting data sets are described in Table 5. The dependent variables (appraisals of the characters) were then compared between the groups and the significance of any difference assessed by a t-test; results (means and standard deviations) of these analyses are presented in Table 6.⁴³

	High-Transportation Group	Low-Transportation Group
N	16	16
Range	35.1% – 83.9%	-14.1% – 27.8%
Mean	54.0%	12.6%
Standard Deviation	14.9%	13.2%
Median	51.4%	17.6%

Table 5: Characteristics of the High- and Low-Transportation Groups

	Odysseus		Polyphēmos	
	Appraisal	Ambiguity	Appraisal	Ambiguity
High-Transportation Group	28.19 (45.21)	8.63 (16.03)	-45.38 (36.54)	4.00 (7.00)
Low-Transportation Group	1.06 (33.08)	9.75 (12.67)	-29.00 (33.28)	12.13 (14.72)
<i>p</i> (1-tailed)	0.0265	0.4136	0.0975	0.0277

Table 6: Means (and Standard Deviations) for the Appraisals and Ambivalence Scores of Odysseus and Polyphēmos by the High- and Low-Transportation Groups

Note: all *p* values are from 1-tailed tests, *df*=31

Odysseus

Appraisal: The mean appraisals of Odysseus (and their standard deviations) for the high- and low-transportation groups are given in the first column of Table 6. The high-transportation group appraised Odysseus in the expected direction: a mean 27 points higher than the low-transportation group.

Ambiguity: The means (and standard deviations) for the Ambivalence Score for Odysseus are given in the second column Table 6. No differences in ambiguity emerged between the two groups.

Polyphēmos

Appraisal: The mean appraisals of the Kyklōps (and their standard deviations) for the high- and low-transportation groups are given in the third column of Table 6. The high-transportation group appraised Polyphēmos 16 points worse than the low-transportation group. This result approached, but did not quite attain, the conventional level of statistical significance.

⁴³ The data may be found below, Appendix 7, pp. 226–27; they are represented graphically on p. 228.

Ambiguity: The means (and standard deviations) for the Ambivalence Score for Polyphēmos are given in the fourth column of Table 6 (page 188). The high-transportation group appraised Polyphēmos in a significantly more unipolar fashion than the low-transportation group.

Discussion

Experimental Method and Procedure

The data of this experiment provide some evidence that transportation, in its conception as a purely on-line phenomenon, is an empirically observable phenomenon which can affect our real-world beliefs and judgments. Although the experiment concentrated on only one aspect of Green and Brock's (broad) study, it nevertheless extended it by demonstrating the efficacy of an indirect, objective measure of transportation. Because this measure gauges transportation on-line (and is thus not subject to hindsight bias) it is more appropriate for investigating transportation as conceived in this thesis (following the model advanced by Richard Gerrig) than the Transportation Scale developed by Green and Brock. Green and Brock's experimental results strongly suggest that their scale measures something of importance, but the lack of inter-measure correlation reported in this thesis clearly demonstrates that what it measures is not the real-world absence involved in the moment-by-moment experience of the narrative.

This experiment has, then, contributed to the discussion of transportation as a psychological concept by refining the definition of the phenomenon, by introducing a new measure of it, and by providing evidence that transportation, measured in this way, fundamentally affects our understanding of a text and the characters depicted within it.

Character Appraisal and Reception of the Κυκλώπεια

Perhaps of more interest to Classicists, however, is the contribution this experiment can make to our understanding of the reception of the Κυκλώπεια (or epic more generally). In the introduction to this experiment I summarized my conclusions from Chapter 4 that Odysseus and Polyphēmos are literally ambiguous but their portrayal is moderated slightly by poetic ambiguity and predicted on these grounds that the influence of transportation on the audience's

understanding of their characters should be to increase the appraisal of Odysseus, to make that of Polyphēmos more negative, and to reduce the perceived ambiguity (*i.e.*, lower the Ambivalence Score) of both.

Let us deal first with appraisal: in line with the prediction, the appraisal of Odysseus increased significantly with transportation: the high-transportation group rated Odysseus in a significantly more positive fashion than the low-transportation group.

The appraisal of Polyphēmos also changed in a direction consonant with the theoretical prediction: the high-transportation group appraised the *Kyklōps* 16.4 points more negatively than the low-transportation group. Although this result did not quite attain statistical significance, it almost did so and it is likely that this effect would attain significance if this experiment is replicated (as it should be) with a greater sample size. If so, this would lend support to my interpretation of the protagonist effect as a facet of narrative persuasion caused by transportation.

It is worth considering whether the phrasing of the semantic-differential scales might explain the lower significance of this result: the scales for Odysseus were all introduced with the instruction, “Please rate ODYSSEUS on the following scale,” but those for Polyphēmos used “THE CYCLOPS” rather than his name.⁴⁴ It is possible, in consequence, that strong word associations with the term “Cyclops” might have caused respondents to rate Polyphēmos more negatively;⁴⁵ as this lowers the appraisal in the low-transportation group, it inherently limits the reduction in appraisal with transportation and may have limited the significance of the result.

This effect, however, is likely to have been minimal: it should, simultaneously, have reduced the amount of ambiguity perceived in Polyphēmos’ character compared to that of Odysseus; yet, both characters were rated as having similar ambiguity.⁴⁶ At

⁴⁴ “*Kyklōps*” is, of course, the term used consistently in the *Κυκλώπεια* to describe Polyphēmos before the use of his name by the other *Kyklōpes* at 1.403.

⁴⁵ I must thank Prof. Greg Horsley (School of Classics, History, and Religion, The University of New England) for bringing this point to my attention during question time after the presentation of an early version of this chapter at a conference.

⁴⁶ See above, Tables 3 and 4, pp. 184–87; over all subjects the ambiguity did not vary between characters.

any rate, the appraisal of Polyphēmos did not seem to be influenced by a floor effect: the lowest appraisals were, indeed, close to the minimum value of the scale (-113, -100), but the *mean* in the high-transportation group was only -45. Thus we can assume any difference caused by semantic association must have applied equally to both groups and cannot influence any measure based on the difference between them.

Let us turn, then, to the effect of transportation on perceived ambiguity. As noted in the introduction to this experiment, the two different types of ambiguity (literal and poetic) lead to competing predictions for the impact of transportation on perceived ambiguity: literal ambiguity should lead to a reduction in the Ambivalence Score in the high-transportation group compared to the low-transportation group; poetic ambiguity should lead to an increase. Looking at the pattern of results for the Ambivalence Score between these two groups, therefore, should allow us to test my assertion that Odysseus and Polyphēmos are to be seen as mainly literally ambiguous characters.

The high-transportation group had somewhat lower Ambivalence Scores for Polyphēmos (*i.e.*, they appraised Polyphēmos in a more unipolar fashion) than the low-transportation group, and this difference attained statistical significance;⁴⁷ these data support the interpretation, therefore, that the Kyklōps is a literally ambiguous character. It is important to note, however, that *some* ambiguity in the characterization of Polyphēmos was observed by the high-transportation group — their average Ambivalence Score for him was 4.0 — and thus the data do support the conclusion to which I came in Chapter 4 that Polyphēmos' (literally ambiguous) character is very slightly moderated by a degree of poetic ambiguity.

The Ambivalence Scores for Odysseus, by contrast, did not differ between the two groups.⁴⁸ This result lies midway between the predictions for literally- and poetically ambiguous characters. I interpret this as indicating that Odysseus was not seen as mostly literally yet slightly poetically ambiguous, but as having equal amounts of literal and poetic ambiguity. Odysseus was, therefore, far more *poetically* ambiguous than had been anticipated.

⁴⁷ See the fourth column of Table 6, page 188 above: $\mu_{\text{low-T}} = 12.13$, $\mu_{\text{high-T}} = 4.00$, $p = 0.0277$.

⁴⁸ See the second column of Table 6, page 188 above: $\mu_{\text{low-T}} = 9.75$, $\mu_{\text{high-T}} = 8.63$, $p = 0.4163$.

We must, then, modify the conclusions of Chapter 4 to allow for greater poetic ambiguity in the characterization of Odysseus, but it is worth noting explicitly that this is a minor revision: not only does the conclusion that Polyphēmos and Odysseus are both ambiguous characters (rather than simple folk-tale hero and villain) still stand, it is now supported by empirical evidence.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Extensions

οὐ γὰρ πῶ πάντων ἐπὶ πείρατ' ἀέθλων
ἦλθομεν, ἀλλ' ἔτ' ὄπισθεν ἀμέτρητος πόνος ἔσται
— HOMER*

This thesis makes two general claims: first, that transportation significantly affects audience responses to narratives (specifically, to the narratives of and within the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*); and secondly, that transportation is a useful extension of existing models of (narrative) reception in and of Homeric epic which allows existing questions to be recast and addressed empirically.

The first claim stems from the argument that transportation impedes the intrusion of real-world knowledge into the moment-by-moment experience of the narrative. Because transported audience members become somewhat isolated from the literal truth underlying the narrative, they are forced to rely on the poetic truth to a greater extent than their non-transported counterparts. Transportation is also associated with narrative persuasion and an exaggeration of character appraisal, and thus transported audience members are likely to arrive at conclusions which are not only different from but also more extreme than those of their non-transported counterparts. The theoretical treatment of the *Κυκλώπεια* in Chapter 4 was based along these lines, and it is therefore encouraging that the conclusions of that chapter were largely supported by the empirical exercise in Chapter 5.

In support of the second claim (that transportation is a useful extension to the existing models of narrative reception), we saw in Chapter 2 how transportation can reframe Bassett's concept of the epic illusion, Walsh's model of enchantment, and Ford and Bakker's notion of vividness in terms of audience response. This allows us to ask (and test) questions about the way(s) in which the experience of enchantment/vividness affects the reception of the narrative. Does it make it more enjoyable or more memorable? Indeed, the experiment in Chapter 5 tested the effects of these experiences on character appraisal.

* ψ 248-49: We have not yet come to the end of all of our tasks, but there is immeasurable work yet to come.

It is important to note, however, that these two claims are broader than the objective evidence of the experiment in Chapter 5. One purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to generalize the experimental results to this wider context. Yet, I certainly do not wish to suggest that the potential for experimental work along these lines on Homeric epic has been exhausted. The other purpose of this chapter is, then, to consider some ways in which the empirical approach of this thesis may be extended.

The experiment reported in Chapter 5 provides evidence that transportation, measured objectively in terms of the reader's absence from her/his extra-diegetic (real-world) environment, affects the audience's understanding of the two main characters of the *Κυκλώπεια*. High transportation was associated with a positive view of Odysseus and a negative view of Polyphēmos; it was also associated with a less ambiguous (more unipolar) view of the *Kyklōps*. In line with my theoretical argument in Chapter 4, I take this as evidence that highly transported readers are affected by the poetic rather than the literal "truth" of the narrative; in consequence, they appraise the characters in a manner consistent with their poetic depiction. Non-transported readers (who react to both the poetic and the literal "truths" of the narrative), on the other hand, may appraise characters rather differently.

This conclusion should apply to the action of the epic as well as to its actors, as there is no real distinction to be drawn between the use of language in the description of characters and its use in the description of action. The same division between the poetic and literal "truth" may be made and, when there is a discrepancy between them, the interpretation of the action becomes, likewise, open to interpretation. The narratological motivation of the events (discussed for the *Κυκλώπεια* in terms of necessity versus caprice in Chapter 4),¹ indeed, forms a liminal case, as it is the mechanism by which the action both reflects on and is reflective of the portrayal of the characters. Transportation, therefore, can affect our interpretation of the epic at a more fundamental level than simply our appraisal of the characters.

¹ See above, pp. 148–51.

To illustrate this point further, let us consider Hektōr's duel with Telamōnian Aias (H 54–312). This scene is important for a variety of reasons, such as its toying with an alternative ending to the epic;² its elucidation (in Hektōr's words of 84–91) of Homeric κλέος (fame);³ and the favourable comparison of Hektōr with Paris implicit in the contrasts between this duel and the scene it doubles in Γ (15–120, 264–382).⁴ What concerns us here, however, is the discrepancy between the poetic portrayal of the duel and the literal "truth" underlying it. At the literal level, the duel ends in a draw: the Trojan and Akhaian heralds together propose an end to the fighting (H 279–82);⁵ Aias' deferral to Hektōr's decision is based on a point of etiquette rather than an admission of inferiority;⁶ and the two part with the exchange of objects of (ostensibly) similar value.

Yet the poetic effect is quite different: not only does the poet implicitly depict Aias as superior by having him outperform Hektōr in each exchange in their battle,⁷ but also explicitly contrasts the departures of the two men:

² James V. Morrison, *Homeric Misdirection: False Predictions in the Iliad*, Michigan Monographs in Classical Antiquity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), at 54–63, discusses the duel between Paris and Menelaos in Γ (15–382) in these terms.

³ See, e.g., Gregory Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry*, Revised ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999 [originally published: 1979]), at 28–29 (§3).

⁴ E.g., Menelaos is eager to fight Paris (Γ 21–29) but reluctant to face Hektōr (H 92–102; and, indeed, the poet comments in 104–05 that he was weaker); and Hektōr does not need to be rebuked to stick to his word and fight the duel he proposes. The fight sequences of these duels also reflect this difference: Hektōr is proactive, but each of his actions (throwing his spear, stabbing with his spear, hitting his opponent with a rock) is matched by a more powerful reaction from Aias; Paris, however, loses the offensive, and does not even match Menelaos' attempts to strike him with his sword or strangle him; we might well assume he is unable to do so. Further, Hektōr continues even though he is bleeding, while Paris is almost immobilized by a death which would not even need to break his skin. (On bleeding as a mark of status in non-fatal wounding in the *Iliad* and the implications for Hektōr and Paris in these duels, see Tamara Neal, "The Wounded Hero: Non-Fatal Injury and Bloodspill in Homer's *Iliad*" (PhD, University of Melbourne, 2003), 30–44.) Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, "The Formal Duels in Books 3 and 7 of the *Iliad*," in *Homer: Tradition and Invention*, ed. Bernard C. Fenik (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 18–40, notes the formal and thematic repetitions, but does not dwell on the differing effects of the duels on the characterization of their participants.

⁵ Cf. Irene J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 1987), at 77, who quotes Σ bT ad H 274–75.

⁶ See, e.g., Richard P. Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad*, Myth and Poetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), at 40–41.

⁷ Thus, Hektōr's spear is stopped by the last layer of Aias' shield (H 244–48) but Aias' goes all the way through and penetrates his θώραξ (breastplate) and χιτών (tunic, 248–54); Hektōr's spear is again stopped by Aias' shield when he stabs at it (258–59) while Aias' goes right through and cuts Hektōr's neck (260–62); Hektōr's stone, though large (μέγαν, 265), seems to have no permanent effect on Aias' shield (it merely περιήχησεν [resounded]; 266–67) while Aias' stone is πολὺ μείζονα (far bigger, 268) and crushes Hektōr's shield, knocking him over (270–72). So also Neal, "The Wounded Hero," 241: "these episodes show how Ajax' armour reveals his greater strength."

τὼ δὲ διακρινθέντε ὁ μὲν μετὰ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν
 ἦϊ', ὃ δ' ἐς Τρώων ὄμαδον κίε· τοὶ δ' ἐχάρησαν,
 ὡς εἶδον ζωὸν τε καὶ ἀρτεμέα προσιόντα,
 Αἴαντος προφυγόντα μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους·
 καὶ ῥ' ἦγον προτὶ ἄστυ, ἀελπτέοντες σόον εἶναι.
 Αἴαντ' αὐθ' ἐτέρωθεν ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
 εἰς Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖον ἄγον, κεχαρηότα νίκη.

H 306–12.⁸

The Trojans clearly did not expect Hektōr to survive: this is implicit in their joy when they see him unharmed (H 307–08) and their focalization of Aias' hands as “invincible” (309), but it is made explicit in 310 when they are described as ἀελπτέοντες σόον εἶναι (“despairing of his survival”). The timing of this phrase — they despair even as they lead him to the city — makes the point emphatic: their preconception he would not survive was so strong that, even as they rejoice in his safe return, they take some time to comprehend that they are seeing him alive.⁹ The absence of a *depicted* reaction from the Akhaians, in contrast, might lead us to assume that his survival was expected. Hektōr's own feelings are not focalized, but Aias goes κεχαρηότα νίκη (“rejoicing in his victory,” 312).¹⁰ The poetic effect — that Hektōr has been lucky to escape from death while Aias is the victor¹¹ — is nicely captured by Jasper Griffin when he asserts that “Trojans propose duels, Achaeans win them.”¹²

Griffin's statement — part of a wider condemnation of the Trojans — is not strictly (literally) accurate, but it is legitimated *in the context of a poetic reading of the text* by the fact that it is felicitous for the transported audience. One would predict, therefore, that transportation would have a significant effect on the audience's

⁸ The two separated, one went amongst the Akhaian host, the other moved into the crowd of Trojans; and they rejoiced in him when they saw him coming alive, safe and sound, having escaped the might and invincible hands of Aias; and they, [who had been] in despair of him being safe, led him to the city. On the other side also the well-greaved Akhaians led Aias, rejoicing in the victory, to resplendent Agamemnon.

⁹ Cf. the parallel at ι 496, which could easily draw a similar comment.

¹⁰ De Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers*, at 102, suggests that the “rejoicing in his victory” of 312 is Aias' focalization, since he “rejoices about what he *interprets* as a victory” (original emphasis). Cf. René Nünlist, “Some Clarifying Remarks on ‘Focalization’,” in *Omero Tremila Anni Dopo*, ed. Franco Montanari and Paola Ascheri, *Storia e Letteratura: Raccolta di Studi e Testi*, 210 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002), 445–53, at 449. This is, indeed, an elegant solution — and it helps preserve the appearance of the poet's neutrality — but it only applies at the literal level: at the poetic level, the problem does not really exist.

¹¹ This is reinforced by the fact that the verb προφεύγειν (which describes Hektōr at H 309) can carry the “unheroic” connotations of flight from (and hence defeat in) battle: Λ 340, Ξ 81. Note that the description of Aias' hands as ἀάπτους (invincible, H 309) is felicitous at both the poetic and literal levels.

¹² Jasper Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), at 4.

understanding of the action and of Hektōr and Aias' characters should this passage be subjected to an empirical study.

Hektōr is, admittedly, shown in more diverse situations than is the Kyklōps, and it is thus not surprising that he is more poetically ambiguous; yet his poetic ambiguity is not simply a product of the tension between his responsibilities to his family, city, and heroic identity; it arises also from his identity as the leader of the Trojans. Although he is an excellent warrior, the cause for which he fights — effectively, the defence of his brother's breach of hospitality — is morally ambiguous, and this undermines his heroism. Because Hektōr is a poetically ambiguous character, the effect of transportation on our overall understanding of him will be less predictable than it was for Polyphēmos; yet, some of his characteristics — such as his martial abilities — may be identified as literally ambiguous, as may some of the scenes in which he participates.¹³ As such, there is still scope for transportation to have an impact on the audience's understanding of him and his role in the poem.

There are, indeed, many examples of literal ambiguity which might be drawn from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Hektōr's duel was chosen not only to illustrate that ambiguity applies to events as well as characters, but also to demonstrate (at a theoretical level, at least) that the effects of transportation are not limited to the *Κυκλώπεια* or even the *Odyssey*.

The effects of transportation are, naturally (and as detailed in Chapter 3), not limited to its influence on the appraisal of ambiguous characters; they include, in addition, the reactions which are (in a modern context, at least) strictly “anomalous” (suspense and participatory responses), persuasion by the implicit message(s) of the text, and an increased perceived realism of the narrative due to a

¹³ In addition to the duel in H, consider the way the encounter with Andromakhē in Z is portrayed as the couple's last meeting, despite the fact that it almost certainly was not. See, in this context, Wolfgang Schadewaldt, *Von Homers Welt und Werk: Aufsätze und Auslegungen zur homerischen Frage*, 4th ed. (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler Verlag, 1965), at 227–28: “Die Begegnung mit Andromache ist das ‘letzte’ Zusammensein der Gatten. Ein aufmerksamer Leser kann herausrechnen, daß Hektōr noch einmal nach Troja kommt (7, 310) und vermutlich auch Andromache wiedergesehen haben wird. Aber das bleibt für den Dichter belanglos, denn er zeigt die Gatten nicht mehr beieinander.” (The encounter with Andromakhē is the “last” meeting of the couple. An attentive reader can work out that Hektōr comes back to Troy once more (H 310) and presumably would have seen Andromakhē again. But that is irrelevant to the poet, since he does not show the couple together again.)

higher propensity to take the narrative at face value. The empirical investigation of these effects has the potential to reframe and elucidate (though not necessarily to resolve completely) some old Homeric problems.

An increased propensity to take the narrative at face value, for example, might be brought to bear on narrative inconsistencies within the Homeric corpus. Such inconsistencies — the moments where “good Homer nods”¹⁴ — have, historically, been “corrected” by the Scholiasts, used as ammunition by the Analyst critics, “explained” (or rejected as trivial) by the Unitarians, or dismissed by the Oralists as characteristic of oral poetry and hence inappropriate to the study of Homer except in the context of a modern literary reception. These perspectives, of course, concentrate on the composer or his text; it is also necessary to examine the responses of the audience, and a detailed theoretical account has been given by Ruth Scodel.¹⁵ The perspective from transportation, however, suggests that the “nods” are less noticeable to members of the highly transported audience than their less-transported counterparts (among whom the literary critic must be counted);¹⁶ the degree to which readers are actually troubled by narrative inconsistencies in the Homeric epics might, then, be fruitfully investigated empirically.

It is, in addition, possible to extend the empirical line of this thesis by investigating the factors which influence transportation rather than its effects. Transportation — like narrative reception itself — is a product of (and will be influenced by any factor affecting either) the text and the reader; there is, in consequence, great scope for further research into the causes of transportation. The claim formulated in Chapter 2 that readers’ personal experience and the

¹⁴ Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 359.

¹⁵ Ruth Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities: Conventions and Strategies of Verisimilitude in Homer and Greek Tragedy*, *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 122* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1999), especially at 15–21. See above, p. 72.

¹⁶ For the empirical evidence from transportation, see above, p. 97; for a theoretical position, see above, p. 41. It is, indeed, highly likely that the distance between the discrepant assertions will further reduce the audience’s ability to identify a contradiction. Cf. the discussion of the inconsistent stories of the laming of Hēphaistos by Lowell Edmunds, “Myth in Homer,” in *A New Companion to Homer*, ed. Ian Morris and Barry B. Powell (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), at 421–22, who notes that “[f]rom the formal and esthetic point of view, this contradiction is a defect (though the two versions are so distant from one another in the poem that there is nothing especially jarring about the contradiction).” One might make a parallel argument for the divergent implications of ε 199 and η 247: even though the distance is much shorter, this inconsistency probably escapes the notice of most readers.

personal significance of the narrative will, respectively, enhance and suppress transportation could be directly tested empirically;¹⁷ it should, in other words, be possible to sort out experimentally whether Walsh's impersonal view of enchantment or the account given in Chapter 2 is more felicitous in its predictions about audience responses to themes of present and personal significance.

In somewhat similar fashion, an empirical investigation may support or cause us to modify Bassett's theoretical account of the epic illusion. Two of Bassett's subsidiary illusions — those of vitality and personality¹⁸ — might be tested experimentally. Bassett claimed that the suppression of temporal inversions and ellipses distracts the audience members from the realization that they are listening to an artificially created story;¹⁹ in addition, he asserted that the driving force behind characterization in the epics is direct speech. These contentions might be tested by, for example, determining whether readers exposed to the original text experience a different level of transportation compared to those exposed to an adapted narrative where an inversion is highlighted or where, in Platonic style, the text has been rephrased to avoid direct speech.²⁰

Perhaps the most important way in which the empirical aspects of this thesis ought to be extended is in a direct investigation into the differing effects of the different modes in which Homeric epic can and has been received. Recognition of the "orality" of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* has, indeed, given us great insight into the nature of the texts we possess, their composer(s), and so on, yet our understanding of the limits and advantages of an oral rather than a written reception remains relatively subjective; as such, it is inherently suitable to empirical investigation.

¹⁷ For the distinction between personal experience and significance, see above, pp. 27–29.

Obviously, the definition of personal experience must be broadened or a different text used for this experiment to be possible.

¹⁸ See above, p. 40.

¹⁹ Samuel Eliot Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, Sather Classical Lectures 15 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938), at, e.g., 41–42: "the effort which the hearer must make to conceive of the two actions as occurring simultaneously would give him time and cause to feel that he was listening to a story, not that he was sharing in it. The epic illusion would be broken and must be established anew."

²⁰ Pl. *R.* 393d–94a. I am aware that such rephrasing of the text is anathema to some Homerists and, I confess, I am not completely comfortable with the idea myself; yet, it is a legitimate experimental procedure for determining the effects of different narrative devices on the audience (cf. Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon, *Psychonarratology: Foundations for the Empirical Study of Literary Response* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 51–52), and there is, at least, a Classical precedent.

The results of such an experiment may be used in a range of ways: they might be brought to bear on the question of whether it is legitimate to apply modern psychological theories to ancient Greek epic in anything more than the context of a modern, literary reception; or whether it is necessary to treat oral poetry as profoundly different from literature.²¹ The empirical approach cannot, of course, answer these questions definitively — there is a dearth, after all, of Ancient Greeks steeped in traditional epic on whom one might experiment — but, once observed, this limit is no great impediment. Only the Muses can know objectively what happened in the past; all we can do is draw inferences from our observations to establish an interpretation beyond reasonable doubt. Perhaps the greatest contribution an empirical approach can make, in this context, is to ascertain how much doubt is reasonable.

²¹ This, of course, is the position of Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London: Methuen, 1982), especially in his rejection of the term “oral literature” at 10–15. Cf. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, at xiii–xiv for the opposing view.

Appendix 1: Epithets for Dēmodokos and Phēmios

The following table lists the epithets for the singers Dēmodokos and Phēmios in the *Odyssey*. I am not restricting my analysis to name-epithet formulae because my interest lies here not in the *pre-Homeric* traditions, but in the *Homeric* portraits themselves. Zsigmond Ritoók, in fact, thinks that all the epithets for singers in the *Odyssey* with the possible exception of θεῖος are novel.¹

In constructing the following figures, I have checked and embellished my own analysis with reference to the catalogue of epithets for humans compiled by James Dee and to the article by Ritoók just cited.² Unlike Dee, I have not listed Phēmios' patronymic separately at χ 330 because of its close linkage with his own name in the following line.

The “Other Uses” column in this table cannot be comprehensive; there is no value, for example, in listing here the 113 individuals described by ἥρωσ. Examples of parallel (rather than identical) uses are introduced with *confer*.

Shared Epithets	Dēmodokos	Phēmios	Other Uses
ᾄδός (“singer”)	1×: (θ 73)	2×: (χ 330, 345)	—
θεῖος ᾄδός (“godlike singer”)	5× (θ 43, 47, 87, 539, ν 27)	6× (α 336, π 252, ρ 359, ψ 133, 143, ω 439)	1× (δ 17 [anon.]); spurious at Σ 604.
ᾄδός ... περικλυτός (“very famous singer”)	3× (θ 83, 367, 521)	1× (α 325)	<i>Cf.</i> π. ἀμφιγύεις (6× <i>Il.</i> , 3× <i>Od.</i>), and π. Ἡφαιστος (2× <i>Od.</i>); also of valuable objects (3×), cities (3×), Patroklos (1×), and Antiphos (1×).
ἐρίηρον ᾄδόν (“worthy singer”)	2×: (θ 62, 471)	1× (α 346)	<i>Cf.</i> ἔ. ἑτάῖροι (7× <i>Il.</i> , 12× <i>Od.</i>)
θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν (“like the gods for voice”)	1×: (ι 4)	1×: (α 371)	1× (Τ 250 [Talthybios])

continued...

¹ Zsigmond Ritoók, “The Epithets for Minstrels in the *Odyssey*,” *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 16 (1968): 89–92.

² James H. Dee, *Epitheta Hominum apud Homerum* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms AG, 2000); and Ritoók, “Epithets for Minstrels.”

Separate Epithets (continued)	Dēmodokos	Phēmios	Other Uses
ἥρωες (“hero”)	1×: (θ 483)	—	113×
Particular Epithets			
πολύφημος αοιδός (“many-worded singer”)	—	1×: (χ 376)	Cf. π. ἀγορά (β 150)
λαοῖσι τετιμένος Δημόδοκος (“D., honoured by the people”)	2×: (θ 472, ν 28)	—	—

Of the 27 *loci* listed above, 23 references are by shared epithets (12/15 for Dēmodokos; 11/12 for Phēmios). Of the shared epithets, θεῖος αοιδός, αοιδός ... περικλυτός, ἐρίηρον αοιδόν, and θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν (*i.e.*, all but the simple αοιδός) reflect positively on the singer’s skill. These cover 20 of the 23 shared references (9 for Phēmios, 11 for Dēmodokos).

Appendix 2: Uses of ΤΕΡΠΩ in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*

The following list broadly categorizes the 100 instances of forms of the verb *τέρπω* and its compounds in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The list adds to 101 as Ω 3 appears twice.

Bathing (1): α 310 (*cf.* θ 429).

Sports (7): Β 774, α 107, δ 626 = ρ 168, ζ 104 (Artemis hunting), θ 131, ρ 174.

Feasting (13): Ι 705, Λ 780, Ω 3, α 26, 258, 369, γ 70, δ 17, ε 201, ζ 99, θ 429 (and the *hymn* of the singer), υ 27, ξ 443.

Stories and Epic(-esque) Song (25):¹ Ι 186, 189, Λ 643, Ο 393, 401 (the *θεράπων* should take up Patroklos' activity), α 422–23 = σ 305–06, δ 160, 239, 598, θ 45, 91, 368, 542, μ 52, 188, ο 391, 393, ρ 385, 606, τ 590, ψ 301, 308.

Leisure (5): Ε 760, Φ 45 (Lykaōn amongst his family before returning to Troy), Ψ 298 (Ekhepōlos paid the ransom so he could *take pleasure* [τέρποιτο] rather than toil at Troy), ζ 46, λ 603.

Sleeping (5): Ω 3, 636, δ 295, ψ 255, 346.

Sex (6): Γ 441, Ι 337, Ξ 314, ε 227, θ 292, ψ 300 (*cf.* 346, sleeping).

Another's company (3): υ 61, ξ 244, ψ 212.

Generic enjoyment (18): Α 474 (Apollo hearing his *hymn*), Δ 10, Η 61 (watching the fighting), Θ 481, Ι 400, Σ 526, 604, Τ 18 (receiving the armour), Υ 23, α 347, δ 179, 194, 372, ε 74, θ 171, ξ 228, π 26, φ 105.

Comforting (3): Τ 312, 313, σ 315.

Taking one's fill (15): Τ 19, Ψ 10, 98, Ω 513, 633, δ 47, 102, κ 181, λ 212, ο 399, 400, τ 213, 251, 513, φ 57.

¹ This figure is conservative and could be as high as 32: religious songs (Apollo listening to his *hymn* at Α 474; the *hymn* of the singer at θ 429) have been excluded, as have those that do not resemble epic performance (the choral ode on Akhilleus' shield at Σ 604 [athetized, at any rate, in the OCT]), and those instances in which the verb covers eating (though a link with the song could be argued): α 369–71 (at Ithaka), δ 17 (in the court of Menelaos), υ 27 (Dēmodokos among the Phaiakians). The number could be as high as 32.

For the ancient controversy about whether or not an *ἄοιδός* is present at [Σ 604], see Mark W. Edwards, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), n. *ad loc.*

Appendix 3: Uses of ἔΓΓΥΘΕΝ in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*

The following gives the uses of ἔγγυθεν in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and defends the placement of η 205 amongst the “geographical” uses.

Geographical (38): E 72, 275, H 219, K 508, Λ 396, 485, 723, M 337, N 574, 647, Ξ 446, O 529, 710, P 128, 554, 582, Σ 16, 381, Υ 330, X 141, 204, 295, Ψ 323, 516, 763, Ω 360, γ 36, δ 630, ζ 279, η 205 (see note), θ 62, 261, 471, μ 183, 354, ο 163, ρ 71, ω 446. Often, ἔγγυθεν is followed by a part of ἔρχομαι (19×) or ἴστημι (4×).

Temporal (2): Σ 16, 133.

Metaphoric (1): ι 423: Referring to the *Kyklōps*, Odysseus states μέγα γὰρ κακὸν ἔγγυθεν ἦεν, literally “for a great evil was close,” but effectively “for we were in great peril.”

At η 205, ἔγγυθεν applies to a part of the verb to be; this occurs 5× elsewhere in the epics (M 337, P 554, X 295, ζ 279, and ι 423), and a part must be supplied 2× (X 141, μ 354). Of these *loci*, one (ι 423) is metaphoric, but 5 are *clearly* geographical. One (P 554) is indeterminate, as the sense of a close relationship between Athēna and Menelaos cannot be excluded, but, given it is in the introduction to a speech, it is

most likely geographical and an extension of the formula $\left. \begin{array}{l} \acute{\alpha}\gamma\chi\omicron\upsilon \delta' \\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\upsilon\theta\epsilon\nu \end{array} \right\} \text{ἴσταμένη προσ-}$
ἐφη [name of speaker or addressee], “standing close, $\left. \begin{array}{l} [\text{name}] \\ \text{he/she} \end{array} \right\} \text{addressed}$ him/her [name]

which occurs in 8 speech-introductions (B 172, 790, Γ 129, K 508, Λ 199, O 173, Ω 87, and ο 9).

Appendix 4: Green and Brock's "Transportation Scale"

Melanie Green and Timothy Brock developed a questionnaire with which participants in their experiments could rate their feelings of transportation. The questions are reprinted here:¹

Panel 1 : General items

1. While I was reading the narrative, I could easily picture the events in it taking place.
2. While I was reading the narrative, activity going on in the room around me was on my mind. (R)
3. I could picture myself in the scene of the events described in the narrative.
4. I was mentally involved in the narrative while reading it.
5. After finishing the narrative, I found it easy to put it out of my mind. (R)
6. I wanted to learn how the narrative ended.
7. The narrative affected me emotionally.
8. I found myself thinking of ways the narrative could have turned out differently.
9. I found my mind wandering while reading the narrative. (R)
10. The events in the narrative are relevant to my everyday life.
11. The events in the narrative have changed my life.

Panel 2: Items specific to the text under consideration

- 12–15. While reading the narrative I had a vivid image of [*persona 1/2/3/4*].

Each of the 15 questions was answered using a scale from "not at all" (1) to "very much" (7); two questions, marked (R) in the list above, were reverse scored (*i.e.*, from "not at all" (7) to "very much" (1)). A score was calculated by simply adding the responses to each question.

¹ These questions are reprinted from Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock, "The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 5 (2000): 701–21 at 704, table 1. I have remodelled this table slightly to remove its specificity to their original experiments: panel two (four questions) is specific to the text under consideration in the particular experiment; hence, the *personae* in Green and Brock's first three experiments were, respectively, Katie, Joan/John, the psychiatric patient, and the registered nurse; in their fourth experiment, they were the boy, the dog, the ice island, and the pilot.

Appendix 5: Experimental Narrative

The following table gives the experimental narrative (1 193–203, 212–542) divided into screens as it was delivered by the computer during the experiment. The break (the digression on Marōn’s wine) occurs between screens 3 and 4.

1	I ordered the rest of my trusty companions to remain there by my ship to guard it, picked out twelve of the best of them, and went off.
2	I had a goat-leather skin of dark, sweet wine, which Maron, the son of Euanthes (the priest of Apollo, who protected Ismaros) gave to me previously when we, in reverence, had helped him, his wife, and his child.
3	He lived in a wooded grove sacred to Phoebus Apollo; and he gave me treasures: seven talents of gold, a solid silver wine-bowl, and ten containers of sweet, potent wine.
4	I filled a large wineskin with this, and I also brought provisions in a wallet; for at once I knew in my heart that we would come upon a man endowed with great courage, fierce, ignorant of justice and law.
5	Soon we arrived in the cavern, but we did not find him inside as he was driving his fat flocks through the pastures.
6	Having come into the cave we looked in awe at each thing in turn; there were loaded baskets of cheeses,
7	The pens were filled to the brink with lambs and kids — each kind was separated and fenced off, with an enclosure each for the oldest animals, the middlings, and the new-borns —
8	And all the milk-jugs and sturdy vessels were overflowing with whey.
9	And then, straight away, the companions entreated me to take some of the cheeses and go back — to drive the kids and the lambs from the pens and sail quickly away in the swift ship over the salty water.
10	But I was not persuaded — though it would have been much better — because I wanted to see him, and obtain a guest-gift.
11	But it was not fated for his appearance to be pleasant for my companions.

12	Next, having lit a fire, we offered sacrifice, ate some of his cheeses, and sat in the cave and waited for him until he drove in his flock.
13	He carried in a heavy load of dried wood, to use for his evening meal, which he threw into the cave making a great noise;
14	We were terrified, and fled back into a recess of the cavern.
15	Then he penned in his fat flocks:
16	Those he used to milk he drove into the wide cave, but he left the rams and he-goats in the high enclosure outside the entrance.
17	Then he lifted and placed a great stone over the doorway; it was huge, and twenty-two sturdy four-wheeled wagons couldn't have made it budge;
18	And he sat and milked the ewes and the bleating goats, all in order, and set the young beneath each.
19	Then he solidified half of the white milk and placed it in woven baskets, and he put the other half in vessels, so it might ready for him to drink with his evening meal.
20	Then, in the bustle of his chores, he lit up the fire and saw us, and asked: "Strangers, who are you? From where have you sailed the watery sea-routes?"
21	"Are you wandering on business? or idly over the sea like pirates, who roam at risk of their lives, and bring evil to foreigners?"
22	So he spoke, and our hearts were broken in fear at his size and the depth of his sound.
23	So I spoke in answer to him: "We are Achaeans driven off course in our journey from Troy by all kinds of winds over the great gulf of the sea;
24	"We were making our way home by a different route, and strayed here on, I suppose, the decision of Zeus.
25	"We claim to be the forces of Agamemnon son of Atreus, whose fame is now the greatest under the heavens (for he sacked such a great city and destroyed many peoples)
26	"and we have arrived here and are at your knees, hoping you might give us some sort of gift (as is the custom for strangers).

27	“But, good sir, honour the gods; for we are your suppliants, and Zeus is the avenger of suppliants and strangers.”
28	So I spoke, and then he replied with a ruthless heart: “Stranger, either you are naïve, or you have come from a foreign land, if you exhort me either to fear or keep out of the way of the gods.
29	“The Cyclopes do not care about Aegis-bearing Zeus, nor about the blessed gods, since we are better by far.
30	“And nor would I spare you or your companions to avoid the enmity of Zeus unless I wished to anyway.
31	“But tell me where you left your sturdy ship when you came — I wish to learn: is it far, or near?”
32	So he spoke, tempting me, but I saw through it and spoke craftily in turn:
33	“Poseidon, the earth-shaker, shattered my ship, hurling it against the rocks at the edge of your land, dashing it against the point; and the wind carried us from the sea; only I with these men escaped utter destruction.”
34	So I spoke, and he did not answer me with his hard heart;
35	Springing up, he grabbed my companions, and seizing two together he dashed them like puppies against the ground; and their brains ran on the ground, and moistened the earth.
36	Dividing them limb by limb he prepared his dinner; and he ate like a mountain-bred lion, without leaving a remnant, guts, flesh, bones, and all.
37	And we, cried and held up our hands to Zeus on seeing these evil deeds; and I felt utterly helpless.
38	When the Cyclops had filled his great belly with human flesh and unmixed milk, he lay inside the cave stretching himself out among the flocks.
39	Then I considered in my great-heated spirit whether I should come near, draw my sharp sword from my thigh, and thrust it into his chest, aiming for his liver;
40	But one thought restrained me. Had I followed this course, we would have perished utterly; for we would not have been able to push back the heavy stone which he had placed over the lofty entrance with our hands.
41	So, groaning, we waited for bright Dawn.

42	When early-born rosy-fingered dawn appeared, he lit up the fire, milked his fine flocks all in order, and set the young beneath each.
43	Then, in the bustle of his chores, he again seized two companions and ate his breakfast.
44	When he'd dined, he drove out the fat flocks from the cave, removing the great door-stone easily;
45	And then he placed it back, as if placing a stopper on a quiver.
46	With a great whistle, the Cyclops directed his fat flocks to the mountain;
47	And I was left secretly pondering how I might take vengeance should Athene give me that glory.
48	And I decided upon a plan.
49	There was a great club, of green olive-wood, laid beside a pen: the Cyclops had cut it so he might carry it when it had dried.
50	When we saw it, we judged it to be as long and thick as the mast of a twenty-oared black ship, a broad sea-going freighter.
51	I struck off about an arm-span, handed it over to my companions, and ordered them to sharpen it;
52	They made it smooth and I stood by and sharpened the point.
53	Then I took it, hardened it in the blazing fire, and hid it well under the dung which was spread thick throughout the cave.
54	Next I ordered the others to cast lots to see who would dare lift the stake with me to press it into his eye as he slept.
55	And those to whom the lots fell were the four I'd wanted to select myself, and I joined them as the fifth.
56	In the evening he came back, driving his thick-fleeced sheep;
57	Immediately he drove his whole fat flock into the broad cave, without leaving any in the deep enclosure outside;
58	Either he suspected something, or this was the gods' work.
59	Then he raised and set back the great door-stone, sat and milked the sheep and bleating goats all in order, and set the young beneath each.

60	Then in the bustle of his chores, he seized another two companions and ate his dinner.
61	And then I stood close and spoke to the Cyclops, holding a drinking cup of dark wine between my hands: “Cyclops, come, drink wine, since you have eaten human flesh, so you might see what sort of drink we have hidden in our ship;
62	“If you take pity and send me homeward, I’d offer you much more; as things are, your madness is no longer tolerable.
63	“O merciless one! How can anyone else come to you in the future from the cities of men? Your behaviour is quite outrageous.”
64	So I spoke, and he received it and drank; and he heartily enjoyed drinking the sweet drink, and asked me again for a second: “Give me more and plenty, and tell me your name, quickly now, so I might give you a guest-gift you’ll enjoy.
65	“The grain-giving earth produces full-bodied wine for the Cyclopes, and Zeus the thunderer grows it for them, but this is as good as nectar and ambrosia.”
66	So he spoke; and I gave him the bright wine again, three times, each of which he drank thoughtlessly.
67	Then, when the Cyclops was out of his mind with wine, I spoke to him in a placating tone: “Cyclops, do you ask me my famous name? Well, I shall tell you, and you can give me the guest-gift you promised.
68	“My name is Nobody; and my mother and father and all my companions besides call me Nobody.”
69	So I spoke, and then he answered me with a hard heart: “Nobody, I shall eat you last among all your companions; that can be your guest-gift.”
70	And, reclining, he fell on his back, and lay there with his thick neck turned on its side. As all-subduing sleep took over him, from his throat there issued forth wine and bits of men, and he belched in his drunkenness.
71	And then I thrust the stake beneath the embers to heat it up, encouraging all my companions, to stop any of them giving up in fear.
72	But when the olive stake was about to catch fire — although it was green, it

	glowed intensely — then I took it from the fire to within a short distance of the Cyclops, and my companions stood around me.
73	Then a great spirit breathed into us courage: they, grasping the sharp-pointed stake, thrust it into the eye; and I put my weight on it, turning it like a man boring a beam for a ship with a drill;
74	He holds a strap at each end, under the bit, and keeps it in motion, and the drill spins continuously.
75	Holding the fire-strengthened stake that way, we span it in his eye, and the blood flowed about it since it was hot.
76	And the blast of fire singed all the eyelashes on both sides and the eyebrow as the bright eye burned up; and the roots crackled in the flames.
77	Just like a great axe or adze hisses loudly when a bronze-worker dips it into cold water to temper it and give it the strength of iron,
78	So his eye hissed about the olive stake.
79	He cried out violently, and the rocks about re-echoed the sound, and we fled, terrified.
80	He extracted the blood-stained stake from his eye, threw it from him with his hand, beside himself in pain, and called loudly to the other Cyclopes living in the caves in the nearby windy peaks.
81	And they heard his shout, came, stood around the cave, and asked what might be troubling him: “What, Polyphemos, has harmed you so much that you shout through this ambrosial night and inflict sleeplessness upon us?”
82	“Surely no mortal drives away your flocks against your will? Surely nobody is killing you yourself with trickery and violence?”
83	At this, mighty Polyphemos replied to the Cyclopes outside: “My friends, Nobody is killing me by trickery and violence.”
84	And then they answered him with this advice: “Well if nobody is attacking you and you are alone, there is no way you may save yourself from an illness of mighty Zeus; why don’t you pray to your father the lord Poseidon.”
85	Thus they spoke and went off, and I rejoiced in my heart at how my name and excellent intelligence had worked deceit.

86	But the Cyclops, groaning in his pain and groping about with his hands, lifted the stone from the doorway
87	And he sat down in the entrance with his hands outstretched in case he might catch someone going through the doorway with the sheep — I suppose he thought me that naïve.
88	But I pondered how to release myself and my companions; and I wove with all my guile and intelligence, for we were in grave danger.
89	I decided on a plan: the rams were well-nourished, with thick fleece dark as dye;
90	Silently I bound them together in threes with pliant willow on which the daunting Cyclops used to sleep; and the one in the middle carried a man.
91	And then I laid myself curled up under the shaggy stomach of the ram which was biggest and far the best of all the flocks;
92	Lying face up, I held the thick wool in my hands without pause and with steadfast soul. And thus groaning we awaited bright dawn.
93	As soon as early-born rosy-fingered dawn appeared, he started to drive out the male sheep to pasture.
94	The females were bleating un milked around the pens, for their udders were full to bursting.
95	But their master, in great pain, was feeling the backs of all the sheep as they stood up;
96	For he, in his naïveté, did not think how they might be tied to the chests under the woolly-fleeced sheep.
97	Last of the flocks the ram was coming through the doorway, encumbered by its wool and by me.
98	And daunting Polyphemos spoke to it as he stroked its back: “My pet ram, why now do you make your way from the cave last of the flocks?”
99	“Never before have you been left alone, but many times you were first to feed on fresh flowers and grass, with eager strides;

100	“You were first to come to the flowing rivers, and you were first to be anxious to depart to your stall in the evening;
101	“And now you are last of all.
102	“Surely you are mourning for your master’s eye, which an evil man blinded with his good-for-nothing companions, after overpowering my mind with wine:
103	“Nobody, who I say has not yet escaped destruction.
104	“If only you were intelligent and endowed with speech you could tell me where he is hiding; and then I could smite him.
105	“His brains would be scattered upon the ground in all directions through the cave, and thus I would get some release from the troubles that worthless Nobody gave me.”
106	So speaking he sent the ram from him through the door.
107	When we had gone a short distance from the cave and the courtyard I detached myself from the ram and released my companions.
108	Then quickly we rounded up the large, long-striding flocks, plump and fat, and drove them until we came to the ship.
109	And we, the lucky survivors, were a welcome sight to our dear companions; but they were wailing and weeping for the others.
110	But I, signalling silently to each, did not permit them to mourn, but ordered them to stow the many thick-wooled flocks in the ship quickly and to sail off over the briny sea.
111	They embarked quickly and sat upon the benches, and sitting in rows they struck the grey sea with the oars.
112	But when I had gone off to about as far as a shout could be heard, then I addressed the Cyclops with mocking speech: “Cyclops, you were not fated to eat the companions of a cowardly man in your hollow cave with your mighty strength.
113	“Surely it was fated that your evil deeds would catch up with you, wretch, since you did not shrink from devouring the strangers who were guests in your house; and for this Zeus and the other gods have punished you.”
114	Thus I spoke, and then he was hopping mad; and he broke off the peak of a great mountain and hurled it at us.

115	It landed just in front of the ornamented prow of the ship, narrowly missing the tip of the steering-oar.
116	The sea surged up from the impact of the rock; and the swell of the sea forced us quickly to land.
117	Then I took a long pole in my hands and pushed off again; and I urged and ordered the companions to throw themselves on their oars, so we might flee from great evil, nodding my head; and they bent forward and plied the oars.
118	But when we'd gone across the sea twice as far as before, I was about to address the Cyclops again; but around me my companions held me back with conciliatory words from their different places: "You fool! Why do you wish to provoke the fierce man?"
119	"Just now he hurled a missile into the sea and drove the ship again to the land; and we were sure we were done for.
120	If he had heard anyone calling out or shouting, then he would have smashed our heads and the beams of our ship with another jagged sparkling stone; for he throws things of such size."
121	So they spoke, but my great-hearted soul was not persuaded, and with rage in my soul I spoke again to him: "Cyclops, if ever any mortal man should ask you of the grievous blinding of your eye,
122	"Tell him that it was blinded by Odysseus the sacker of cities, the son of Laertes, who dwells in Ithaka."
123	So I spoke, but he cried out and spoke to me with words: "Woe is me! Indeed the ancient prophecies about me have come to pass.
124	"There was here a seer, a good and great man, Telemos the son of Eurymos, who was the best in the prophetic arts, and grew old as a seer for the Cyclopes;
125	"He told me all these things would be accomplished in the future, that I would lose my vision at the hands of Odysseus.
126	"So I always waited for some large and beautiful man to come here, endowed with great strength. But now he has blinded me in my eye though small and worthless and feeble, since he overpowered me with wine.
127	"But come here, Odysseus, so that I may give you that guest-gift, and so I may rouse Poseidon, the famous earth-beater, to give you safe conduct; for

	I am his son, and he acknowledges he is my father.
128	“And, should he choose, he will personally cure my eye, and he wouldn’t send anybody else of the blessed gods or mortal men to do it for him.”
129	So he spoke, but I addressed him in reply: “O how I wish that I could take from you your soul and vital spirit, and to send you into the house of Hades, as surely as the earth-beater will not cure your eye.”
130	So I spoke, and he then prayed to the lord Poseidon, holding out his hands into the starry heavens: “Hear me, dark-haired, earth-encircling Poseidon:
131	“If I am indeed your son, and you acknowledge you are my father, grant that Odysseus, the sacker of cities, the son of Laertes, who dwells in Ithaka, will not come home.
132	“But if it is fated for him to see his family and to come to his sturdy home and his own fatherland, may he come late and badly, deprived of all his companions, in someone else’s ship, and may he find troubles in his house.”
133	So he spoke in prayer, and the dark-haired god heard him.
134	Then he raised up another, much bigger stone, whirled it around, and threw it, and he put all his weight behind it.
135	It struck only just behind the ship with its ornamented prow, and it narrowly missed the tip of the steering-oar.
136	The sea surged up from the impact of the rock; but this time the wave carried the ship onward, and it drove it until we came to another land.
137	[End]

Appendix 6: Psychophysical Method for Calibrating the Volume of the Aural Stimulus

The absolute threshold of hearing (the volume below which a sound is, on average, inaudible) was approximated using a modified method of limits, and refined somewhat using a method of constant stimuli.¹

The method of limits involves a series of trials with the characteristic being measured (here, volume) being steadily altered between each signal delivered. In *increasing trials* the characteristic is increased between deliveries; in *decreasing trials* it is decreased. After each delivery, the respondent indicates whether or not s/he has perceived a signal. For each trial, the limit is the level at which the respondent can or can no longer perceive the stimulus. The threshold is then approximated as the average of these trial limits.

The method of constant stimuli involves a large number of individual trials with the characteristic set randomly at one of several predetermined levels. After each trial, the respondent indicates whether s/he has perceived a signal. After all trials have been conducted, the proportion of signals detected is calculated for each level. The threshold is then approximated as the level at which this proportion equals 50%.

		Method of Limits						
		Trial						
Volume		1	2	3	4	5	6	
	1	N		N		N		
	2	N		N		N		
	3	N	N	N	N	N		
	4	N	N	N	N	N		
	5	N	Y	N	Y	N		
	6	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
	7	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
	8	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	
	9		Y		Y	Y	Y	
	10		Y		Y		Y	
	11		Y		Y		Y	
	12		Y		Y		Y	
	13		Y		Y		Y	
Limit		7	4	6	4	8	7	
Threshold:		$(7 + 4 + 6 + 4 + 8 + 7) \div 6 = 6.00$						

		Method of Constant Stimuli						
		Trial at this volume						
Volume		1	2	3	4	5	%	
	1	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
	2	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
	3	N	N	N	Y	N	N	20
	4	N	Y	N	N	N	N	20
	5	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	40
	6	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	60
	7	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	80
	8	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	80
	9	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	100
	10	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	100
	11	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	100
	12	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	100
	13	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	100
Threshold:		calculated statistically at 5.5						

¹ The “method of limits” and “method of constant stimuli” are well-tested psychophysical methods; they date back to one of the pioneers of psychophysics, Gustav Theodor Fechner, *Elemente der Psychophysik* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Hartel, 1860).

Calibration Procedure

During the method of limits phase, the “gaps” (and indications of yes or no) between individual deliveries of the signal were removed and the sounds were presented as a tone which gradually built from or faded away to nothing. The participant pressed a key to indicate s/he could hear (increasing trials) or could no longer hear (decreasing trials) the sound. After three increasing and three decreasing trials, the threshold was calculated at half way between the mean ascending and mean descending limits.

During the method of constant stimuli phase, the volume was set at a level where the participant responded to 80% of signals. Signal volumes were set at 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, and 1.5 times the approximation of the threshold of hearing calculated from the method of limits. Signals were delivered for 500ms at random intervals (between 5 and 15 seconds) at a volume level chosen at random from the four signal volumes until 10 responses had been recorded for each level. Only the first 10 responses were recorded for each volume. The test volume was then set assuming (for simplicity) a linear relationship around the 80% level.²

If the hit rate dropped below 70% during the recording of the baseline then the volume was increased slightly and the baseline taken again until a hit rate of 80% or above was attained. If the volume was set at a level tested during the method of constant stimuli procedure, then the ten results recorded at that volume level were used as the baseline to save time and to provide a safeguard against the participant’s ears becoming temporarily attuned (and more sensitive) to the tone.

² The relationship is, admittedly, not linear but exponential; even so, the relationship approximates a linear trend when reasonably localized. The concern in setting the volume was not to underestimate the threshold (in which case a participant might not actually be able to hear the signals at all); a linear relationship will inherently *overestimate* the volume at which 80% accuracy is achieved.

The volume was set, therefore, proportionally between signal volumes where the participant had scored less than and greater than 80%. If the participant scored 80% for one of the signal volumes, then, naturally, that volume was used. *I.e.*, the formula used to set the volume was

$$\text{Lower volume} + \left(\frac{\text{Target Hit rate} - \text{Hit rate}_{\text{lower volume}}}{\text{Hit rate}_{\text{upper volume}} - \text{Hit rate}_{\text{lower volume}}} \times (\text{Upper volume} - \text{Lower volume}) \right).$$

E.g., if a participant scored 50% at a volume level of 16, and 90% at a volume level of 24, the volume was set at $16 + \left(\frac{80\% - 50\%}{90\% - 50\%} \times (24 - 16) \right) = 22$.

Appendix 7: Experimental Results

Transportation Measures

On-Line Measures

Data Set	Latency (ms)				Score						
	Baseline	Test Phase	Δ	% Δ	Baseline	Test Phase		Δ	False Alarms		
1	808.6	977.1	168.4	20.8%	80%	15 / 26	58%	22%	7		
2	511.0	833.1	322.1	63.0%	100%	31 / 31	100%	0%	0		
3	867.5	924.4	56.9	6.6%	100%	16 / 17	94%	6%	0		
4	954.1	912.1	-42.0	-4.4%	100%	33 / 35	94%	6%	1		
5	499.5	733.4	233.9	46.8%	100%	34 / 35	97%	3%	1		
6	646.9	729.4	82.5	12.8%	100%	22 / 30	73%	27%	0		
7	895.3	1085.2	189.9	21.2%	80%	35 / 35	100%	-20%	1		
8	551.2	818.9	267.7	48.6%	100%	33 / 33	100%	0%	0		
9	654.3	776.2	121.9	18.6%	90%	33 / 33	100%	-10%	0		
10	483.3	758.8	275.5	57.0%	100%	19 / 22	86%	14%	0		
11	533.6	681.8	148.2	27.8%	100%	31 / 35	89%	11%	0		
12	679.2	814.9	135.7	20.0%	90%	29 / 35	83%	7%	0		
13	487.7	660.0	172.3	35.3%	100%	30 / 35	86%	14%	1		
14	1019.8	876.4	-143.4	-14.1%	80%	34 / 35	97%	-17%	5		
15	718.0	758.1	40.1	5.6%	80%	34 / 35	97%	-17%	2		
16	687.1	N.R. ¹	∞	∞	90%	0 / 29	0%	90%	0		
17	602.4	818.7	216.3	35.9%	100%	30 / 35	86%	14%	4		
18	450.7	771.2	320.5	71.1%	100%	31 / 35	89%	11%	0		
19	869.2	809.1	-60.1	-6.9%	100%	34 / 34	100%	0%	0		
20	505.8	626.4	120.7	23.9%	80%	31 / 35	89%	-9%	0		
21	611.9	879.8	267.9	43.8%	70%	26 / 35	74%	-4%	0		
22	452.7	754.2	301.5	66.6%	100%	30 / 33	91%	9%	0		
23	584.5	739.1	154.6	26.5%	100%	34 / 34	100%	0%	0		
24	603.9	907.4	303.5	50.3%	100%	22 / 27	81%	19%	1		
25	558.3	707.3	149.0	26.7%	100%	29 / 32	91%	9%	0		
26	898.2	895.3	-2.9	-0.3%	90%	31 / 35	89%	1%	0		
27	513.5	693.5	180.0	35.1%	100%	31 / 35	89%	11%	0		
28	547.1	1006.1	459.0	83.9%	100%	33 / 35	94%	6%	0		
29	482.7	837.1	354.4	73.4%	100%	35 / 35	100%	0%	0		
30	551.3	841.1	289.8	52.6%	100%	32 / 35	91%	9%	7		
31	832.6	1101.1	268.5	32.2%	80%	32 / 35	91%	-11%	0		
32	429.2	628.1	198.9	46.3%	100%	34 / 35	97%	3%	1		
33	534.5	622.7	88.2	16.5%	100%	30 / 35	86%	14%	1		
Max	1019.8	1101.1	459.0	83.9%	100.0%		100.0%	90.0%	7		
Min	429.2	622.7	-143.4	-14.1%	70.0%		0.0%	-20.0%	0		
Range	590.6	478.4	602.4	98.0%	30.0%		100.0%	110.0%	7		
Mean	637.1	811.8	176.2	32.6%	94.2%		87.6%	6.6%	0.9697		
SD	165.14	123.41	131.51	24.8%	9.0%		18.2%	18.6%	1.9282		
Median	584.5	812.0	176.1	32.2%	100.0%		90.9%	5.7%	0		

¹ Participant made no responses to the tone in the test phase, but verified afterwards that the signal was audible.

Item-Total Correlations for the Off-Line Measure (Transportation Scale)

Data Set	Easily picture the events	Activity in room on mind (r)	Picture myself in scene	Mentally involved while reading	Easy to put out of mind (r)	Wanted to learn how ended	Affected me emotionally	Thinking of alternative endings	Mind wandering while reading (r)	Events relevant to my life	Events have changed my life	Vivid image Odysseus	Vivid Image Cyclops	Vivid Image Cyclops' cave	Vivid Image Companions	Total (theoretical range: 15-105)	Subset: Theoretical range 12-84
1	6	6	5	6	5	6	3	5	4	2	1	5	6	6	2	68	55
2	7	5	5	5.9	5	6	5	5	5	2.1	2	4	4	6.1	2	69	56
3	7	6	6	7	5	6	4.8	5.1	6	6	3	7	7	5	2	83	66
4	5	3.8	2.9	3.4	4.6	5	2	3.6	5	5	3	3.5	4.5	4.1	4.1	60	45
5	6	3.5	4	5	4	5	4	5.6	4.9	2.9	1.9	4.5	5.1	5	2	63	52
6	5.5	5.5	5	5	5	5.5	3.4	6	4.7	3.5	2	2.7	5.5	4.4	2.4	66	52
7	6	6	4	6	4.5	4.8	5.5	5.4	5.7	2	1	5	5	6	2	69	58
8	6	7	4	6	5	5	4	5	7	2	2	5	6	6	5	75	63
9	6.5	7	2.5	5.5	5	6	2	5	6	3.5	1	5	5	3.5	1	65	50
10	5.6	6.3	4.8	6	4.9	4.6	4.5	5.7	5.4	2.8	2.6	3.8	5.3	4.6	2.3	69	57
11	6	6	6.1	5.8	3.1	4.7	3	2.5	4.8	4.6	2.8	3.6	5.1	5	2.1	65	53
12	5	3	2	4	5	5	5	6	3.5	5	3	5	5	4.5	3	64	49
13	6.4	7	5.4	6.3	5.8	6	4.3	6	6.2	4.2	3.6	5.6	5.5	5	4.2	82	66
14	6	5	2	7	6	4	3	2	6	1	1	3	7	6	2.1	61	50
15	5.1	7	3.4	5	4.9	5	4	5.5	6.5	4	1	5.8	6.2	6	1.9	71	57
16	6.5	6.6	3.8	6.8	6.1	6	6	6.6	6.5	4.4	3	5	6	6.5	3.6	83	67
17	7	6	7	6	6	7	3	6	7	1	2	7	5.9	7	2	80	66
18	5	6	2	5	5	5	4	5	6	3	1	5	6	4	2	64	51
19	6.5	6	3	5.5	6	7	1	7	6	1	1	6	7	3	1	67	53
20	5.7	5.5	6	5	4	5.5	2	3.4	6.5	1	1	2	5	6	2.5	61	51
21	6.9	7	1	6	1.9	6.4	3.1	1.1	6.9	1	1	6	6.2	5.1	1.1	61	51
22	5.8	3.7	5.1	4.9	4.5	5.3	4.4	3.7	3.8	2.7	2.1	5	4.6	5.3	3.8	65	52
23	3.7	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.6	3.5	3	4.5	2	2	3.5	6	5.5	2	59	47
24	6	6	7	7	6	6	5	5	7	3	3	7	7	5	1	81	66
25	6	5.5	4	6	5	5	6	4.5	5	4	4	5	6	5.5	4.5	76	62
26	6.1	6.9	1	6.3	6.2	6.5	5	1.6	6.3	1	1	6.1	2	6.5	1	64	50
27	6	6	4.9	7	6.3	6	4.2	5	5.7	3	3.2	6.5	6	6.6	4.6	81	66
28	6	6.1	5.9	5.9	5.2	5.8	3.5	4	4	2.2	2.1	5	5.9	5	3	70	56
29	5	4.3	1	5	5.3	7	1.4	3.7	3.2	2.3	1	4.7	2.1	3	1.6	51	36
30	7	5	3	5	3	6	6	5	3	2	1	7	7	7	4	71	60
31	6	4	1	5.3	4	5.1	5.8	2.7	3.7	1	2	6	6	5	3	61	51
32	6	3	5	6	7	4	1	3	2	3	1	4	6	1	1	53	39
33	7	2.8	7	7	1.8	7	2.5	2.9	5.9	1	1	5.9	7	7	1	67	57

continued...

		Easily picture the events	Activity in room on mind (r)	Picture myself in scene	Mentally involved while reading	Easy to put out of mind (r)	Wanted to learn how ended	Affected me emotionally	Thinking of alternative endings	Mind wandering while reading (r)	Events relevant to my life	Events have changed my life	Vivid image Odysseus	Vivid Image Cyclops	Vivid Image Cyclops' cave	Vivid Image Companions	Total (theoretical range: 15-105)	Subset: Theoretical range 12-84
Max		7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	6	4	7	7	7	5	83	67
Min		3.7	2.8	1	3.4	1.8	4	1	1.1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	51	36
Range		3.3	4.2	6	3.6	5.2	3	5	5.9	5	5	3	5	5	6	4	33	31
Mean		5.979	5.424	4.076	5.7	4.87	5.57	3.785	4.442	5.264	2.703	1.918	5.006	5.573	5.188	2.448	68	55
SD		0.736	1.285	1.818	0.886	1.171	0.833	1.434	1.484	1.301	1.388	0.932	1.285	1.2	1.305	1.185	8.4	7.7
Median		6	6	4	5.9	5	5.5	4	5	5.7	2.7	2	5	6	5.1	2	67	53
<i>r</i>		0.45041766	0.514822342	0.484644963	0.550953989	0.234033235	0.268019046	0.534247238	0.568129644	0.51907551	0.314077106	0.57065866	0.531685834	0.413182098	0.505207771	0.385667628	1	0.975282815
<i>p</i>		0.00852945	0.00217289	0.00425972	0.00089138	0.18990089	0.13154669	0.00136247	0.0005628	0.00196639	0.07507292	0.00052483	0.00145127	0.01685196	0.00271052	0.02664958	—	6.8658×10 ⁻²²


Character Appraisals

Item-Total Correlations for Semantic-Differential Scales


Data Set	Odysseus					Polyphēmos				
	Good/ Bad	Right/ Wrong	Pleasant/ Unpleasant	Like/ Dislike	Total	Good/ Bad	Right/ Wrong	Pleasant/ Unpleasant	Like/ Dislike	Total
1	11	0	10	-20	1	-13	0	-24	10	-27
2	20	20	20	30	90	-20	0	-9	-20	-49
3	0	5	-10	10	5	0	0	-10	20	10
4	0	0	-4	10	6	-6	-10	-30	4	-42
5	10	10	6	16	42	-11	-11	-21	-10	-53
6	-6	-20	-6	-5	-37	-10	6	-15	15	-4
7	0	8	10	-15	3	0	10	-10	5	5
8	10	0	-5	-10	-5	-10	-10	-10	-10	-40
9	-10	-10	-5	-10	-35	2	0	0	10	12
10	13	10	-7	-4	12	-5	-16	-17	-10	-48
11	10	0	0	15	25	0	0	0	8	8
12	10	5	13	6	34	-17	-26	-24	-9	-76
13	20	6	15	20	61	-10	-10	-20	-14	-54
14	10	20	-4	0	26	-10	-10	-24	-17	-61
15	0	0	-15	-7	-22	0	0	-16	12	-4
16	-2	0	-2	-2	-6	0	-2	-2	4	0
17	30	20	21	30	101	0	-15	-10	10	-15
18	20	-20	-10	20	10	-10	-10	-20	-10	-50
19	20	10	0	10	40	-10	-20	-30	-20	-80
20	20	10	-10	17	37	-20	-30	-20	0	-70
21	0	10	-11	-8	-9	-26	-27	-30	-30	-113
22	2	4	-8	-17	-19	-14	4	-9	-8	-27
23	5	3	0	5	13	-7	-10	-15	-10	-42
24	20	10	10	20	60	-20	-20	-30	-30	-100
25	0	5	-5	15	15	-5	-5	-10	10	-10
26	-20	-16	-20	-30	-86	-20	-20	-25	0	-65
27	20	20	17	21	78	-22	-30	-20	-14	-86
28	0	-16	-4	-20	-40	5	10	-10	15	20
29	23	10	12	10	55	0	-12	4	-3	-11
30	2	-2	-2	-7	-9	-3	-3	-5	-9	-20
31	-10	30	-10	-20	-10	-30	-30	-30	-30	-120
32	0	20	0	10	30	-20	0	-30	-30	-80
33	5	-10	-8	5	-8	10	-19	-19	10	-18
Max	30	30	21	30	101	10	10	4	20	20
Min	-20	-20	-20	-30	-86	-30	-30	-30	-30	-120
Range	50	50	41	60	187	40	40	34	50	140
Mean	7.061	4.303	-0.364	2.879	13.88	-9.15	-9.58	-16.39	-4.58	-39.70
SD	11.280	12.126	10.443	15.582	39.53	9.59	11.56	9.82	14.51	37.68
Median	5	5	-4	5	10	-10	-10	-17	-8	-42
<i>r</i>	0.865	0.667	0.802	0.854	1	0.869	0.777	0.794	0.866	1
<i>p</i>	8.49×10^{-11}	2.27×10^{-5}	2.02×10^{-8}	2.57×10^{-10}	—	5.22×10^{-11}	1.05×10^{-7}	3.6×10^{-8}	7.87×10^{-11}	—

Histograms and Approximated Normal Distributions for the Character Appraisals

Odysseus



Polyphēmos



Character Appraisals and Ambiguity Scores as a Function of Transportation



Data Set	Transportation On-Line Measure	Odysseus		Polyphēmos		
		Appraisal	Ambiguity	Appraisal	Ambiguity	
Low-Transportation Group	14	-14.1%	26	8	-61	0
	19	-6.9%	40	0	-80	0
	4	-4.4%	6	8	-42	8
	26	-0.3%	-86	0	-65	0
	15	5.6%	-22	0	-4	24
	3	6.6%	5	20	10	20
	6	12.8%	-37	0	-4	42
	33	16.5%	-8	20	-18	40
	9	18.6%	-35	0	12	0
	12	20.0%	34	0	-76	0
	1	20.8%	1	40	-27	20
	7	21.2%	3	30	5	20
	20	23.9%	37	20	-70	0
	23	26.5%	13	0	-42	0
	25	26.7%	15	10	-10	20
11	27.8%	25	0	8	0	
(Median)	31	32.2%	-10	60	-120	0
High-Transportation Group	27	35.1%	78	0	-86	0
	13	35.3%	61	0	-54	0
	17	35.9%	101	0	-15	20
	21	43.8%	-9	20	-113	0
	32	46.3%	30	0	-80	0
	5	46.8%	42	0	-53	0
	8	48.6%	-5	20	-40	0
	24	50.3%	60	0	-100	0
	30	52.6%	-9	4	-20	0
	10	57.0%	12	22	-48	0
	2	63.0%	90	0	-49	0
	22	66.6%	-19	12	-27	8
	18	71.1%	10	60	-50	0
	29	73.4%	55	0	-11	8
	28	83.9%	-40	0	20	20
16	∞	-6	0	0	8	
Max	83.9%	101	60	20	42	
Min	-14.1%	-86	0	-120	0	
Range	98.0%	187	60	140	42	
Mean	32.6%	13.88	10.73	-39.70	7.82	
SD	24.8%	39.53	16.56	37.68	11.96	
Median	32.2%	10	0	-42	0	

continued....

		Transportation On-Line Measure	Odysseus Appraisal Ambiguity		Polyphēmos Appraisal Ambiguity	
High-T	Max	83.9%	101	60	20	20
	Min	35.1%	-40	0	-113	0
	Range	119.0%	141	60	133	20
	Mean	54.0%	28.1875	8.625	-45.375	4
	SD	14.9%	42.51309	16.02862	36.54016	7.00476
	Median	51.4%	21	0	-48.5	0
Low-T	Max	27.8%	40	40	12	42
	Min	-14.1%	-86	0	-80	0
	Range	41.9%	126	40	92	42
	Mean	12.6%	1.0625	9.75	-29	12.125
	SD	13.2%	33.07662	12.66754	33.27862	14.72356
	Median	17.6%	5.5	4	-22.5	4
<i>p</i>		2.47876×10 ⁻⁰⁹	0.02651	0.413579	0.09754	0.027698

(*p* expresses the probability that the observed difference between the groups occurred purely by chance.)

Influence of Transportation on Character Appraisal



Other Data

Data Set	Mean Reading Speed Words/Sec	Multiple-Choice Test Score	Screen of Final Signal
1	5.544351573	3	131
2	4.667748751	3	135
3	7.554829664	3	131
4	4.799596644	5	131
5	4.510049067	5	126
6	5.57093249	3	131
7	3.497503285	3	114
8	4.8363019	3	131
9	3.868864462	3	123
10	7.778077148	5	135
11	3.36634461	3	89
12	3.459405107	3	102
13	4.016812388	5	128
14	2.831954962	5	77
15	3.991943072	4	120
16	5.195483129	3	129
17	2.699573217	3	90
18	3.695133579	5	90
19	4.30454453	4	135
20	4.69031281	4	129
21	3.954448098	5	113
22	4.703140764	5	130
23	4.196619991	4	131
24	5.454972387	4	132
25	4.970034795	5	131
26	3.419863085	4	91
27	3.870297615	5	109
28	3.454861813	3	118
29	4.295173991	5	127
30	4.448704317	3	130
31	2.632100179	4	78
32	3.346474188	4	101
33	3.470094211	5	96

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Index Locorum

- A.: A.: 80, 136.
Apollod.: *Bibliotheca* 2.6–7: 14.
Apollonius (Soph.): *Lex.*: 21.
Arabian Nights: 117, 122.
Arist.: *Po.* 1448^a: 104; 1450^b: 87; *Pol.* 1253^a: 121.
Book of Dede Korkut: 117.
Demetrius: *Eloc.*; 130: 127.
Dionysios of Halicarnassus: *De Comp.* 20: 93.
E.: *Andr.*: 80; *Cyc.*: 117; 96–274: 104; *Tr.*: 80.
Eust.: I 186–88: 17; I 189: 17; I 63: 163; ι 060: 104; ι 106: 164; κ 200: 113; λ 328: 21.
Gorg.: *Enc. Helen* § 8: 36; § 10: 36.
Herodianus: *Schematismi Homerici*: 21.
Hes.: *Op.* 109–19: 159–62; 692: 115; *Th.* 98–103: 39; 139: 115; 139–46: 115–16; 140–41: 124; 453–506: 161; 898: 115.
Homer: A 1: 60; 1–11: 81; 25–28: 58–59; 76: 35; 263–65: 112, 115; 393: 135; 450: 145; 474: 203; 496–99: 44; 511–13: 44.
B 104–05: 158; 118: 153; 172: 205; 222: 44; 320: 121; 484–87: 4, 10, 48, 60, 88; 488: 19; 761: 60; 774: 203; 790: 205; 846–47: 135, 158, 165.
Γ 15–382: 195; 21–29: 195; 24: 114; 53–55: 17; 95: 20; 106: 111; 111–12: 20; 129: 205; 166: 114; 176: 12; 216–24: 19; 229: 114; 275: 145; 318: 145; 417: 24; 441: 203.
Δ 10: 203; 23: 114; 74–79: 158; 106: 114; 127: 60; 146: 60; 176: 112; 223–25: 60; 401: 112; 411: 112; 429: 60.
E 52: 114; 72: 205; 85: 60; 143: 112; 151: 112; 174: 145; 201: 132; 251: 112; 275: 205; 286: 112; 341: 113; 395: 114; 594: 113; 601: 121; 703–04: 60; 725: 121; 741: 114; 760: 203; 782: 113; 785: 44; 814: 112; 842: 114; 847: 114; 881: 111.
Z 57–60: 136; 97: 112, 114; 257: 145; 278: 112, 114; 301: 145; 334: 35; 392–502: 197; 403: 23; 454–65: 23.
H 44: 35; 54–312: 195; 61: 203; 84–91: 195; 92–105: 195; 92–94: 20; 104: 60; 163: 112; 177: 145; 208: 114; 211: 114; 219: 205; 238: 44; 244–72: 195; 256: 113; 279–82: 195; 306–12: 195–96; 310: 197; 398–99: 20.
Θ 17–32: 112; 28–30: 20; 34: 24; 96: 114; 273: 60; 338: 114; 354: 24; 424: 113; 460: 114; 465: 24; 481: 203; 532: 112; 538–41: 145.
I 25: 153; 29–31: 20; 63–64: 112, 163; 96–111: 99; 186: 203; 186–189: 17; 189: 203; 308–429: 17; 312–13: 88; 328–29: 135; 328–29: 135; 337: 203; 400: 203; 430–32: 20; 524–28: 17; 539: 114; 563: 24; 624–42: 99; 629: 114; 646–48: 17; 693–95: 20; 693–96: 20; 705: 203.
K 12: 121; 369: 112; 439: 114, 121; 446: 112; 508: 205; 536: 112.
Λ 130: 45; 140: 112; 199: 205; 218–20: 60; 299–300: 60; 316: 112; 340: 196; 361: 112; 383: 94; 384: 112; 396: 205; 479: 113; 485: 205; 643: 203; 660: 112; 723: 205; 777–79: 133; 780: 203; 820: 114.
M 255: 14; 337: 205.
N 11: 121; 99: 121; 258: 112; 293: 111; 435: 14; 574: 205; 603: 60; 621: 111; 647: 205; 825–29: 145.
Ξ 81: 196; 215: 16; 314: 203; 446: 205; 508: 60.

- O 94:** 111; **173:** 205; **271:** 114; **286:** 121; **320–22:** 14; **393:** 203; **401:** 203; **529:** 205; **582:** 60; **592:** 113; **594:** 14; **697:** 60; **710:** 205.
- Π 20:** 60; **25:** 112; **112:** 60; **157:** 113; **584:** 60; **692–93:** 60; **744:** 60; **754:** 60; **787:** 59, 60, 61; **812:** 60; **830–42:** 144; **843:** 60.
- P 19:** 115; **71–74:** 158; **128:** 205; **174:** 114; **260:** 60; **360:** 114; **366–67:** 60; **398:** 114; **554:** 205; **582:** 205; **679:** 60; **702:** 60; **737:** 114.
- Σ 16:** 205; **75:** 145; **83:** 114, 121; **114–15:** 77; **133:** 205; **262:** 115; **300:** 111; **377:** 121; **381:** 205; **410–17:** 114; **467:** 121; **496:** 121; **526:** 203; **549:** 121; **604:** 201, 203.
- T 18:** 203; **19:** 25, 203; **30:** 114; **84:** 35; **88:** 114; **250:** 201; **254:** 145; **312:** 203; **313:** 203; **404–18:** 123.
- Υ 2:** 60; **23:** 203; **330:** 205; **344:** 121; **419–54:** 77.
- Φ 34–35:** 77; **45:** 203; **54:** 121; **224:** 111; **414:** 111; **459:** 111; **527:** 114.
- X 92:** 114; **103:** 132; **131–366:** 77; **141:** 205; **204:** 205; **295:** 205; **313:** 114; **345–54:** 144; **410–11:** 23.
- Ψ 10:** 203; **31:** 94; **98:** 203; **116:** 44; **205–07:** 158; **221:** 45; **290:** 112; **298:** 203; **323:** 205; **472:** 112; **516:** 205; **600:** 60; **611:** 111; **763:** 205; **812:** 112.
- Ω 3:** 203; **41:** 114; **87:** 205; **293:** 113; **301:** 145; **308–21:** 153; **311:** 113; **315:** 113; **343–44:** 14; **359:** 37; **360:** 205; **388:** 24; **394:** 121; **513:** 24, 203; **629:** 121; **631:** 121; **633:** 25, 203; **636:** 203; **729–32:** 23.
- α 1:** 4, 60; **1–4:** 24; **13:** 143; **20–21:** 141; **21:** 112; **22–26:** 158; **23:** 158; **26:** 203; **35–43:** 80; **68–69:** 118; **68–75:** 141, 145, 146, 153, 155, 156, 165; **69:** 111; **70:** 111, 128; **70–71:** 112, 118; **71:** 111; **107:** 203; **134:** 111; **154:** 88; **155:** 11; **199:** 114; **258:** 203; **261:** 113; **298–300:** 80; **310:** 203; **325:** 26, 35, 73, 201; **325–64:** 11; **326–27:** 26, 27; **328–29:** 34; **336:** 201; **337:** 14, 26; **339:** 35, 73; **343–34:** 29; **343–44:** 13; **346:** 201; **346–59:** 13; **347:** 203; **350:** 24; **368:** 115; **369:** 203; **369–71:** 26, 30, 73; **371:** 201; **382:** 121; **421–23:** 29; **422:** 203; **423:** 203.
- β 15–24:** 153–54, 156; **17:** 112; **19:** 111, 113, 114, 121, 131; **19–20:** 165; **33–34:** 142; **41–49:** 29–30; **85:** 113; **266:** 112; **303:** 113; **310:** 111; **324:** 112; **331:** 112.
- γ 36:** 205; **70:** 203; **71–74:** 96; **130–83:** 81; **134:** 24; **245:** 154; **264:** 14, 16; **290:** 114; **315:** 111; **373:** 121.
- δ 17:** 203; **44:** 121; **47:** 25, 203; **85–89:** 158, 162; **102:** 203; **160:** 203; **179:** 203; **194:** 203; **239:** 203; **295:** 203; **321:** 115; **351–586:** 81; **372:** 203; **499–511:** 14; **503:** 111; **512–37:** 14; **559:** 142, 143; **563–68:** 158, 162; **569:** 158; **594–99:** 18; **598:** 203; **626:** 203; **630:** 205; **655:** 121; **741:** 112; **766:** 112; **769:** 112; **774:** 111; **790:** 111.
- ε 3–42:** 42; **4:** 153; **16:** 142, 143; **34–42:** 156; **47–48:** 14; **63–74:** 81; **74:** 203; **82–84:** 12; **141:** 142, 143; **199:** 198; **201:** 203; **227:** 203; **234–36:** 118; **278–81:** 20; **288–89:** 156; **345:** 156; **386–87:** 156; **396:** 12.
- ζ 2–10:** 5, 156, 157; **5:** 111, 122; **8:** 158; **41–46:** 162; **46:** 203; **49:** 121; **87:** 81; **99:** 203; **104:** 203; **119–21:** 114, 165; **204–05:** 158; **262–72:** 5; **274:** 111, 159; **279:** 205; **306:** 121; **330–31:** 141; **331:** 112.
- η 36:** 5; **43:** 121; **45:** 121; **53–68:** 157; **103–32:** 81; **112–32:** 160; **145:** 121; **153–55:** 20; **188–96:** 142; **199–206:** 157; **205:** 205; **205–06:** 156–59, 156; **206:** 111, 114; **247:** 198; **248–53:** 142, 143; **317–28:** 142; **325–26:** 5.
- θ 30–36:** 142; **43:** 201; **45:** 203; **47:** 201; **50–56:** 142; **62:** 201, 205; **73:** 30, 201; **73–82:** 9, 32; **74:** 30; **83:** 201; **83–92:** 10; **87:** 201; **90–91:** 73; **91:** 16, 26, 203; **93–96:** 11, 35; **108:** 121; **111–19:** 5; **131:** 203; **171:** 203; **204–13:** 5; **222:**

113; 261: 205; 265: 121; 266–366: 26, 51; 292: 203; 304: 114; 366: 121; 367: 201; 367–69: 16, 26; 368: 203; 429: 203; 459: 121; 471: 201, 205; 472: 202; 483: 202; 487–98: 9–11; 489–91: 24, 30; 491: 10; 492–95: 73; 499–520: 32; 509: 16; 517–19: 23; 521: 201; 521–30: 12, 23, 31; 522: 12; 532–35: 11, 35; 536–45: 11; 538: 13, 26; 539: 201; 542: 203; 542–43: 13, 17; 556–63: 5; 572–76: 114, 136; 572–86: 19; 577–86: 10; 578: 24.

ι 1: 128; 4: 201; 20: 30; 21–28: 81; 34–36: 18; 37: 27; 39–40: 135, 136; 39–66: 158; 40: 139, 143; 40–45: 131–34; 45: 135; 60–61: 103, 143; 89: 113; 92: 165; 98–99: 134; 105–566 (Κυκλώπεια): 6, 101, 171, Chapter 4 *passim*; 106: 111, 131; 106–15: 159–65, 166; 106–49: 131; 107: 126; 107–41: 81; 114–15: 116; 117: 111; 119: 114; 124: 94; 125: 111; 125–26: 5, 116; 153: 121, 131; 159: 103; 161–65: 131; 165: 139; 166: 111; 166–67: 150; 172–76: 104, 136; 174: 150; 174–76: 114, 165; 182–86: 122, 150; 187: 113, 122; 187–92: 120, 131; 189: 131, 163, 164; 190: 122; 191: 113; 191–92: 121; 195–211: 131; 196–2011: 135–36; 211: 131; 213–15: 130, 133, 136; 215: 114, 122, 164; 216–18: 137, 139; 218–23: 169; 219–22: 149; 224–29: 104, 138; 228: 132–33; 228–29: 126, 147; 228–30: 99, 126, 132, 150; 231–33: 137, 139; 238–39: 149; 240–43: 122, 149; 244: 94; 244–49: 169; 251: 149; 252–55: 96; 257: 43, 114, 122, 123; 259–71: 140; 268: 133; 273: 125; 273–80: 167–68; 275: 111; 275–76: 137, 145, 167; 278: 148; 281: 127, 141; 281–82: 125; 288–93: 103, 121–22, 123; 288–98: 148; 294: 145; 296: 111, 122; 297: 118; 299–305: 140, 148; 307–09: 169; 311: 103; 313–14: 122, 149; 316: 111; 317: 144; 319: 111; 319–24: 122; 333: 123; 337–39: 149; 338–39: 149; 340–42: 169; 341: 94; 344: 103; 345: 111; 347: 111; 355–70: 127, 146; 357: 111; 360: 129; 362: 111; 363: 127; 364: 111; 366–67: 127, 128; 369–70: 140; 378–94: 147–48; 391–96:

93–94; 395: 123; 399: 111; 403: 111, 128; 405–406: 128; 407: 111; 408: 128, 167; 410–12: 128, 168; 412: 157; 415: 111; 417–19: 126, 127; 423: 205; 425: 126; 428: 111, 113, 114, 163, 164; 438–43: 126; 440–41: 129; 446: 111; 447–60: 4, 108, 119, 124, 128; 454: 129; 455: 129; 456–60: 123, 168; 460: 129; 469–70: 138; 474: 111; 475: 111; 475–79: 140, 144; 481: 122; 491–500: 134; 492: 111; 494: 114, 122; 496: 196; 502: 111; 502–05: 128, 136; 506–16: 145; 510: 111; 515: 146; 516: 129; 517–19: 127, 145; 517–25: 138; 519: 157; 523–25: 144–46; 527: 145; 528–35: 103, 141, 142, 157; 534: 103, 141, 142; 536: 142; 537: 122; 548: 111; 551–53: 139; 553: 139.

κ 8–12: 81; 19–55: 134; 44–45: 132; 60–61: 139; 72–75: 103; 81–120: 123; 81–86: 162; 82–90: 81; 101: 113; 116: 143; 157–86: 114; 181: 25, 203; 200: 111, 113; 205: 141; 208: 103, 143; 230–32: 141; 236: 15; 290–91: 15; 291: 20; 293–95: 15; 318: 20; 318–29: 15; 326: 20, 121; 329: 20; 388–96: 15; 431–37: 99, 141; 435: 111; 447–48: 141; 467–75: 18; 562–65: 44; 567: 44.

λ 14–19: 81; 24–50: 139; 100–17: 141, 142; 116: 111; 187–203: 141; 212: 203; 287: 121; 328–32: 19; 330–31: 21; 333–34: 20–21, 26, 35, 40, 49, 97; 336–41: 21; 350–51: 21; 356–61: 30; 363–69: 88, 98; 368–69: 19, 21; 370–72: 73; 405–34: 80, 82; 422: 136; 485: 118; 517: 19; 548–51: 10; 572: 114; 593–600: 44, 93; 594: 114; 603: 203; 634: 114.

μ 39–54: 15, 17; 40: 14; 44: 14; 52: 203; 85–87: 114, 123; 119: 114; 137–41: 142; 159: 16; 183: 205; 188: 203; 189–91: 10; 192–94: 15, 35; 209: 111; 209–12: 140; 223–25: 16; 223–59: 123; 260–402: 134; 343–65: 139; 344: 139; 354: 205; 379: 115; 447–53: 57; 450–53: 20.

ν 1–2: 20–21, 26, 35, 40, 49; 4–15: 21; 27: 201, 203; 28: 202; 61: 203; 96–112:

81; 108: 121; 126: 112; 157: 121; 160–64: 156; 200–02: 114, 165; 254–86: 88; 297–99: 129, 156; 299–351: 146; 341–43: 118, 141; 355: 145; 373: 111; 384: 24; 429: 15.

ξ 27: 111; 40: 112; 50: 114; 55: 60; 56–58: 133; 92: 115; 95: 115; 142–47: 26; 156–57: 88; 165: 60; 192–359: 69; 228: 203; 244: 203; 257–84: 132; 292–309: 26; 316–33: 25; 334–59: 26; 360: 60; 361–68: 10, 25–26, 69; 387: 14; 442: 60; 443: 203; 459: 127; 507: 60; 523: 25.

ο 9: 205; 12: 111; 27: 35; 90: 112; 161: 114; 163: 205; 186–88: 25; 212: 116; 301–02: 25; 304–20: 127; 315: 111; 318: 35; 325: 60; 334: 45; 376: 111; 391: 35, 203; 393: 203; 398–401: 24; 399: 203; 400: 203; 400–01: 26; 403–11: 158, 162; 403–84: 26.

π 17–19: 12; 26: 203; 41: 12; 60: 60; 135: 60; 156: 12; 172: 15; 190–91: 12; 192–200: 29; 203: 121; 252: 201; 259: 35; 271: 111; 298: 14; 315: 115; 393–94: 20; 410: 115; 456: 15; 464: 60.

ρ 71: 205; 153: 35; 168: 203; 174: 203; 239: 145; 251–53: 145; 272: 60; 306: 121; 311: 60; 359: 201; 363: 112, 163; 380: 60; 385: 203; 406: 113; 419–44: 3, 132; 482: 112; 512: 60; 513–21: 16, 21, 25; 514: 14; 521: 14; 522–27: 25; 579: 60; 581: 112; 606: 203.

σ 129: 35; 141: 163; 167: 111; 191: 121; 212–13: 14; 267–70: 141; 267–80: 104; 282: 16; 304–06: 29; 305–06: 203; 315: 203; 411: 121.

τ 36: 121; 136: 12; 165–202: 3, 25; 204–08: 12; 209–12: 12; 213: 25, 203; 215: 127; 229: 121; 251: 25, 203; 262–307: 3, 25; 268: 35; 279: 157; 456: 112; 467–75: 29; 513: 25, 203; 590: 203.

υ 12: 111; 18–21: 140; 19: 111, 113; 92: 35; 97: 145; 262–307: 25; 269: 121; 287: 163; 291: 111; 320–21: 20; 369: 112; 375: 112; 394: 139.

φ 15: 45; 57: 203; 105: 203; 221–25: 29; 254: 112; 289: 111, 163; 361: 112; 401: 112.

χ 12–15: 60; 192: 45; 194: 60; 291: 112; 330: 201; 345: 201; 347: 9; 350–53: 88; 376: 202.

ψ 1–9: 44–45; 7: 141; 11–24: 29; 31: 112; 32–38: 29; 114: 127; 133: 201; 143: 201; 144–45: 17; 181: 127; 190–204: 118; 212: 203; 231–32: 12; 241–46: 17; 248–49: 193; 255: 203; 300: 203; 300–43: 17; 301: 203; 308: 203; 310–43: 140; 312: 111; 346: 203; 356: 111.

ω 3–4: 14; 19–34: 80; 95–97: 80; 121–90: 82; 214–18: 127; 232–40: 127; 234: 12; 265: 35; 318–48: 12; 370: 121; 439: 201; 446: 205; 456: 132.

Horace: *Ars Poetica* 359: 198.

Johannes de Alta Silva: *Dolopathos*: 117, 124, 138.

Longin.: *Sub.* 26: 60.

Ovid: *Met.* I 715–17: 14; XIII 898–XIV 74: 43.

Paus.: *Graeciae Descriptio* 2.22.4: 158.

Pi.: *O.* 1 36: 158.

Pl.: *Ion* 535b–c: 9; 535b–e: 25, 37; 535e–536a: 43; *R.* 377d–78e: 3; 393d–94a: 199; 605c 10–d 5: 25, 39.

Plautus: *Amphitruo* 50–63: 80.

Porph.: *ad Od.* θ 564: 142.

Proclus: *Chrestomathia*: 136.

Suda Lexicon: 104.

Σ: *Hes. Th.* 139: 116; 898: 116; *Homer* B 103: 14; H 274–75: 195; α 070: 112; η 205: 157; θ 075: 30; θ 077: 30; ι 106: 155, 164–66; ι 107: 155, 158, 166; ι 403: 128; λ 333: 21; ν 002: 21; Pl. *Hipparch.* 229d 7: 104.

